

THE WORKING OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDER AURANGZEB

(ABSTRACT)

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

HISTORY

By

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Under the Supervision of

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
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Aligarh

1977



A b s t r a c t

The reign of Aurangzeb constitutes an important and eventful period of the Indian history. It does not only form a line of demarcation between the medieval age and the modern era, it also marks the end of the glory and might of the Mughal rule. There are many works on the reign of Aurangzeb representing different points of views. While some represent him as the champion of Islam, others describe him as an orthodox ruler who changed the secular character of the Mughal government. But no attempt has so far been made to study in detail, on the basis of the vast and varied material that is available, the working of the government under Aurangzeb and effect of his policy and attitude on it. The gap becomes all the more baffling as both Parmatma Saran and Ibn Hasan ended their studies of the provincial and the central government of the Mughals at the close of Shah Jahan's reign. It was to fill up this important gap that we chose the subject of our study. The study is a humble attempt to construct a picture of the working of the central government under Aurangzeb and to assess the impact of his so-called religious measures on the day to day functioning of the government at the centre.

The study has been divided into six Chapters besides an Introduction and the Conclusion. The Introduction contains a brief description of the nature of the sources that form the basis of this study

and a mention of the conditions that existed on the eve of Aurangzeb's accession.

In the First Chapter we have discussed the powers and functions of the King as exercised by him and reflected in his various acts and measures, and not as proclaimed by Aurangzeb and attributed by his admirers. We have also discussed the political and administrative significance of some important royal prerogatives and the court procedure for a better understanding of Emperor's role in administration.

The Second Chapter deals with the powers and functions of the Wazir who was the highest official in the state and headed the most important department of the central government. We have also tried to determine the extent of his influence in general administration, imposition and remission of taxes and in other matters. The position and powers of his colleagues and the procedure of the work in the department have also been discussed.

The Mir Bakhshi who comes next to the Wazir in the hierarchy of the central government, and headed a department that was the mainstay of the Mughal administrative set up, is the subject matter of the Third Chapter. The internal structure of the department and the position and powers of his junior colleagues have also been described.

The Fourth Chapter deals with the Mir Saman who looked after the

state's stores, workshops, buildings, groves and, above all, the sub-treasuries, and controlled the state expenses. We have also attempted to explain the procedure of the transfer of cash from the main treasury to the sub-treasuries, of the payment of wages to different categories of staff under him and of sales and purchases made by the government.

The Fifth Chapter is related to the Mir Atish, the head of the imperial artillery and his department that acquired special significance during the second half of Aurangzeb's reign because of his restless fort-capturing campaigns in the rocky region of the Deccan.

The last Chapter is devoted to the Sadr-us sudur who headed the department that dealt with the grant of charity, madad-i maash and the appointment of sadrs, qazis, muhtasibs and hosts of other religious functionaries - the department that ironically turned out to be the smallest, and perhaps the most corrupt of all the central departments of Aurangzeb as far as the character and working of its staff were concerned.

At the end we have given our conclusions about the nature and character of the government of Aurangzeb and its actual state of functioning. The study furnishes a detailed account of the central government under Aurangzeb, would fill up the long-felt lacuna in the study of Mughal period, give an idea about the character and spirit of the government under Aurangzeb and would provide an explanation to the subsequent developments under Aurangzeb's successors.

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This is to certify that the thesis entitled "The Working of the Central Government under Aurangzeb" submitted by Mr. S.N. Raza Naqvi, is the candidate's own work and has been written under my supervision. I recommend that it may be forwarded to the examiners.

Sd/- S. Nurul Hasan
3 May 1977

TRUE COPY

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Preface

The reign of Aurangzeb that was spread over half a century (1658-1707), was perhaps the most crucial and eventful period of the Mughal rule in India, and indeed of the Indian history. But while J.N. Sarkar and others wrote on the history of his reign, no similar study was made of his government and administration as being affected by his attitude and policies which in turn affected the course of events in his own reign and subsequently. Even Ibn Hasan refrained from entering into the subject. It was with this view that the present study of the 'Working of the Central Government under Aurangzeb' was taken up. The work, it is hoped, would fill up the long felt lacuna in the study of the Mughal period.

Words fail me to express my deep sense of gratitude to my teacher and Supervisor, Professor S. Nurul Hasan, who created my interest in Medieval Indian History, impressed upon me the importance of the topic, and during the drafting, was kind enough to give me time and attention in spite of his preoccupations as the Union Minister for Education, Culture and Social Welfare. It was indeed a privilege and a pleasure to work under his stimulating guidance.

I also express my grateful thanks to Professor Irfan Habib, Head of the Department of History, A.M.U., of whom I have the privilege

to count myself a pupil, for clarifying many points I discussed with him, lending me some valuable documents in his possession, and helping me in other ways in completing my work. I also offer my thanks to my colleagues in the Department who were always a source of inspiration for me and assisted me in different ways to complete the work.

I acknowledge with thanks my indebtedness to the authorities and staff of the Asafiyah Library (Hyderabad), the Maulana Azad Library (Aligarh), the National Archives (New Delhi), the National Library (Calcutta), the Research Library, Department of History, A.M.U. (Aligarh), and the State Archives (Hyderabad) for permitting me to use their collections.

I am also grateful to Mr Zaidi for his cooperation in neatly and accurately typing the thesis.

Contents

Abbreviations

The abbreviations in brackets are those used in Tables.

Adab.	_Adab-i Alamgiri_
Add. 6598	_Halat-i Mamalik-i Mahrusa-i Alamgiri_
Ahkam	_Ahkam-i Alamgiri_
Akhbarat (Akh.)	_Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mualla_
Ain.	_Ain-i Akbari_
Arkan-i Timuriyah (AT)	_Tarikh-i Arkan u Muasir-i Timuriyah_
Badauni	_Muntakhab-al Tawarikh_
Blochmann	_Ain-i Akbari_, English Translation by H. Blochmann
Dastur	_Dastur-al Amal-i Shah Jahani_. Add. 6588, ff.15b-63a.
Dastur-i Agahi	_Dastur-al Amal-i Agahi_.
Dastur-al Amal	_Dastur-al Amal-i Alamgiri_. Add. 6599, ff.1a-132a.
Futuhat (F.A.)	_Futuhat-i Alamgiri_
Hatim Khan (A.N.)	_Alamgirnamah_
Ilm-i Nawisindagi	_Dastur-al Amal-i Ilm-i Nawisindagi_. Add. 6599, ff.133b-185a.
Inayat Collection	Documents of Inayat Jang Collection, National Archives, New Delhi.

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Kalimat	_Kalimat-i Taiyibat_
Kazim (A.N.)	_Alamgirnamah_
Khafi Khan (K.K.)	_Muntakhab-al Lubab_
Lahori	_Padshahnamah_
(M.A.)	_Maasir-i Alamgiri_
Maasir (M.U.)	_Maasir-al Umara_
Maktubat	_Maktubat-i Imam-i Rabbani_
Mamuri	_Tarikh-i Aurangzeb_
Muhammadi (T.M.)	_Tarikh-i Muhammadi_
Qazwini	_Padshahnamah_
Raqaim	_Raqaim-i Karaim_
Razi	_Waqiat-i Alamgiri_
Ruqaat	_Ruqaat-i Alamgiri_
Ruqaat-i Alamgiri	_Ruqaat-i Alamgiri_, Ed. by S. Najib Ashraf Nadwi
Sadiq Khan	_Tarikh-i Shah Jahani_
Salatin-i Chaghta (S.C.)	_Tazkirat-as Salatin-i Chaghta_
Salih	_Amal-i Salih_
(TU)	_Tazkirat-al Umara_
Zakhirat	_Zakhirat-al Khawanin_
(ZA)	_Zawabit-i Alamgiri_

INTRODUCTION

The Mughal rulers established one of the largest and the most stable state in India. This they were able to accomplish through their far-sighted policies and an administrative system which was fairly efficient. Without breaking away completely either from the Turko-Mongol and the earlier Indo-Islamic traditions, they built up an administrative structure which was, in many respects, unique in design as well as functioning. It was strong and effective, and gave to the empire durability as well as stability. It was capable of implementing their liberal and benevolent though despotic policies of fulfilling the aspirations of a large ruling class by providing it suitable outlets and opportunities and, at the same time, giving to the common people a reasonably good government in accordance with the standards of the day. For a proper understanding of the Mughal rule, its success and prosperity, therefore, the study of the Mughal administration is inevitable. It is equally necessary for explaining the weaknesses that were inherent in the system which led inevitably to its decline.

A number of interesting modern works are available on the various Mughal insititutions and on the Mughal administrative structure. Without underestimating the value of these pioneering studies, however, it may be submitted that these are mainly based on the Ain-i Akbari and some administrative manuals (dastur-al amals) of later dates. Some of these studies

present what is essentially the theoretical position, without always resolving the internal contradictions contained in such sources. For, while the _Ain-i Akbari_ describes the administrative set up as it existed under Akbar in its formative stage, the _dastur-al amals_ and latter chronicles mention it as it crystallised and developed under his successors. The details in the two categories of sources, therefore, differ on many important points; and the juxtaposition of the two presents a confused picture. It was, perhaps, because of these considerations that Ibn Hasan preferred to bring to an end his _Central Structure of the Mughal Empire_ at the close of Shah Jahan's reign. The modern studies of the central administration under Aurangzeb, therefore, are few and depict by and large the theoretical position. Aurangzeb's reign was an eventful period of Mughal history, and crucial for understanding the decline which became apparent within a few decades. It need hardly be pointed out that the disintegration of the Mughal empire affected drastically India's history. This lacuna becomes all the more regrettable because of a general assumption that Aurangzeb introduced, as a result of his education, temperament and the circumstances of his accession, some significant changes in his policies and administration which hastened the fall of the Mughal empire.

It was to fill up this long and crucial gap in the study of the central administration of the Mughals and to examine the above assumption that we chose our subject, 'The Working of the Central Government under

Aurangzeb'. Though starting from the point where Ibn Hasan ended his study of the central structure of the Mughals, we have, however, not been content only with discussing the powers and functions of the central ministers; we have also tried to study the position and powers of their colleagues in the department, the inner working of their respective departments and the extent of their control over their counterparts in the provinces.

The work has been divided into six chapters, besides an Introduction and a Conclusion. The first chapter deals with the position of the King and examines his powers, not on the basis of his claims and protestations, but as Aurangzeb exercised them in day to day administration. We have also tried to examine as to how far Aurangzeb's claim for 'reviving the glory of Islam' affected his own position and powers, his administrative policies and the functioning of the central departments.

The next five chapters deal with the functioning of the five central ministers, namely the Wazir-i Azam, the Mir Bakhshi, the Mir Saman, the Mir Atish and the Sadr-us Sudur, including the changes in their position and the fluctuations in their fortunes. The last chapter includes the summary of conclusions, especially the impact of the developments on society and administration generally.

Tables have also been appended at the end of each chapter, showing the rank and status of each of the central ministers, his junior colleagues,

their race and group and the dates of their appointments and transfers. These Tables will help in having a precise and clear idea about the comparative ranks and positions of the central ministers themselves and their colleagues, the reason of their vacating the post, their average tenure, and the extent of representation of the social groups in the central administrative set up under Aurangzeb.

Our study being mainly confined to the principal central ministries under Aurangzeb, exercising jurisdiction over their counterparts in the provinces, we have not discussed the position of those officials who did not form a part of any central department, whatever might have been their position and function in the Mughal Court. Thus we have not discussed the *Mir Tuzuk*, the *Mir Bahr*, the *Mir Shikar* and a host of officials who neither headed a central department, nor functioned as a part of it, although they otherwise performed some important jobs and held high positions among the Mughal officials. For the same reason we have avoided a discussion on the functions of provincial and local *qazis*, although the importance of the *qazi* was undeniable under the Mughals. In spite of some studies, it has not yet become clear as to what was his position as a judicial official, the kind of cases he decided as distinguished from those heard by the *diwans* and the *faujdars*, and what was his position in administration and society.

While discussing the working of the central ministers and their departments, we have also departed from the usual method of reproducing

their functioning as described by the *Ain-i Akbari* or some *dastur-al amals*. For understanding the actual function of officials we also collected information from the *Akhbarat* (the Court diaries), the *Waqai* (the news-reports), the chronicles and the epistolary collections as to the kind of jobs and duties assigned to them which related to their own departments; and then tried as far as possible, to collate it with the available documents of the reign. Our study is, therefore, based on a variety of original and contemporary sources.

It was, of course, necessary to study the Akbari, Jahangiri and Shah Jahani sources to understand the structure and functioning of Mughal administrative system as established by Akbar, and its growth and development under Jahangir and Shah Jahan. But as the subject is confined to the reign of Aurangzeb, the work is mainly based on a detailed study of those Alamgiri sources which could become available to us.

As Aurangzeb forbade the compilation of the official history of his reign in his 10th R.Y. (February 1667 - February 1668), we lack a complete and comprehensive official version of his reign which could give us an integrated and total picture of the reign, as is available for the reigns of Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Luckily, however, the reign of Aurangzeb is very rich in original sources of other nature. These sources include, besides the Persian chronicles and the biographical dictionaries of the Mughal nobles, the *Akhbarat*, the *Waqai*, the *dastur-al amals*, the collections

of letters, original documents or their copies, the foreign travellers' accounts and the English factory records.

Among these sources the *Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mualla* (the diary of the Court) of Aurangzeb are extremely rich and important for the study of his reign. Fortunately many volumes of these *Akhbarat* or their copies (*naql*) have been preserved.[1] As they were the records of almost all daily orders and instructions of Aurangzeb in the Court, there can be no more detailed and authentic source material for the study of his reign. It were the *Akhbarat* that formed the basis of detailed official histories. Apart from their general value, the *Akhbarat* have been proved to be extremely useful for our subject as they contain the exact orders of the Emperor to the officials of various categories and departments, which help us in determining the functions and duties of these officials. They also sometimes refer to many small officials and their appointments, transfers, *mansabs* and promotions, the details necessary for understanding the position and functions of subordinate staff of a department, but generally missing from the chronicles and other sources.

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1. The *Akhbarat* are available in original or in transcript at the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, the National Library, Calcutta, the Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, and at the Library of Maharajkumar Raghubir Singh of Sitamau. The Research Library, Department of History, A.M.U., has got the microfilms of the *Akhbarat* from the Royal Asiatic Society. Though the *Akhbarat* for the entire reign are not available, those dealing with the whole or part of the regnal years 8th - 15th, 17th, 20th - 22nd, 36th - 40th, 42nd - 49th are available.

The Waqai (news-reports) may also be included in the above category of sources as regards their originality and detail. These news-reports were sent to the Court by the local waqai-nigars (the news-writers) from the provincial and sarkar (district) headquarters, cities, towns, forts and from the armies sent on expeditions, mentioning whatever happened in their respective jurisdictions, and especially the functioning and conduct of the local officials. Among such Waqai some are preserved in the State Archives of Jaipur and Hyderabad, and a selection from them has also been published by the latter. But the Waqai-i Subah-i Ajmer,[1] is by far an extremely interesting and valuable collection. It covers the Mughal military campaigns in Rajasthan during 1678-80. But it does not only contain details about the military activities, but also possesses rare and valuable information about the functioning of many local officials of the region and the nature of the control of the central authorities over them.

Equally important are the original documents of the reign, namely the farmans, parwanas (the official's orders to subordinates), the yaddashts (the memorandum of a grant of mansab, promotion, jagir or appointment), the sanads (the letter of grant or appointment etc.), the dastaks (official permits) the chehra (descriptive roll) and the tashiha (verification

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1. This is a collection in book-form of the news-report sent by the local bakhshi-cum-waqai-nigar to the Court, and is preserved in the Asafiyah Library, Hyderabad. The Research Library, Department of History, A.M.U., has got transcript copy of it.

certificate) etc., that are available.[1] The value of these documents for the study of the period, and especially for the study of the actual working of the Mughal administrative system can hardly be exaggerated. They lay bare the procedure followed in processing the papers andthe documents and the role of various officials in the matter. The documents therefore have proved very useful for our subject. We have not been able to see the rich records preserved in the Rajasthan State Archives mainly because those studied by some modern scholars have indicated that information in these records is far more detailed on provincial and local administration than on the functioning of the central ministers.[2]

Among the chronicles the Alamgirnamah of Munshi Muhammad Kasim, naturally comes the first. It is the official history of Aurangzeb's reign and gives a comprehensive and connected account of first ten formative years of his reign (1658-1668), where it comes to an end as Aurangzeb forbade the

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1. Perhaps the largest collection of such documents is preserved in the State Archives, Hyderabad, where they are in tens of thousands, though bulk of them are the chihra and tashiha documents of the soldiers and the horses. The other huge collection, known as the Inayat Jang Collection is at the National Archives, New Delhi. But most of these documents are the revenue records related to the Deccan province and belonged to the 18th century. The Research Library, Department of History, A.M.U., has also acquired a good number of documents from the old families of Bilgram, Amroha, Sambhal and Shamsabad etc. Most of them are related to the madad maash grants, appointment of the qazis and the sale-deeds etc.

2. The studies based on Rajasthan State records published by Professor S. Nurul Hasan and Satish Chandra, and Doctors Raghubir Singh, S.P.Gupta, Dilbagh Singh, S.M. Sharma and others have given such an impression to the author.

further continuation of the work for reasons not yet convincingly explained. The deficiency is, however, made out to great extent by Maasir-i Alamgiri, Nuskha-i Dilkusha, Muntakhab-al Lubab and by some other contemporary and semi-contemporary works.

The Maasir-i Alamgiri (a chronogram - 1122 A.H./1710-11 A.D.) was compiled a few years after Aurangzeb's death, by Saqi Mustaid Khan, who had held various posts under Aurangzeb, and was, as such, closely associated with the Court and administration. Moreover, it is based, as its author states, mainly 'on the news-letters and the original papers of the Court'. It is, therefore, perhaps the most valuable of all the chronicles for the study of the reign of Aurangzeb; and more so for the study of his nobles, officials and administration, because it is like a state gazetteer mentioning the mansab, appointment, promotion and the transfer of nobles and officials with many of whom we are concerned.

Another chronicle of almost the same date and value is Nuskha-i Dilkusha of Bhim Sen who compiled it in 1120 A.H./1708-09. Born at Burhanpur about 1648-49, Bhim Sen lived for almost the whole of his life in the Deccan, first with his father Raghunandan Das who was the Mushrif of the Topkhana (artillery) of the Deccan; and later, after the resignation of his father in 1670 because of his old age, he himself joined the Mughal service there as the Mushrif of Dagh-o Tashiha in 1672. Since then he was a witness to most of the events in the Deccan. The work, based mainly on the personal

recollections of the author while he was spending a retired life at Gwalior and, therefore, inaccurate in some dates and events, is primarily an account of Mughal military campaigns in the Deccan from Aurangzeb's march towards Agra in 1658 to the defeat of Prince Kambakhsh in 1709. It furnishes us with valuable details about Aurangzeb's Deccan-Maratha policy and campaigns, and its impact on various wings of administration. Moreover, the author as a shrewd observer and objective assesser of the developments that were taking place in those fateful days of Aurangzeb's reign, has tried to explain many a political, military, financial and administrative problems of the period. And herein lies the main value of the work.

Still another important chronicle is Muntakhab-al Lubab of Muhammad Hashim Khafi Khan. Although this is a general history of India from Muslim conquest to the 14th R.Y. of Muhammad Shah's reign (i.e. till 1731), and was compiled much after the death of Aurangzeb, it has great value for the study of our period and subject. Compiled by a person who served under Aurangzeb for many years, and based, according to his own statement, 'on official records, the reports of trustworthy persons and his personal experience', it compensates to considerable extent the lack of a detailed and continuous account of Aurangzeb's reign. Moreover, the author, as an independent and objective writer, provides with valuable information about Aurangzeb's policies towards various state matters, about the composition of his nobility in the latter part of his reign, the problems of mansabdars

and the crisis of the *jagirdars*. His comments about the functioning and character of some high officials and Aurangzeb's attitude towards them are of especial significance for us.

Another mid-18th century source has also proved extremely useful for our subject. This is *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, a history of the Mughal province of Gujarat from the earliest times to 1761, when it was completed. Its author Ali Muhammad Khan, born about 1700 A.D., was the son of a small Mughal official of Ahmadabad. But he himself attained high *mansabs* and became the *Diwan* of Gujarat in 1746. Compiled by a *Diwan* of Gujarat, and a person having practical experience of the Mughal administrative system, this work contains invaluable details for our project of study. The great value of this work for us lies in the fact that in his main narrative the author has reproduced the texts of many important, rather rare *farmans*, *yaddashts*, *hasb-al hukms* and *parwanas* of the reign of Aurangzeb, and has also mentioned innumerable orders, instructions and guidelines sent by the central ministers to their counterparts in the *suba* of Gujarat. Moreover, in the *Khatimah* (the Supplement) which may be treated its third Volume, he has described, besides the peoples and tribes, saints and Saiyids, the temples and shrines and rivers and mountains of Gujarat, its *sarkars* and *parganas*, *thanas* and forts, towns and *mahallas*, various provincial and local officials, their number and strength, their *mansab* and salary, the manner of their appointment and payment of salary, and in some cases, the extent of

Centre's control over them. It thus possesses valuable details for any study of Mughal history and institutions.

Another category of important source-material is the administrative manuals, commonly known as the *dastur-al amals*. There are many such *dastur-al amals*, most of whom were compiled during the reign of Aurangzeb by persons having personal experience or first-hand information of the subject. Among them *Dastur-al amal-i Alamgiri* (post-1667), *Farhang-i Kardani* (1679), *Zawabit-i Alamgiri* (post-1691), *Siyaqnamah* (1694-96), *Khulasat-al Siyaq* (1115 A.H./1703-04 A.D.), and *Hidayat-al Qawaid* (1126 A.H./1714-15 A.D.) are very important. These *dastur-al amals* contain detailed account of the Mughal provinces, *sarkars*, *parganas* and *mahals* and their assessed revenue, state's stores and workshops (*karkhanas*), treasuries and sub-treasuries (*khazain*), the heads of collection and expenditure, regulations of payments of and deductions from the allowances of *mansabdars*, the main central departments, their staff and its duties, specimen of various official papers and documents and hosts of other matters. They are thus invaluable treasures of vast and varied details of the Mughal government and administration; and, therefore, one of the most important source for any study of the period, and more so for the study and understanding of their administrative system.

Still another class of our sources are the biographical dictionaries of the Mughal nobles like the *Zakhirat-al Khawanin*, *Maasir-al Umara*, *Tazkirat-al Umara* and the *Tarikh-i Muhammadi* of Mirza Rustam. Among

them the *Maasir-al Umara* is most comprehensive and valuable as it describes the life and the career of Mughal nobles in detail, covering his whole career from birth to death, mentioning various positions and *mansabs* held by him with anecdotes, if any, about his character, working and influence over and closeness to his contemporary sovereign. It thus gives us detailed information about the whole life of Mughal nobles and officials in a condense manner, and has helped us in knowing the rank, the offices, the power and influence held by the central ministers and their colleagues, and in preparing our Tables.

Next come the collections of letters and documents which are found in large number. Important among them are *Adab-i Alamgiri*, *Ahkam-i Alamgiri*, *Kalimat-i Tayyibat* and *Raqaim-i Karaim*. *Adab-i Alamgiri* contains besides other letters and a narrative of the war of succession among the sons of Shah Jahan, about 700 letters of Aurangzeb sent before and after his accession to Shah Jahan, and to some princess and nobles, covering the period from 1649 to 1659. The letters were collected by the then *Munshi* (the writer) of Aurangzeb, Abul Fath Qabil Khan; but were edited later in 1703, by Muhammad Sadiq of Ambala, once the *Munshi* of Prince Akbar. *Kalimat-i Tayyibat* and *Ahkam-i Alamgiri* were edited in about 1710 by another of Aurangzeb's confident servant, Inayatullah Khan of Kashmir, who was his *Diwan-i Khalisa* and *Tan* during the last years of his reign. The two collections contain hundreds of letters, orders and notes of Aurangzeb sent

through Inayatullah Khan to different personalities of the period. These two collections and _Adab-i Alamgiri_ thus cover the beginning and the end of Aurangzeb's reign. _Raqaim-i Karaim_ was edited by another Alamgiri noble, Saiyid Ashraf Khan who had served on various posts under Aurangzeb. But this is only a small collection of his letters, a little over one hundred.

Although most of the letters in above collections are without date and context, and often very brief, their real value lies in the fact that they reveal to us the true and exact feelings of Aurangzeb about various state matters, political questions and administrative problems, referred to in these letters. They also contain his remarks and opinion about the character, capabilities and functioning of his nobles and officials, the facts rarely found in sources of other nature.

Lastly there are the European sources which include the travellers' accounts as well as the despatches of the English factors in India to their masters in England. All of them were, of course, not relevant to our period and subject. But travellers like Jean Baptiste Tavernier (1640-67), Francois Bernier (1656-68), Jean de Thevenot (1666-67), Gemelli Careri (1699) 1695, Niccolao Manucci (1656-1712) and Norris were useful for us. They have discussed apart from other things, the central ministers and their departments, their position and functions. The English factors, interested as they were in expanding their trade and commerce in India, and securing trade concessions and tax remissions, give good information in their

despatches about the role of some nobles and officials and especially the Wazir as the premier official of the state and the head of the Diwani, in securing the above privileges for the Company. Their despatches also refer to some appointments and the changes affected by Aurangzeb in the tax structure from time to time.

The author is conscious of the fact that he has used only those records left by foreign travellers which have been published in English. This is a serious limitation, but it was not possible to use the rest of the material. It may be, however, suggested that even if these records have been studied, the picture would not be modified to any appreciable extent.

The study is thus based on a variety of original and contemporary sources which made it possible for us to go beyond the powers and functions of only the heads of the central departments, and to explain the inner working of the central departments under Aurangzeb. The work, we hope, would fill up the gap in the study of the central administration of the Mughals, help in understanding the internal structure of each of the central department as they existed under Aurangzeb, the work distribution among their officials, and their respective position and standing; and would give an insight into the actual functioning of their departments. Although we cannot claim that the working of the central departments under the immediate predecessors and the successors of Aurangzeb would have been exactly the same,

this work nevertheless takes us closer to that. It would also explain perhaps the greatest puzzle of the Mughal history, viz. how some of the Mughal institutions that were once a source of its strength and the secret of its success and stability, turned into its weaknesses and hastened the collapse of the Mughal rule. The administrative negligence and inefficiency under Aurangzeb was as much the cause of the breaking down of these institutions as their breaking down was the cause of the disintegration of the Mughal empire.

When Aurangzeb came to power in 1658, the structure of the central government that had been established by Akbar, had already taken a definite shape and had been suitably developed and elaborated. The central government as it existed under Shah Jahan, consisted of a Wakil and five ministers who headed the five administrative departments at the Centre.[1]

Like Akbar and Jahangir, Shah Jahan too had a Wakil in the person of Asaf Khan Yamin-al Daula, his father-in-law and the main architect of his succession to the throne on the death of Jahangir.[2] He held the

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1. For detail see Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire.
2. Mirza Abul Hasan Asaf Khan was the son of famous Mirza Ghiyas Beg Itemad-al-Daula, and the brother of Empress Nur Jahan. He served on various high posts under Jahangir, and in his last year (1626) became his Wakil (Tuzuk, p.410; Iqbalnamah, pp.278, 307). As his daughter Arjumand Banu Begum, later known as Mumtaz Mahal, had been married to Shah Jahan, he on the death of Jahangir on 7th November, 1627, made Dawar Bakhsh, Prince Khusrau's son, as the King to secure the throne for his son-in-law who was at that time in Gujarat; and sent a reliable messenger with his signet inviting him to occupy the throne. Later he made the proclamation in the name of Shah Jahan (on 31st January 1628) and executed other princes to ensure his succession. After his formal coronation, Shah Jahan duly rewarded him for his services by the title of Yamin-al Daula, the mansab of 8000/8000 and the post of the Wakil (Lahori, vol. I, pp.114-15, 188; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.151-60).

Wikalat for comparatively a longer period of about fourteen years, from Shah Jahan's formal accession in February, 1628 to his own death in November, 1641.[1] He got the highest rank of 9000/9000 and wielded so much influence over Shah Jahan that perhaps no other Mughal officials would have ever enjoyed with their sovereigns.[2]

Besides the *Wakil*, there was the *Diwan*, who headed the *Diwani*[3] (the central revenue department), and was as such also called the *Diwan-i Kul*[4] and the *Wazir*,[5] but perhaps not as the *Wazir-i Azam* (the Grand *Wazir*) obviously because of the presence of the *Wakil*. After the death of Asaf Khan in 1641, however, the post of the *Wakil* was allowed to lapse, and the *Diwan* or the *Diwan-i Kul* became the premier official of the state whom we henceforth found being mentioned as the *Wazir-i Kul* also.[6] Among the *Wazirs* of Shah Jahan, Sad Ullah Khan was undoubtedly the most distinguished, and like most of his predecessors on the post, held the rank of 7000/7000 at the time of his death.[7] After his death on 17th April, 1656, there was no *Wazir*

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1. *Lahori*, Vol. II, p.257.
2. Cf. *Ibid.*, p.258.
3. Cf. Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, Chapter V.
4. Cf. *Lahori*, Vol. II, p.164.
5. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p.186.
6. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.433.
7. *Ibid.*, p.679; Salih, Vol. III, p.437. For his life and career see *Ibid.*, pp.379-80; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.441-49.

for a while, and Rai Rayan Raghunath, the *Diwan-i Tan* and *Khalisa* was asked to present the *Diwani* papers before Shah Jahan himself for disposal.[1] When Mir Jumla Muazzam Khan, a Qutb Shahi noble who had deserted to the Mughals,[2] arrived at the Court from the Deccan on 22nd July, 1654, he was made the *Wazir-i Kul*.[3] But he was soon sent back to the Deccan (4th January 1657) to assist Prince Aurangzeb in his campaigns, and his son Muhammad Amin Khan

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1. Originally simply Raghunath, was an assistant (*peshdast*) of Sad Ullah Khan the *Wazir*. In April, 1650 he was given the title of Rai, and later made the *Daftardar* (the Keeper, i.e. the *Diwan* vide Infra p.191) of the *Khalisa* and *Tan* sometimes in 1652 and promoted to 1000/200 (1655). After the death of Sad Ullah Khan, when he got the temporary charge of the *Diwani*, Shah Jahan gave him the title of Rai Rayan. On his accession, Aurangzeb promoted him to 2500/500, gave him the title of Raja, and left him in charge of the *Diwani* as he appointed no *Wazir* till his death in June 1663 (*Salih*, Vol. III, pp.109, 217; *Kazim*, pp.395, 829; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.282). For his working under Aurangzeb see Infra pp. 96-100.

2. He was Mir Muhammad Said of Ardistan, a town in Persia, whence he came to the Court of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golconda, who assigned him the administration of his dominions and the title of Mir Jumla. There he acquired great wealth and power; and having apprehension from his master, negotiated with Prince Aurangzeb, then the Viceroy of the Deccan, for service (1656). On request from Aurangzeb, Shah Jahan sent him a *farman*, conferring on him the title of Muazzam Khan and the rank of 5000/5000, and on his son, Mir Muhammad Amin, that of 2000/1000. On arrival at the Court, his rank was increased to 6000/6000. (*Salih*, Vol. III, pp.219-28; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.530-55). He had a distinguished career both under the Qutb Shahis and under the Mughals, and later led the Mughal armies into the north-eastern regions of India in early years of Aurangzeb's reign (for a detailed account of which see Shihab-al Din Talish, *Fathiyah-i Ibriyah*). There is a good monograph on the life and career of Mir Jumla by Jagdish N. Sarkar, *Life of Mir Jumla*

3. *Salih*, Vol. III, p.228.

was asked to officiate on the post till the return of his father.[1]

The other central ministers of Shah Jahan at about this time (i.e. 1657) were Fazil Khan[2] (3000/1000) the *Mir Saman*;[3] Danishmand Khan[4]

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1. *Saleh*, Vol. III, pp.233-34. Mir Muhammad Amin, Amin Khan had come to the Court of Shah Jahan a little behind his father (on 2nd Dec. 1656), was given the title of Khan and his rank was soon raised to 3000/1000. Subsequently, when his father was removed from the *Wizarat* in suspicion of being in league with Aurangzeb, Muhammad Amin Khan too was prevented to officiate his father (Oct. 1657), *Saleh*, Vol. III, p.262). But we soon find him as being appointed the *Mir Bakhshi* (Nov. 1657, *Ibid.*, 263-64); and, therefore, there is some confusion about any one of the above two dates. However, he was also put in confinement for a while on the same suspicion, but was later released. On his accession, Aurangzeb restored him to the rank of 4000/300 and the post of the Mir Bakhshi (1658). Later he was promoted to 5000/5000, made the governor of Lahore (1667) and of Kabul (1670) where he was defeated and arrested by the Afghans, and was therefore, demoted from 6000/5000 to 5000/5000, and transferred (1672) to Gujarat as its governor where he died in 1682. (*Kazim*, pp.111, 119, 1058; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.104, 121; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.613-20). On the death of Jafar Khan the *Wazir*, in 1670, he was summoned to the Court to take up the job, but he just missed it by putting certain conditions. For detail see Infra p. 104.

2. Fazil Khan Mulla Ala-al Mulk Tuni was a Persian who came over to India in 1633-34 during Shah Jahan's reign and attached himself with Asaf Khan the *Wakil*. On the death of Asaf Khan (November, 1641), Shah Jahan gave him the *mansab* of 500/500. But as he was a scholar of mathematics and physical sciences, he distinguished himself by bringing a canal to Lahore (1642), Shah Jahan showed him favours and later made him the Mir Saman (1646) on which post he continued to serve till Aurangzeb made him the *Wazir* in 1663 (*Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.315, 492; *Saleh*, Vol. III, 380-81; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.524-30). See also Infra pp. 100 - 101.

3. *Saleh*, Vol. III, pp.241, 268.

4. Danishmand Khan, Mulla Shafia of Yazd (Iran), came to India as a trader and visited the Imperial camp on its way from Agra to Lahore-Kabul and back (1648-50). When he reached Surat on way back home, Shah Jahan learnt about his qualities and scholarship and sent for him. On arrival at the Court in December 1650, he was given the mansab of 1000/100. In September 1655, he was entitled Danishmand Khan, made the Second *Bakhshi* and raised to 2500/600. In March 1657, he was promoted to 3000/800 and made the *Mir Bakhshi*, but resigned (October 1657) and retired. On his accession, Aurangzeb restored him to 4000/2000 (June 1659), and made a *5-hazari* in 1664. In Feb. 1666 he was appointed the *Nazim* of Dehli, and in 1667 the *Mir Bakhshi*, on which post he died in July 1670 (*Saleh*, Vol. III, pp.115-16, 208, 241, 263-64, 381; *Kazim*, pp.359, 858, 937; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.105; *Maasir*, Vol.II, pp.30-32; *Bernier*, pp.48,100,186,352-53).

(3000/800) the _Mir Bakhshi_;[1] Sarbaland Khan[2] (1500/300) the _Mir Atish_;[3] and Saiyid Hidayat Ullah[4] (2500/200) the _Sadr-as Sudur_.[5] Ibn Hasan does not mention the _Mir Atish_ and his department in the _Central Structure_. But the official and his department did certainly exist under Shah Jahan,[6] as also under Jahangir.[7] Under Akbar he was apparently called the _Darogha-i Topkhana_.[8]

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1. _Salah_, Vol. III, p.241.

2. Sarbaland Khan, Khwaja Rahmat Ullah, was the daughter's son of Mirza Shahrukh, a scion of the ruling family of Badakhshan (for him see _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.329-35), and the sister's son of Najabat Khan Mirza Shuja, a prominent noble of both Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb (for his career see _Ibid._, pp.821-28). In view of his old family connections with the Mughals, Shah Jahan showed him favours, appointed him on various posts. In Feb. 1657 he entitled him Sarbaland Khan and promoted him to 1000/300; and the next year made him the _Darogha-i Topkhana_ and raised him to 1500/300 (_Salah_, Vol. III, pp.237, 268). He continued to hold important positions under Aurangzeb, who promoted him to 2500/1500 (1663, _Kazim_, p.817). Later he appointed him the Second _Bakhshi_ in addition to the governorship of Agra (1672, _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.120). He was under displeasure for a while, but was soon restored and was apparently made the _Mir Bakhshi_ (1676, _Ibid._, pp.150, 157; _Maasir_, Vol. II, pp.477-79). ~~See also Infra p.~~

3. _Salah_, Vol. III, p.268.

4. He was the son of Saiyid Ahmad Qadiri, the _Sadr-as Sudur_ of Jahangir. He was the _Diwan_ of Qandhar under Shah Jahan. But when Saiyid Jalal the _Sadr-as Sudur_ (for him see _Salah_, Vol. III, pp.354-57; _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.447-51) died in June 1647, and Shah Jahan learnt the scholarship of Hidayat Ullah, he summoned him to the Court, appointed him the _Sadr-as Sudur_ and promoted him to 500/20 (_Salah_, Vol. III, pp.2-3). He later rose to the rank of 2500/200, and continued to serve on the post till the 2nd R.Y. of Aurangzeb who then retired him from the post (March 1660, _Kazim_, p.473). He died a little later (_Maasir_, Vol. II, pp.456-57).

5. _Salah_, Vol. III, p.245.

6. Cf. _Lahori_, Vol. II, pp.414, 492; _Salah_, Vol. III, p.212; Add. 6598, f.179; _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.95-96.

7. Cf. _Tuzuk_, p.10.

8. _Ain_ (Blochmann), p.119.

However, this was the structure of the central government of Shah Jahan at about the end of his 30th R.Y. (closing on the 16th March, 1657). But after a few months there was almost a complete break down of the government at the centre because of the illness of Shah Jahan and the subsequent developments that brought to an end his reign itself.

Shah Jahan fell seriously ill on 16th September 1657. The news of his illness and his inability to appear at the Jharokha Darshan for weeks together, caused all kind of wild rumours about him and threw the whole empire into confusion and turmoil. And although he started recovering after about three months,[1] the damage had already been done.

During the illness of Shah Jahan, Prince Dara Shikoh, the heir-apparent, who was at the Court at that time, naturally got the reins of the entire administration in his hands. Taking advantage of his position, he tried to ensure his smooth succession to the throne in the eventuality of Shah Jahan's death. In this anxiety he started removing those officials from the key positions at the Centre whom he suspected of having the sympathy with his brothers, and especially with Aurangzeb, the most dreaded of them. As a result, Muazzam Khan Mir Jumla was removed from the Wizarat and his son Muhammad Amin Khan was forbade to officiate him (c. Muharram, 1068 A.H./ October 1657); Rai Rayan was again instructed to look after the Diwani.[2]

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1. Salih, Vol. III, pp.260-63.

2. Ibid., p.262.

Later, Jafar Khan (5000/5000, 2500 2-3 horse) was made the *Wazir* (c. end Rabi I 1068/beg. January 1658).[1] In the meanwhile, Danishmand Khan *Mir Bakhshi* also resigned from his post (c. 29th Muharram, 1068/6th November 1657), either because of his not so cordial relations with Dara Shikoh or to make room[2] for Muhammad Amin Khan (3000/1500) who was now appointed to the post.[3] But, the latter was removed from this post too for being in league with Aurangzeb; and now Khalil Ullah[4] Khan (5000/5000) was made the *Mir Bakhshi*.[5] At about

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1. Jafar Khan, the son of Sadiq Khan *Mir Bakhshi* (for him see *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.729-31), was closely related to the Mughal ruling family as he was the nephew (sister's son) and the son-in-law of Asaf Khan Yamin-al Daula. He was thus the brother-in-law of Shah Jahan himself, and received his favours from the very beginning and got promotion after promotion. In 1646, when he held the *mansab* of 5000/3000, he was appointed the governor of Panjab; and in May 1647 the *Mir Bakhshi* (*Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.500, 681). In Dec. 1649 he was appointed the governor of Shahjahanabad, and on Feb. 1651 that of Thatta wherefrom he returned in 1657; and shortly afterwards was made the *Wazir* on which post he worked till Shah Jahan was deposed by Aurangzeb in June 1658 (*Salih*, Vol. III, pp.104, 118, 268; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.531-35). For his career under Aurangzeb, see Infra pp. 95, 102-103.

2. Cf. *Bernier*, pp.48, 100.

3. *Salih*, Vol. III, pp.263-64.

4. Khalil Ullah Khan was the son of Mir Miran, a distinguished Saiyid of Yazd (Iran) who came over to the court of Jahangir in 1608 because of the fear of Shah Abbas I of Persia (1588-1629), and was subsequently married to a daughter of Asaf Khan (later Yamin-al Daula). Khalil Ullah Khan and his elder brother Mir Abdul Hadi (later Azalat Khan *Mir Bakhshi*, *Maasir*, Vol. I pp.167-72) however, came later. Khalil Ullah Khan was also married to a daughter's daughter of Asaf Khan and got many important posts under Shah Jahan, like that of *Qur Begi*, *Mir Atish*, the *Mir Bakhshi* (1649), the governorships of different provinces and then again the *Mir Bakhshi* in 1658 (*Lahori*, Vol. II, p.474; *Salih*, Vol. III, p.104). Later he fought with Dara Shikoh against Aurangzeb in the battle of Samugarh (June 1658), but is said to have made secret understanding with Aurangzeb, remained inactive in the battle. After the battle also, while representing Shah Jahan in negotiation with Aurangzeb, he warned the latter against accepting the invitation of the former. On his accession, however, Aurangzeb first sent him in pursuit of Dara, and later made him the governor of Panjab. He died in March 1662 (*Hami*, pp.72-74; *Kazim*, pp.114-15; *Bernier*, pp.52-54; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.775-82). See also Infra p. 223.

5. The removal of Muhammad Amin Khan from, and the appointment of Khalil Ullah Khan to the post of *Mir Bakhshi* is not recorded in *Amal Salih*. But his

contd....

the same time, Sarbaland Khan also seems to have been replaced by Husain Beg Khan (1000/800) at the post of the Mir Atish.

Thus among the five central ministers who were running their respective departments just before the illness of Shah Jahan, only Fazil Khan Mir Saman and Shaikh Hidayat Ullah Sadr-as Sudur were left untouched. The heads of other three departments that were more important from administrative point of view, and had to face the brunt of ensuring crisis, were changed more than once, perhaps because they could play the important role in the possible contest for the throne.

However, besides making the above changes in the central government, Dara Shikoh also took other measures against his brothers and their sympathisers among the nobles and the officials sometimes against the wishes of the Emperor. His brothers showed even greater disrespect to the Crown by defying his orders to stay at their respective seats of government and advancing towards Agra to capture the throne for themselves. The subsequent developments ultimately led to the denigration and the deposition of Emperor Shah Jahan and the accession of Aurangzeb in July 1658. It need not be emphasised that the events since the illness of Shah Jahan till his

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continued (from page 22)........

removal from the post, the confinement on suspicion of being in complicity with Aurangzeb, and the appointment of Khalil Ullah Khan is mentioned in Khafi Khan (Vol. II, p.21) and in Maasir-al Umara (Vol. I, p.78). His appointment as the Mir Bakhshi is also supported by a reference in Alamgirnamah (Kazim, p.95) and by Bernier (p.48) who wrongly states that he succeeded Danishmand Khan.

dethronement seriously affected the government and administration and greatly lowered the dignity of the King.

After coming to the throne, therefore, Aurangzeb had to rehabilitate the position and the prestige of the Crown in the eyes of a hostile public opinion and to reorganise the government with the help of a divided nobility to bring relief to the people who were the greatest sufferers during the disturbances.

CHAPTER I

THE KING

Concept of his Position, Functions and Powers

Aurangzeb's education and training as also the environment in which he was born and brought up, very much affected his notions about the position and functions of the King. He projected himself as a divinely ordained king, elevated to the throne by God to protect His 'faith' and creatures. He introduced certain religious measures and liked to claim that he conformed his rule to the precepts of the Shariat. As a result, the position and powers of the King, as also the nature of the government, was slightly affected. The changes were, however, superficial, and Aurangzeb continued to exercise vast executive, financial, judicial and legislative powers almost unrestricted by the limitations of the holy law and based, as in the case of his predecessors, on considerations of state craft.

The reign of Mughal Emperor Akbar was marked by liberalism, toleration and benevolence. However, the resentment of the orthodox Muslims against the policies of Akbar, as mentioned by Abdul Qadir Badauni[1]

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1. The resentment of Badauni against the liberal policies of Akbar is scattered throughout his book Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh. For a few instances see, Ibid., Vol. II, pp.255-64, 268-69, 270-72, 273-74. For a consolidated account of Badauni's reaction on Akbar's religious views and policies, see Blochmann, Vol. I, pp.177-220.

and Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi,[1] was manifest even before Akbar closed his eyes. Jahangir might or might not have sought the support of the orthodox Muslim sections for his accession to the throne,[2] but it seems that his accession raised the hopes of many of these people.[3] However, he did not come under the influence of the orthodox sections,[4] otherwise he would not have put Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi into prison on the first volume of his letters becoming public in 1618.[5] Nevertheless, it seems that the orthodox sections believed that Jahangir was far more considerate towards their susceptibilities than his father.[6] Shah Jahan was certainly more orthodox than his father. When he occupied the throne, he took some measures that were meant to convey the impression that Islam occupied a position of pre-eminence in

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1. Cf. *Maktubat*, especially, Vol. I, *Maktub* Nos.47, 193, 195. For his views and influence see S. Nurul Hasan, 'Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi and Mughal Politics', *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1945, pp.248-57.

2. For opposite views see Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, pp.67, 409; R.P. Tripathi, *Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire*, p.340; I.H. Qureshi, *Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, pp.149, 159; see also A.J. Qaisar, 'Jahangir's Accession - An Outcome of Orthodox Revivalism', *Proceedings of Ind. Hist. Cong.*, 1960 (Summary), pp.251-52.

3. Cf. *Maktubat*, Vol. I, *Maktub* Nos.47, 53, 97, 195.

4. For opposite views see Irfan Habib, 'The Political Role of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhind and Shah Waliullah', *Ind. Hist. Cong.*, 1960, pp.209-23; Rizvi, S.A. Abbas, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India*, Chapter VI.

5. *Tuzuk*, pp.272-3.

6. Cf. *Maktubat*, Vol. I, *Maktub* Nos.53, 193, 194; Vol. III, *Maktub* 43.

the State.[1] Aurangzeb also adopted the same policy partly because of his own personal inclinations, and partly because of the circumstances in which he occupied the throne.

Born in November, 1618,[2] Aurangzeb was educated in the theological sciences (ulum-i diniyah) like the commentary on the Quran, Traditions (Hadis) and the Hanafi jurisprudence. He had also studied many books on mysticism and ethics.[3] This education and environment contributed in moulding his character and ideas, and that was inclined towards orthodox Islam. He offered prayers, observed fast and read and wrote the Quran.[4] This religious bias in Aurangzeb affected his understanding of the function and obligation of a 'ruler' and the 'State'. Besides, he gave a religious colour to some of his political actions that had come out because of his love for power and throne. When he left the Deccan to contest for the throne (February, 1658), he declared he was going to end the ascendancy of an infidel at the Court.[5] After his victories and deposing Shah Jahan, he

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1. Among such measures were the abolition of sijida from court etiquettes (1627, Lahori, Vol. I, pp.110-12); introduction of the use of Hijri calendar in official records and papers (Ibid., pp.126-29); orders for the demolition of some temples (Lahori, Vol. I, p.452; Saleh, Vol. I, p.398); ban on the marriage of the Muslim women with non-Muslims (Lahori, Vol. I, part II, p.58; Saleh, Vol. II, p.49).

2. Isaak, p.250.

3. Bani, p.3; Kazim, p.1091.

4. Kazim, pp.1091-92; Mirat-ul Alam, f.210a; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.525-27.

5. Masumi, f.96b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.11. This declaration was made before a sufi saint of Burhanpur, Shaikh Burhan (and not before Shaikh Abdul Latif, as referred to by M.A. Ali, 'The Religious Issue in the War of Succession', MIQ, Vol. V (1963), p.82).

described his accession as divinely arranged. He emphasised that 'his elevation to the throne was not the result of the efforts of an individual or group; it was predestined by God. His succession was, in fact, the assertion of the supreme will of God Almighty. He elevated him to the throne in adverse circumstances so that he might bring peace and prosperity to the people and protect and propagate the religion of the Prophet of God. Everybody should, therefore, submit to his authority and accept ungrudgingly the changes affected by God Himself'.[1] Aurangzeb also acquired a *fatwa* (June, 1659) which justified the deposition of Shah Jahan and declared Aurangzeb qualified to sit on the throne in the lifetime of his father.[2] The *fatwa* and the above 'theory of succession' to the throne was put forward by Aurangzeb not only to wash off from himself the blot of rebellion against the recognised sovereign, and absolved himself of the treatment he meted out to his father and brothers, it also meant to sanctify his position in the eyes of the people who considered him a usurper. It also clearly indicated what Aurangzeb considered to be his position as ruler and the primary duty and function of a king.

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1. Aurangzeb asserted these points in his letters to Shah Jahan which he wrote to him after he captured power. *Adab*, ff.290a, 89b-94a; *[illegible]*, ff.91-92; *Ruqaat-i Alamgir*, pp.212-14; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.101-107. See also *Kazim*, pp.25-27, 132-34, 356-61; *Futuhat*, f.5b; *Bernier*, pp.167-68; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.1.

2. *Futuhat*, ff.36b-37a; *Tavernier*, Vol. I, pp.355-56; *Manucci*, Vol. I, p.361; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.248.

Thus Aurangzeb described himself as the divinely ordained king. He has also been described as the *Khalifa* (or variously as the *Khalifa-i Ilahi, Khalifa-i Rahmani*, i.e. the Vice Regent of God) and *Zill-al Allah* (the Shadow of God).[1] It signified that he acquired his position and powers from God; and that as the Vice Regent of God, his position was pre-eminent in the empire; he was the head of the State and the administration and was entitled for unconditional obedience of all. His service was the service of God and his servants were, in fact, the agents of God.[2] It also implied that as the sovereign of the State, his name was to be recited in the *Khutba* in the Jama Mosque and to be inscribed on coins.[3]

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1. *Ruqaat*, pp.28, 29; *Rami*, pp.49, 70, 72, 73, 75, 121; *Kazim*, pp.133, 356-57; *Hatim Khan*, ff.39a, 70b, 83b; *Dilkusha*, f.149a. Cf. also *Akhbarat*, 28th Rabi II, 8th R.Y.; 8th Ramzan, 13th R.Y.

2. *Ruqaat*, pp.36-39.

3. The recitation of the name of the reigning sovereign in the *Khutba* had become an institution in the states governed by the Muslim rulers. It indicated to the succession of the new king; and unless his name was recited in the *Khutba*, he was not considered the recognised king. Similarly the inscribing the name of the king on the coins signified the sovereignty of the ruler. No independent ruler liked the name of any other ruler on his coins as it amounted to recognising the suzerainty of that ruler. Shah Jahan insisted upon the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda (1636) to recite his name in the *Khutba*, and inscribe his name on their currencies (*darahim-o-[illegible]*), to show that they recognised his suzerainty (*Lahori*, Vol. I, pp.171, 210-11; *[illegible]*, ff.38-39). For the origin and significance of *Khutba* and *sikka*, see T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp.37-39, 192; Hodivala, *Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics*, pp.330-31. According to established norms, Aurangzeb also ordered at the time of his final coronation that the *Khutba* be read and coins struck in his name. *Kazim*, pp.362-66; *Hatim Khan*, ff.76b-80a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.77.

All these assumptions were old and in accordance with the traditions of earlier Muslim sovereigns.[1] But Aurangzeb also described himself as the *Murshid* (the Spiritual Guide).[2] It means that as a ruler, Aurangzeb had combined in himself the spiritual leadership along with the temporal headship. This was the position which Akbar had claimed for himself.[3] Now Aurangzeb was claiming the same position for himself without saying it in so many words.

As regard to his functions, Aurangzeb had claimed, as referred to above, that he had been raised to the throne to protect the *Faith*, maintain law and order in the country and work for the prosperity and the welfare of his subjects.[4] The sultanate meant to him the protecting the country (*mulkdari*) and looking after the subjects (*rayyati*).[5] For a sovereign like Akbar, this was the primary duty of a king, which, in fact, necessitated his existence, gave him the authority to rule over the people, and entitled him to their submission and obedience.[6] All his functions

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1. Cf. T.W. Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp.115-20, 129.
2. *Ruqaat*, p.29.
3. *Ain*, Vol. I, pp.121-23.
4. Aurangzeb has described these duties of the king in his letters to Shah Jahan; and in one of his letters (*Adab*, f.398b) he seems to have put the two duties of protecting the religion and the running of administration (*tarwij-i Din-i matin wa intizam-i muhimmat-i mamlakat*) at par.
5. Aurangzeb's letter to Shah Jahan, *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.104-106. The letter is also found in *Adab* (f.391a) with slight difference. See also *Ruqaat-i Alamgiri*, pp.216-17. Cf. *Ruqaat*, p.8.
6. *Ain*, Vol. I, pp.2, 139-40.

were derived from this primary duty. Aurangzeb, however, according to his own notion and usual way, gave a religious orientation to this kingly duty also. He held that his religion demanded of him that as the Vice Regent of God, he must ensure that the people live in peace and tranquillity and receive their due; he would be answerable to God for injustice committed against the people.[1]

In accordance with his claims and protestations, Aurangzeb assumed the title of *Muhyi-ud Din* (The Reviver of the Faith) on his final coronation (25th June, 1659).[2] He also introduced certain religious measures[3] from time to time and constituted a board of jurists (1664) to

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1. Aurangzeb emphasised on his 'answerability' to God for injustice against and oppression of his subjects in many of his letters to princes and officials. Cf. *Ruqaat*, pp.6, 8; *Raqaim*, f.11b.

2. *Kazim*, pp.361-72; *Adab*, f.282a; *Mirat-ul Alam*, f.132b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.76-78.

3. The religious measures introduced by Aurangzeb are innumerable and were spread over his entire reign. Some important among them may, however, be mentioned here:

   ban on the stamping of the *Kalima* and the names of the Pious Caliphs on coins (1659, *Kazim*, p.366; *Adab*, f.282a); ban on the use and sale of bhang and other intoxicants (1659, *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.3-4); stopping of the celebration of Nauroz, the solar New Year (1659, *Kazim*, p.390; *Adab*, f.283a); appointment of *Muhtasib* to see that the people do not indulge in act prohibited by the *Shariat* (1659, *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.5; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.80); banning the manufacturing of clay figures of living beings and visiting the shrines and tombs of the saints (1665, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.262); ban on *qawwali* and music and ending his appearing for *Jharokha* (1668-1669, *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.212; *Manucci*, Vol. III, p.5); stopping of the celebration of the weighing ceremony and prohibiting the production of superfine and gold-silver stuffed cloth by the state *karkhanas* (1677, *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.162).

compile a comprehensive and authentic collection of juridical interpretations for his own and his officials guidance, which later came to be known as the *Fatawa-i Alamgiri*.[1] He did all these things to show that he was working as the protector and reviver of the *Faith*. But while this is true that some of his measures gave the impression that the sovereign was striving for the revival of the *Faith* and had turned the government into an instrument to maintain the supremacy of Islam and the '*believers*', Aurangzeb took no drastic measure to bring his rule in conformity with the *Shariat*; and there was almost no material change in the powers and functions of the king and the working of the government.

Among his measures against the non-Muslim subjects, orders were, of course, issued for the destruction of temples[2] and for the reducing the number of the Hindus from the public service.[3] But it has now been proved that he at the same time issued grants to the temples and priests.[4]

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1. *Kazim*, pp.1086-87; *Mirat-al Alam*, ff.211, 224; *Maasir-i Alamgir*, pp.94, 529-30; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.251. For the jurists who formed the board, see Abdur Rahman, *Bazm-i Timuriyah*, pp.236-43.

2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.84, 88, 95, 171; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.259-60; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.143.

3. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.249, 252; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.354.

4. Jnan Chandra, 'Aurangzeb and Hindu Temples', *JPHS*, Vol. V (1957), pp.246-54; 'Alamgir's Patronage of Hindu Temples', *Ibid.*, Vol. VI (1958), pp.208-13; 'Alamgir's Grants to Hindu Pujaris', *Ibid.*, Vol. VI (1958), pp.55-65; 'Freedom of Worship for the Hindus under Alamgir', *Ibid.*, Vol. VI (1958), pp.124-25; 'Alamgir's Tolerance in the Light of Contemporary Jain Literature', *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp.269-72.

The per centage of the Hindus in the public service had, indeed, increased under Aurangzeb from what it was under his predecessors.[1] The modified rates of custom duties for the Muslims and the non-Muslims[2] and the jiziyah on the latter were, no doubt, strictly enforced.[3] But other taxes remained almost the same. A farman was certainly issued to a provincial diwan in 1668-69 enunciating the principles laid down by the Shariat about the land revenue administration.[4] But there is, perhaps, no evidence to suggest that the practical changes according to above farman were affected in the distribution of land and the assessment and collection of revenue. The orders for the abolition of abwab-i mamnua (the illegal cesses) were also issued.[5] But these orders were not sincerely enforced; and it seems that cesses were continued to be levied.[6] Nor was the disbursement of the vast

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1. For a discussion on the matter and statistics see M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, pp.29-32.

2. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.41b; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.258-59, 265, 298-300; Thevenot, p.4; English Factories (1665-67), p.266.

3. Futuhat, f.74a; Khulasat-as Siyaq, f.38b; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.174; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.252; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.296. For a detailed discussion on assessment, collection and disbursement of jiziyah see below Section on the Nazir-i Aam.

4. This is with reference to Aurangzeb's farman to Muhammad Hashim, (Durr-al Ulum, ff.139b-142b; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.268-72). For detail see below p. 145.

5. Kazim, p.1082; Durr-al Ulum, ff.37b-38b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.88; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.259-64. For these taxes see infra p. 50.

6. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.286-88.

income of the State strictly according to the Shariat. A large amount of this money was still spent, besides the army and the armaments, on the huge court establishments, court ceremonies, and on princes, harem and royal-household.[1] Similarly, we do not come across any evidence where the four-fifths of the ghanimah (war-booty) captured in battles, especially in the wars against Bijapur and Golconda, where large booty had come into the possession of the army,[2] would have been divided among the soldiery as recommended by the Shariat.[3] Notwithstanding a few religious measures, therefore, Aurangzeb governed the country through a law not entirely in consonance with the Islamic law.

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1. For the income and expenditure of the state see Chapter II.

2. According to Khafi Khan (Vol. II, p.367), Aurangzeb had got over six karor rupees in booty after the capture of Golconda alone (1687). This was besides the jewellery and other articles.

3. Cf. Fatawa-i Alamgiri, Vol. I, p.98, Vol. II, p.260; Aghnides' Mohammedan Theories of Finance, p.411. Some modern scholars have given unconvincing explanation for this act of 'misappropriation' of the Mughal emperors. They observe: "The jurists prescribe a fifth of the booty as the share of the State and the rest goes to the soldiers. This was based on precedents when the soldiers were unpaid volunteers and did not receive regular salaries from the exchequer. As the soldiers in the Mughal armies were full-time paid servants of the State and were not unpaid volunteers, they were not given any share in the booty, except perhaps that to which they surreptitiously helped themselves without being detected" (I.H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Mughal Empire, p.148). But this is not the fact. The voluntary military service by the Muslims had ceased with the Umayyads, who started paying regular salary to the soldiers (R. Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, p.413). But the soldiers continued to share the war-booty at the prescribed rate, till as late as the reign of Alauddin Khalji, who, because of his political and economic considerations, modified its rates to 1/4 for the soldiers and the remaining for the State, (K.S. Lal, History of the Khaljis, p.250). According to the Fatawa-i Alamgiri itself (vide reference cited above) the 4/5 of the booty was to be distributed among the soldiers.

The Administrative Law

According to Islamic theory of jurisprudence, no Muslim sovereign enjoyed the legislative powers because the essentials of law having been provided by the *Shariat*, could not be changed or modified by the Emperor.[1] However, within the frame work of the *Shariat*, administrative procedures and orders could be governed by rules and regulations (*dastur-al-amals*, *qawaid*, *zawabit* or *ain*). Sometimes equally important was the concept of customary law. At the same time the Mongol and Turkish tradition was also recognised as binding in the name of *yasa-i Chingizi* or *tura-i Ghazani*. Aurangzeb once himself defined the law that was to be followed in day to day administration in one of his farmans sent (November, 1664) to Sardar Khan,[2] the *faujdar* of Junagarh. Some residents of the area appealed to Aurangzeb against some injustice. He wrote to the *faujdar*, among other things, that 'he should decide the *Shariat* matters (*umur-i shar'iyah*) like the *qazaya* (plural of *qaziyah*, i.e. the dispute)[3] and *daawa* (plural of *dawa*, i.e. the claim, law suit)[4] according to the

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1. Cf. R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, pp.294-96; T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp.53-54.

2. A noble of standing of Aurangzeb holding the rank of 3000/3000 (1667, Kamin, p.1050). For his life and career see *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.422-23.

3. *Steingass*, p.975.

4. *Ibid.*, p.526.

Shariat in consultation with the *qazi*, the *mufti* and the *mir adl*; and whatever is related to the *Daftar-i Diwani* (the revenue department) and to the *qawanin-i mulki* (the state regulations), should be settled according to the claim and calculation (*haqq-o-hisab*) and the established rules and regulations (*qawaid-o-zawabit*)'.[1] It is thus clear from above instructions that the revenue and administrative matters were governed by the customary law, known as *qawanin-i mulki* rather than by Islamic law.

But what is more interesting is the fact that there are instances when even in the reign of Aurangzeb the rules of the *Shariat* were ignored in favour of customary or local law. Thus for example, Aurangzeb ordered a water-carrier to be handed over to the *Kotwal* (November, 1676) simply for saluting him by the Islamic formula of *salam-o-alaikum* (peace be upon you),[2] perhaps for violating the court etiquette by doing so. A little earlier (October, 1676) he had sent a person to be imprisoned at Ranthambhor without trial or interrogation for advancing towards him with a sword.[3] He also allowed the grandsons whose fathers were already dead, to inherit, along with their uncles, from the *madad-i-maash* holdings of their deceased grandfather,[4] although such a grandson is not entitled to inherit according to the Islamic law.[5]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.257-58 (the text of the *farman*).
2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.155.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Allahabad Documents* II, 53 and 55 (Aurangzeb's *farman*, dated the 15th Rabi I, 34th R.Y.). I am grateful to Professor Irfan Habib for lending me the copy of this valuable document.
5. *Fatawa-i Alamgiri*, Vol. IV, pp.403, 405.

But besides them, there are some more glaring instances. While Aurangzeb tried to provide religious cover for the execution of Dara Shikoh and subsequently of Murad,[1] no such legal justification was offered for the confinement of the 'invalidated' Shah Jahan. In the case of Prince Muhammad Muazzam and his sons who were imprisoned in March, 1686, on charges of intriguing with the enemy during the siege of Golconda, Aurangzeb violated the precepts of _Shariat_ when he denied the captives the facilities of cutting of hair and nails for over six months.[2] Even less respect was shown to the _Shariat_ and its exponents in political matters. Perhaps, the most significant case was that of Aurangzeb's attack on the kingdoms of Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687). While the fight of the imperial forces against the Marathas were explained as 'wars against the rebel infidels' (_kafir-i harbi_ as against _kafir-i dhimmi_ who submitted to the king),[3] the

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1. Prince Murad had been sent by Aurangzeb to thefort of Gwalior. After Murad's unsuccessful attempt to escape from the fort, Aurangzeb is said to have induced a son of Ali Naqi, the provincial _Diwan_ during Murad's governorship of the Gujrat, who had been murdered by the Prince, to file suit against Murad for murdering his father. The _Qazi_ sentenced him to death. The Prince was executed in December, 1661. _Mamuri_, Vol. I, pp.361-62; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, pp.155-56. It is sad that Z. Faruki (_Aurangzeb and His Times_, pp.84-85 and note), in his over-enthusiasm to disprove Aurangzeb's complicity in the case against Murad, has quoted _Khafi Khan_ out of context and has even mistranslated the relevant passage.

2. _Fatuhat_, f.114b; _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.341; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, pp.332-34. According to _Fatawa-i Alamgiri_ (Vol. IV, p.113), one should have a hair-cut at least once in forty days.

3. This is what Aurangzeb wrote to Abul Hasan, the ruler of Golconda before its siege was laid. In this _farman_ Aurangzeb described the Marathas, and their leaders Shambhaji as _kaffar-i harbi_, obviously because they did not submit to Emperor. _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.328.

attack on the above two Muslim kingdoms was declared illegal and prejudicial to the interests of Islam and the Muslims by the highest religious authorities of the State, first by the Qazi-al quzat Shaikh-al Islam,[1] and then by his successor Qazi Abdullah.[2] Aurangzeb, instead of withdrawing him from the war, or proving the legality of his action as he had attempted on the question of his succession, disgraced both the jurists for giving unwelcome opinion. Shaikh-al Islam was 'permitted' to proceed on Haj; he resigned from the post and went to Mecca, while Qazi Abdullah was refused audience for sometime.[3]

Notwithstanding their political or administrative niceties or otherwise, the above instances that can be multiplied, clearly show that Aurangzeb sometimes acted against the explicit injunctions of the Shariah and its spokesmen and that his acts and orders did not always conform to his own Fatawa-i Alamgiri .

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1. The son and successor of Qazi Abdul Wahab, the first Qazi-al Quzat of Aurangzeb. For his life, career and impeccable character, see Maasir, Vol. I, pp.237-39.

2. There appear only a few notices about Qazi Abdullah in Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.258-59, 393; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.309-10, 319; Tarikh-i Muhammadi, p.9.

3. Waqai Nemat Khan, pp.22-24; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.343; Maasir, Vol. I, p.238.

The Role of the Emperor in Administration and Administrative Procedures at the Court

The Emperor was the Head of the State, the chief executive and the head of the entire administration in the empire. The whole administrative machinery of the state revolved round him. All the departments of administration were created by him and their function and jurisdiction defined by him. He directed and supervised the work of every department of administration. As the Emperor could not personally attend to all aspects of State's administration throughout the empire, he performed his duties through the hierarchy of officials. Emperor alone appointed all such officials like the administrative heads at the centre, their subordinates, a large number of the personnel of each department of the administration, the provincial governors and the departmental heads in the provinces, the executive officers, the collectors of revenues, the treasurers, the armed forces, the intelligence staff, the judges and the religious functionaries, or any other official he deemed it necessary to appoint.[1]

The methods of appointment to the state services had become well-established even before Aurangzeb came to power. For all appointments, a

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1. Abul Fazl has explained the matter in the following words: "...As the strength of one man is scarcely adequate to such an arduous undertaking, he selects, guided by the light of his knowledge, some excellent men to help him, appointing at the same time servants for them" (Blochmann, pp.247-48).

candidate was first granted a *mansab* by the Emperor.[1] With the grant of *mansab*, the *mansabdar* was not only to maintain, and provide to the state at the time of exigency, the stipulated number of soldiers (*sawars*), he now also entered into the state service. Appointment for almost all posts in the empire, like the heads of central departments, provincial governors, *diwans*, *bakhshis*, *buyutats*, military generals, fort commandants, *faujdars*, *thanedars* and *kotwals* etc., were made by the Emperor from amongst these *mansabdars*; and a *mansabdar* could have been assigned a post or a function at any place in the empire that the Emperor considered commensurate with the rank, talent and the experience of the *mansabdar*.[2] Thus, apart from its military significance in the Mughal administration, the '*mansabdari*' system was also a sort of the 'cadre of the State service' under the Mughals.

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1. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.140; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.18b-19b; *Dastur-ul Amal*, f.159a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.411-12. The smallest unit of *mansab* granted to a person was ten (*Dahbashi*) under Akbar (*Ain*, Vol. I, p.140). But later twenty (*bisti*) had become the standardised unit of *mansab* and, perhaps, no candidate was granted a *mansab* less than that unit (Cf. *Dastur-ul Amal*, f.146b). An individual got the *mansab* according to his previous status and experience. For example, when a few servants of Shivaji joined the imperialists in the Deccan (April, 1661), they were given the rank of 500 *zat* 50 *sawars* (*Selected Documents*, Aurangzeb, p.17). But when Shambhaji, the son of Shivaji, did the same, he was assigned the rank of 5000 *zat*/5000 *sawar* (October, 1665, *Kanin*, p.906).

2. The *mansab* of official or noble had, in fact, become the yard-stick for determining the talent and experience of a *mansabdar*; and while assigning him a post, his *mansab* was also considered. This is evident from a letter of Aurangzeb itself. He wrote to Prince Azam that the *Faujdarship* of Sorath (In Gujrat) was an important assignment and had been held by, and should be assigned to, only *panjhazaris* (i.e. the *mansabdars* of 5000). *Ruqaat*, pp.7, 11; *Hasain*, f.14b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.352-55.

Appointments, at the centre, provinces, *sarkar* and *pargana* level were generally made by the Emperor, and the appointment letters (*sanad*) were issued by the *Wazir-i Azam* or the *Diwan-i Ala*.[1] However, we come across many cases of deviation from this policy which will be discussed later. It appears that under Aurangzeb, all the heads for the central departments like the *Diwan-i Ala*, the *Mir Bakhshi*, the *Mir Saman*, the *Mir Atish* and the *Sadr-us Sudur* were selected from amongst the *mansabdars* by the Emperor himself on the basis of personal knowledge and assessment of the character and worth of that particular candidate. No instance of an individual recommending a person for the above posts appears to us. Similarly, the *nazims* or *subadars* for the provinces and the heads of the provincial departments were generally selected by the Emperor, though in most cases the Emperor consulted the *Wazir-i Azam* on the matter, and the latter played important role in these appointments.[2] Apparently, the other heads of central departments played the same role in the appointment of their counterparts in the provinces.

The subordinate staff at the centre and elsewhere was also appointed by the Emperor himself. However, as the Emperor did not have the personal knowledge of such a large number of persons to be appointed on

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1. For detail see Chapter II.

2. For instances see *Ruqaat*, pp.32-33; *Hasain*, ff.7a, 8a; *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.28a.

innumerable posts, these appointments were made on the recommendation (*tajwiz*) of princes, the central ministers, the provincial *nazims*, *diwans* and heads of other departments.[1] Some officials, however, enjoyed the privilege of more than simple recommendation. We have specific evidence of the fact that the *nazims* of far off provinces like the Bengal, Deccan and Kabul, were allowed to exercise greater discretion in matter of appointments for subordinate posts like the *faujdars* and *thanadars* in their respective provinces. It appears that they made the appointments and sent their *tajwiz* to the Emperor who generally approved it and *sanad* of appointment was issued accordingly. This policy had been adopted, according to Aurangzeb's own reasoning, because these provinces were border provinces and were at a great distance from the centre.[2] The *nazims* of these provinces were, therefore, permitted to make appointments to avoid delay and ensure administrative efficiency. From this evidence we can infer that provincial ministers of these distant provinces might have also enjoyed the same discretion in their respective departments.

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1. For instances of such *tajwiz*, see *Ruqaat*, pp.10, 35; *Raqaim*, ff.8a, 10a; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.346; *Akhbarat*, 2nd Ramzan, 40th R.Y., 20th Shaban, 43rd R.Y. Also Cf. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.373-74. The word *Tajwiz* appears to have been used in two meanings: one in the sense of simple recommendation whereby a person was introduced to the Emperor for the grant of a *mansab* or a post; and secondly, in the sense of appointing a person on a particular post and sending that 'appointment' (*Tajwiz*) to the Emperor for his approval and the issue of the *sanad* by the *Diwani*. This was done by those officials who were authorised by the Emperor to do so in especial circumstances.

2. *Ruqaat*, p.18; *Raqaim*, f.32a; *Kalimat*, f.36b.

It seems that the same privilege was enjoyed by the *parganah Amin* in the appointment of the *Karori* and the *Fotahdar*. According to one authority, this was necessary to create required cooperation among the staff of assessment and collection of revenue at the *parganah* level, and to ensure the proper assessment and full realisation of state dues. It was feared that, if the *Karori* was imposed from the above, the *Amin* might inflate the assessment and put the blame for not realising the assessed revenue on the inefficiency or non-cooperation of the *Karori*.[1]

It appears that the Princes were also authorised to appoint *faujdars* in their own *jagirs*. They were authorised to do so, perhaps, because of the large area assigned to them in *jagir*. The appointments were, however, subject to the approval of the Emperor. For such appointments, first the prince used to issue a *Nishan* for the appointment and then a *sanad* was issued by the *Diwan-i Ala* if the appointment was approved by the Emperor.[2] Apparently the Emperor could approve or reject such appointments. There are instances of Emperor censuring a prince for appointing

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1. *Hidayatul Qawaid*, f.30a. This statement is also supported by the two letters of appointment (*sanads*) of the *Karori* and *Fotahdar* respectively found in *Nigarnamah* (pp.86-87). It has been mentioned in each of two *sanads* that the appointment was made on the *tajwiz* of the concerned *Amin*. This *tajwiz* has not been mentioned in the *sanads* of other *parganah* officials like the *Faujdar*, *Amin*, [illegible] and the [illegible] etc. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp.83-87.

2. This inference is based on a set of documents related to the appointments of the *faujdars* in the *jagir* of a prince reproduced in the *Nigarnamah* (pp.78-81). The inference is also supported by some letters of Aurangzeb in which Prince Azam has been advised to appoint suitable *faujdars* in his *mahal* of *jagir* (*Ruqaat*, pp.7, 10-11; *Rasain*, ff.10b, 12b, 14b.)

incapable or inefficient persons in his *jagir*, and proposing him new candidates for appointment instead.[1]

It, however, seems that during the latter period of his reign, when Aurangzeb was deeply involved in the Deccan warfare, the officials in the provinces had got greater say in the matter of appointments. Because while on the one hand we find the Emperor admonishing a prince for appointing subordinate officials in Gujrat, a later source mentions that the governor of Gujrat appointed his own *faujdars* for the suburbs of Ahmadabad, who, in turn, appointed their own *thanadars* for the security of seventeen localities and eight villages of the area.[2] If the governor of a province so close to the seat of the Emperor could exercise such authority, the officials of distant provinces would have enjoyed even the greater discretion.

However, as the Emperor used to appoint the state servants, so did he transfer or remove them as he pleased. The system of transfers of officers and *jagirdars* was already well established in the Mughal empire. According to Abul Fazl, transfer and dismissal of officials was necessary for the good of the officials and the welfare of the community; and essential to maintain peace and order in the empire, lest the officials develop local

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1. *Ibid.*; *Ruqaat*, pp.7, 10-11.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), pp.113-14, 169.

connections and raise the standard of rebellion.[1] Moreover, the exigencies of situations and the suitability of a particular person for a particular job sometimes necessitated the transfer.[2]

Except the holders of the post of *Wazir-i Azam* or the *Diwan-i Ala* which the incumbents under Aurangzeb, as also under Shah Jahan and Jahangir, held till their own death or till the death of the respective Emperors,[3] all Mughal officials were transferred from one position, or from one place, to another. Thus, for example, Amanat Khan, Mirak Muinuddin Ahmad, the *Bakhshi* and *Waqia-nigar* of Multan under Shah Jahan, was recalled by Aurangzeb at the centre and appointed the *Diwan-i Khalisa* (1671). After four years at the centre, he was sent as the *Nazim* and *Diwan* of the *suba* of Lahore and the Commandant of its fort (1675); thence he was transferred as the *Diwan* of the Deccan provinces (1679).[4] This instance

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1. *Akhbarnama*, Vol. II, p.332. *Bernier* (p.227) and other European travellers have also spoken about the transfer, but their comments appear to be mainly concerned with the transfer of *jagir*, though in most cases the transfer of *jagir* was linked with the transfer of *mansabdars* from one place to another. See M. Athar Ali, *op. cit.*, p.78.

2. For instance, Muhammad Amin Khan (*Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.613-620) was appointed by Aurangzeb the *Nazim* of Kabul (May 1670), but was soon recalled to the centre (June 1671) to be appointed the *Wazir-i Azam*, as after the death of Jafar Khan (May 1670), no person suitable for the job, was found at the centre. But he was soon returned to his previous job (Sept. 1671), as he himself was found unfit for the post of *Wazir-i Azam*. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.104, 108-09, II.

3. Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, p.263; and Chapter II. ~~(Infra) p.~~

4. *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.258-68.

shows that there was no fixed rule as to how long an official could hold an office before he was transferred from that position or place. Apart from the above example, there are other instances of an official holding a particular post for more than two decades, while others served on the same post just for two or three years.[1] Therefore, the transfer, like the initial appointment, depended upon the pleasure of the King. Many examples of 'transfer on displeasure' are found.[2] Transfers were sometimes made on the request of an official himself.[3]

Similarly, all servants of the State, irrespective of their rank and position held office and/or _mansab_ during the pleasure of the emperor. However, the removal from service (_ma'zuli_) under the Mughals did not mean the removal from an office. Sometimes a person could be removed from particular appointment or post even while retaining his _mansab_.

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1. Fidai Khan Koka (_Maasir_, Vol. I, pp.247-53) served as the _Nazim_ of the _suba_ of Kabul from September 1674 to March 1677, but his successor Amir Khan Mir Miran (_Maasir_, Vol. I, pp.277-287) held the same post from March 1677 to April 1698 (_Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.137, 157, 394). Similarly, at the centre, Amanat Khan (III), Mir Husain (_Maasir_, Vol. I, pp.287-90) served as the _Diwan-i Tan_ from May 1690 to July 1692; but his successor Inayatullah Khan (_Maasir_, Vol. II, pp.828-32) served on that post since then till the death of Emperor in February 1707. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.335, 349, 521.

2. _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.433. To mention an example, Amirul Umara Shaista Khan (_Maasir_, Vol. II, pp.690-707) was transferred from the _subahdari_ of the Deccan to Bengal because of his failure against Shivaji (1663). _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.175.

3. _Akhbarat_, 14th Ramzan, 40th R.Y.

A sizeable section of the Mughal _mansabdars_ was, in fact, without a specific administrative post; such _mansabdars_ either remained in attendance at Court, or were posted in provinces to perform such military service as they be called upon to do.[1] Under the Mughals, therefore, the 'removal' meant 'depriving a servant of mansab and jagir'. He then lost his service and salary. The Mughal Emperors, however, maintained patriarchal attitude towards their servants and only in pressing circumstances went to the extremity of depriving a servant of his livelihood.[2] Whenever a servant committed a fault, the Emperor showed his displeasure with that person either by transferring him, refusing him audience, or reducing his _mansab_ and _jagir_ or with all of them.[3] There would be comparatively few instances of removal from service and that again on gross misconduct on the part of

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1. For example Mahabat Khan Lohrasp (_Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.590-95) after being removed from the _subadari_ of Kabul (1670) was sent to the Deccan expedition. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.104, 107.

2. Cf. Aurangzeb's orders (_hasb-ul-hukm_) to Prince Azam. _Ruqaat_, pp.39-40; _[illegible]_, f.13a.

3. Cf. _Ruqaat_, pp.29-30; _[illegible]_, f.5a; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, pp.278-79. For instance, Mahabat Khan Lohrasp was transferred from the Deccan because of his connection with the Deccani Afghans and was refused audience (1672), _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.121). Similarly, when Muhammad Amin Khan, the _Subadar_ of Kabul, tactlessly handled the Yusufzai Afghans and was badly routed by them, the Emperor punished him by transferring him from Kabul to Gujrat, reducing his _mansab_ from 6000/5000 to 5000/5000 and refusing him interview (1672, _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.117, 121).

the *mansabdar*.[1] That removal, too, used to be for a short period,[2] and most of the Mughal servants died while holding *mansab* and *jagir*. There was, therefore, no minimum or maximum prescribed service tenure for a Mughal servant and no age of superannuation; and a *mansabdar* served during the pleasure of the Emperor. There was, however, provision for compulsory and voluntary retirement from service and grant of pension by the Emperor. Some nobles with whom the Emperor was displeased, were compulsorily retired and granted pension.[3] Similarly a large number of state servants who could not actively serve the state for one reason or the other, applied to the Emperor for retirement and were granted *salyana* or *mahiyana* (monthly or annual stipend).[4] Sometimes the families of deceased nobles

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1.) &) 2.) For example, Khan Jahan Bahadur Zafar Jang Kokaltash (*Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.798-813) the *Nazim* of the Deccan, was punished for his tyranny in exacting *peshkash* from the ruler of Bijapur and for misappropriating it, by being deprived of his *mansab* and title (May 1678). Within a year, however, he was restored to his *mansab* and title. *Dilkusha*, ff.70a-72a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.395; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.168. For another incident of same nature, *Ibid.*, pp.121-22; *[illegible]*, f.61b. Cf. *[illegible]*, f.13a; *Ruqaat*, pp.39-40.

3. Among those who were retired compulsorily and were granted pension were: Abdur Rashid Deccani, Rs.60,000 annual (*Hatim Khan*, f.131b); [illegible] Khan, Rs.4,000 annual (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.132).

4. We have come across many *mansabdars* of Aurangzeb who requested to the Emperor for voluntary retirement. Aurangzeb accepted their request and granted them *salyana* or *mahiyana*. Among them were:

   [illegible] Khan Bukhari, Rs.12,000 annual (*Hatim Khan*, f.89a);
   Qabil Khan Munshi Abul Fath, Rs.5,000 annual (*Adab*, f.236a; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.[illegible]);
   Mehdi Quli Khan, Rs.10,000 annual (*Hatim Khan*, f.100a; *Maasir*, Vol. I, 821)
   Aqil Khan Razi, Rs.50,000 annual (*Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.127).

Manucci (Vol. II, p.365) has also mentioned a few *mansabdars* who were not in the active service of the state but were enjoying the pensions.

were also granted pension.[1] It is, thus, clear that the Emperor exercised unrestricted powers in matter of appointment, transfer, dismissal and retirement.

Imposition and Remission of Taxes

In the sphere of finance the Emperor exercised great powers, though sometimes Aurangzeb remitted, modified or imposed some taxes because of his desire to show his adherence to the Shariat. The earlier Mughal Emperors imposed or withdrew as many taxes as they wished; and spent it as they liked. Thus for example, Akbar abolished the pilgrim tax (1563)[2] and the jizyah (1564) levied from the Hindus.[3] With Aurangzeb, however, the case was somewhat different. As he wanted to show his adherence to the Shariat, he reduced, remitted or increased some of the existing taxes as required by the Shariat and represented by the jurists. Thus Aurangzeb abolished (December 1667) as referred to above, a large number of taxes that were considered illegal (abwab-i mamnua), though, it

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1. For instance, Ihtisham Khan, the Diwan and Darogha-i Topkhana of Bengal, was killed in a battle there (1659). His family was granted a pension. Similarly, the wife and daughter of Khalil-Ullah Khan (Maasir, Vol. I, pp.772-82) were granted an annual pension of Rs.50,000 after his death in 1661 (Hatim Khan, ff.83a, 114b). Cf. also Mamuri, Vol. II, p.365.

2. Akbarnama, Vol. II, p.190.

3. Ibid., pp.203-04.

seems, that these taxes continued to be levied at many places.[1] Under the same consideration, Aurangzeb also changed the rates of custom duties for the Muslims and the non-Muslims which were so far collected at equal rates from both of them. He now modified it to the rates of 1/40 from the Muslims and 2/40 from the non-Muslims (March, 1682); the collection from the Muslims was now termed Zakat, the name given to it by the Shariat.[2]

But politically, as also from administrative point of view, the more significant change was the imposition of jizyah on the non-Muslims. The Ulama represented to the Emperor that the Shariat requires that this tax must be imposed on the non-Muslims subjects. It was, therefore, imposed by Aurangzeb in 1679.[3] It has been argued by Zahiruddin Faruki

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1. Kazim, p.1082. According to Mirat-i Ahmadi (Vol. I, pp.259-64), the number of these illegal taxes was 36. But Khafi Khan (Vol. II, p.88) has put their number upto 80. These illegal cesses included the taxes on some professions, on the sale and purchase of houses, on cattle-heads left for grazing, on carts, on Hindu and Muslim pilgrims etc. J.N. Sarkar has given the list of these taxes (The Mughal Administration, pp.80-90). It seems that the officials did not properly follow the first order, and a fresh farman was issued again in April 1672, ordering them not to collect the illegal taxes in future. For the farman see Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.286-88.

2. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.41b; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.298-9, 265, 298-300; [illegible], p.4; English Factories (1665-67), p.266.

3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.174; Futuhat, f.74a; Khulasat-us Siyar, f.30b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.252; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.296; English Factories (1678-84), pp.261, 255. (For detailed discussion on the imposition, assessment, collection and the disbursement of jizyah, see the Chapter on the Wazir-i Azam). Jizyah was imposed, as said above, on the representation of the Ulama and the Jurists. This is what the contemporary authorities say. However, it has been observed by some modern Scholars (S.R. Sharma, The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors, p.153) that it was imposed on the representation of Inayat Khan, the Diwan-i Khalisa of Aurangzeb. But this is, perhaps, no where mentioned in our sources, not even in the authorities cited by the learned scholar.

that, "The proposal (of imposing the *Jizyah*) was, however, considered (by Aurangzeb) not only from the religious, but also, as there are reasons to believe, from the financial point of view".[1] He then mentions the abolition of 80 taxes (mentioned above) and writes, "By remitting other taxes and levying *Jizyah*, he thought he would be able not only to adjust his finances, but discharge a religious obligation as well".[2] But the argument is fallacious, and the two measures together prove just the contrary. The fact that Aurangzeb abolished a large number of illegal taxes which yielded huge income to the state,[3] and imposed *Jizyah* which, at any rate, did not yield as much, suggests that Aurangzeb wanted only to follow the *Shariat* in regard to these taxes, paying no regard to income or loss. Moreover, this 'partial objective of adjusting the finances by imposing the *Jizyah*' is also untenable because of the fact that the amount collected as *Jizyah* was not included in the general revenue of the state, but was to be kept in a separate treasury known as the *Khazana-i Jizyah* and was to be spent only for charitable and pious purposes.[4]

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1. Zahiruddin Faruki, *Aurangzeb and His Times*, p.150, p.150. The same line has been taken by S.M. Jafar in his work, *The Mughal Empire*, pp.292-94. Cf. also *English Factories* (1678-84), p.255.

2. *Ibid.*, p.151.

3. According to Munshi Muhammad Kazim (p.1082) the remissions amounted to Rs.32 lakhs in Khalisa alone. *Khafi Khan* (Vol. II, p.88) is, therefore, justified in putting the remissions in the whole empire to Krores of rupees.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatima*), pp.178-79; *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, ff.46b-48b.

It may be argued that as both Akbar and Aurangzeb remitted or imposed certain taxes, the two exercised the same authority in these matters. True, the 'actions' of the two rulers appear similar; but the difference lies in the fact that while the action of Akbar came out on his own, Aurangzeb did the same thing under some 'compulsion'. Akbar abolished or imposed a tax because his own judgement or political wisdom convinced him that the action was in the interests of the people or the government. The very action of Akbar was, therefore, an assertion of his unquestioned authority in remitting or imposing a particular tax. But Aurangzeb had to do the same thing under outside compulsions which he could not possibly resist. Nor did he spend the entire income from different taxes as he liked: his discretion in this respect was restricted in so far as he had to keep the income from the Jizyah in separate treasuries and spend them only on heads prescribed by the Shariat, according to the recommendation of, and through the Ulama and the qazis.[1]

However, apart from the above limitations, Aurangzeb exercised full control over the finances of the state. After his final coronation, he remitted (September, 1659), on his own will, many sair-i jihat[2] taxes

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1. Ibid. For heads on which the income from these two sources was spent, see infra p. 156

2. Sair, sair-i jihat or sair-al wajuh taxes 'covered almost all the major taxes apart from the land revenue'. Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, p.243 and note.

to bring relief to the people who had suffered because of prolonged wars of succession.[1] A little later, he also remitted to the factors of East India Company in India half of the usual custom duty and issued a *farman* to this effect (1664), and the Dutch were also granted some trade privileges.[2] Subsequently, he imposed *Jizyah* on all European nationals as he had imposed on the Hindus (1679).[3] On their resistance, however, he withdrew it after a year (April 1680), and ordered them to pay 3½ per cent custom duty on their goods at Surat instead of 2 per cent.[4] The Emperor exercised the same authority over the state's resources. He could grant any revenue yielding or the barren area of the empire to any person.[5] Similarly,

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1. The remitted taxes were (a) the *rahdari* on grain and other edibles that was collected at the borders (of the provinces), highways and on the ferries (for a *hasb-al-hukm* to the governor of the Deccan for stopping the collection of this tax in his jurisdiction see, *Selected Waqai*, p.46); (b) the tax on the items mentioned above that was levied in all towns of the empire in the form of local tax (Octroi ?); (c) *pandari*, the tax which was realised each month as a rent of land from the stall-holders in the bazars, like the butchers, cloth and vegetable sellers and the jewellers. *Kazim*, pp.437-38, 1082; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.87; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.248-49. For the actual *farman* sent to the provincial *diwans* remitting the taxes, see *Durr-al Ulum*, ff.37a-38b. It is significant to note that these taxes were remitted in the last week of Zilhijja 1069 (10-17 September, 1659), that is to say about three months after the final coronation of Aurangzeb, but within that very week in which Dara Shikoh was executed on 9th September, 1659 (*Kazim*, p.432).

2. *English Factories* (1661-64), pp.288-9, 313, (1665-67), p.28, (1668-69), p.35.

3. *English Factories* (1678-84), pp.241-42.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.255-56.

5. Thus the Emperor granted either in the form of *jagir* or *madad-i maash* grant. For detail, see Infra pp. 163, 170-72

he could spend the huge income of his vast empire, or the booty he got in his innumerable expeditions, as and where he pleased. Aurangzeb had an estimated income of over twenty-three karor rupees,[1] and he considered himself fully authorised to spend this vast income 'on the affairs of the country and the community' as he deemed proper.[2]

Another authority that the Emperor exercised in financial matters was that he decided the gold and silver content in the currency and fixed its value. The Emperor was, of course, influenced by the general economic conditions in the empire and the prices of gold and silver while fixing the gold and silver content in his coins and their values. Theoretically, however, he could do so as and when he desired. Aurangzeb did so when sometime after his accession he reduced the gold and silver content in his coins, and forced the unwilling public and especially the bankers to accept these coins on their fixed value.[3]

Thus, apart from some limitations in regard to illegal taxes, _Zakat_ and _Jizyah_, the Emperor exercised unrestricted authority in imposing taxes, deciding their rates, in disbursing the income of the state from these taxes and in determining the value of his currencies.

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1. _Mirat-ul Alam_, ff.214b-15b; _Malumat-al Afaq_, p.194.
2. Aurangzeb's letter to Shah Jahan, _Adab_, f.293b; _Ruqaat-i Alamgiri_, p.224; also Cf. _Ruqaat_, p.29; _Rasain_, f.5a.
3. _Mirat-i Ahmadi_, Vol. I, pp.277, 308, 304, 327-28, 337. Cf. Hodivala, _op. cit._, 237-38; Irfan Habib, 'Currency System of the Mughal Empire', _MIQ_, Vol. IV (1961), pp.1-21.

The Judicial Function:

All Mughal Emperors considered it their foremost duty to rule over the people with justice, give them their due and protect the weak from the strong. Aurangzeb gave a fresh orientation to this important function of the king when he claimed that this was one of the objectives for which he had been raised to the throne by God. He, therefore, attached great importance to the administration of justice;[1] and the qazis enjoyed greater favour and influence during his reign.[2] A full-fledged central department under the headship of the Sadr-as Sudur looked after the administration of justice.[3] But as the 'Head of the State', the Emperor himself performed certain judicial functions.

As mentioned above, it was the Emperor who appointed the Chief Qazi (the Qazi-al quzat) and subordinate qazis in the empire to administer justice.[4] The Emperor also sent instructions, from time to time, to the

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1. Kazim, pp.1075-80, 1097-98; Rami, pp.3-4; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.527; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.550; Ahkam, f-4a; Bernier, p.263.

2. Cf. Raqaim, f.7a; Ruqaat, p.32; Dastur-i Aqhi, f.111b; Mirat-al Alam, f.226a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.215, 256.

3. For detailed discussion on the powers and functions of the Sadr-as Sudur, and the appointment of the qazis, see Chapter VI.

4. Inshaat, ff.37a, 71b; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.148; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.248; Tavernier, Vol. I, p.356. For the manner in which the qazis were appointed, see Chapter VI.

Qazis and the judicial officials, laid down procedure to be followed in the courts (*adalat*) and recommended various forms of punishments for different kind of offences and crimes.[1]

But, perhaps, more important judicial function of the Emperor was that he as the King used to hear the 'appeals' that the people from different parts of the country preferred before him. By 'appeal' we do not mean its modern legal sense of bringing a case decided by a lower court to a higher court for review, though such appeals too were sometimes brought before the Emperor as we shall see. 'Appeal' stands here for *faryad* (an exclamation) and *istighasa* (demanding justice) against the action of an individual or a state official. It was for such sorts of appeals that the Abbasids Caliphs of Baghdad had established the *Diwan-al nazar-fi-al-mazalim* (the department for looking into the grievances) that was presided over by the Caliph himself.[2] The tradition apparently continued under later Muslim rulers in one way or the other. Aurangzeb also heard such types of appeals; and he, like his predecessors, was accessable to the people who wanted to approach him in this connection and held regular court for the purpose.

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1. Many such instructions are found in the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (see for example, Vol. I, pp.257-58, 275). But perhaps the most significant of such instructions is a *farman* issued in 1672. The *farman* contained 33 Articles in which various offences and punishment for them have been recommended. *Ibid.*, pp.277-83. These articles have been reproduced by Sarkar in English in his *Mughal Administration* (pp.109-115) with the caption of 'The Penal Code in the Reign of Aurangzeb'.

2. Cf. P.K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, pp.321-22; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. II, p.324.

The people could report their grievances to the Emperor when he appeared for *Darshan* at the window (*Jharoka*) of the palace every day early in the morning.[1] When Aurangzeb gave up the practice of appearing for *Darshan* in 1669,[2] he instructed the officials to pick up the complaints of the people from the same window through the means of rope and put them before him.[3] Sometimes the Emperor also heard the appeals of the people in his court, in the *Diwan-i-Am* or in the *Ghusalkhana*.[4] Besides, Aurangzeb held regular courts, variously described as the *diwan-i adalat* (the court of justice), the *dar-al adalat*, or as Bernier says, *adalat khana* (the house of justice) on every Wednesday and Saturday where the *Darogha-i Adalat* (the Superintendent of the Court)[5] presented the aggrieved persons (*faryadiyan* or *mustaghisan*) or their complaints before the Emperor.[6] Fortunately, *Durr-al Ulum*, a contemporary collection of miscellaneous documents, contains many imperial orders (*hasb-al hukms*) about some very interesting appeals (*istighasa*) made to the Emperor. Citing a few cases here would reveal the nature of appeals brought before the Emperor.

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1. *Kazim*, p.1098.

2. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.213. For more detail see Infra p. 72.

3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.95.

4. *Akhbarat*, 14th, 16th, 19th Ramazan, 13th R.Y.; 18th Rajab, 39th R.Y.; 17th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.; *Kazim*, p.1077; *Bernier*, p.263.

5. The official who put before the Emperor the complaints of the people, its gist, or the complainants themselves (*Mahmud-al Akbar*, p.192).

6. *Kazim*, pp.1102-03; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, 155, 527; *Dilkusha*, f.157a; *Bernier*, p.263; *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.433-34.

One Bolchand (or Molchand?), a _zamindar_ of Mandawar in Sambhal _sarkar_ in the province of Delhi, came to the Court and represented that the _zamindari_ of the said _parganah_ had been formally divided between him and Sukhanand etc. from the same grandfather. But the latter has taken possession of the entire hereditary buildings (_haveli_) and the groves (_bagh_), and has been encroaching upon the villages of his share. The instructions sent to the local governor are interesting as they show the nature of decision taken by the Emperor on this particular appeal. The governor was asked to ascertain the correct facts of the dispute (_muqaddimah_) and if the _zamindari_ has actually been divided according to claims and rights, the complainant looks after the proper cultivation and prosperity of the place, and pays the revenue regularly, he (the governor) should ensure that Sukhanand should not encroach upon the share of the complainant; and that the dispute about the houses and the groves should be decided according to the _Shariat_.[1]

In another case, Parsuram, a resident of the _sarkar_ of Kalpi in the province of Agra came to the Court and complained that Basant and Harbans of Qannauj killed his brother, wounded twenty others, and forcibly took possession of his two villages and a tank (_talab_). The Emperor instructed the local officials to enquire into the case. If they found

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1. _Durr-al Ulum_, ff.43a-44a.

the allegations true, they should decide the murder case in accordance with the Shariat, take back the two villages and the tank from the offender and give its possession to the plaintiff. The order was sent through a mace-bearer for its prompt execution.[1]

There is another case of the residents of a village in the parganah of Jahangirnagar in the province of Bengal who came to the Court and protested that the local revenue officials have fixed rupees 250 as the revenue (jama) of the village without actually assessing the crops (mazruat) which the residents were unable to pay. The complaint prompted the Emperor to send orders to the governors of all the provinces to see that, for the welfare and the prosperity of the people, the assessed revenue should in no case exceed the half of the produce.[2]

Similarly, some traders of Badakhshan arrived at the Court and complained that the officials of Kabul, Attock and Panchir exacted from them, besides the usual taxes, one rupee per horse and fifty tanka per hundred of goats which they were bringing into India, and other amount as bhent (offering), dalali (brokerage) and other illegal taxes. The local governor was ordered to enquire into the complaint, arrange the return of unauthorised taxes collected from the traders, and to ensure that only

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1. Durr-al Ulum, f.57a. For a similar case see Akhbarat, 14th Shaban, 49th R.Y.

2. Ibid., f.42b.

the authorised taxes were collected. A mace-bearer was also sent from the Court for quick action on Court's instructions.[1]

Mentioning of two more cases here would be of special interest as they also shed light on Aurangzeb's religious attitude and his sense of justice. In one case, a Muslim women of Allahabad city came to the Court and prayed that a certain Hari and others were not allowing her to construct a mosque on her own land.[2] In other case, Arjun Mal and a few other Hindu _sanyasis_ of Banaras went to the Court (1674) and complained that five _havelis_ of a _math_ (monastry) in their hereditary possession have been forcibly taken over by the local officials and they have exacted rupees five hundred from them as the rent of the _havelis_.[3] As regard to the first case, the local officials were asked to ascertain the facts of the complaint; and if the woman is constructing the mosque actually on her own land, they should prevent Hari etc. from putting hurdles in her way.[4] And in the second case, the complaints were sent to the _Qazi-al Quzat_ evidently for ascertaining their claims, who sent a _hasb-al hukm_ to the

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1. _Durr-al Ulum_, ff.50a-50b. For many other complaints of different nature see _Ibid._, ff.43a-57a; _Akhbarat_, 19th Shaban, 36th R.Y.; _English Factories_ (1665-67), pp.265-66, (1667-69), pp.191-92.

2. _Durr-al Ulum_, f.49a.

3. Vide a _parwancha_, quoted by Jnan Chandra, 'Alamgir's Patronage of Hindu Temples', _Journal of Pakistan Historical Society_, Vol. VI, pp.208-13.

4. _Durr-al Ulum_, f.49a.

faujdar to return back to the *sanyasis* their *hawelis* and five hundred rupees taken from them.[1]

The above cases we have come to know through the imperial orders (*hasb-al hukm*) that were sent to the local officials. As referred to above, these orders were sometimes sent through the mace-bearer to impress upon the local officials the urgency of the order and its prompt execution. The two facts together show that on receiving the complaint, the Emperor took immediate action and instructed the officials concerned to investigate the case and take corrective steps. If, however, the Emperor was not satisfied with the role of local officials, or did not deem it proper to assign them the inquiry, he himself deputed independent persons to probe into a particular case for the sake of impartial justice.[2]

However, besides the above kinds of complaints, the Emperor also heard those appeals where the question of the *Shariat* was involved. In such cases theologians (*fuqaha and muftis*) sat with him and apprised him of the correct and relevant interpretation of the law for that particular case.[3] Sometimes the people also appealed to the Emperor

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1. Jnan Chandra, *op. cit.*

2. Aurangzeb thus instituted an inquiry against the *Kotwal* of Lahore, who, it was alleged, killed the *qazi* of the city (1680) on the instigation of local governor (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.188; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.256-58). Cf. *Durr-al Ulum*, f.52 .

3. *Kazim*, p.1102; *Bernier*, p.263.

against the judgement of a local court seeking clemency or benevolence from him. But we have not come across a case where he might have increased or decreased the sentence awarded by a judicial official or would have reversed or set aside his judgement. In such cases, the Emperor only persuaded the winning party to withdraw its claims.[1] Similarly, we have not come across any evidence when the Emperor would have granted pardon to a person already tried and sentenced by a court of law. Nor does he appear to have reprieved the enforcement of a punishment.[2] The Emperor, therefore, functioned as a 'Court of Appeal' in a limited sense.

Foreign Relations :

As the head of the government, the Emperor also formulated his country's foreign relations, political as well as economic. During the medieval period the rulers gave great deal of attention to relations with neighbouring powers, and it was entirely upon the Emperor to decide what sort of relations he wanted to establish and maintain with a particular neighbouring country. At that time there was no system of keeping the permanent diplomatic representatives at the court of a foreign ruler. The

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1. & 2. These conclusions are based on a piece of evidence wherein it is stated that a person murdered a certain Farjam Barlas and was awarded death sentence by the *Qazi*. The helpless old mother of the accused appealed to the Emperor who only persuaded the wife and the daughter of the deceased to accept blood-money and spare the life of the assassin. On their refusal, the accused was executed before the *Jharoka* [illegible]. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.126.

common form of maintaining the diplomatic relationship during those days was to exchange the envoys with letters and presents.

Envoys of different countries came to Aurangzeb after his accession. Among them were the envoys from Subhan Quli, the ruler of Balkh (February, 1661), from the Shah of Persia (May, 1661), from the Khan of Bukhara (November, 1661), from the rulers of Ethiopia, Mecca and Basrah (1662).[1] Aurangzeb, however, did not send return embassies to all of above countries. He only sent an envoy to the Shah of Persia (November, 1663) and the other to the ruler of Bukhara (July, 1664).[2] He, therefore, formulated his own foreign policy in relation to these two powers in so far as he did not lead any military expedition in that direction as his father Shah Jahan had done.[3] Aurangzeb also seems to have reversed his policy towards the Deccan rulers from what it was under Shah Jahan. Shah Jahan had concluded a treaty with the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda.[4] Aurangzeb, however, invaded them and annexed their kingdoms in 1686 and 1687 respectively.[5]

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1. *Kazim*, pp.606, 616, 637; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.124; *Tavernier*, Vol. I, pp.373-74; *Bernier*, pp.133, 144; *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.32, 43, 102, 106-07.
2. *Kazim*, pp.845, 863; *Tavernier*, Vol. I, pp.373-74; *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.118-22.
3. Vide *Lahori*, Vol. II ; *Salih*, Vol. II and III; B.P. Saksena, *History of Shah Jahan*, Chapters VIII and IX.
4. *Salih*, Vol. III; B.P. Saksena, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII.
5. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.279-80, 299; *Dilkusha*, ff.91b-94b; *Futuhat*, ff.88a-93a.

Similarly, Aurangzeb received envoys from some European countries who visited his court to obtain trade privileges from him. He granted trade concessions to those of them who*m* he considered in the interests of the country. Thus a Dutch ambassador arrived at the Mughal court in 1662. Aurangzeb was favourable towards him and granted the Dutch trade privileges in Bengal and Orissa.[2] Another embassy came from France which visited the Mughal court for the same purpose in 1666. But the court was not as favourable to the French as it was towards the Dutch. The French ambassadors returned without getting any concession from the Emperor.[2] An English envoy Sir William Norris also visited Aurangzeb for the same purpose (1701). But he also failed to secure anything from him.[3] Aurangzeb thus established his foreign relations as and with whom he liked.

The Prerogatives of the Emperor :

Apart from the powers mentioned above, the Emperor enjoyed certain prerogative as the King. These prerogatives were the exclusive privileges of the sovereign and no individual in the empire, not even the princes, were allowed to encroach upon them. These prerogatives were not

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1. Tavernier, Vol. I, p.273; Bernier, pp.127-29; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.57-58; English Factories (1661-64), pp.288-89.

2. Manucci, Vol. II, pp.140-41; English Factories (1665-67), pp.157-58.

3. Manucci, Vol. III, pp.283-88. For detail on William Norris' embassy, its purpose and end see Harihar Das, The Norris Embassy to Aurangzeb (1699-1702), Calcutta, 1959.

just simple privileges of the Monarch. Some of them were, of course, the traditional emblems of royalty and marks of kingly splendour and glory. Others were meant to distinguish the ruler from the ruled and create terror and awe in the minds of the subjects; and some of them were of some political and administrative consequence.

Almost all the prerogatives of the Mughal Emperors had been introduced, as would appear from the following discussion, by Akbar. But, apparently, they had not been fully established as such till the early years of Jahangir's reign. Jahangir found some of his nobles in the border provinces encroaching upon these privileges and he forbade them to do so through a *farman* issued in 1611.[1] However, when Aurangzeb occupied the throne, the royal prerogatives appear to have become well established. But as Aurangzeb initiated some changes in his attitude to show his adherence to the *Shariat*, the royal prerogatives did not remain unaffected. While some of them were retained by Aurangzeb as they were, others were either modified or were discontinued.

Perhaps the most significant prerogatives of the King was, besides the throne (*Aurang*), the use of the *Chatr*, *Sayeban* and the *Kaukaba*.

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1. *Tuzuk*, p.100.

They followed the Emperor whenever he rode out.[1] These three things, along with the throne, were considered the insignia of royalty. When Prince Murad declared himself the king at Ahmadabad (1657), he adopted the Chatr and the Sayaban, and sat on the throne.[2]

Another exclusive privilege of the King was the receiving the kornish and the taslim[3] from his nobles and the subjects. The kornish and the taslim were two special forms of salutations to the Emperor by his subjects and were performed on two different occasions.[4] The kornish was performed when a person got audience and waited upon the Emperor; taslim

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1. Ain, Vol. I, pp.35-36 (Blochmann, Vol. I, p.52); Bernier, p.266; Thevenot, p.219. Abul Fazl has described them as follows:
'Chatr, or umbrella, is adorned with the most precious jewels, of which there are never less than seven'.
'Sayaban is of an oval form, a yard in length, and its handle, like that of the umbrella, is covered with brocade and ornamented with precious stones. One of the attendants holds it, to keep off the rays of the sun. It is also called Aftabgir'.
'Kaukaba (was a sort of flag) of which several are hung up before the assembly hall'. Blochmann, p.52.

2. Kazim, p.29; Hatim Khan, f.40a.

3. The sijda (prostration) or zaminbos (kissing the ground), as it was then officially called, had also been practised under Akbar and Jahangir, but was discontinued by Shahjahan in the very first year of his reign (Ain, Vol. I, p.180; Badauni, Vol. II, p.301; Lahori, Vol. I, pp.110-12). It has, therefore, not been mentioned here.

4. The Kornish was a form of salutation in which 'the palm of the right hand was to be placed upon the forehead and the head to be bent downward; in the taslim, the back of the right hand was placed on the ground, and then it was raised gently till the person stood erect and put the palm of his hand upon the crown of his head. Ain, Vol. I, p.179.

was performed by a person whenever he was honoured by the Emperor with a present or honour. Three *taslims* were performed on the grant of a *mansab*, *jagir*, robe of honour, elephant; and just one on other favours.[1]

Besides these ceremonial privileges, there were other royal prerogatives which were of more utility and some political and administrative significance. One such prerogative was the maintenance of *naqqarkhana*. Under Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb till his 11th R.Y. (1668-69), *naqqarkhana* consisted a number of musical instruments.[2] The imperial musicians, attached to *naqqarkhana*, played different melodies through these instruments, at the dawn, sun-rise, mid-day, commencement of night and at other occasions.[3] Two of these occasions were very important from administrative point of view: one was when the Emperor appeared to hold the court; the other when he came out of the palace for going some where.[4]

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1. *Ain*, Vol. I, pp.119-20; *Bernier*, pp.214, 258; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.32; *Thevenot*, p.243. Shah Jahan is said to have introduced fourth *taslim* for such occasion after he abolished the *sijda*. (*Lahori*, Vol. I, p.110). But under Aurangzeb only three *taslims* were performed as mentioned by authorities cited above.

2. These instruments included: (1) *damama*, more or less eighteen pairs. It gave deep sound. (2) the *naqqara* itself, more or less twenty pairs. (3) the *duhul*, in all four were used. (4) *karna*, an instrument made of gold, silver, brass, and other metals. It was never less than four in number. (5) the *surna* of the Persian and Indian kinds; they blow nine together. (6) the *nafir*, of the Persian, European and the Indian kinds; they blow some of each kind. (7) the *sing* is of brass and made in the form of a cow's horn; they blow two together. (8) the *sanj*, or cymbal, of which three pair are used. *Blochmann*, Vol. I, p.52.

3. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.118.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.36, 119; *Tavernier*, Vol. I, p.98; *Bernier*, p.259; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.63.

In his eleventh regnal year, when Aurangzeb discontinued *Darshan*, he also banned the music and dance. As a result, the dancing and music at the court was discontinued and the court-musicians were dismissed. He, however, retained the naqqara itself,[1] perhaps, because, apart from its ceremonial value, it was of great administrative utility. At a time when there were no watches, sirens or other systems of informing the public of the time and the beginning of the business at court, or of other important events with which they were concerned, the imperial *naqqarkhana* served a very useful purpose and would have contributed to the punctual and regular holding of, and attending to the court and the various administrative offices. Aurangzeb did not only retain the *naqqarkhana*, he was jealous of its use by others. When prince Muazzam infringed upon this royal prerogative during his stay in Kabul, Aurangzeb reprimanded him through a letter.[2]

Another royal prerogative which Aurangzeb enjoyed till only 1668, was weighing his body against gold. Introduced by Akbar, and followed by Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, the Emperor was weighed against about twelve articles including gold and silver.[3] But while princes on their

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1. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.212; *Bernier*, p.363; *Thevenot*, p.219.

2. *Ahkam*, f.4b.

3. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.196; *Tuzuk*, p.163; *Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.9-10; *Kazim*, pp.229, 425; *Tavernier*, Vol. I, pp.379-80; *Bernier*, p.270; *Thevenot*, pp.66-67.

birthdays, or even some courtiers on some particular occasions could be weighed against other articles,[1] no body could be weighed in gold.[2] Perhaps the only exception was made by Shah Jahan himself when he weighed her daughter Jahan Ara in gold after her recovery from most serious burns (June, 1644).[3] Such gold or other articles were considered propitiatory offerings and were distributed as alms.[4] It was, thus, also a source of charity for the needy. Aurangzeb, however, altogether stopped weighing himself against any article in October 1668.[5] This royal prerogative, therefore, came to an end.

The distribution of mansab and the khitab (title) was another prerogative of the Emperor. The grant of mansab by the Emperor to his servants or to the new recruits has already been discussed above. Similarly, it was the Emperor alone who gave a particular khitab to his

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1. The Emperor was weighed twelve times on his solar birthday against the following articles: gold, quicksilver, silk, perfumes, copper, ruh-i tutiya, drugs, ghi, iron, rice-milk, seven kinds of grain, salt (Blochmann, Vol. I, p.277). As against this, 'The imperial princes, sons and grandsons of His Majesty are weighed once every year. They are for the first time weighed when two years old, but only against one thing. Every year, however, a new additional thing is put on the scales. When grown up, they are generally weighed against seven or eight things, but not against more than 'twelve' (Ibid., p.277). As for the weighing of a courtier is concerned, there is at least one instance when Jahangir weighed a physician of his court against silver and gave it to the courtier himself (Ibid., p.278, and Note).

2&3. Lahori, Vol. II, p.377.

4. Vide authorities cited in Note 3 of the previous page.

5. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.75.

nobles.[1] After the recital of khutba, it was the distribution of titles and mansabs to the people that heralded the accession of a king. The first thing that Prince Aurangzeb did before his departure from Aurangabad to Agra to contest the throne was the distribution of titles and mansabs to those of imperial servants who sided with him.[2] Later, Shah Jahan objected to this encroachment by the Prince on this royal prerogative through a letter to Aurangzeb, and Aurangzeb tried to explain his action.[3]

Another royal prerogative was the Chauki and the Taslim-i Chauki. Every Mughal noble present at the capital, had to mount guard with his contingent inside the palace for twenty-four hours once a week. It was called the Chauki. They had also to formally salute before the Emperor a collection of royal flags known as the Qur before they go on the Chauki. This was called the Taslim-i Chauki (salute of the Guards). Generally, the Emperor himself inspected the Qurs and the Taslim every evening. However, if the Emperor could not come for any reason, a prince was sent

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1. The distribution of titles by the Mughal Emperor is too well-known to be substantiated by citing the authorities. The instances of the distribution of mansabs and titles by the Emperor are scattered on almost every page of the Mughal chronicles. See also Bernier, pp.5-6; Manucci, Vol. II, p.345.

2. Bani, p.34; Kazim, p.51; Hatim Khan, f.15a.

3. Adab, f.290a; Ruqaat-i Alamgiri, pp.211-13.

to inspect the guards and the *Taslim*.[1]

An irksome and submissive duty as it was to guard the royal palace and salute the imperial flags, Akbar introduced it, perhaps, to test the sense of pride and fidelity of his high nobles. To mount guard in the royal palace and salute the *Qurs* by some of those who themselves were the hereditary rulers of their respective territories, certainly indicated their unqualified submission to the reigning sovereign. Indeed, it was, perhaps, for the first time in India that the highest dignitaries of the state were to salute the royal flags to mark their loyalty to the regime.

The *Chauki* and the *Taslim-i Chauki* was also meant, as Abul Fazl has remarked, to maintain the efficiency of the army.[2] 'The Emperor took the notice of the presence or absence of the nobles and the soldiers. If any one was absent without having a proper excuse, he was fined one week's pay or received a suitable reprimand'.[3] It kept at least one-seventh of

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1. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.150; *Kasim*, p.1105; *Bernier*, pp.258-266. Bernier's description of the *Chauki* does not only show the form of the ceremony, it also explains the *Qur*. Bernier writes, "There is this peculiar ceremony in the evening assembly, that all the *Mansabdars* who are on guard pass before the King to salute him with much form. Before them are borne with great ceremony that which they call the *Kour*, to wit, many figures of silver, beautifully made, and mounted on large silver sticks; two of them represent large fish; two others a horrible and fantastic animal called Ejedeha (*azdaha*); others are the figures of two lions; others of two hands; and the others of two scales; and several more which I cannot here enumerate (*Bernier*, pp.266-67). For *Qur*, see also *Ain*, Vol. I, pp.35-36.

2. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.150.

3. *Blochmann* (*Ain*), Vol. I, p.267.

the *mansabdars* and their contingents present with the Emperor in complete readiness. It also gave the Emperor an opportunity to come into contact with the contingents of all the *mansabdars* in turn, and see for himself their physical fitness, professional aptitude and the quality of their equipments. These were, perhaps, the reasons that Aurangzeb, like his predecessors, was very particular to inspect himself the *Chauki* and the *Taslim-i Chauki*. Aurangzeb came to the *Ghusalkhana* many times during his illness in May, 1662, to show himself to the nobles and to inspect the *Chauki*; and he himself signalled to the nobles and the soldiers to salute the *Qur*.[1]

Darshan was another royal prerogative which continued under Aurangzeb till only 1669. In the *Darshan*, the Emperor showed himself almost every morning to the public gathered below the palace through a window ('*jharoka*') of the palace. It had been introduced by Akbar and was followed by his successors.[2] During a period when the Emperor might not come out of his palace for days together, the *Darshan* was a political necessity. In a system where only the sovereign kept the state-machinery moving, the doubt about his existence could throw the whole empire into confusion and turmoil. The daily appearance of the king at the *jharoka*

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1. *Kazim*, p.747.

2. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.118; *Lahori*, Vol. I, pp.144-45; *Bazi*, pp.7-11; *Kazim*, p.1098; *Bunaat*, pp.5-6.

darshan prevented mischief about the person of the king. It was because of these reasons that all the Mughal Emperors were very particular about appearing for the *Darshan*, and missed it only in unavoidable circumstances. Shah Jahan's illness and his inability to appear for the *Darshan* for a few weeks (September, 1657)[1] caused so much trouble and bloodshed in the country and finally led to his deposition. It was to prevent such a situation to reoccur again during his one week's illness in May 1662, that Aurangzeb dragged himself up many times to the *Jharokha* for the *Darshan* to assure the people of his existence and to keep them in peace.[2]

Darshan also served some other useful purposes. It was an opportunity for both the sovereign and the people to come into contact with each other. While the Emperor was at the *Jharokha*, even the most ordinary man could put his grievances or complaints before him against any official of the state or any other person.[3] This daily availability of the sovereign to all people, irrespective of their status, was a great source of relief for the subjects, and an effective deterrent for the unscrupulous and cruel officials.

However, during the life time of Akbar himself, this useful

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1. *Saleh*, Vol. III, pp.261-62.
2. *Kazim*, pp.744-50.
3. *Ain*, Vol. I, p.118; *Lahori*, Vol. I, pp.144-45; *Kazim*, p.1098.

royal prerogative got the shape of a ritual; because for a section of the illiterate masses who always had great reverence for their ruler, the king became a sort of deity, appearing at the *jharoka*, and without having his *darshan* in the morning, they would not break their fast.[1] Aurangzeb considered it human worship and could not tolerate it for long. Moreover, his appearance at the *jharoka darshan* had acquired a new significance; it became an opportunity for the people to demonstrate there against his unpopular measures. The musicians and the *qawwals* who had lost their livelihood because of the ban on dancing and music a little earlier, demonstrated in a large number below the *jharoka darshan*, with a symbolic coffin of the music. Aurangzeb, therefore, gave up the practice of appearing for the *Darshan* in the 11th year of his reign (Feb. 1668 - Feb. 1669),[2] and this useful royal prerogative came to an end.

Ordering for the elephant-combat was another privilege reserved for the Emperor. Akbar had great liking for elephants and was an apt elephant rider. He maintained a large elephant stable, introduced the royal sport of elephant-fighting and made elaborate rules for it. Each elephant of the imperial stable had its match for the combat and the two were let loose for fighting on the sandy bank of the river, below

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1. *Badauni*, Vol. II, p.391; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.213.
2. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.213.

the Jharoka darshan wherefrom the Emperor used to see it.[1] Introduced by Akbar, this royal pastime was followed with interest by his successors.[2]

However, a great innovator and far-sighted ruler as Akbar was, he would not have introduced the ferocious fighting of the giant beasts just for the sake of amusement. Abul Fazl has emphasised the importance of elephants for the army. He describes a good elephant equal to five hundred horses for military purpose, and says, "when guided by a few bold men armed with matchlocks, such an elephant alone is worth double that number".[3] The elephant-fighting would have accustomed the beast to the bursting of crackers, muskets and fire and would have made them suitable for battles and wars for which they were especially trained by their keepers.[4] The fact that each elephant had its match for fighting and some were always kept ready at the palace and engaged when the order was given,[5] suggests that every elephant had to undergo this training. The fight would have also served as a test of the personal courage and riding skill of the keepers of the elephants and of their capacity to control and manoeuvre their beasts.

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1. Ain, Vol. I, p.104; Bernier, pp.276-77.

2. Tuzuk (Bikasha), pp.16-17; Roe, pp.106, 112; Lahori, Vol. I, pp.145, 489-92; Thevenot, pp.47, 100-01; Kamin, p.1098.

3. Ain, Vol. I, p.91.

4. Ibid., p.98; Bernier, p.277.


5. Ain, Vol. I, p.102.

These were, perhaps, the reasons that the puritan Aurangzeb retained this royal sport.[1] Some foreign travellers who visited Aurangzeb's court, witnessed the elephant fighting and have described it with detail.[2] Aurangzeb did not only retain elephant-combat, he was also jealous of this royal prerogative; and reprimanded those who tried to encroach upon it.[3]

J.N. Sarkar has mentioned a few more royal prerogatives. Among them are: (1) No Viceroy could pass the sentence of blinding on an offender or cutting off his nose or ears; (2) No one was to be forcibly converted to Islam by any *subahdar*; (3) The Viceroys should not affix their seals to the letters they address to imperial officers, but only their signatures; (4) No subject, while holding office or giving audience, should sit on a higher level than the carpet on the floor of the hall; (5) Lion-hunting.[4] Sarkar's observation in regard to first three items is based on a *farman* of Jahangir, referred to by Jahangir himself in the *Tuzuk*, in which he ordered his nobles posted in the border provinces to refrain from certain acts that suited only the kings (*khassa-i padshahan ast*) (1611).[5] The acts

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1. *Kazim*, pp.1098-99.
2. *Tavernier*, Vol. I, p.106; *Bernier*, pp.276-77; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.340; *Thevenot*, p.132.
3. *Inshah*, ff.144b-145a.
4. J.N. Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, pp.125-30. Cf. also R.P. Khosla, *Mughal Kingship and Nobility*, p.80.
5. *Tuzuk*, p.100.



prohibited by Jahangir to his nobles include, no doubt, some royal prerogatives discussed by us in preceding pages. But it seems that Jahangir has used the term _khassa-i padshahan_ losely, and his _farman_ includes some those acts which may not be maintained as royal prerogatives, although they were inappropriate on the part of the nobles and officials.[1] We must differentiate between the royal prerogatives and the acts that were not suited to the nobles, although they were not the royal prerogatives. The above mentioned acts, described by Sarkar as Emperor's prerogatives, come, perhaps, in the second category.

There is, perhaps, no instance of a Mughal Emperor ordering for the chopping off the nose or ears of a person; and there appears only four cases where an Emperor ordered for the blinding of a person. Humayun

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1. The order of Jahangir is as follows:
"Having again heard that the _Amirs_ on the borders interfered with authority in matters that do not concern them, and do not observe laws and regulations, I ordered that the _Bakhshis_ should circulate orders, to be obeyed amongst the Amirs of the borders, that hereafter they should not interfere in such things, which are the private affairs of kings. The first thing is this, that they should not sit in the _jharokha_ (private window), and should not trouble their officers and captains of the auxiliaries with keeping guard or saluting them, and should not have elephant fights, and should not inflict the punishment of blinding, and should not cut off ears and noses, and should not force Islam on any one, and should not confer titles on their servants, and should not order the royal servants to do _kornish_ or prostration, and should not force singers to remain on duty in the manner customary in (royal) _darbars_, and should not beat drums when they go out, and when they give a horse or elephant to anyone, whether to the kings attendants or to their own servants, they should not place reins or elephants goads on their backs and make them perform obeisance. In going in procession they should not take with them on foot in their retinue the royal attendants. If they write anything to them they should not put a seal on it" (_Rogers and Beveridge_, p.205).

ordered for the blinding of his brother Mirza Kamran (1553)[1]; Jahangir is said to have ordered his rebellious son Khusro to be blinded;[2] Shahryar was blinded during the interlude between Jahangir's death and Shah Jahan's accession (1627);[3] and Aurangzeb ordered for the blinding of the Maratha chief Shambhaji (1689).[4] In all these cases, those who were blinded were the potential challengers to the respective Emperors and the action may be described as political. Therefore, the blinding of a person, or cutting off his nose or ears cannot be described as royal prerogatives simply because Jahangir forbade his nobles to do so. Same may be said about forcible conversion. Among all the Mughal Emperors, perhaps only Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb are said to have encouraged conversion to Islam.[5] And even if forcible conversion by them is established, it could, at best, be described their personal attitude. Jahangir asked his nobles to refrain from forcible conversion not because it was a royal prerogative, but, perhaps, because he considered it improper for his nobles to do so.

The two other so-called prerogatives, namely the fixing of the seal and sitting on a level higher than the carpet, come in the same

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1. Akbarnama, Vol. I, pp.327-28; Bayazid, pp.155-56.
2. Intekhab-i Jahangir Shahi, f.185a-b.
3. Tuzuk, p.423.
4. Futuhat, f.156a; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.323; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.389.
5. Cf. S.R. Sharma, The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors, pp.90-92, 163-69.

category. We know that affixing the seal alone was not a royal prerogative; and princes, nobles and officials also affixed their seals on official and non-official letters.[1] Jahangir's contention in forbidding his nobles to affix their seal, appears to be, as observed by Rogers and Beveridge,[2] that the Viceroys should not impress their seals on the face (*zu*) of the letter (as against affixing it below, at the end, or at the back of the letter), because it was the place where royal seal was put. Similarly, sitting on a level higher than the carpet from the floor was not a royal prerogative. According to an authority cited by Sarkar himself, officials were permitted to sit on higher level, though not more than half the human stature above the ground.[3] The lion-hunting also was not an exclusive privilege of the Emperor. According to evidence cited by Sarkar himself, the princes also enjoyed this particular sport and others could also do so with the permission of the king.[4] The permission was required for others, not because the game was a royal prerogative, but, perhaps, to keep the

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1. *Mirat-i Alamgiri*, pp.103-04; *Dastur-ul Amal*, ff.88a-90a. For various officials affixing their seals on different documents see the following Chapters. The seal was a must for almost every official, and the *Akhbarat* tell us that the forged seals of the Emperor, the *Diwan-i Ala* and other officials were once discovered from the custody of a person (*Akhbarat*, 23rd Shaban, 36th R.I.).

2. *Rogers and Beveridge*, p.205, Note 2.

3. J.N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p.130.

4. *Bernier*, p.278.

hunting places reserved and undisturbed for the Emperor and his party.[1]

Sarkar has mentioned two more royal prerogatives which are related to each other and one has special reference to Aurangzeb. The first is that 'the Emperor alone could go in a _palki_ to the public (_jama_) mosque, to say Friday prayers'; the other is that 'no noble could make any imperial officer walk on foot in his retinue'.[2] This implies that the nobles followed the Emperor on foot. The statement is based on Jahangir's _farman_ cited above and on Tavernier's observation. Tavernier writes, "When the Emperor goes to mosque in his _palki_, one of his sons follows on horse-back and all the princes and officers of the household on foot.....".[3] But neither the use of _palki_ was a royal prerogative, nor was it necessary that noble should follow the Emperor on foot. The Emperor did sometimes use the _palki_,[4] but the nobles also rode on it.[5] Tavernier has, perhaps, confused the palki with the _takht-i rawan_ (the portable throne) which was sometimes used by the Emperor.[6] It was to some extent similar to _palki_ and was also carried on by a few men.[7] But, as is

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1. For hunting of various beasts and birds and their elaborate rules introduced by Akbar see _Ain_, Vol. I, pp.163-73; _Bernier_, pp.278-80.
2. J.N. Sarkar, _op. cit._, pp.125, 131. Also R.P. Khosla, _op. cit._, p.80.
3. _Tavernier_, Vol. I, pp.390, 398.
4. _Bernier_, p.214.
5. _[illegible]_, p.47; _[illegible]_, f.30b; _Bernier_, pp.214, 282-83; _Thevenot_, pp.221, 246.
6. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.126; _Bernier_, pp.128, 214, 370; _Manucci_, Vol.III, p.337.
7. For a description of the _palki_ see _Thevenot_, pp.159-60. And for a description of the _takht-i rawan_, pp.214, 280, 370.

evident from the name itself, it was a moving throne and was used by the Emperor alone. However, whatever the mode of travelling of the Emperor and whatever his destination, it was not necessary for the nobles to walk on foot with him. A statement of Bernier, who was an eye-witness to many a movements of the Emperor, will clear the position about both the matters. He writes, "..... His Majesty leaves the fortress (for Friday prayer), sometimes on an elephant..... and sometimes in a throne gleaming with azure and gold, placed on litter covered with scarlet or brocade, with eight chosen men, in handsome attire, carry on their shoulders. A body of Omrahs follow the king, some on horse-back, and others in Palkeys".[1] Bernier is supported by other authorities cited above. It is, thus, clear that neither the use of the palki was a privilege of the Emperor, nor the nobles were required to accompany the Emperor on foot.

The Emperor and the Court Procedure :

The Emperor had adopted a business routine to perform his duties and functions. He disturbed this routine only in unavoidable circumstances. However, during his prolonged Deccan campaign, and especially during its closing days, he could not attend to routine business. This resulted in the inefficiency in various government departments and dislocation of administrative machinery.

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1. Bernier, p.280.

Aurangzeb was a very strong and energetic ruler, and conscious of his duties and functions. He gave his maximum time to state business and looked into the minutest details of various branches of administration. The administrative structure of the government itself required his utmost attention to sustain the system. The Emperor was not just the head of the State or the head of the government. He was the actual master of all affairs. The Emperor himself took decisions about the financial, civil and military matters of the state, appointed, transferred, promoted and dismissed the officials, looked into the important occurrences in the fortresses, _thanas_, towns and in the _parganahs_, _sarkars_ and provinces, heard the appeals, decided the cases and himself received the foreign envoys. He had no alternative but to devote his maximum time and energy to the business of the state. It was a political and administrative necessity for him. In the Mughal system of government, only the mental alertness and physical capability of the Emperor to attend to the state affairs in the time of war and peace, could ensure him of his survival as king, and not just his physical presence in the palace. When Shah Jahan ceased to attend to state affairs because of his illness in 1657-58, the government and the throne slipped out of his hand.

Aurangzeb was fully alive to these requirements. To cope with his huge responsibilities in a systematic way, he divided his time for

different kind of works as his predecessors had done.[1] The chronicles have given a detailed account of Aurangzeb's business routine, and the court-diaries (the Akhbarat) fully borne them out. The foreign travellers who visited Aurangzeb's court, have also spoken of Aurangzeb's putting maximum time to the state business,[2] and have described in detail the manner in which the Emperor transacted the state business.[3] A perusal of the business routine of the Emperor does not only show as to how the Emperor performs his functions, it also gives us an insight into the day-to-day working of the government at the centre. The procedure was as follows.[4]

The Emperor got up before dawn. After the morning prayer and the recitation of the Quran etc., he sat for a while to hear the complaints

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1. For their work-routine, Ain, Vol. I, pp.116-18; Lahori, Vol. II, 140-42; Guldasta-i Chandrabhan, ff.6b-9a; Ruqaat, pp.5-6.

2. Manucci, Vol. II, p.16; Thevenot, p.240; Manucci observes (Vol. II, p.309) that Aurangzeb unceasingly occupied himself with state business, never failed to attend to state-matters every morning, and that in twenty-four hours he ate once and slept three hours.

3. There is a striking similarity between the accounts of Emperor's business routine given by the court historian Munshi Muhammad Kazim in Alamgirnamah (pp.1096-1107) and one given by the French visitor to Aurangzeb's court, Francois Bernier (pp.261-67), who is, however, not as detailed as the former.

4. The procedure is mainly based on Alamgirnamah (pp.1096-1107). But as mentioned above, it is supported by and large by the Akhbarat and the accounts of the foreign travellers who visited Aurangzeb's court and have given some description of the functioning of the government as they witnessed it. These authorities will be cited at their proper places.

of the people who wanted to seek redress from the Emperor.[1] At about the sunrise, the Emperor appeared at the *Jharokha darshan*. Apart from giving *darshan* to the people collected there, he also inspected from the *Jharokha* the contingents of the nobles, the huge elephants that could not be brought inside the palace-fort, their combat and their skill in chasing and attacking the horses and their riders, the purpose for which they were maintained and trained.[2] In 1669, the Emperor gave up the practice of appearing for the *darshan*. The written complaints of the people were now picked up by the officials through the *Jharokha* by means of rope;[3] and the Emperor inspected the elephants and horses etc. either from the *Shah Burj* of the Fort or while on his way to Friday congregational prayer.[4]

After about two hours from sunrise, the Emperor came to the *Diwan-i Khas-o Am*.[5] This was the open court or the audience hall of the

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1. *Bast*, p.3; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.309.

2. *Kazim*, pp.1096-99.

3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.95.

4. *Kazim*, p.1098; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.435.

5. It has been observed by some scholars that *Diwan-i Am* and the *Diwan-i Khas* were two separate sessions which Aurangzeb amalgamated (in the Deccan) because of the exigencies of the military affairs in the Deccan (S.R. Sharma, 'Aurangzeb's Share in Public Administration', *Islamic Culture*, October, 1940, p.447). But it was not so. Not only in the earlier years of Aurangzeb's reign, but also under his predecessors, the *Diwan-i Am-o Khas* was a single place and session where both the dignitaries and the commoners were permitted to have audience, and hence its name *Am-Khas*. If there was anything like the *Diwan-i Khas*, it was actually the *Ghusalkhana* which was variously described by these two names because the attendance there was restricted. Cf. *Salih*, Vol. III, pp.41-42; *Guldasta-i Chandrabhan*, f.8a; *Kazim*, 1099; *Inshaat*, f.96a; *Bernier*, pp.259-61; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.8; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.442.

Emperor where he attended to a variety of state business. The Bakhshis presented before him the nobles and the mansabdars. Those among them who received any post, promotion or any other favour, offered the usual taslim and those who got assignments in some provinces or far off regions, took here the leave of the Emperor and received the gifts, robe and other favours. The Emperor also interviewed here the candidates for service, mansabs or promotions and showed them his favour according to their worth. He also inspected here the musketeers, and the archers presented by the Mir Atish, the gentlemen troopers (ahadis) shown by the Bakhshis of Ahadis the imperial horses and elephants brought by the Akhta-Begi and the Darogha-i Filkhana respectively; and the horses and contingents of the mansabdar presented by the Darogha-i Dagh-o Tashiha. The Emperor also saw here the letters and presents sent by the provincial and sarkar officials. The Darogha-i Arz-i Mukarrar also put here before the Emperor the cases of the grant of mansab, jagir promotion etc. for his final approval. Thus, after spending about two hours in the Am-o Khas, the Emperor moved from there to the Ghusalkhana.[1]

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1. Kazim, pp.1099-11; Akhbarat, 28th Rabi II, 8th R.Y., 8th Ramazan, 13th R.Y., 1st Ziqada, 20th R.Y., 16th, 20th Jumada II, 31st R.Y., 20th Shawwal, 32nd R.Y., 6th Shawwal, 33rd R.Y., 18th Zilhijja, 32nd R.Y., 4th Shaban, 36th R.Y.; Bernier, pp.261-65; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.433-34; Thevenot, pp.59, 220-22.

Ghusalkhana may be described as the 'Emperor's office' where he attended to state affairs in a restricted manner[1] and looked into the working of each department of the government separately. It was at this time in the *Ghusalkhana* that the *mansabdars*, the dignitaries of the state, the high and low officials, the mace-bearers and *chelas* were granted audience (individually?). Similarly, the *Diwans*, the *Bakhshis*, the *Mir Saman*, the *Buyutat* and the *Daroghas* of the *karkhanas* waited upon the Emperor and put before him the problems of their respective departments, and took their orders from him. The *Sadr-us-sudur* also presented here the needy and the poors before the Emperor for the grant of stipend and other forms of assistance. The reports of the *sawanih-nigars* coming from different parts of the empire, and the despatches of the *subahdars* and other officials was also put before the Emperor at this time, and the Emperor dictated his decisions and orders on them. When the drafts of the orders were prepared, they were shown to the Emperor; and after his corrections, alterations and approval, were given to the *munshis* (writers) for final draft and despatch. Sometimes the Emperor also heard in the *Ghusalkhana* the appeals and the complaints of the people.[2]

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1. For the origin, meaning and significance of *Ghusalkhana*, see *Lahori*, Vol. I, p.148; *Salih*, Vol. I, p.247; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.442; *Bernier*, p.265.

2. *Kazim*, pp.1077-80, 1100-02; *Akhbarat*, 14th, 16th, 19th Ramzan, 13th R.Y., 12th Zilhijja, 20th R.Y., 2nd Rajab, 28th R.Y., 17th Jumada II, 30th R.Y., 19th Jumada II, 31st R.Y., 2nd Shawwal, 33rd R.Y., 2nd Shaban 36th R.Y., 19th Zilhijja, 39th; *Bani*, pp.3-4; *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.19[illegible] *Tavernier*, Vol. I, p.101; *Bernier*, pp.265-66; *Manucci*, p.434; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.540.

The Emperor left the *Ghusalkhana* about mid-day. After lunch, siesta and midday (*zuhr*) prayer, he stayed back during the afternoon in his private chamber (*khilwat kada* or *khilwat khana*, that was situated between the *Ghusalkhana* and his bed room). He spent this time in relaxation, in study, in copying the Quran, in attending to the affairs of the harem and the ladies of the palace, or going through the written petitions of the people. There was, however, no bar to the state officials at this time too, and they could come to discuss any emergent matter with him.[1] Nay, they could even call upon the Emperor in mid-night if they had any important matter to report.[2] A little before dusk, the Emperor visited the *Ghusalkhana* again to inspect the *Chauki* and the *Taslim-i Chauki*.[3]

After the sunset and the *maghrib* prayer, the Emperor came to the *Ghusalkhana* once again. This night session in the *Ghusalkhana* was reserved generally, though not exclusively, for the *Wazir-i Azam* or the *Diwan-i Ala*. The Emperor discussed with him in private various matters of state and administration. The *Wazir-i Azam* also put before the Emperor the finances of the state and other affairs of the *Diwani*, and received the instructions and guidelines from him. After this final session of about one and a half

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1. *Kazim*, p.1103.
2. Cf. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.312-13.
3. *Kazim*, pp.1104-05; *Akhbarat*, 2nd Zilhijja, 9th R.Y., 7th Shawwal, 33rd R.Y.; *Bernier*, p.266.

hours, the business of the day came to an end, and the Emperor retired for night (isha) prayer, dinner and bed.[1]

This was the daily routine of the Emperor. There were, however, two exceptions. On Saturdays and Wednesdays, the Emperor did not come to the Diwan-i-Khas-o-Am in the morning and sat instead in the Ghusalkhana as a 'court of appeal'. The officials of the Adalat (court of appeal), the qazis, the muftis of the imperial camp, the scholars, the divines, the jurists and the law and order officials (shahnagan) of the town sat with the Emperor to hear the appeals and help him in deciding the cases. No unauthorised person was allowed to sit in the Ghusalkhana during the hearing of the cases.[2] Similarly, on Thursdays, the Emperor held the morning session of the Diwan-i-Khas-o-Am alone, and did not come to the Ghusalkhana in the forenoon, afternoon, and in the evening. He spent the time thus spared in the prayers etc., because of the sanctity of the night preceding Friday.[3] Needless to say, the Emperor does not appear to have enjoyed a holiday. Officially, however, Friday was observed as holiday and the officials did not sit on that day at the Court itself[4] or in the provinces[5] because of the congregational prayer.

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1. Kambu, p.1105.
2. Ibid., pp.1102-03; Dilkusha, f.157a; Bernier, p.263.
3. Kambu, p.1106. Cf. Akhbarat, 18th Ramazan, 13th R.Y.
4. Thevenot, p.240.
5. Selected Waqai, pp.65, 66, 69.

The Emperor followed the above business routine whether he was in the capital or on his tours. The Diwan-i Am-o Khas or the Ghusalkhana did not just mean the stone structures in the forts of Agra, Fatehpur Sikri and Shahjahanabad. The terms had acquired special functional meaning. Wherever the Emperor was, the enclosures of stone or canvas, as the case might have been according to place of his stay, were styled as the Am-o Khas or Ghusalkhana or Adalat etc., according to the nature of the business undertaken there by the Emperor. In the Deccan, where the Emperor spent almost half of his reign, he mostly lived in tents. The whole royal enclosure was known as the Gulalbar; there were the Am-o Khas and the Ghusalkhana as also the Khilwat khana and bed-room etc. inside it.[1] It, however, appears that during his prolonged Deccan campaign, the Emperor could not regularly attend to the routine business in the Am-o Khas or in the Ghusalkhana. There are references in the Akhbarat to the effect that the Emperor suspended the morning session of the Am-o Khas or of Ghusalkhana, or sitting in the Darul Adalat or appearing at the Ghusalkhana in the evening.[2] It was, in fact, impossible for him to hold regular

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1. Cf. Akhbarat, 1st Rajab, 28th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.338-34; Thevenot, p.240. For a detailed description of the imperial camp and its various quarters and enclosures during Emperor's journey from Sholapur to Bijapur (November-December, 1689), given by the European traveller John F.G. Careri, see Thevenot, pp.217-22.

2. Akhbarat, 18th Jumada II, 31st R.Y., 10th Zilhijja, 32nd R.Y., 29th Ramzan, 33rd R.Y., 21st Rabi I, 36th R.Y., 2nd Shaban, 36th R.Y., 5th Shaban, 36th R.Y., 2nd Ramzan, 37th R.Y., 3rd Ramzan, 37th R.Y., 18th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y., 11th Safar, 39th R.Y., 18th Rajab, 39th R.Y., 28th, 29th Ramzan, 40th R.Y.

court or business sessions when he was mostly on move from one place to another. In the latter years of the campaign, indeed, the whole state-business seems to have dislocated and the administrative machinery shattered down as the entire imperial entourage was busy in war and skirmishes; and almost every official at court was busy in laying the siege to one fort or capturing the other as we shall see. As a contemporary chronicler has observed, the Emperor had concentrated his attention on qilagiri (capturing the forts) in preference to looking after the people and the country. The result was the near collapse of administration and the government.[1] The conditions were manifest on Aurangzeb himself before he closed his eyes.[2]

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1. Dilkusha, f.146a.

2. This is clear from a letter of Aurangzeb which he wrote to Prince Azam, apparently, during latter's governorship of Gujrat (May 1701 - March 1706, Cf. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.442, 512). The Emperor laments in the letter that, "Because of the Deccan expedition, our attention has been diverted from other affairs (of the state) and there is complete chaos in administration. Ruqaat, p.20; Raqaim, f.19a. Cf. also Dastur-i Aqhi, f.77b.

CHAPTER II

THE WAZIR

His Position, Powers and Functions

The Working of the 'Diwani' (Revenue Department) Under Him

The '*wizarat*' had developed into one of the most important administrative institutions under the Mughals. The matter has already been discussed by some writers on the subject.[1] A repetition of this discussion will serve no useful purpose. Here an attempt is made only to examine the working of the institution under Aurangzeb which has not been studied in detail so far.

The Wazir of the Diwan-i Ala :

Before we proceed to discuss the position and functions of the '*Wazir*' under Aurangzeb, we should first say a few words about the use of the designation of the '*Wazir*' in its various forms. As far as the reign of Aurangzeb is concerned, the terms *Wazir*, *Wazir-i Azam*, the *Diwan-i Ala* and the *Diwan-i Kul* had become synonymous and interchangeable, and there was no difference in their connotation. The same officer has

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1. See R.P. Tripathi, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, Part II, Chapters I-VI; Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of The Mughal Empire*, Chapter IV. Also I. Alam Khan, '*Wizarat* Under Humayun', *MIQ*, Vol. V (1963), pp.73-79.

been called *Wazir-i Azam* by one authority and simply the *Wazir* by another.[1] The other heads of central departments, like the *Mir Saman* and the *Mir Bakhshi* etc. have nowhere been described as the *Wazir*. The simple *Wazir* always meant the *Wazir-i Azam*; the other ministers were generally described with their proper designations like the *Mir Saman* or *Mir Bakhshi* and *Mir Atish*. However, the titles of *Wazir-ul mamalik* (the minister of the empire), *wizarat-panah* and *wizarat-dastgah* (the abode of ministership) were sometimes prefixed to their names or designations.[2]

The same *Wazir* or the *Wazir-i Azam* has often been called the *Diwan-i Ala* (the high *Diwan*) or the *Diwan-i Kul* (the *Diwan* of the entire empire).[3] A contemporary writers says that 'the *Diwan-i Ala* is also

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1. Fazil Khan, the first *Wazir* of Aurangzeb, has been described as the *Wazir-i Azam* in *Alamgirnamah* (p.833) and simply the *Wazir* by Saqi Mustaid Khan (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.46); Similarly, Jafar Khan has been called as the *Wazir-i Azam* (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.51) and simply the *Wazir* (*Ibid.*, p.47; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.177, 234). Some authorities have mentioned the *Wazir-i Azam* as *Wazir-i Ala* (*Salatin-i Chaghta*, f.253a). Among the foreign travellers, Tavernier has described him as the 'Grand Vizier' (*Travels in India*, Vol. I, p.380), while Bernier calls him simply the Vizier (p.271).

2. Cf. *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), p.20. The title was prefixed even to the names of provincial *diwans*. *Inayatjang Collection*, I 8/94, 1770.

3. *Kazim*, p.395. At other places the terms *Wizarat-i Azam*, *Wizarat* and the *Diwani* have been used for the same official, i.e. Fazil Khan (*Kazim*, pp.829, 833). Similarly, all three *Wazir-i Azams* of Aurangzeb have been described as the *Diwan-i Ala* in *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.83b. In *English Factories*, the *Wazir-i Azam* has simply been called the *Diwan* or 'King's Chanceller', 1661-64, pp.612-14.

called the *Jumdat-al mulk* (the high in the state), *Madar-al maham* (centre of important affairs) and the *Wazir-i Azam*.[1] Another authority has assigned all the duties of the *Wazir-i Azam* to the *Diwan-i Ala*.[2] Thus the two designations were synonymous and the *Diwan-i Ala* did not mean simply the revenue minister. It seems that the different designations for the holder of a single office had resulted from the historical practice of differentiating between the political and administrative affairs (*umur-i mulki*) and revenue matters (*umur-i mali*). The designation of *Wazir* or the *Wazir-i Azam* signified his position in the administration as a whole as he was above other ministers; but in relation to the *Diwani* (the revenue ministry), he was called the *Diwan-i Ala* or the *Diwan-i Kul* to distinguish him from the subordinate *diwans* in the revenue ministry itself like the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan*, and in the *subahs*. Under Aurangzeb, therefore, the same dignitary was the *Wazir*, *Wazir-i Azam*, *Diwan-i Ala* or the *Diwan-i Kul*. Under him we will not find a *Wazir* or *Wazir-i Azam* who was not the *Diwan-i Ala* or the *Diwan-i Kul*; and if there was no *Diwan-i Ala*, we will not find a *Wazir* or the *Wazir-i Azam* either.

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1. *Farhang-i Kardani*, ff.20b, 27b; *Malumat-al Afaq*, p.190. The author of *Mirat-al Alam* put *Diwan-i Kul* and *Diwani u Wizarat-i Kul* in one category (ff.133a, 223b).

2. *Khulasat-as Siyaq*, ff.15a-17a.

A Brief Historical Survey :

The reign of Aurangzeb, as a whole, was not a favourable period for the institution of *Wizarat*. For some years in the first half of his reign, Aurangzeb did not have a permanent and full-fledged *Wazir-i Azam* or the *Diwan-i Ala*. He kept the post vacant and made only ad hoc or temporary appointments to look after the '*Diwani* affairs'. Probably the prevailing political conditions in the beginning of his reign and some administrative considerations forced him to pursue this policy. Whatever the reasons, it only hampered the growth of the institution during this period. In the second half of his reign, however, one single person, Asad Khan held the office of the *Wazir-i Azam* till the death of the Emperor in 1707. The strong and energetic personality of Aurangzeb and his keen personal interest in the administration, did not allow the *Wazir-i Azam* to transgress his powers and overshadow the Emperor. Nevertheless Aurangzeb allowed him full liberty to play his role as the *Wazir-i Azam* and gave him the maximum discretion in his jurisdiction. As a result, the position and function of the *Wazir-i Azam* stabilised during this period. The holder of the office emerged as the closest and the most confidential adviser to the Emperor for all state affairs, the head of the revenue ministry (*Diwani*), supervisor over the other branches of administration, and the premier dignitary in the state - a true *Wazir-i Azam*, indeed, as the term was then understood.

Aurangzeb had captured the throne by a coup. Though, no doubt, he himself had chalked out the plan for how to wrest the throne from his ailing father, the influential nobles and senior officials of Shah Jahan had played no insignificant role in making the plan of Aurangzeb a success. Muazzam Khan Mir Jumla, his son Muhammad Amin Khan, and Shaista Khan Amir-ul Umara,[1] Khalil-al Allah Khan and others, taking advantage of their position and influence at the court and elsewhere, helped the rebellious prince in different ways, and greatly contributed in the successful execution of Aurangzeb's plan. And although Aurangzeb had assumed the kingship, Dara Shikoh and Shuja were striving to retrieve their positions. Shah Jahan and Murad, though in confinement, were still alive. Any one of them could have become a serious threat for him if they were joined by a sizable section of the nobles. Under these circumstances Aurangzeb had to be very careful about the nobles and cautious and choosy in giving them important positions and assignments.

During the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign, Jafar Khan was holding the post of _Wazir-i Azam_. After the battle of Samugarh, Jafar Khan, like many other nobles and officials, hastened to join Aurangzeb outside

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1. The son of famous Asaf Khan Yamin-al Daula, the father-in-law and the _Wakil_ of Shah Jahan, and, therefore, a prominent noble of Shah Jahan (5000/5000, _Salih_, Vol. III, p.439) and the maternal uncle of all his sons. But he had special liking for Aurangzeb and was his strong supporter. For his career and role in succession crisis see _Zakhirah_, f.78a; _Maasir_, Vol. II, pp.690-70.

Agra, on 9th June, 1658.[1] He might have been hoping that by doing so he would be confirmed on his post by Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb, however, was too wise to precipitate a crisis for him at such an early stage by appointing to the highest post under him a person who had otherwise played a lukewarm role in his struggle for the throne, ignoring the claims of those who had played more active and deciding role in the matter. Any resentment among them on this account in the existing circumstances, was wrought with serious consequences for Aurangzeb. Perhaps for the same reasons he did not want to assign the post to any other person.

But Aurangzeb could not have delayed the key appointments at the centre after he had assumed the powers of the king. The wars and disturbances had seriously affected the country and the people. The administration had been dislocated and the most affected branch of administration was the revenue ministry itself.[2] The conditions obtaining at that time, as also the interests of the new king himself, demanded that the uncertainty must be removed at the earliest and appointments should be made promptly. However, instead of appointing a full-fledged Wazir, Aurangzeb asked Raja Raghunath, the Diwan-i Khalisa of Shah Jahan's

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1. Razi, p.68; Kazim, p.116.

2. Kazim, p.117.

reign, to look after the revenue ministry and put revenue matters before him (20th June, 1658).[1] Some other functions of the *Wazir*, like the supervision of the drafting and preparation of royal orders and mandates, was assigned to Fazil Khan *Mir Saman*.[2] And finally, all the *farmans* or *sanads* that used to be issued with the *risalah*[3] (attestation) of the *Wazir*, were now to be issued with the *risalah* of Prince Muhammad Muazzam.[4] This is, however, obvious that the issue of these papers with the *risalah* of the Prince had only a symbolic significance and beyond that the Prince was not concerned with practical functioning of the revenue ministry,

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1. *Kazim*, p.117; *Dilkusha*, f.16b; *Hatim*, f.39b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.89b.

2. *Kazim*, p.395; *Hatim Khan*, f.81a; *Maasir*, Vol. III, p.325.

3. The term *risalah* has been , perhaps, nowhere explained by our authorities. Literally, it means, apart from other things, a letter, a treatise (Steingass, p.574). But it appears from a study of administrative manuals and the documents that bear the term that technically it meant 'attestation' and had special 'procedural' significance. When the Emperor h verbally assigned a *jagir* or a post to a person, the matter was verified by the *Wazir* on the basis of the court-diary (*waqai-i huzur*) and the document was known as *yaddasht* (memorandum). On the basis of this *yaddasht* a *farman* or a *sanad* (certificate), as the case may be, was prepared, which contained on its back the *yaddasht* itself, now technically called *zimn*. This *zimn* was again to be verified and sealed by the *Wazir*. And the term *ba-risalah* (i.e. with the attestation of) was prefixed to his titles and name (*Selected Documents Aurangzeb*, pp.5, 7, 18, 79).

4. This particular aspect of division of work has not been mentioned by our chronicles. But some administrative manuals have clearly described the fact (*Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.89b, 90a; *Maasir-i Timuriyah*, f.141a). We have also come across some *farmans* issued with the *risalah* of the Prince in the State Archives, Hyderabad. See, for example, *farman* of Aurangzeb to Khwaja Beg alias Pratap Singh (10th Muharram, 4th R.Y./ 5th September, 1661) granting him the *qiladari* of Chuler; and a *parwanah* of *madad-i-maash* grant to Saiyid Abdul Wahab, 4th Jumada I, 5th R.Y./15th December, 1662.

because he was in the Deccan at this time. He came to court only about the end of 1660.[1]

In any case, the formal functions of the Wazir were divided among three persons: a revenue official, who did not belong to any important family or group of the nobles, and was holding a rank of 2500/500 among the mansabdars,[2] was asked to look after the revenue affairs; a noble of higher rank and position, and one who was holding the important post of the Mir Saman,[3] was assigned the job of drafting and preparation of imperial orders and mandates that were to be issued in the name of a prince. Aurangzeb, thus appointed no Wazir or Diwan-i Ala at this juncture. Jafar Khan was conveniently eased out, and shortly afterwards, was sent to Malwa as its Hakim.[4]

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1. Kazim, p.452.

2. In the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign, the mansab of Raja Raghunath was only 2000/300. After his accession Aurangzeb promoted him to 2500/500, which he held till his death in 1663. (Kazim, p.396; Maasir, Vol. II, p.282). Hatim Khan, however, describes his last rank as 3000/700 (f.126a).

3. Before the accession of Aurangzeb, the mansab of Fazil Khan, the Mir Saman of Shah Jahan, was 3000/400. After his final coronation, Aurangzeb confirmed him on his post and was promoted to the rank of 4000/2000 (Kazim, p.395).

4. Kazim, p.162; Khafi Khan (Vol.II, p.41) does mention that 'the subahdari of Malwa was given to him in addition to Wizarat which was to be performed by his 'deputy'. But after his appointment as the subahdar of Malwa, Jafar Khan does not appear to have been described as the 'Wazir' in any authority. Maasir-ul Umara also does not support the statement of Khafi Khan. Moreover, if the version of Khafi Khan is accepted, then, after the death of Rai Rayan (1663), a new 'naib-i-wazir' should have been appointed and not the Wazir-i Azam, as, according to Khafi Khan, the Wazir-i Azam (i.e. Jafar Khan) was still alive. But Fazil Khan was now offered the post of Wazir-i Azam (see Infra p. 101).

Perhaps Aurangzeb could not have made better arrangement under the circumstances. Raja Raghunath had been trained in the revenue matters under the stewardship of Allami Sadullah Khan and was a veteran official of the revenue ministry. He could perform his job in satisfactory manner without creating resentment among the influential nobles, because he had not been designated the Wazir or the Diwan-i Ala. He has generally been described as the Mutasaddi-i muhimmat-i Diwani[1] (the Superintendent[2] of the revenue matters).

The fact that this arrangement lasted for full five years, till the death of Rai Rayan in 1663, indicated the system worked well and Aurangzeb was satisfied with its working. But it did stall the growth of the institution of Wizarat under him.

Sarkar has observed that by not confirming Jafar Khan as the Wazir, and asking Rai Rayan to look after the Diwani, Aurangzeb 'kept the

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1. Kazim, pp.396, 829; Maasir, Vol. III, p.526. Khafi Khan sometimes describes him as Naib-wazir or Naib-i wizarat (Vol. II, pp.78, 175). But as mentioned above, no other authority describes him as such.

2. Mutasaddi means 'an inferior officer of the government, a writer, clerk or accountant' (Steingass, p.1160; Wilson's Glossary, p.359). In Mirat-i Ahmadi (Vol. I, p.256) the term has been used for 'administrator' of Surat, which English factors there understood as 'governor' (English Factories, 1661-64, pp.203, 311, 324). Jadunath Sarkar has, however, translated the word into 'Superintendent' (Maasir-i Alamgiri, English translation, p.29), which I think, is most appropriate in this context, for, whatever the designation, Raja Raghunath was the highest official of the diwani at this time. Cf. Kazim, p.116; Hatim Khan, f.39b.

premiership in abeyance for restoration to Mir Jumla'.[1] A recent writer has gone even further and has written that (after the battle of Khajwa, 21st January, 1659) 'Muazzam Khan (Mir Jumla) .... was confirmed in his former post of *Wazir*'.[2] Perhaps no contemporary source has mentioned that Aurangzeb at any time appointed Mir Jumla as his *Wazir*, nor even the sources cited by the learned writer himself. Nor there seems any evidence to suggest that Aurangzeb kept the post vacant for him. If Aurangzeb so desired during Mir Jumla's absence in the Deccan or later in Bengal, he could have made the same arrangement which Shah Jahan had made during Mir Jumla's posting in the Deccan. Nor the view is supported by the actual treatment meted out by Aurangzeb to Mir Jumla on his arrival at Court at Khajwa (12th January, 1659). After the battle, he was promoted to 7000/7000 and sent in pursuit of Shuja (22nd January, 1659);[3] which seems a deliberate move on the part of Aurangzeb to keep him away from the Court. The appointment of Mir Jumla as the *Wazir* or keeping the post vacant for him is, therefore, not supported by facts.

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1. J.N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol. III, p.72.
2. Laiq Ahmad, *Prime Ministers of Aurangzeb*, p.61. Cf. also p.62.
3. *Kazim*, pp.242, 267, 269.

However, Raja Raghunath died in June 1663, while the Emperor was in Kashmir.[1] His death revived the question of the appointment of a Wazir-i Azam. The task, however, was not as difficult at this time as it was in the beginning of the reign. Aurangzeb had now fully consolidated himself on the throne. The choice, was perhaps, limited between the two persons: Jafar Khan the former Wazir, and Fazil Khan Mir Saman who had been performing some functions of the Wazir. The mantle fell upon Fazil Khan, perhaps, because of his seniority in age and experience and instant availability: he was accompanying the Emperor while Jafar Khan was in Malwa. He was appointed the Wazir-i Azam on 17th June 1663.[2] Because of his prominent position among the nobles, high academic calibre and administrative experience, Fazil Khan might have contributed in rehabilitating the position of Wazir-i Azam under Aurangzeb. But he died of severe illness on the seventeenth day of his assuming the office (3rd July, 1663).[3] Aurangzeb had to find out a new incumbent. The choice now fell upon Jafar Khan, the Nazim of Malwa.

Jafar Khan was one of the senior surviving nobles of Shah Jahan. He was the daughter's son of Itimad-ud Daula[4] Ghiyas Beg and son-in-law of

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1. Kazim, p.829.
2. Ibid.
3. Maasir, Vol. III, p.589; Kazim, p.833.
4. The father of Empress Nur Jahan and the famous Diwan of Jahangir. For his life and career see Zakhirah, ff.45b-47a; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.127-34.

Asaf Khan Yamin-al Daula, and was thus closely related to Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. He had served on many posts under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb and had also been the Wazir-i Azam of Shah Jahan, though for a brief period. He was thus, perhaps, the most suited person for the post[1] and was, therefore, summoned from Malwa to take over as the Wazir-i Azam.[2] Till he arrived at the court and assumed the office, which took him some five months, Asad Khan the Second Bakhshi, was asked to look after the Diwani as the deputy of Jafar Khan.[3] Jafar Khan joined Aurangzeb at Panipat, while the latter was on his way back from Kashmir to Delhi, on 10th January, 1664, and was created the Wazir-i Azam.[4] The Emperor showed him utmost regard and favour and allowed him full liberty to play his role as the Wazir. Jafar Khan, on the other hand, served with devotion and sincerity.[5] He was practically the first Wazir of Aurangzeb. But because of his age and experience, close relationship with the Emperor, and the respect and regard showed to him by the king, he was able to

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1. Ishiq Ahmad (op. cit., p.92) has described the appointment of Jafar Khan to the post of the Wazir as 'an act of concession to an elder peer'; and writes 'His only qualifications were geniality of temperament, righteousness and affable manners'. We have already mentioned the earlier career of Jafar Khan (Supra p.22). It would, therefore, not be correct to describe the appointment of a person of such vast experience and close links with the royal family as a concession to him.
2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.47.
3. Maasir-i Timuriyah, f.14b.
4. Kazim, p.849; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.177.
5. Kazim, p.914; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.103; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.531-35; Bernier, p.271.

restore to the *Wizarat* its previous prestige and dignity in a short period. Foreign visitors to the court of Aurangzeb have described Jafar Khan as 'the premier dignitary in empire', 'First Minister' in the State and the 'Chief Secretary' to the Emperor.[1] But he also died on the 16th May, 1670, after serving for comparatively a brief period of six years.[2] Whatever stability he might have brought to the institution of *Wizarat*, it again suffered a set back after his death, as during the next few years again there was no *Wazir*.

After the death of Jafar Khan, Aurangzeb was feeling it difficult to find a suitable person, as we shall see. However, till a new incumbent was found, Asad Khan the Second *Bakhshi* was once again asked to look after the *Diwani* as the *Naib Wazir*.[3] The other powers of the *Wazir* the Emperor kept for himself.[4] Nor was he authorised to sign on the *yaddasht* and the *zimn* of the *farmans*. In this respect, the arrangement made during the period of Raja Raghunath was repeated once again and Asad Khan was instructed to write on these documents *ba risalah-i padshahzada Muhammad*

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1. *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.145-46.
2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.103.
3. *Akhbarat*, 29th Zilhijja, 13th R.Y.; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.104; *Salatin-i Chaghta*, f.253a.
4. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.235.

Muazzam',[1] and the seal of the Prince was to be fixed by Diyanat Khan, a noble who was then spending a retired life.[2] It seems that after assuming new responsibility, Asad Khan relinquished the post of the Second Bakhshi, and a little later he was appointed to the substantive post of Mir Bakhshi vice Lashkar Khan, deceased (in August, 1670).[3]

Meanwhile the search for a full-fledged Wazir-i Azam continued. The choice fell upon Muhammad Amin Khan, the then subahdar of Kabul. He was one of the important nobles, had held the post of the Mir Bakhshi for more than a decade, both under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb; and had even served under Shah Jahan as the Naib Wazir, as the deputy of his father, Muazzam Khan Mir Jumla when the latter was sent to the Deccan. He was, therefore, recalled from Kabul. On his arrival at Court on 22nd June 1671,

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1. This passage has been given by Maasir-i Alamgiri (pp.103-04), and reproduced by the author of Maasir-ul Umara (Vol. II, p.85; see also Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.90a). We have already explained the meaning and significance of the term risalah (see Supra p. 97). But JN Sarkar has translated the passage in completely different way which altogether changes the significance of this important official endorsement. He translates it, "The Emperor ordered that (on Asad Khan's letter of appointment) should be written through the mediation (wasilatan) of Prince M. Muazzam, and that the seal of the Prince should be affixed by Dianat Khan" (p.64). Beveridge, in his translation of Maasir-ul Umara (Vol. I, pp.270-71, Note 5) and Laiq Ahmad (op. cit., p.103) have further confused the meaning.

2. Diyanat Khan was a Shah Jahani noble who had served under him on various posts. Aurangzeb appointed him the Daroghah-i Baghra Jashiba. In the 8th R.Y., he was appointed the Diwan-i Buyutat, and was relieved from that post the next year. He was, apparently spending retired life when he was asked to fix the seal of the Prince. He died sometimes in the 16th R.Y. (Maasir, Vol. II, p.37).

3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.105, 108; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.29a.

he was given a very favourable reception, befitting the position he was going to be elevated to: Lutfullah Khan (the *Darogha-i arz-i mukarrar*) received him at the gate of the fort; and Asad Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi* and the *Naib Wazir*, at the door of *Ghusalkhana*.[1] A little later (September 1671) he was invited to take up the duties of the *Wazir*. Muhammad Amin Khan, aware of the dearth of suitable persons for the post, and inflated by the reception he was accorded to at the Court, put forward 'some difficult and unacceptable conditions' to the Emperor before he could accept the offer.[2] Our authorities do not mention as to what exactly were his 'requests'. Probably, taking advantage of the situation, he would have desired maximum powers and concessions. He was, thus, dictating the terms to the Emperor even before he took over as the *Wazir*. We may judge from it what sort of a *Wazir* he would have proved after assuming office, had his terms been accepted by the Emperor. Naturally, the Emperor could not have allowed such a situation to develop. The offer was, therefore, withdrawn; and he was sent back to Kabul.[3] As for the revenue ministry, the previous arrangement was allowed to continue.

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.109.

2. *Ibid.*, p.111; *Maasir-ul Umara*, Vol. III, p.617.

3. At Kabul he showed recklessness against the Afghans and was routed; his son killed and daughter arrested by the enemy and released on ransom (May 1672). As a result, he fell from grace, his rank was reduced by one thousand *zat* (to 6000/5000) and shifted to Gujrat as its *Nazim* without being granted the permission for Court. He died while serving on that post, on 14th June, 1682 at Ahmadabad (*Ibid.*, pp.613-620).

But the arrangement was somewhat confused and complicated: there was no Wazir-i Azam or the Diwan-i Ala; Asad Khan, while holding the post of the Mir Bakhshi was also designated the 'Naib Wazir' and was asked to look after the revenue ministry, in addition to his duties as the Mir Bakhshi. But he had neither been permitted to sign or seal in that capacity; nor was he even authorised to keep and affix the seal of Prince Muazzam. The Prince on the other hand, was neither designated as the Wazir, nor was he given any function or responsibility of that office; but his seal was to be put on the papers issued by the revenue ministry. And the Emperor had retained for himself most of the powers of the Wazir. The defects of the system were obvious. Apart from putting additional burden on Asad Khan, it created multiplicity of authority and complicated the procedure, which might have caused delay. These defects could not have escaped the notice of a person like Aurangzeb. But, perhaps, there was no way out.

It seems that there was a 'crisis' of administrative personnel about this time; and, apparently, the Emperor was feeling it difficult to find suitable persons for higher administrative posts at the centre. We have already noticed that after the death of Lashkar Khan Mir Bakhshi, Asad Khan was also appointed the Mir Bakhshi, although he had already been appointed the Naib Wazir and given the charge of the Diwani. The conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that after the rejection of

Muhammad Amin Khan, our authorities do not mention any further search by the Emperor for another candidate for Wizarat. The reasons for this crisis were, perhaps, the wars before and after the accession of Aurangzeb that had consumed many senior and capable nobles, who had been trained and experienced during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Many others died of their natural death. Among the new nobles who now swelled the number, or the old surviving nobles, all could not have been raised to the high administrative posts at the centre and, especially, to the position of the Wazir. The nature of the post demanded, among other qualities, highly technical knowledge and experience of the revenue ministry. Among the central ministers, the Mir Atish and the Sadr-us Sudur were out of question for the promotion to the post of Wazir because of the nature of their job and experience; perhaps, there is no instance of these officials having been ever promoted to the post of Wazir or the Diwan-i Ala. Only the Mir Bakhshi or the Mir Saman could have been considered. The present Mir Bakhshi Asad Khan had an edge over the Mir Saman Ashraf Khan.[1] Like Jafar Khan, Asad Khan was also related to the royal family.[2] Moreover,

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1. For his life and career see Amusir, Vol. I, pp. 272-74.

2. Muhammad Ibrahim, entitled Asad Khan, was the son of Zulfiqar Khan Qaramanlu, the nephew of Farhad Khan, the famous general of Shah Abbas I of Persia. When Farhad Khan was executed by the Shah and the family fell from grace, Zulfiqar Khan fled to India in the closing years of Jahangir's reign, was received favourably by the Emperor, and was married to the daughter of Sadiq Khan Mir Bakhshi of Jahangir. The issue coming out of that marriage, Asad Khan was in turn married to the daughter of Yaminud Daula Asaf Khan. Asad Khan was, thus, the brother-in-law of Shah Jahan and maternal uncle-in-law of Aurangzeb, though younger to him in age (Maasirul Umara, Vol. I, pp.310-16; Vol. II, pp.85-89).

he had come of a distinguished family of administrators who had served on many high posts with distinction since the time of Jahangir. He was himself attached to the administration for over two decades,[1] and as already mentioned, had also served as the *Naib Wazir*, though for a brief period of about six months. He could have been, probably, the best choice for the post of *Wazir-i Azam*. But, perhaps, the problem before Aurangzeb was that he was too junior to be elevated to that office. He had started his career as the *Akhta Begi* in 26th year of Shah Jahan's reign (1653-54). He was later appointed the Second *Bakhshi* (1657). After his accession, Aurangzeb confirmed him on the post of the Second *Bakhshi* which he was holding when Jafar Khan *Wazir-i Azam* died. Now he could not have been jumped from that position to that of the *Wazir-i Azam*. His age might have also been an obstacle; he was about forty at that time[2] while

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1. Asad Khan got his first appointment under Shah Jahan who appointed him the *Akhta-Begi* (horse-master) and raised him to 1500/300 (Cir. March, 1653, *Salih*, Vol. III, p.158). Subsequently, he was entitled Asad Khan (Nov. 1653, *Ibid.*, 173), promoted to 2000/800 (14 Oct. 1656, *Ibid.*, 231), and appointed the Second *Bakhshi* (17 March, 1657, *Ibid.*, 241). He defected to Aurangzeb after the battle of Samugarh and joined him at Noor Manzil on 16th June, 1658, was promoted to 3000/1500 and was confirmed on his post (*Kazim*, pp.115, 119; *Aqil Khan*, ff.35a-36b; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.310-20). His career thereafter has been mentioned above.

2. Asad Khan is said to have attained 94 years at the time of his death in 1129 A.H./1716-17 A.D. (*Maasir*, Vol. I, p.318). It means he was only 45 years old at the time of the death of Jafar Khan in May 1671. The author of *Muhammadi* (p.35), however, describes him still younger. According to him Asad Khan was only 88 years old at the time of his death in 1128 A.H./1715-16 A.D.

both the two previous holders of the post under Aurangzeb were above sixty.[1] It seems that Aurangzeb thought to promote him to that position gradually, as is evident from the fact that immediately after his appointment as _Naib-Wazir_, he was promoted to the post of _Mir Bakhshi_.[2] The blame on Aurangzeb, however, lies in the fact that during these long years after his accession, he apparently made no attempt to bring forward young and capable persons who might shoulder the responsibilities of the old guards after their deaths. For example, Asad Khan himself was stagnated on the post of the Second _Bakhshi_ for more than a decade. But when Aurangzeb found no candidate for _Wizarat_, Asad Khan was promoted from the position of the Second _Bakhshi_ to that of the _Wazir-i Azam_, as we shall see, within a short period of about five years.

However, whatever the difficulties or future plans of Aurangzeb, Asad Khan, perhaps, resented this arrangement which was very unfavourable for him. He was looking after the two most important central departments without being rewarded for extra burden and over-work that he would have been putting. He might have, indeed, felt humiliated for not being given

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1. Fazil Khan had reached 70 when he had been appointed the _Wazir_ (Cf. _Muhammadi_, I.O. MS. 3890, year 1073). We were unable to find the exact age of Jafar Khan. But this much is clear from a statement of _Mamuri_ (Vol. II, pp. 145-46) that at the time of his appointment as _Wazir_, he had reached to a very old age, and might have reached closer to the age of Fazil Khan.

2. Cf. _Akhbarat_ (29th Zilhijja, 13th R.Y.) which clearly gives this impression.

the custody of the seal of Prince Muazzam. He, therefore, resigned from the post of *Naib-Wazir* on 20th March, 1673,[1] after serving on it for about three years.

Now Amanat Khan,[2] the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and Kifayat Khan, the *Diwan-i Tan* were asked to transact the business in the *Diwani*. Apparently each of them got the independent charge of the respective section of the *Diwani*.[3] But there was none who might have supervised and coordinated the work in the two wings of the revenue ministry. Nor was there any one to whom the Emperor could assign other sundry duties and functions of the *Wazir*. This would have put great strain on the Emperor and would have affected the efficiency of administration. Political conditions in the empire were all but peaceful. Apart from the Deccan problems, the Afghans were creating serious troubles in Kabul province. The imperialists had suffered great losses in men and material.[4] Ultimately, the Emperor had to proceed to Kabul (on 16th April, 1674) to handle the situation

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.125.

2. A distinguished noble of Aurangzeb, whose father and descendants served four Mughal Emperors from Jahangir onward. (*Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.258-68; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.261, 376-78).

3. *Ibid.* (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*), p.126; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.93b.

4. The humiliation of Muhammad Amin Khan by the hands of rebel Afghans his disgrace and transfer to Ahmadabad had already been mentioned. Some of the subsequent expeditions sent against them met the same fate and their commanders were killed (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.131).

himself.[1] These conditions demanded a strong and effective administration at the centre which may relieve the Emperor of unnecessary burden and help him in dealing with the brewing problems in the empire. This was not possible without a permanent and full-fledged Wazir.

It was, perhaps, because of these pressing circumstances and the non-availability of other persons for the post of Wazir, that Aurangzeb ultimately appointed Asad Khan as the Wazir on 18th October, 1676,[2] after a gap of three years since he resigned from the post of Naib-Wazir. These three years were, however, enough for stabilising the position of Asad Khan as the Mir Bakhshi; and the period would have been considered a reasonable gap for promoting him from the position of Second Bakhshi to that of the Wazir-i Azam. He was, however, confirmed on the post only in 1687 and was honoured with the masnad-i wizarat (a cushion or carpet meant for the sitting of the Wazir).[3]

During this long tenure of office, Asad Khan served the Emperor and the country with loyalty and sincerity. Perhaps, the only official

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1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.132; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.237. For Emperor's prolonged stay at Hasan Abdal and his operations against the Afghans, see Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.133-48; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.237-47.

2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.152.

3. Ibid., p.280; Maasir, Vol. I, p.312. This is supported by some documents which establish that although Asad Khan had been appointed the Wazir, the farmans were still issued with the risalah of Prince Muazzam (see Aurangzeb's farman, granting qiladari of Auter to Saiyid Zainul Abidin, dated 11th Shawwal, 22nd R.Y., State Archives, Hyderabad).

who was a near contemporary to the Emperor - he was about twelve years younger to him[1] - he grew closer to him with the passage of time. The Emperor considered him friend and companion and reposed full confidense in him. There was no position in the empire above the Wizarat to which Asad Khan could have been promoted. But the Emperor rewarded him in other ways for his commendable services. Apart from usual favours which he received with other nobles from time to time, he was raised to the rank of 7000/7000,[2] the highest mansab held by any noble or Wazir under Aurangzeb or his predecessors. And finally, he was given the rare honour of being entitled Amir-al Umara.[3] In the long reign of fifty years of Aurangzeb, the only other recipient of this coveted title was Shaista Khan, Mirza Abu Talib, the maternal uncle of the Emperor. We have come across only a few instances when Asad Khan was censured or admonished by the Emperor.[4] In view of his long term of office, these instances are negligible. This, indeed, goes to the credit of Asad Khan that he was able to successfully manage an Emperor like Aurangzeb. While other

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1. While Aurangzeb was of 91 years (lunar) in February, 1707 A.D. (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.523), Asad Khan was of 76 years (Muhammadi, p.35)

2. Akhbarat, 13th Shaban, 37th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.392.

3. Dilkusha, f.136a; Maasir, Vol. I, p.315.

4. One of these instances was in 37th R.Y., when during the siege of Jinji, he had a hitch with Prince Kam Bakhsh. As a result he was censured (For the episode, see Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.354-66). The other occasion was in the 47th R.Y., after the siege of Kondana. For the incident, see Infra p. 155.

ministers came and went, he served as Wazir for more than three decades without interruption. Perhaps no other minister in the long administrative history of the Mughals, held an office for such a long term - a term that came to an end only because of the death of his master.

All three Wazirs of Aurangzeb, thus, served till their death though their tenure varied from seventeen days to thirty years. The traditions of life-term of the Wazir established under Jahangir and followed under Shah Jahan,[1] were thus maintained under Aurangzeb. The three Wazirs of Aurangzeb had come from the lower cadre of the administration, after a long period of successfully serving on various posts and gaining maturity and experience; no outsider or amateur was raised to the position of the Wazir. All three belonged to the Irani group of nobility, though two of them i.e. Jafar Khan and Asad Khan had been born in India. These two were, indeed, closely related by blood to the Emperor. If we exclude the two weeks' tenure of Fazil Khan, we can justly say that the Wizarat under Aurangzeb remained confined in the relations of the Emperor. But we cannot say that their appointment was because of this relationship to the Emperor, or they were appointed because of any extraneous consideration or pressure. As we have already discussed, they were apparently the best available talents for the posts of Wizarat at the time of their appointments.

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1. Cf. Ibn Hasan, op. cit., p.203.

The *mansabs* held by the three *Wazirs* do not only show their position among the Mughal mansabdars, it throws light on some important aspects of terms and conditions of their office. When Fazil Khan was appointed the *Wazir*, he held the rank of 5,000 *zat* (2000 *sawar*).[1] He died on the *mansab* of 5000/2500.[2] We may, however, assume that had he served for a longer period, he would have attained higher rank. Jafar Khan held the *mansab* of 6000 *zat* (6,000 4000 2-3 horse) at the time of his appointment.[3] During six years of his office he got no promotion in his personal rank, but his *sawar* rank was enhanced to 6,000, 2-3 horse.[4] When Asad Khan was appointed the *Wazir*, his *mansab* was also 5000 *zat* (5000 *sawar*). When he was confirmed on the post in 1686, he was raised to 7000/7000.[5] When the Emperor died, he held the same rank. It means he got no promotion in *mansab* for about twenty years. We can draw a few conclusions from the above data. All three persons who were appointed the *Wazir* were holding the rank of 5000 *zat* or above at the time of their appointment; their *sawar* rank, however, varied from 2500 to 6000. In other words, the *mansab* of 5000 *zat* was considered the lowest rank for a prospective candidate for

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1. *Kamin*, p.762; *Hatim Khan*, f.126a; *Maasir*, Vol. III, p.525.
2. *Kamin*, p.831.
3. *Ibid.*, p.162.
4. *Maasir*, Vol. I, p.533.
5. *Akhbarat*, 6th Ramazan, 13th Shaban, 37th R.Y.; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.302.

Wizarat. That is, perhaps, another reason why Raja Raghunath was not designated the Wazir, as his rank at that time was less than 2500/500.[1] And, as such, there seems no reason to attribute communal considerations for not making him a Wazir.[2] At the same time, the varying high mansabs held by three Wazirs show that no upward limit of the mansab was attached with the office; it was governed by other factors. As the zat mansab also indicated the personal salary or allowance of the officials, the varying zat rank of three Wazirs also suggests that no particular salary was fixed for the office; nor was there any definite formula for annual or periodical enhancement in the allowances. It depended entirely on the pleasure of the Emperor; and one might receive no increment for twenty years (as in the case of Asad Khan). But this cannot be described as unusual thing, because the person concerned had already attained the highest position in the state, below the monarchy; and the highest mansab held by any contemporary official.

Position and Status :

The 'Wizarat' under Aurangzeb was the most important administrative institution after the 'padshahi' (monarchy) and the 'Wazir' held the

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1. Kamin, p.396; Maasir, Vol. II, p.282; Matin, however, mentions his rank as 3000/700 (f.126a).

2. Cf. J.N. Sarkar, Mughal Administration, p.20.

highest position in the realm, next only to the Emperor.[1] In status he was certainly below a prince! the prince was the 'star of the forehead of the state', the diadem of the crown of the monarchy' and the 'son of the Emperor',[2] while the Wazir-i Azam was simply 'one of the naukaran' (servants of the State or the Emperor);[3] he held a mansab much below the mansab of a prince;[4] whenever the prince came to the court, he went outside the city to receive him.[5] In administrative matters, however, the prince exercised no authority except when he himself was assigned some functions of the Wazir-i Azam as referred to above. But the Wazir-i Azam was the highest administrative officer in the state and exercised great influence over the Emperor. When, after the death of Shujaat Khan, the Nazim of Gujarat (June, 1701), Prince Azam expressed his desire for the post, the Emperor consulted Asad Khan, the Wazir-i Azam, whether the Prince would be a suitable choice for the post.[6] The same

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1. The English Factors have described Jafar Khan, the first Wazir of Aurangzeb as the 'Second man in the Kingdom', English Factories (1665-67), pp.158, 266.

2. Kazim, p.394; Alqabnamah, ff.151a-153a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.98b; Dastur-al Ulum, f.35a.

3. Ahkam, f.3a.

4. The first mansab assigned to the fourth son of Aurangzeb, Prince Muhammad Akbar in May 1667 was 7000/3000 (Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.209), while the highest ranks held by three Wazirs of Aurangzeb were as mentioned above, Fazil Khan 5000/2500, Jafar Khan 6000/6000 (2,3 horse) and Asad Khan 7000/7000.

5. Ruqaat, pp.30-31; Raqaim, f.7a; Kazim, p.1031.

6. Ruqaat, pp.32-33.

prince himself had earlier requested Asad Khan to intercede on his behalf with the Emperor who had become angry with the Prince for some offence and had asked him to leave the royal camp for Ujjain (c. August, 1700). The request of the Wazir-i Azam was turned down.[1] But the very fact that a prince, second in line of succession, but overshadowing the heir-apparent in affection and favour of the Emperor, sought the intercession of the Wazir-i Azam shows his prestige in the Empire and his position vis-a-vis a prince.

The appointment to the post of the Wazir-i Azam was, of course, within the sole discretion of the Emperor. But the Emperor would consider only those persons for the post who fulfilled certain qualifications. The post of the Wizarat was the highest office in the empire, and the holder of the office had to deal with the Emperor on the one hand, and hosts of officials, mansabdars and other peoples on the other. The nature of the job, therefore, required certain qualities of nature and attainment in its holder. He ought to be a man of good disposition and noble character, of virtuous habits and polished manners, of honesty and rectitude, of vision and experience, of wisdom and high sense of justice. He was expected to be affable and sweet-tongue, generous and considerate, selfless and magnanimous in dealing with the people and the state servants; a loyal and faithful servant of the state and a well-wisher of the subjects.

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1. Ahkam, ff.3a-b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.474.

And finally, he had to be fully conversant with the state rules and regulations and an apt master of accountancy (*ilm-i siyaq*), drafting (*insha*) and calligraphy.[1] Such qualifications were rarely combined in a person.

To attain these accomplishments one had to pass through various stages of apprenticeships and probation. The three *Wazirs* of Aurangzeb had held many posts before they were raised to the position of the *Wazir*: Fazil Khan had been the *Mir Saman* under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb;[2] Jafar Khan had served as the *Mir Bakhshi* and the *Wazir* under Shah Jahan, and *Nazim* of various provinces under him and under Aurangzeb;[3] and Asad Khan had held the posts of the *Mir Bakhshi* and that of the *Naib Wazir* a number of times under Aurangzeb.[4] This does not include the subordinate post held by them. Holding of these posts, however, was not a guarantee that one would acquire all the requirements of the office and would be appointed to the post. There is the concrete example of Muhammad Amin Khan who was considered because of his standing and past experience for the

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1. *Kazim*, pp.829-30; *Dastur-ul Amal*, f.112a; *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f.15a; *Hidayat-ul Qawaid*, f.9a; *Siyaqnamah*, p.99; *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.27b.
2. *Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.492; *Razi*, p.68; *Kazim*, p.112; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.106b; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.524-30. Fazil Khan had been appointed the *Khan Saman* on 12 March, 1646 (vide *Lahori* cited above), and appointed the *Wazir* by Aurangzeb on 17th June, 1663 (*Kazim*, p.829). He thus held the post of *Khan Saman* for a record period of seventeen years.
3. *Lahori*, Vol. II, p.681; *Saleh*, Vol. III, p.628; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.89a; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.531-35.
4. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.104, 108, 152; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.235; *Maasir-i Timuriyah*, f.147b.

post of *Wazir-i Azam* after the death of Jafar Khan, but was found to be ambitious and too proud and was, therefore, rejected; the /post remained vacant. However, one who successfully got through the probationary assignment and showed that he did combine in himself the required qualifications was elevated to the coveted post. With appointment he also got certain privileges befitting his office and position. He was honoured by a jewelled pen-stand (*qalamdan*) and the '*masnad-i Wizarat*' (the cushion on which the *Wazir* sits for work) along with a pillow, the two emblems of the office. A canopy, an umbrella and a golden railing (*katahra*) were put where he held the office, to distinguish him from other officials.[1] At the court he held his place to the left of the Emperor, while the *Mir Bakhshi* was on his right.[2] But when the *Wazir-i Azam* came to the court, the *Mir Bakhshi* received him at the doors of the *Ghuslkhana*.[3] Similarly, all *panjhazari* nobles (i.e. the *mansabdars* of 5000) were to come down from their mounts to salute him; to them he would give two betel-leaves (while returning their salute); to the *mansabdars* of lower rank only the reply (*alaik*, i.e. *alaikum as salam* — peace be on you).[4]

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.152; *Mahumat-al Afaq*, p.190; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.93b.
2. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.70a.
3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.109, 241.
4. *Raqaim*, f.30b; *Ruqaat*, p.47.

Thus among the Mughal nobles and mansabdars the *Wazir-i Azam* enjoyed a privileged position. He might not be holding the highest *mansab* among them; none of the three *Wazir-i Azam* of Aurangzeb held the highest *mansabs* when they were appointed to the post;[1] but his office gave him a distinguished position among all the servants of the state. As *Wazir-i Azam*, he held the place of heart in the body of the state administration[2] and was called "The Select of the eminent *Amirs*, the Choicest of the high ranking *Khans*, Master of the sword and the pen, the Bearer of the flag and the banner (of the state), the prudent, sincere and faithful *Wazir*".[3] His office, thus, put him above those who possessed *tabal*, *tagh* and *alam*.[4] On his own part, however, the *Wazir-i Azam* was not allowed to treat even lower officials and *mansabdars* lightly, or with contempt. He was expected to regard them as 'fellow-servants'. But if he did behave otherwise with any *mansabdar* or official, he was admonished by the Emperor.[5]

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1. The *mansabs* of the three *Wazirs* have already been mentioned. When Fazil Khan and Jafar Khan were appointed the *Wazir*, Shaista was holding the higher rank of 7000/7000 (*Kazim*, p.130); and when Asad Khan got the post, Khan Jahan Kokaltash (*Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.791-813) held the higher rank of 7000/7000 (*[illegible] Alamgiri*, p.142).

2. *Hidayat-ul Qawaid*, f.70a.

3. *Dastur-ul Amal*, f.44b; *Kazim*, p.1036; *Malumat-ul Afaq*, p.190; *[illegible]*, f.154b; *[illegible] Alamgiri*, ff.102a-b.

4. *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f.3a.

5. *Ruqaat*, p.41; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.381.

Functions and Powers :

As regard to his functions and powers, the _Wazir-i Azam_ under Aurangzeb was the highest executive authority in the state, next only to the Emperor. His functions and powers, though delegated by the Emperor, were very wide and extensive. He has been described in contemporary sources and official documents as the '_Umdat-al Mulk_' (Chief of the realm) and '_Madar-al maham_' (centre of important affair).[1] Another contemporary writer writes that "The _Wazir-i Azam_ was responsible for all matters pertaining to finances, the state, the religion and the administration. It is he who enforces the imperial rules and regulations; executes the King's orders about the administration, endeavours to increase the revenue of the state and to promote the prosperity and the welfare of the _raiyat_ and the army, appoints those officers who strive for the prosperity of the people and removes oppressive ones, realises the state-dues and effects the economy in the state-expenditures".[2] Still another source says that "after the appointment to the '_Wizarat_', all matters (of the state) are left to his discretion".[3] This suggests that the powers and functions of the _Wazir-i Azam_ were very comprehensive, and were not confined to just

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1. _Kamta_, p.1065; _Dastur-al Amal_, f.44b; _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.10?b; _Selected Documents_, p.57; _Bikaner Arahtoma_, 252/157.

2. _Khulasat-al Siyaq_, f.15a; _Manucci_, Vol. II, p.393.

3. _Malumat-al Afaq_, p.190.

'revenue' matters alone. He exercised jurisdiction over other branches of administration, financial and administrative, political and religious. We have already mentioned that the two designations of *Wazir-i Azam* and the *Diwan-i Ala* had become identical, and a distinction could not always be made in his functions in that capacities. Still, it would be better for a clear and proper discussion of his powers and functions, to divide them into two broad heads: (a) political and administrative responsibilities and supervision over, and coordination of the works of other administrative departments; (b) administration of the '*Diwani*' i.e. the central revenue ministry. We would, therefore, discuss his powers and functions under these two heads.

(A) *Political and Administrative Functions:*

Advising the Emperor

One of the most important functions of the *Wazir-i Azam* was to advise the Emperor on state matters. The *Wazir* was the closest and the most confidential adviser to the Emperor. He consulted him, whenever he needed a counsel, on all matters of state - political, military, administrative and financial. When the Emperor was disturbed by the activities of Shivaji in the Deccan, he consulted Jafar Khan, the *Wazir*, as how to tackle this problem.[1] Aware of this role of the *Wazir*, a noble of Raja Jai Singh's

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1. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.217.

standing,[1] wrote his plans about the Deccan campaign to Jafar Khan to put it before the Emperor and get it approved.[2] Similarly, when the Emperor heard about the plans of rebel prince Akbar in Persia to come over to India, the perplexed Monarch consulted Asad Khan, the then Wazir, as how to keep the rebel out of India.[3] The instances can be multiplied.[4]

The Emperor also consulted the Wazir-i Azam on administrative matters - on appointments, transfers, punishments, promotion, and the posting of mansabdars and officials. The matter would be discussed in detail in the following pages. It was because of this role of the Wazir and Emperor's reliance on him for administrative matters that he has been described as "The Confidant of the State and the Trust of the Empire".[5] Later this closeness developed further. As all his contemporary nobles were passing away one by one, the aging Emperor found in the 'Wazir' a

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1. The Raja replaced Prince Muazzam and Maharaja Jaswant Singh in the Deccan in March 1665. He was holding the mansab of 7000/5000 at this time and in that very year was promoted to 7000/7000 2-3 horse (Kazim, p.907). For his position among the nobles, see Ibid., p.868. For life and career, Maasir, Vol. III, pp.568-77.

2. The interesting six-point proposal about the Deccan problem is contained in a letter of the Raja to Jafar Khan reproduced in full in Nigarnamah-i Munshi (pp.188-190).

3. Raqaim, f.3b; Ruqaat, pp.26-27.

4. For a few of them see Akhbarat, 4th Jumada II, 12th R.Y., 12th Zilhijja, 20th R.Y.; English Factories (1665-67), pp.265-66.

5. Dastur-al Amal (Shahjahani), f.45a; Malumat-al Afaq, p.190; Alqabnamah, f.155a; see also Akhbarat, 9th Rajab, 24th R.Y.

companion and expressed to him all his woes about life and rule and thus relaxed his strained nerves.[1]

Appointments :

Another function of the Wazir was (a) to advise the Emperor on appointments to innumerable posts in the empire and, (b) to issue the appointment letters for a large number of posts in the empire. As we have already discussed, the appointing authority in the State was the Emperor. He had to appoint innumerable officials at the centre, and in provinces, sarkars and the parganahs. But it was practically impossible for him to select himself suitable persons for all sorts of posts from the Wazir to the Karori. The Wazir, therefore, played very important role in the matter. He was asked by the Emperor to recommend persons for all kind of appointments, especially for the higher posts of nazims (governors),[2] and diwans[3] in the provinces. Even if the Emperor wanted to appoint somebody on a post, he sometimes consulted the Wazir whether the selection was correct.[4] The recommendations (tajwiz) of the Wazir were generally accepted, though instances of rejecting his suggestions are there.[5]

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1. For Emperor's feelings over the death of old nobles and how he expressed them to the Wazir, see Raqaim, ff.4a, 7b; Ruqaat, pp.27-28,35.

2. Raqaim, f.7a; Ruqaat, p.32.

3. Farhang-i Kardani, f.28a; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. II, p.173; Raqaim, f.8a. The Wazir was even asked to recommend diwan for the sarkars of the princes (Akhbarat, 12th Rabi II, 39th R.Y.).

4. Ruqaat, pp.32-33.

5. Akhbarat, 17th Shaban, 36th R.Y.

In the appointments to subordinate posts in the provinces, the provincial *nazim* and *diwans* had some say,[1] though this is difficult to determine the extent of their influence in these appointments; we do not know whether they sent their recommendations to, or were consulted by the centre on specific names. Nor is it clear whether these appointments were made by the *Wazir* or final approval of the Emperor had to be taken for each post. In any case the appointments for the posts of the *subahdars*, provincial *diwans*, the *faujdars*, the *amins*, *karoris*, *mushrifs*, *tahvildars* and *fotahdars* of *parganahs*, the *darogha*, *amin*, *mushrif* and *tahvildar* for the *mahal* of *sair* (taxes other than land revenue), the *daroghas*, *amin*, *mushrifs* and the *khazanchis* of provincial and *parganah* treasuries were made by the *Wazir* and the appointment letters (*sanads*) for these were issued in the name, and with the seal of the *Wazir-i Azam*.[2] As the Emperor consulted the *Wazir* about the appointments, so also he consulted him about the posting of the *mansabdars*, sending them on expeditions or campaigns, and

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1. While describing various revenue officials in the province of Ahmadabad, the author of *Mirat-i Ahmadi* writes that in the province the revenue officials, the mint officials and the treasury officials are appointed 'according to the diwan of the province' (*mutabiq-i diwan-i suba*), *Khatimah*, pp.179-183.

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.31b; *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.28a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), pp.179-83; *Nigarnamah*, p.78. *Nigarnamah* has reproduced many *sanad* of appointments issued in the name of the *Wazir*. The list is long. It includes *sanads* of appointment for the posts of *diwans* (including the *diwans* of *mahals* of the princes), *karori*, *mushrif*, *khazanchi*, *karkun* (clerk), and *qanungo*. *Nigarnamah*, pp.78-95.

sometimes also about their promotion and dismissal (*hartarafi*).[1]

It is significant to note that we have not come across any instance where the *Wazir* would have been consulted about the selection of the central ministers like the *Mir Bakhshi*, the *Mir Saman*, the *Mir Atish* and the *Sadr-us Sudur*. Even his own assistants, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan*, were apparently appointed without consulting him.[2] The only instance of *Diwan-i Ala* recommending an official for centre is that of the '*Second Bakhshi*'.[3] The recommendation was accepted by the Emperor. But we cannot exactly say whether it was the rule or exception. In any case, two significant aspects of central structure under Aurangzeb emerge from it: firstly, the *Wazir-i Azam* or the *Diwan-i Ala* had no say in the selection or appointment of other ministers at the centre; and secondly, the central ministers were not necessarily consulted in the appointment of their assistants.

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1. Instances of consultation about such matters are innumerable. For a few of them see, *Raqaim*, ff.4b, 8a; *Ruqaat*, pp.28-29, 35.

2. Dr. Noman Ahmad Siddiqi has observed, "The *Diwan-i Khalisa* was appointed by the order of the Emperor on the recommendation of the *Diwan-i Ala* (*Land Revenue Administration Under the Mughals*, p.64). But he has cited no authority to this effect. This may, however, be an exception or related to the period subsequent to Aurangzeb.

3. This particular instance is related to Sadruddin Muhammad Khan Safavi (for him see *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.692-94) who was the Third *Bakhshi*; and on the death of Ruhullah Khan II, the Second *Bakhshi* on 19th May, 1704, he was appointed to that post on the recommendation of Asad Khan (*Raqaim*, f.1b; *Dastur-i Agahi*, f.71b; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.489).

This is not surprising. During the period under review there was no 'cabinet system'; nor was the Wazir-i Azam the 'Prime Minister' in the modern sense of the term. It would be, indeed, a futile to find the features of the 'cabinet government' in the seventeenth-century India[1] when the system had not yet developed in the country of its birth itself. As all powers rested with the Emperor, and the central ministers were only to assist him in administering the country and to carry out his orders, it was but natural that the Emperor did not only appoint them, he also chose them himself. The Wazir-i Azam had no say in their selection. It was all the more necessary during those days of court intrigues and factionalism to prevent the development of cliques and groups in the administrative set up at the centre. Almost all central ministers were, therefore, appointed by the Emperor without consulting anybody.

An extremely striking situation, however, emerged during the latter period of Aurangzeb's reign. When Asad Khan the Wazir was sent against the Marathas and to the Jinji campaign (1690-93), his son-in-law Bahramand Khan,[2] the then Second Bakhshi was asked to officiate him.[3]

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1. Cf. J.N. Sarkar, Mughal Administration, pp.15-16.

2. For a brief note on his career see Infra p. 225.

3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.338; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.404; Maasir, Vol. I, p.456. For a few documents issued by Bahramand Khan as the 'Naib of Asad Khan the Wazir' see Inayat Collection, Nos. I 8/98-1814, I 8/49-1357, I 8/103-1819.

Meanwhile, when Ruhullah Khan I, the Mir Bakhshi died in July 1692, the same Bahramand Khan was appointed the Mir Bakhshi,[1] and held the post for over a decade - till his death in November, 1702.[2] The post of the Mir Bakhshi then went to Zulfiqar Khan, the son of the Wazir Asad Khan, who held the post till the death of Aurangzeb.[3] Similarly, Tarbiyyat Khan,[4] the other son-in-law of Asad Khan was appointed the Mir Atish in March, 1696,[5] a little after his engagement to the daughter of the Wazir.[6] He too held the post for more than a decade, till the death of Aurangzeb himself in 1707.[7] Besides, at about the same time, Khudabanda Khan,[8] still another son-in-law of the Wazir, was appointed to the post of the Diwan-i Buyutat (April 1697 - October 1700)[9] and subsequently, to that of the Mir Saman (May 1704 to the death of Aurangzeb in 1707).[10]

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1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.348-49; Dilkusha, f.105a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.407.
2. For detail see Chapter III and the Table showing the Mir Bakhshi.
3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.461; Dilkusha, f.143a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.527. See also Chapter III and the Table.
4. For a sketch of his life see Infra p. 384.
5. Akhbarat, 24th Shaban, 39th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.395-96.
6. This engagement occurred sometime in January, 1696. Cf. Akhbarat, 22nd Jumada II, 39th R.Y.
7. See Chapter V, and the Table.
8. For a brief description of his parentage, life and career, see Infra p.311.
9. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.386. See also Chapter IV and the Table.
10. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.489; Dilkusha, f.149a. See also Chapter IV and the Table.

Thus, from 1696 onward, three among the five central departments of Aurangzeb's government were under the full charge of the Wazir, his son and sons-in-law; and the fourth one too ultimately went to his another son-in-law. Only one central department, and unquestionably the least important of all from political and administrative point of view, i.e. the department of the Sadr-us Sudur was held by a person not related to the Wazir. We have not come across to any specific evidence that the appointments of above central ministers were made on the recommendation of the Wazir himself. But the facts speak out themselves. They clearly indicate that during the latter years of Aurangzeb's reign the Wazir had got much greater say in the appointment of the central ministers; and during the last decade of his rule, the Wazir got his own son and sons-in-law appointed to all but one central department. The instance we quoted above of Emperor accepting his recommendation for appointment to the post of the Second Bakhshi too belongs to this period, and to the department then held by his son Zulfiqar Khan.

The above facts also shew that during the last decade of Aurangzeb's rule, the Wazir had become very powerful, not only because that he could influence the Emperor in the appointment of the central ministers; but actually because four of the five central departments were held by himself or by his family members. The reasons for this dominance of the Wazir were obviously the deep involvement of the Emperor in the

Deccan warfare, and his growing age and incapacity to attend to all state business. This would have left him no alternative but to depend heavily upon the *Wazir*. Under the circumstances, the extra-cautious and over-suspicious Aurangzeb would have preferred to let the *Wazir* dominate rather than to leave the matters to one of the princes and precipitatete the bloodshed among them and his own deposition.

Execution and Communication of Imperial Orders :

Another function of the *Wazir-i Azam* was to execute the royal orders. These orders could be of general nature or might be related to any branch of administration. He was asked, for example, to arrange the reception of the princes at Court.[1] Once he was also ordered to arrest Prince Muazzam.[2] A little earlier, he had been assigned the temporary custody of the vanquished Sikandar Adil Shah of Bijapur.[3] He was sometimes ordered to inspect the working of a particular department,[4] watch the performance of some *mansabdars*,[5] probe into the allegations against an official or institute an inquiry in the matter.[6]

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1. *Raqaim*, f.7a; *Inayat*, pp.30-31.
2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.178-79; *Ahkam-i Alamgiri*, f.131a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.332.
3. *Intikhab*, f.104a.
4. He was asked, for example, to inspect some *karkhanas* and buildings (*Raqaim*, ff.5b-6a).
5. He was, thus, asked to watch the activities of Fathullah Khan Bahadur, a brave and daring but outspoken noble who had been sent to Kabul (*Inayat*, p.28). For Fathullah Khan, see *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.40-47.
6. *Raqaim*, f.7b; *Inayat*, pp.30, 33.

But much more important than this was his function to communicate the royal orders to the different officials at centre, provinces, *sarkars* and parganahs. The orders that were conveyed were known as the '*hasb-ul hukm*' or '*hasb-ul amr*' (according to the imperial orders). *Hasb-ul hukm* were also sent by the *Mir Bakhshi* and other central officials. But while they generally wrote to their subordinates, the *Wazir* was asked to write *hasb-ul hukm* to any person in the State, to the princes, to the central ministers[1] (i.e. the *Mir Bakhshi*,[2] *Mir Saman*,[3] *Mir Atish*[4] etc.), to the *nazim*[5] (governors), *diwans*,[6] the generals of military expeditions,[7] and to the *waqai-nigar* (news-writer) etc.[8]

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.32a. The Emperor's instructions to the *Wazir* for writing these *hasb-ul hukms* are scattered through the chronicles, *Akhbarat* and, especially, in collection of letters, and are too numerous to be quoted. A few of them are, however, cited below.

2. *Ruqaat*, p.31.

3. *Raqaim*, f.4b.

4. *Ruqaat*, p.36.

5. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.429; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.475, 478.

6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.247, 283, 298.

7. *Akhbarat*, 25th Jumada I, 8th R.Y.; 3rd Zilhijja, 19th R.Y.

8. *Akhbarat*, 2nd Jumada II, 8th R.Y.

The Wazir-i-Azam was not only to convey the king's orders to the official; he had also to perform the unpleasant duty of communicating the displeasure of the Emperor to the princes,[1] the ministers and the officials.[2] Sometimes he was asked to censure or admonish a particular official for his faults;[3] at other, he was ordered to tutor a certain official about the state's rules and regulations or about the manners and etiquettes of the Court.[4] A large number of imperial orders were, thus, issued through the Wazir.

A Link between the Emperor and the Officials :

As the Wazir communicated the imperial orders to the official, so also he put the applications of the officials before the Emperor about the administrative matters[5] or presented their problems and grievances

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1. He was asked to draw the attention of Prince Muazzam to his extravagance. Raqaim, f.4b.

2. Ibid., f.3b.

3. He was instructed, for instance, to write a harsh, censuring hasb-ul-hukm to Tarbiyyat Khan, Mir Atish for his lapses. Ruqaat, p.38; Raqaim, f.9a.

4. He was ordered, for example, to tutor a mansabdar to come to the Court in proper and prescribed dress. Raqaim, f.10a.

5. He presented before the Emperor a gist (talkhish) of the despatches of the provincial and other revenue officials. Kalimat-i-Alamgiri, f.32b. Cf. Akhbarat, 18th Rabi I, 12th R.Y.

before the Emperor and get them redressed.[1] He, thus, acted as their representative and protector of their interests at the Court. Instances of his role in this two-way communication are scattered throughout the contemporary sources and especially in epistolary works. Communicating the royal orders to the officials and putting the officials' applications before the Emperor was an important function of the _Wazir_ and occupied his considerable time and attention. He was, thus, truly a 'link' between the Emperor and the centre administration - a position assigned to the Wazir by the Italian Traveller Manucci.[2] This role of the _Wazir-i Azam_ fully establishes the fact that he enjoyed a premier position among all the servants of the State including the central ministers. The _Wazir_ might not directly interfere in any other central department; this was, indeed, impossible to do so in a system of government where the Emperor appointed the minister and distributed works among them according to established norms and conventions. But the fact that he was asked by the Emperor to inspect the working of other central departments, issue instructions to the _Bakhshis_, the _Mir Saman_ and the _Mir Atish_, and even to admonish them on Emperor's behalf, sufficiently proves that the _Wazir_ did

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1. This included their request for posting, transfer, promotion or a proper 'place' in the court. Cf. _Akhbarat_, 2nd Zilhijja, 9th R.Y.; 12th Zilhijja, 20th R.Y.; 27th Rajab, 24th R.Y. For instance, Ruhullah Khan the _Tan-Bakhshi_ and _Khan-i Saman_ put his request for suitable placing in the court through the _Wazir_. _Ahkam_, f.7a.

2. _Manucci_, Vol. II, p.145.

not only exercise financial control over them,[1] but enjoyed precedence over them in administrative hierarchy, and had supervisory authority over their departments. His designation of the _Wazir_ was, therefore, not simply a 'courtesy title' as suggested by some modern scholars.[2] His powers and functions made him truly a _Wazir-i Azam_. That is why the foreign visitors to the court of Aurangzeb have described him as the 'premier official, the first minister and the chief _Wazir_, the principal counsellor and the Chief Secretary to the Emperor.[3]

On the basis of facts cited above, we can also determine the extent of _Wazir_'s control over the provincial and _parganah_ official. We have already mentioned that most of them were appointed on the recommendation of the _Wazir_. Appointment-letters (_sanads_) for their posts were also issued by the _Wazir_. The _nazims_, the _diwans_, the _waqai-nigars_ (they might also be the _bakhshis_) and _sawanih-nigars_ of the provinces were, indeed, expected to wait upon the _Wazir_ before departure for their new assignments. He apprised them of their duties and functions and gave them guidelines and instruction.[4] While they served on their assignments, the _Wazir_ watched

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1. Cf. Qureshi, I.H., _op. cit._, p.75.
2. Faruki, Z., _Aurangzeb and His Times_, p.416.
3. _Manucci_, Vol. II, pp.42, 393. Also Cf. _Tavernier_, Vol. I, p.380.
4. _Hidayat-al Qawaid_, ff.9a-12b.

their performance, issued them instructions, apprised the Emperor of their behaviour and activities, advised the Emperor about their transfer and promotion, and influenced his opinion about them. The Wazir, thus, exercised considerable control over all officials in the provinces and parganahs etc.

Drafting of Imperial Orders and Letters:

The Wazir-i Azam was also responsible for the drafting and preparation of the imperial orders (amsila-e-manshur). It is obvious that a large number of imperial orders and farmans were issued to officials and individuals. Perhaps the largest number of these farmans related to the assignment of jagirs and madad-i maash lands. Then there were thousands of other kind of official communications sent to provincial, sarkar and parganah officials in the forms of hasb-al hukm, parwanahs, dastak, tamassuk and sanad etc. They have to be drafted, faired, sealed and finally given to the person concerned or despatched to the official. An office known as the 'Dar-al insha' was maintained for this purpose under the charge of Mir Munshi (head-draftsman).[1] As the designation of the official indicates, there might have been other munshis also in the office. The over all charge of the office was with the Wazir. In the beginning of

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1. Mirat-i Alamgiri, f.37a; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.23a; Maasir, Vol. III, p.38; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.361.

the reign when there was no Wazir, and Raja Raghunath was looking after the Diwani, the responsibility for the preparation of imperial orders was assigned to a senior central minister, Fazil Khan Mir Saman.[1]

This duty of drafting and preparing the royal orders by the Wazir might have included the preparation of replies to the letters of foreign rulers. Mention has already been made to a number of foreign envoys who visited the court of Aurangzeb, and brought letters and presents from their respective rulers to the Emperors. The Wazir played a prominent role in their reception and dismissal: he received them, led them to the court, and received the letters brought by them.[2] He later presented these letters to the Emperor and prepared their replies in consultation with the Emperor.[3] The Wazir was, thus, also the 'foreign secretary' to the Emperor and advised and helped him in establishing and maintaining relations with foreign countries - a position which Italian traveller Manucci assigns to him.[4]

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1. Kazim, p.393; Kalimat, f.133a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.89b.

2. Kazim, p.1066; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.71.

3. & 4. Manucci explicitly says that the Wazir received the letters brought by the foreign envoys and prepared their replies (Manucci, Vol. II, pp.32-33, 44-45, 57). We, however, have the specific evidence of Alamgirnamah (p.864) that Danishmand Khan drafted a letter to Abdul Aziz Khan, the ruler of Bukhara. It is, perhaps, because of this sort of work assigned to Danishmand Khan that Bernier calls him the Foreign Minister of Aurangzeb (p.138, see also p.186). But there is, perhaps, no contradiction between the statements of two travellers. Danishmand Khan, probably, performed the job when Fazil Khan had become too old and was, perhaps, unable to do the job. But Jafar Khan took over the job after he became the Wazir.

Military Assignments :

Finally, the Wazir, like other high and low officials and nobles, was sometimes assigned the military duties, which he was no doubt more entitled to perform as the highest dignitary of the empire. Apart from Mir Jumla's campaigns in Bengal and Assam, Aurangzeb himself led most of his important expeditions against his rivals, and later, in Rajputana and in the Deccan. A prince or the Wazir, therefore, rarely got the full command of a major military expedition, as had happened under Shah Jahan and earlier. Nevertheless Aurangzeb sometimes assigned his Wazir Asad Khan some important military duties. One such occasion was when Prince Akbar revolted in Mewar in January, 1681, and the Wazir was entrusted with the defence of the imperial camp at Ajmer.[1] Subsequently, he took leading part in Aurangzeb's campaigns against Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687) during which he was assigned the painful job of arresting Prince Muazzam on suspicion of being in league with the enemy.[2] In 1690 he was sent to chastise the Marathas south of the Krishna river;[3] and then to capture the fort of Nandiyal in the Kadapa district of Karnatak (1693).[4]

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1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.198.
2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.293-95; Dilkusha, ff.93a-96a, 104a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.330-33.
3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.338.
4. Ibid., pp.352, 354.

But, perhaps, his most important military expedition was against the fort of Jinji (1693), which however, failed and brought him disgrace. His son Zulfiqar Khan had already been deputed to capture the fort. On report that he was hard pressed by the enemy, Asad Khan and Prince Kam Bakhsh were deputed to reinforce Zulfiqar Khan. But unfortunately for the *Wazir*, the Prince developed misunderstanding with him, and entered into negotiation with the besieged, which ultimately forced Asad Khan to withdraw. This emboldened the Marathas who inflicted heavy losses on the imperialists; and the *Wazir* was subjected to royal displeasure.[1] The event, however, did not disqualify him from further military assignments. In 1701 he was again deputed to an expedition for the capture of almost impregnable fort of Khelna, which was his last important military exploits under Aurangzeb.[2]

(5) *Wazir-i Azam as the Head of the Diwani* :

The *Wazir-i Azam* was also the head of the *Diwani* (i.e. the central revenue department) and was, hence, called the *Diwan-i Ala* (the Supreme *Diwan*) or the *Diwan-i Kul* (the *Diwan* of the entire empire). As the head of the *Diwani* his most important functions were (i) to supervise the

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1. For detailed account, see *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.354-59; *Dilkusha*, ff.107a-108a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.418-21; *Ruqaat*, pp.40-41; *Raqaim*, f.24b.

2. For its prolonged siege and capture see *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.449-58; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.492. See also *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.310-16.

collection and disbursement of state revenues realised from the *Khalisa-i Sharifa*; (ii) to ensure the payment of the salary and allowances to the *mansabdars* and state-officials (a) in cash, or (b) in the form of *jagir*. The ministry of the *Diwan-i Ala* was accordingly divided into the two sections: (i) the *Daftar-i Khalisa*, the section that looked after the collection and disbursement of revenue and maintained its records and papers; (ii) *Daftar-i Tan*, the section that was responsible for the payment of the cash salaries or assignment of jagir to the *mansabdars* and kept the relevant record. For each of the two branches of the *Diwani*, the *Diwan-i Ala* had two subordinate *diwans*, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan* and other staff who assisted him in respective branches of the *Diwani*.

Collection of Revenue :

The *Diwan-i Ala* had the over all supervision of the collection of revenue from all areas under *Khalisa-i Sharifa*. Under Aurangzeb out of a total *jamadami* of 924 karor *dams*, the area worth 725 karor *dams* was assigned in *jagir* and the rest was left as *Khalisa-i Sharifa*,[1] that is to say, only 20 percent of total *jamadami*. It means that the *Diwan-i Ala* of Aurangzeb was responsible for the collection of revenue just from one-fifth part of the empire, and had to look after the income and expenditure of the state to that extent.

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1. *Mirat-al Alam*, ff.214b-15a; *Malumat-al Afaq*, p.194.

By the time Aurangzeb came to the throne, the sources of the revenue and their rates, the machinery employed for the realisation of the revenue and rules and procedure for the revenue collection had become well-established. But, as already said, Aurangzeb tried to show his adherence to the *Shariat* in various spheres of administration. He also introduced some changes in the tax-structure. As a result, the organisation of imperial treasuries and the heads of expenditure underwent some changes, and the *Diwani* did not remain completely unaffected.

Under Aurangzeb, the principal, and by far the largest source of state income remained the land-revenue which was collected through the agency of the revenue-officials of the *parganah* - the *chaudhuri*,[1] the *qanungo*,[2] the *amin*,[3] the *karori*,[4] the *fotahdar*[5] and the *mushrif* under the

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1. *Desai* or patel in Gujrat and *deshmukh* in the Deccan. The village headmen who assisted government officials in the assessment and collection of revenue (*Malumat-ul Afaq*, p.192). See also Moreland, "The Pargana Headman (Chaudhuri) of the Mughal Empire", *JRAS* (London), 1938, pp.511-21. For the *desai* see, B.R. Grover, 'The Position of Desai in the Pargana Administration of Subah Gujrat under the Mughals', *Proceedings of IHC*, Delhi, 1961, pp.151-55.

2. Or *deshpandeh* in the Deccan, the official who maintained the revenue records and assisted the government officials in the assessment of land-revenue and also sent some relevant revenue records to the *Diwani*. *Nigarnamah*, pp.90-91; *Malumat-ul Afaq*, p.192.

3. The government official responsible for the assessment of land-revenue and general welfare of the peasants in his jurisdiction. *Siyaqnamah*, pp.26-28; *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, ff.17b-18a; *Waqai Ajmer*, f.402; *Nigarnamah*, pp.135-36.

4. The official responsible for the collection of the revenue which he did with the help of *muhassils* (collectors). *Siyaqnamah*, pp.48-50; *Nigarnamah*, pp.136-37; *Waqai Ajmer*, f.402.

5. The official who kept the collected money in the safe custody in the *[illegible] khazana* (the strong room). *Nigarnamah*, pp.87, 94, 137.

immediate supervision of the provincial *diwan*. But as regards to *sair-i jihat* taxes, some changes were made. Apart from the remission of some taxes in August, 1659 mentioned above, a large number of taxes that were considered unauthorised by the *Shariat* (*abwab-i mamnua*) were also abolished (December, 1665),[1] though the *Diwani* officials continued to assign the revenue from these cesses in *jagir* to *mansabdars*, and they continued to realise them from the people.[2] Similarly, the rates of custom duty were modified to bring it in conformity with *Shariat*. Its rate was fixed as two-and-half per cent from the Muslims and five per cent from the non-Muslims (April, 1665). Later, the Muslims were altogether exempted from this tax (May, 1667). Subsequently, however, when it was found that they were cheating the state by securing exemption for the commodities of the non-Muslims in their own names, it was reimposed, but now with the name of *zakat* (March, 1682).[3] But much more significant from the administrative point of view was the imposition of *jizyah* in 1679 as we shall see.

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1. *Kazim*, p.1082; *[illegible] Ulum*, ff.37b-38b (the original *farman*).

2. The officials did not properly follow the imperial ban about the illegal taxes (*Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.88-89; Cf. also *[illegible] Ulum*, ff.44b-45a, 50a, 51b, 53b). A *farman* was issued again in April 1672, banning the collection of these illegal taxes (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.286-88). It is, however, difficult to say as to how much this second *farman* was effective.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.258-59, 265, 298-300; *[illegible]*, f.41b; *[illegible]*, p.4.

Influence in Imposition and Remission of Taxes :

The Emperor imposed or remitted any tax he deemed fit. But the Diwan-i Ala (or his subordinate diwans) sometimes influenced the Emperor to impose or remit certain taxes. For instance, the Emperor had abolished in May 1667 the custom duty on the merchandise of the Muslims.[1] But the Diwani official represented to the Emperor that the Muslims were cheating the state by declaring the commodities of the non-Muslim merchants as their own and securing tax-exemption for them. The custom duty was, therefore, reimposed on Muslims in 1680, on the 'advice of the diwans'; and the Diwan-i Ala issued the instruction to the revenue officials to realise the tax from the Muslims.[2] But the Diwan-i Ala seems to have played greater role in the remission of taxes. The English factors in India maintained very good relations with Jafar Khan the Wazir, perhaps, through letters and presents, and with his support at the court, were able to secure from the Emperor tax-concessions on their export and exemption from the transit duties (1667).[3] But the French who could not placate Jafar Khan in the beginning, found it difficult to get admittance to the

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1. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.265.

2. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.230; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.41b. For the text of the hasb-al hukm, see Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.298-300.

3. The English used to pay the custom duty at the rate of 3½ per cent on their merchandise at Surat, besides the transit duty in case of transporting their commodities to Agra or elsewhere. But in 1667 they were allowed to pay only 2 per cent custom duty and exempted from duty 'on way' (The English Factories - 1665-67, pp.274). Later, however, the custom duty was restored to 3½ per cent (April 1680) on their refusal to pay jizyah (Ibid., 1678-84, pp.255-56).

court (1666), let alone any concessions. When at last they pleased the *Wazir* with an offer of Rs.10,000, did they get tax concessions (1667).[1] The failure of the English envoy Sir William Morris to secure trade privileges from Aurangzeb (1701) has also been partially attributed to his inability to invoke the sympathy and support of Asad Khan, the then *Diwan-i Ala*.[2] Incidentally it also indicates the role of the *Diwan-i Ala* which he played in the development or otherwise of Indian trade and commerce with European nations and their representatives in India were fully aware of it.[3]

Almost all important imperial orders about the revenue matters like the remission or imposition of taxes, reduction or increase in the levies, or any change or modification in the rules and regulations of assessment or collection were communicated to the revenue official of the provinces and the *parganahs* generally through the *Diwan-i Ala*.[4] Some of them were issued in the form of *farman*,[5] while others with the name of the

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1. *English Factories* (1665-67), pp.157-58, 281.

2. *Manucci*, Vol. III, pp.285-6. Cf. Harihar Das, *The Morris Embassy to Aurangzeb*, Chapter II.

3. Cf. *English Factories* (1665-67), pp.28-29, 278, 274.

4. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.15b.

5. Among such *farmans* mention may be made of those sent to Muhammad Hashim and Rasikdas cited below (p.   ), the *farman* remitting *rahdari* and some other taxes in 1659 cited above (p. 52), and the *farman* abolishing the illegal cesses (*abwab-i mamnua*) in 1665 mentioned above (p. 35); the *farman* imposing the *jizyah* (1679, *Maasir Alamgiri*, p.305).

parwana[1] or *hasb-al-hukm*.[2] It was the privilege of the *Diwan-i Ala* that such *farmans* were issued with his *risalah* and the *hasb-al-hukms* in his name and with his seal.[3]

More important function of the *Diwan-i Ala* was, however, to supervise the collection of the revenue. As the head of the *Diwani* he was ultimately responsible for the finances of the state, and it was his responsibility to ensure that the state share is realised in full. But he was at the same time expected to see that the tax-payers were not subjected to hardship and injustice.[4] Thus the *Diwan-i Ala* had to work as the protector of the interests of both the state and the people. He, therefore, asked the officials to adopt an attitude of benevolence to the people (*raiyat-parwari*) and work in a way that might lead to increase in production and the prosperity of the people and the country. These instructions were embodied in their appointment letters themselves.[5]

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1. Like the *parwana* of Raja Raghunath about *madad-i-maash* grants (dated 10th January, 1671, Allahabad Document, II, 284. For the content see Chapter VI); the *parwana* of Asad Khan about the imposition of *jizyah* (*Waqai Ajmer*, p.305).

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.32a.

3. Thus for example, Raja Raghunath issued the *hasb-al hukm* to all provincial *diwans* for the ban on the cultivation of hemp (*bhang*) in the 2nd R.Y. (May 1659 - May 1660). For the *hasb-al hukm*, see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I p.247; and Asad Khan issued *hasb-al hukms* reimposing custom duty on Muslims in 1681 (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.298), for realising the custom duty at the place of sale instead of at the the place of purchase by the merchants in 1688 (*Ibid.*, p.318), and, subsequently, for collecting it at the place of purchase as previously in 1697 (*Ibid.*, p.339).

4. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, ff.15b-16a.

5. For such appointment letters, see *Nigarnamah*, pp.134-37.

In this respect two *farmans* of Aurangzeb are very significant.[1] The first was issued to Rasikdas *Karori* in the 8th R.Y. (18th March 1665 - 6th March, 1666); and the other to Muhammad Hashim the *Diwan* of Ahmadabad, in the 11th R.Y. (14th February 1668 - 1st February, 1669). The *farman* sent to Muhammad Hashim contains, of course, some clauses enunciating the theoretical rules about the assessment and collection of revenue which seems to have been included under the growing religious pretensions of the Emperor.[2] The two *farmans* are nevertheless very important as they deal

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1. For the two *farmans* (along with a Persian commentary by some near-contemporary person on the second *farman* and) with their English translation see J.N. Sarkar, 'The Revenue Regulations of Aurangzeb', *JRAS*, Vol. II (1906), pp.223-55; *Mughal Administration*, pp.177-98 (English translation only). The *farman* to Muhammad Hashim is also found in *Durr-al Ulum*, ff.139b-142b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.268-72. The *farman* to Rasikdas *Karori* has also been given in *Nigarnamah*, where it has been divided into two parts. The preamble of the *farman* is given on pp.123-24, and the main *farman* on pp.99-102. Here, however, the *farman* has been described as the '*dastur-al amal-i diwanian-i juz*' (the guidelines for the subordinate *diwans*). In one MS the *farman* is found addressed to Mir Muhammad Muizz, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* of Bihar (Cf. I. Habib, *op. cit.*, pp.222, note 17). Indeed the very first article of the *farman*, as also its other clauses, show that the *farman* would have been addressed to a *diwan* and not to a *Karori*. Apparently, the *farman* would have reached to Rasikdas *Karori* as a circular to all the *Karoris*; or as Moreland has observed (*The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p.133), Rasikdas would have been a *Karori* before his promotion to the post of the *Diwan*. It would be then, perhaps, the only example where a *Karori* was promoted to the post of provincial *diwan*.

2. It is relevant to note here that it was in the same 11th R.Y. that Aurangzeb took some other important religious measures like dismissing the musicians from the court and ending the *Jharokha Darshan* (*Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.213), stopping the weighing ceremony and the use of cloth of gold and some other measures (Cf. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.48-50).

with various aspects of revenue administration and set guidelines for the revenue officials in regard to various aspects of assessment and collection.[1] The officials were asked in the farmans to assess and collect the revenue according to established rules and regulations, and in considerate manner paying due consideration to the difficulties and problems of the cultivators (muzare).

The officials were also instructed to ensure that no arable land was left untilled, and to try to bring back the deserting peasants to their villages by persuasion and promise of help and assistance, so that the desolated villages were repopulated and cultivation increased.[2] The officials were also asked to strive for the improvement of crop by replacing the jins-i naqis (second rate crops) by the jins-i kamil or the jins-i ala (the first rate crops).[3]

The instructions of the Diwan-i Ala were apparently effective on the Khalisa officials, and the Diwan-i Ala kept himself fully informed about their functioning as regard to assessment, collection and arrears etc.,

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1. For a discussion on the content and meaning of the farmans, see Moreland, 'The Development of the Land Revenue System of the Mughal Empire', JRAS, 1922, pp.19-35; The Agrarian System of Moslem India, pp.132-43.

2. Cf. also Nigarnamah, p.77.

3. Cf. also Nigarnamah, p.62. The sugar-cane, pine-apple and rice were considered the jins-i ala (Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.408). Cf. Irfan Habib, op. cit., p.39 and note.

through a number of papers that were regularly sent to the _Diwani_ by the revenue officials of the _parganahs_. These papers described the number of villages, the actual areas under cultivation with kind of crop, the assessment of each village, the _qabuliat_ of the peasant for the assessment with sureties to pay, the daily collections of the land-revenue and other taxes, the daily receipts in _parganah_ treasuries, the arrears if any, and the money advanced to the peasants as loan, if any. The _Diwan-i Ala_ also received from the provincial _diwans_ twice a year a consolidated statement of the assessment, collections, arrears and of _taqavi_ loans from each province, prepared on the basis of papers submitted by the _parganah_ officials to the respective provincial _diwans_.[1] If any one of the parganah officials or the provincial diwans failed in sending them or delayed their despatch, he was censured by the _Diwan-i Ala_.[2] Besides, there was the _waqia-nigar_ (news-writer) in each _parganah_, who entered into his diary (_roznamcha_) the actual assessment, the daily collections of various taxes and the balance in the _parganah_ treasury etc. and sent his report to the court.[3] The papers that come from revenue officials at

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1. _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.34b; _Dastur-al Amal_, f.151a. For a comprehensive list of the papers received by the central _Diwani_ from the revenue officials of provinces and _parganahs_, see _Infra_, p. 250.

2. An official of the treasury in Bengal, was censured for delaying the despatch of usual records of the treasury and the _Diwan-i Ala_ in his _hasb-al hukm_ asked him to send them immediately. _Nigarnamah_, p.152. For other letter of the same nature, see _Ibid._, p.99.

3. _Akhbarat_, 4th Rabi I, 49th R.Y. Cf. _Nigarnamah_, pp.87-89, 95; _Mirat-i Ahmadi_ (_Khatimah_), pp.174-75.

different levels along with the report of the *waqia-nigar* would have helped the *Diwan-i Ala* to exercise full control over the revenue officials at the provincial and *parganah* level and to maintain their efficiency. As these papers and statements come from different officials responsible for the different aspects of revenue collection, it was easy to find out the discrepancies in the statements or the shortcomings and misappropriations of officials at any level. An official in the revenue ministry, the *Mustaufi-al Mamalik* (the Auditor) checked and compared the papers and reported the arrears and misappropriation by the officials to the office of the *Diwan-i Ala.*[1] The office instructed the *parganah* officials to realise the amount in instalments.[2] According to one evidence large amount of state dues stood against the peasants of troubled provinces of the Deccan.[3] Thus the supervision of the *Diwan-i Ala* appears effective over the collection of revenue from the *Khalisa-i Sharifa.* Conditions were, however, different as regard to the collection of *jizyah.*

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.32b; *Dastur-al Amal*, f.164b; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, ff.75b-77a.

2. *Nigarnamah*, p.100; Cf. Article IV of the farman to Rasikdas *Karori* cited above. A large number of the officials and the *zamindars* who had not paid the arrears were languishing in jail in Lahore. On promise to pay the arrears in instalments, they were set free by the provincial *diwan*. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.261.

3. *Khafi Khan* states (Vol. II, p.337) that in the provinces of Aurangabad and Khandesh alone nearly twelve lac rupees stood against the poor peasants for which *mansabdars* and *ahadis* were sent by the *diwans* every year to realise the money. But without success. The amount was ultimately written off by Amanat Khan, the *diwan* of the Deccan (from 1679 to 1683, *Maasir*, Vol. I, p.263).

Jizyah:

Aurangzeb imposed *jizyah* in April, 1679,[1] on its early Islamic terms and conditions[2] on all non-Muslim subjects of the empire, including the English, the Dutch and the French settled in India.[3] On showing great resistance, the European settlers were later (April, 1680) exempted. But the remission was largely compensated by enhancing the custom duty from 2 per cent to 3½ per cent.[4] However, all eligible subjects were divided into three categories: poor (*faqir*), middle-class man (*mutawassit*) and the rich (*ghani*). It was imposed at the rate of twelve *dirhams* on the poors; twenty-four *dirhams* on the middle class person; and forty-eight *dirhams* on the rich. The rich was defined as one who possessed ten thousand *dirhams* (Rs.2,500) or more; the middle class man was one who had more than two hundred *dirhams* (Rs.52) but less than ten thousand *dirhams* in his possession; and the poor was that who possessed less than two hundred *dirhams*. If, however, the poor did not possess any

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1. The circumstances of this imposition have already been discussed above, p. 50.

2. These terms and conditions have been described in detail in *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.296-97. A circular of these regulations of *jizyah* (*afrad-i dastur-i jizyah-i shar'iyah*), with the signature of the *Bakhshi*, but of a later date (i.e. 25th Zilhijja, 40th R.Y./26 July, 1696) is preserved at the State Archives, Hyderabad (A.R. 115). Prof. S.R. Sharma, (*Religious Policy of the Mughals*, pp.161-62) has given an English translation of these rules without, however, mentioning his source wherefrom he got the Persian text.

3. *English Factories* (1678-84), pp.241-42.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.255-56.

amount, *jizyah* was to be realised from him only if he earned more than the requirements of his family. If he earned less than that, *jizyah* was not to be imposed on him. The minors, the women, slaves, crippled, blinds, insane, destitutes and unemployed were declared free from this tax.[1] The state servants were also exempted from the *jizyah*.[2] The rich had to pay the whole amount of *jizyah* in one instalment, while the middle class man had the option to pay it in one or two instalments, and the poor in four instalments.[3]

As the *dirham* was not the standard currency of the period, its original weight in silver or its equivalent amount in rupee was fixed as the standard rate.[4] Thus the rich had to pay 13 rupees, the middle class man 6½ rupees and the poor 3¼ rupees.[5]

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.174; *Intuhat*, f.74a; *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, ff.38b-39b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.66b-67b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.252; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.296; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.219.

2. The exemption of state-servants has been explicitly stated by some of the sources cited above: and there is no reason to disbelieve them because some of them are non-Muslims themselves. It has been, however, asserted by some scholars that no such exemption was made (S.R. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p.154). But it appears from a careful reading of the evidence cited by Prof. Sharma (i.e. News Letter, (Provincial, Agra), 8th May, 1694) that the officials who were asked to pay *jizyah* were not the imperial servants, but personal attendants or the establishment officers of imperial nobles or officials; and the imposition of *jizyah* on them would not mean its enforcement on government servants.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.297.

4. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.39a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.296.

5. *Intuhat*, f.74a.

Inayatullah Khan[1] was entrusted with the task of setting up a separate machinery for the collection of _jizyah_. Accordingly, he appointed _amins_, _mushrifs_ and the _tahvildars_ in all the _subahs_ to assess and realise the tax. These officials, like other revenue officials, were to work under the supervision of respective provincial _diwans_.[2]

There was great resentment among the people against the new impost. They demonstrated against it below the _jharokha-darshan_ and on the streets.[3] Where the demonstration was not possible, the people showed their indignation against the tax by resisting its payment. At many places

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1. A small _mansabdar_ who later became the _Diwan-i Tan_ (1692) and subsequently also the _Diwan-i Khalisa_ (1701), and combined the two posts till the death of Aurangzeb (_Maasir_, Vol. II, 828-32).

2. _Mirat-i Ahmadi_, Vol. I, p.297; _Khulasat-al Siyaq_, f.39b; _Futuhat_, ff.74a-b. Perhaps, the specific functions of the three _jizyah_ officials mentioned above have been/described. But as their designations are similar to those of revenue officials, we may safely presume that they performed the same functions. Thus the _Amin_ was responsible for the assessment and collection of the tax. He was assigned some retainers (_sawars_ and _piadahs_) who might assist him in the realisation of the tax (_Nigarnamah_, p.139). These retainers might, however, belong to his own contingent (_tabinan_, vide following evidence). It seems that the _Amin_ was generally appointed for a whole province or for large dwellings like the imperial camp and held the _mansab_ from 200/50 to 400/600 (_Akhbarat_, 10th, 12th Rabi II, 39th R.Y., 24th Ziqad, 40th R.Y.). Generally, the pious men were appointed to the post and sometimes the job was assigned to the _Sadr_ or the _Qazi_ of the province (_Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.174; _Akhbarat_, 23rd Ramzan, 38th R.Y.; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II p.278; _Mirat-i Ahmadi_, Vol. I, p.319). The _Mushrif_ apparently audited the collection and disbursement of _jizyah_, because of the amount collected, like the collections of other taxes, was not necessarily sent to the court. It was rather spent in the province of its collection on heads permitted by the _Shariat_ (_Mirat-i Ahmadi_, Vol. I, p.330). The _Tahvildar_ was obviously the treasurer of the _jizyah_ collections.

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3. _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.255; _Manucci_, Vol. III, pp.274-76. Cf. _English Factories_ (1678-84), pp.241-42.

the officials faced great difficulty in collecting *jizyah*. They had often to seek the help of civil authorities for its realisation.[1] It seems that the *jizyah* officials were not exercising their discretion in assessing and realising the tax properly. The poors who earned less than the bare-requirements of their families, had already been exempted from the *jizyah*. But it was reported to the Emperor that many poor peasants who did not earn enough to feed themselves and their families, and were dependent on loan for acquiring the seeds, cattles and fodder, had also been subjected to the tax; and that they were deserting the villages because of the hardships they were subjected to because of the additional burden. It was submitted to the Emperor that because of their economic conditions they were exempted from *jizyah* by the *Shariat* itself, and that a specific order exempting such poor peasants be issued so that they might be freed from the afflictions of the *jizyah* officials and could freely devote themselves to their profession of cultivation. An order of remission (*Sanad-i muafi*) of *jizyah* was accordingly issued to the effect that the cultivators (*muzarian*) were exempted from *jizyah*; and that it should be realised only from the *talluqadaran*, *chaudharis*, *qanungos*, *tarafdars*, the artisans (*ahl-i hirfa*) and other (viable ?) inhabitants of towns and

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1. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.278; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.325, 340; *Akhbarat* (circ) 14th Shaban, 49th R.Y.

villages.[1] The state servants had already been exempted. Besides, there there are many instances of remitting *jizyah* in special cases.[2] Thus, without absolving the Emperor of imposing this discriminating tax on his subjects, it must, at least, be said in fairness to him that he made as much concession about the *jizyah* as he could do according to his own convictions. And beyond that he strongly resented any concession made by his officials.[3]

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1. *Nigarnamah*, p.139 (the text of the *Sanad-i muafi*). Unfortunately this extremely important document does not bear the date of the issue or the name of the province or the *diwan* to whom it was addressed which might have helped us in determining the time and area of this remission. Nor is it clear whether this *Sanad-i muafi-i jizyah* was sent only to one provincial *diwan* and this remission was operative for that province only, or it was sent to all the provinces. It appears from the content of the *sanad* that the representation to the Emperor had been made not about the people of a region, but about the *riaya* who were engaged in cultivation, as a class; and the exemption order was meant for all provinces. As the remission was not a concession or favour of the Emperor for the people of a particular region, but was based on a principle enunciated by the *Shariat* itself, it seems unlikely that the remission was granted to the people of a particular income-group of one province only, and people of same income had to pay *jizyah* in the remaining provinces of the empire. We may, therefore, infer that the *muzarian* (cultivators) of this category were exempted from *jizyah* throughout the empire. The state servants had already been exempted from it. It then leads us to the conclusion that among all the non-Muslim subjects of the state, it were only the viable sections of the people mentioned in the *Sanad-i muafi* itself who ultimately remained under the purview of *jizyah*. The conclusion, however, requires further scrutiny from the actual figures of collection of *jizyah* before we give a final statement.

2. *Inshaat*, f.111b. Also cf. S.R. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p.157.

3. Thus Amanat Khan, the Diwan of the *Deccan* was admonished for having issued remission certificates to some non-Muslims (*Khafi Khan*, Vol. II p.378).

As in the case of other taxes, so also in relation to the *jizyah*, the revenue papers like the *tumar-i jama-wa mujmal* (the recorded standard assessment)[1], *roznamcha-i jama-wa kharch* (the diary of daily collection and expenditure) and the *awarija* (the abstract account of receipts and disbursements)[2] of each *parganah* was prepared by the *jizyah* officials. It was then signed by the officials themselves, verified by the local *chaudhris* and the *qanungos* and sent to the provincial *diwans*. Apparently, the provincial *diwans* sent it in a consolidated form to the central *Diwani*.[3] However, there was still great scope for misappropriation by the officials. *Jizyah* had been reimposed after a gap of more than a century after Akbar had abolished it in 1564.[4] When it was reimposed by Aurangzeb no previous records of eligible persons or of yields of previous years were available which might give to the provincial *diwans* or the central *Diwani* an idea about the expected collection of *jizyah* from a particular area, as they were available about the land revenue and the *sair-i jihat* taxes. There was, therefore, great possibility for oppression and corrupt practices. Even if the officials imposed the tax on only the eligible persons, they collected it with a heavy hand, and appropriated for themselves large

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1. *Wilson's Glossary*, p.527. Cf. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.22b.

2. *Ibid.*, p.40. Cf. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.28a.

3. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, ff.38b-39b. The work contains a specimen *tumar* which gives the total number of the residents of a village, number of exempted and taxed individuals and the amount realised category-wise (f.39a).

4. *Akbarnama*, Vol. II, pp.203-4; *Badauni*, Vol. II, p.276.

portion of the collected amount and deposited only a small fraction of it in the state-exchequer.[1] This suggests that the control of the central Diwani on the jizyah official was not as effective as it was on the revenue officials. This incidentally also reflects on the efficiency and character of, at least, some of the jizyah officials who were otherwise considered 'pious' and had been assigned a 'pious' job.[2]

Control over the State Expenditures :

As the Diwan-i Ala was responsible for the collection of state revenue, so also he controlled the money that was collected and the expenditure of the state. No payment was possible without his instructions to the treasury officials through parwanah or dastak. The daftar-i khalisa of the Diwani maintained a complete record of state expenditures as it kept full account of collections. The money that was collected at the

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1. Dilkusha, f.127b. There is a concrete example of this sort of misappropriation from the collections of Burhanpur. While an Amin of this place deposited only Rs.26,000 as the collection for the whole year, his successor collected just from the half of the town Rs.108,000 in three months (Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.279). Although the increase was partly the result of the harshness of the Amin (Ibid., p.338), the difference between the two collections is great, and could not be explained merely as the result of the enthusiasm of the succeeding official. This leads us to the conclusion that the previous Amin had misappropriated the part of jizyah collections of the town.

2. For the corruption of, and the embezzlement of jizyah money by the qazi of Merta in Rajputana, see Waqai-Ajmer, ff.473, 508-509.

parganah or *mahal* level was first kept in the local treasury in the custody of local treasurer under the seal of all local revenue officials.[1] After meeting the local expenses according to the instruction of the *Diwan*, the balance was finally sent to the central treasury at Agra or wherver the Emperor was.[2]

Kind of State Treasuries :

Treasuries under Aurangzeb were maintained according to the nature of taxes and each treasury was earmarked for expenses on specified heads. Under him there were four main treasuries or *khazanas*. (1) *Khazana-i jizyah*: As is evident from the name of the treasury itself, it consisted of the collections of *jizyah*. This money was spent on charitable and pious purposes. (2) *Khazana-i Sadaqa* or *bait-al mal*: It contained the money that was realised from the Muslims in the form of *zakat* (custom duties) at the rate of one-fortieth, the unclaimed property and the assets of heirless

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1. *Nigarnamah*, pp.81, 135-37.

2. *Ibid.*, p.138; Inayatjang Collection, I, 8/54, 1770; *Akhbarat*, 21st Rajab, 24th R.Y., 13th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y.; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.32a. When the money was despatched from the local *khazana* to the central treasury or to ~~the central treasury or to~~ the court, the *deshmukhs*, the *deshpandehias*, the *thanadars*, the *faujdars*, the *jagirdars*, the *zamindars* and the officials responsible for the security of roads and highways were ordered by the *Diwan-i Ala* to escort the treasures in their respective jurisdictions. (*Akhbarat*, 17th Safar, 49th R.Y.).

persons. This treasury was, perhaps, also known as the *bait-al mal*.[1] Money from this treasury was spent on the salaries of the *ulama* and divines, on the temporary maintenance of the converts to Islam and on the burial of poors, travellers and heirless persons.[2] There does not seem much difference between the two treasuries. The heads on which the money was spent were of similar nature, and when the fund was not available in one treasury, it was taken from the other and generally spent according to the recommendation of the *qazis* or the *Qazi-al Quzat*.[3] (3) *Khazana-i baqaya* : The arrears that were realised from the state officials or from the peasants given to them in the form of loan or *taqavi*, and the tribute paid by the chiefs (*peshkash*) was kept in this treasury. (4) *Khazana-i amira* or *bait-i kharaj*: The main imperial treasury which consisted of all the revenues (i.e. land-revenue and other taxes) collected from the *khalisa-i sharifa*.[4] There seems

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1. Cf. Janan Chandra, 'Alamgir's Patronage of Hindu Temples', *JPIS*, Vol. VI, pp.209-213. Abul Fazl (*Ain*, Vol. I, p.10) also refers to a separate treasury for the heirless property, without, however, giving it a specific name.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.298, 330; *Ibid.* (*Khatimah*), p.185.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp.298, 330.

4. This division and account of treasuries is based on *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*, pp.178-79). The author of *Khulasat-al Siyaq* (ff.46b-48b) has given a different account. While he agrees with *Mirat* in mentioning the second and fourth *khazana*, he does not describe the remaining two treasuries. Instead he mentions two other treasuries namely the *bait-al khums* (the treasury of one-fifth) and the *bait-i sai* (the treasury of unclaimed property). He also differs from *Mirat* in naming the collections that were to be put in these treasuries and the heads on which they were to be spent. For instance, he puts collections from *jizyah* in the *bait-al kharaj* which is not supported by other evidence. It seems the author did not fully know about the matter or has described the theoretical position. We have, therefore, preferred the statement of *Mirat* which seems more reliable as its author himself had been a provincial *diwan* under Aurangzeb's successors and knew better the actual working of the system.

no strict separation between these two treasuries and it were these treasuries which were spent on the state's requirements under the supervision of the *Diwan-i Ala*.

Perhaps the largest amount of the state-income from the *khalisa-i sharifa* was spent on the different categories of the state-servants. This was besides the 4/5 of the total yield of the empire assigned to a large number of nobles and officials in the form of *jagir*. First among these servants come the revenue officials of the *parganahs* themselves. The *Diwan-i Ala* issued the *parwanahs* for the payment of the salaries of revenue officials and the perquisites of the *Karoris* and the *fotadars* that were paid from the local treasury itself.[1] Next come the expenses on the cash salaries of other categories of the state servants like the musketeers and artillerymen (*bandooqchiyan* and *barqandazan*), the gentleman-troopers (*ahadis*), the retainers (*ahsham*), the house-hold servants (*shagirdpesha*) etc.[2] For these payments some specific treasuries (*khazain*) were maintained from which they were paid.[3] Then there were the expenses on the requirements of the army and other state departments for various kinds of finished and unfinished goods. They were generally provided by the state *karkhanas*

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.31b. Cf. Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, pp.279-80.

2. *Ibid.*, f.32b; *Inayat Collection*, I 6/132, 1388; I 8/45, 1761. For detail see Chapter IV.

3. These treasuries came under the immediate jurisdiction of the *Mir Saman*, and have been, therefore, described in Chapter IV.

(factories and stores). These *karkhanas* formed a separate department, and large sum was spent on them and on the salaries of their staff and have their own sub-treasuries. Finally there were the expenses on the imperial court, household and the *haram*. Almost all of their requirements for finished and unfinished goods were also met by the imperial *karkhanas*. For other sundry expenses, some sub-treasuries (*khazain*) were maintained for the ready cash payments.

The *karkhanas* and the sub-treasuries were under the charge of another central minister, the *Mir Saman*, and their functioning has been discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter. It should, however, be mentioned here that the money to the sub-treasuries and for expenditure on the *karkhanas* was released from the main treasury (*khazana-i amira*) only on the orders of the *Diwan-i Ala* after the requisition was made by the *Mir-i Saman*. Similarly, the salaries of the staff of the *karkhanas*, the *barqandazan*, the *ahadis*, the *ahsham* etc. were paid only after the orders to this effect were issued by the *Diwan-i Ala*. The payments or disbursements from the sub-treasuries were made on authorisation of the *Mir Saman* and the *Buyutat* themselves.[1] However, the *siyaha*, the *awarija*, the balance-sheet and the stock position of all these treasuries, as also of all the *karkhanas*, regularly came to the *Daftar-i Khalisa*[2] which kept the *Diwan-i Ala* fully informed about the daily disbursements.

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1. For detail on these matters see Chapter IV.
2. Add. 6598, f.136b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.14b-15b.

There was one more head on which the state spent huge amount and which was considered one of the main activities of the state in those days. It was on innumerable military expeditions which the Emperor undertook.[1] For expenditure during these campaigns a cash advance was almost always provided by the _Diwan-i Ala_. An ad hoc _Diwan_ (designated as the _Diwan-i fauj_) and a _mushrif-i khazana_ (auditor for the treasury sent with the army) was also sent with such expeditions as the representatives of the central _Diwani_. The two officials maintained the account of the expenditures and sent the necessary papers and records to the _Diwan-i Ala_.[2] If extra amount needed for these campaigns, an imperial _farman_ or _Diwan-i Ala_'s instructions (_hasb-al hukm_) were sent to the officials of provincial or capital's treasury to remit certain amount to meet such expenses.[3] During the prolonged Deccan campaign, the _Diwan-i Ala_ was even authorised by the Emperor to requisition money from the reserves in the fort of Agra.[4]

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1. Under Aurangzeb large amount of state income was spent on military expeditions and especially on the Deccan campaigns. On the siege of Wagingera (1705) alone some forty lakh rupees were spent (_Akhbarat_, 8th Rabi I, 49th R.Y.). The Emperor himself was much concerned over these expenses in the Deccan and was keen to discover the hidden treasures of the Karnatik (_Kalimat_, f.70a).

2. _Akhbarat_, 13th Rajab, 39th R.Y.; 27th Shawwal, 43rd R.Y.; _Selected Documents_ (Aurangzeb), p.60; _Waqai Ajmer_, f.700; _Nigarnamah_, p.96. The same _Diwan_ took control of the booty, if any. _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.307.

3. Thus for instance, three separate _farmans_ were sent to the _subahdar_, the _diwan_ and the _qiladar_ of Lahore to send 20 lac rupees to Kabul where operations were in progress against the Afghan rebels (_Akhbarat_, 27th Ziqad, 13th R.Y.). Cf. also _Akhbarat_ cited in note 1 above; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.206; _Nigarnamah_, p.43.

4. _Akhbarat_, 10th Rajab, 24th R.Y.

Lastly, the Diwan-i Ala also arranged the money for any unforeseen expenditure on the army or any head in the provinces, if so ordered by the Emperor.[1] In such cases he issued parwanas, generally to the nearest treasury, for the provision of the money or arranged its remittance himself from the treasury at the Court.[2]

A very significant aspect of the functioning of the government as regard to state expenses emerges from the above discussion. It appears that for any sort of state expenditure the Diwan-i Ala did not provide the cash himself; he only issued orders to the treasury officials for the payment or provision of the money. The treasury officials, on the other hand, had no authority to release any cash without the authorization from the Diwan-i Ala. In other words, those who had the authority to sanction expenses did not have the cash at their disposal; and those who had the money in their custody, did not possess the power to authorise the disbursement. The financial transactions of the state thus worked through the system of bills and payments. The method was, as such, the procursor of our modern system of banking and state treasuries. This system would have seeved as a check on above two wings of the government, and would have minimised the chances of misappropriation or embezzlement by the officials concerned.

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1. [illegible]-i Alamgiri, f.32a.
2. Waqai Ajmer, f.557.

The *Diwan-i Ala*'s office received the figures of state income from the revenue officials, the deposits, disbursements, and balance-sheets from the officials of *parganahs* and sub-treasuries, and the expenditure accounts from the *Mir Saman*.[1] Through these papers the *Diwan-i Ala* kept himself fully informed about the income and expenditure of the state and informed the Emperor from time to time about the exact position of the state finances.[2] Moreover, on the basis of these papers, a final statement of income and expenditure of the state for the whole year was prepared by the office of the *Diwan-i Ala*[3] which was known as the *madakhil-o-makharij* (income and expenditure).[4] This was, thus, the consolidated statement of the income and expenditure of the state for that year, from which the exact position of the state income, expenditure, balance or deficit in a particular year was known. This was, finally, presented before the Emperor. The Emperor took keen interest in the income and expenditure of the state and kept himself fully informed about the exact position of the '*madakhil*' and '*makharij*'. Thus, for example, in mid Zilhijja 1080 / April, 1670, Inayat Khan, the *Diwan-i Khalisa*[5] reported to the Emperor that

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1. For the list of the papers received from these officials, see Infra p. 196
2. *Kazim*, p.1105; *Akhbarat*, 11th Rajab, 24th R.Y.; *Hidayat-ul Qawaid*, f.9a.
3. For a specimen as how it was prepared, see *Dastur-ul Amal*, ff.154b-155b.
4. *Dastur-i Agahi*, f.77b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.91a.
5. Inayat Khan was, perhaps, officiating the *Diwan-i Ala* Jafar Khan because of latter's severe illness which ultimately caused his death in the same month. (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.130).

the expenses had exceeded the income by fourteen lacs of rupees. The Emperor showed his concern on the imbalance and ordered that the expenses should be reduced forthwith. As it was not possible to curtail the regular expenses of the state on its servants and establishments, it was ordered that 'many items of expenses in the establishments of the King, the princes and the Begums should be reduced'.[1]

The Assignment of Jagir :

Another function of the Diwan-i Ala as the head of the Diwani was to formally assign jagirs to the mansabdars. As referred to above, about 4/5 of revenue yielding area of the empire under Aurangzeb was assigned in jagirs to the mansabdars and officials in lieu of their own salaries and of the maintenance allowance of their contingents (tabinan).

The jagir assigned to a mansabdar in the first instance, or in exchange of his previous jagir in case of transfer, was ought to be equal to his salary and allowances. The office of the Diwan-i Ala, therefore, kept a complete record[2] of the land that was already assigned to mansabdars

1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.100. The Emperor later gave the same instructions to Asad Khan, the Diwan-i Ala (Dastur-i Aqahi, f.77b).

2. For a comprehensive list of official papers maintained by the two sections of the Diwani, see Infra p. 195

or was earmarked to be assigned in *jagir* (known as '*paibaqi*') with the estimated yield of each *mahal* (revenue unit). It was on the basis of this record in the *Daftar-i Tan* that a particular *mahal* was assigned to a *mansabdar*. Sometimes the land-revenue of a particular *mahal* was assigned in *jagir* to a particular *jagirdar*, and not all the taxes like the '*sair*'. It happened when the *jamadami* of the *mahal* was more than the '*talab*' of the *jagirdar*. In such cases, the land-revenue was collected by the agents of the *jagirdar*, but for the collection of other taxes, the *Diwan-i Ala* instructed the concerned provincial *diwan* to collect through the state-agencies these taxes that were not assigned to the *jagirdar*.[1] Similarly, if a *jagirdar* was transferred along with his *jagir* from one place to another, the *Diwan-i Ala* wrote to the provincial *diwan* to take over the *mahals* of transferred *jagirdar* into *Khalisa* or *paibaqi* and arrange the realisation of its revenue; and if anything has already been collected by the agents of the *jagirdar*, to recover it from them.[2]

It is, however, difficult to determine the exact role of the *Diwan-i Ala* or his colleague the *Diwan-i Tan* in the assignment of *mahals* in *jagir*. Some *mahals* in a particular province were reserved for some officials of that province, and were conventionally assigned to them.[3]

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.32a; *Akhbarat*, 5th Rabi I, 49th R.Y.
2. *Inayat Collection*, I 7/265, 1681, I 7/274, 169.
3. For example, the *sarkar* of Patan and Serangpur in the province of Gujrat were reserved to be assigned to the local governor (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.308).

But to most of the jagirdars the jagirs were assigned from thousands of mahals taking into consideration the jamadami of the mahal, the volume of the jagir and the status and the posting of the jagirdar etc.[1] Besides, all mahals were not of the same nature as regard to realisation of revenue from them. While some of them were raiyati (peasant-held) and, therefore, not unwilling to pay the revenue, other areas were under the big and recalcitrant zamindars, and were considered rebellious (zor-talab). It was not always easy to realise the revenue from these zor-talab areas without a show of force.[2] Subsequently, when Aurangzeb annexed the two kingdoms of Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687), there too it was difficult to realise the full revenue because of the local resistance and depredations of the Marathas.[3] The assignment of jagir was, therefore, a delicate matter as it concerned almost all nobles and majority of state servants who held some mansab.

It was, perhaps, because of these considerations that in case of both big and small jagirdars we find the Emperor himself specifying the jagir that was to be assigned to them.[4] We are not quite sure whether the

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1. For these considerations see Irfan Habib, op. cit., p.283.

2. For difference between the raiyati and zamindari villages and its relevance with the collection of revenue, see Ibid., pp.136-143, 331. For the zamindars see also S. Nurul Hasan, 'The Position of the Zamindars in Mughal Empire, IESHR, Vol. I (1963-64), pp.107-119.

3. Dilkusha, f.139a.

4. Thus for instance, the Emperor himself assigned Surat and Bharoach in the jagir of Diler Khan (for him see Maasir, Vol. II, pp.42-56) while deputing him to the Deccan (Akhbarat, 8th Ramazan, 13th R.Y.). Similarly, the Emperor himself specified the jagir that was to be assigned in the subah of Berar to a mansabdar of 1000/500 (1692, Inayat Collection, I 8/44, 1757).

Emperor assigned these *jagirs* on his own or after consulting the *Diwan-i Ala* or the *Diwan-i Tan*. We have at least one instance where even in the case of Prince, the Emperor asked the *Diwan-i Ala* to suggest the *jagir* to be assigned to him.[1] Besides, there are at the same time cases where the Emperor did not mention the *jagir* to be assigned and apparently left the matter to the discretion of the *Diwan-i Ala*, or more probably, the *Diwan-i Tan*.[2] Even the provincial *diwans* appear to have had the discretion to assign *jagirs* to smaller *mansabdars*.[3] In any case, it was the privilege of the *Diwan-i Ala* as the head of the *Diwani* that the formal *sanad* of the *jagir* was processed and prepared under his immediate supervision and was issued with his attestation (*risalah*).

The procedure for the assignment of *jagir* was long one and was completed by many officials, not exclusively of the *Diwan-i Ala's* department. The *jagir* was assigned to an individual only after he was formally granted a *mansab* where too the *Diwan-i Ala* had some role to play as we shall see.[4]

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1. *[illegible]*, f.4a; *Ruqaat*, p.28.
2. In the case of Diler Khan himself cited above, the Emperor did not specify the jagir that was to be assigned to him in the Deccan. Likewise, when Iftekhar Khan (*Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.[illegible]; Chapter IV below) was restored to his *mansab* while in Kashmir, part of his *jagir* the Emperor assigned him in Kashmir itself; and told that the rest would be assigned somewhere else (*Akhbarat*, 10th Ramzan, 13th R.Y.). For a similar unspecified order of the Emperor about a *mansabdar* of 100/? see *Inayat Collection*, I 8/98, 1814. Cf. also *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.432.
3. Cf. *Ibid.*, I 6/131, 1387.
4. For the procedure followed in the grant of *mansab*, see Chapter III.

However, once the Emperor approved the person for imperial service, and granted him a *mansab*, the process for the assignment of *jagir* was started by the *Daftar-i Tan* of *Diwan-i Ala*'s office. The procedure was as follows:[1]

On the basis of the court-diary (*siaha-i waqai-i huzur*, that contained the *mansabdar*'s audience with the Emperor and Emperor's oral grant of a *mansab* to him), the *Diwan-i Tan* prepared a statement of the above fact, the statement being called the *fard-i haqiqat-i mansabdar*. The *Diwan-i Ala* presented this *fard* before the Emperor who then issued orders for the assignment of the *jagir* to the *mansabdar* concerned from a specific part of the *rabi* or *kharif* season. The *Diwan-i Ala* then put his endorsement on the *fard* '*manzur*' (granted) and an order on its margin that 'the *mansabdar* be assigned a *jagir*'. On the basis of this document, the officials of the *Daftar-i Tan* prepared the *siaha-i daul-i jagir-i mansabdaran* (the account of the particulars of the *jagir* of the *mansabdars*). It contained the name and the *zat* and *sawar* rank of the *mansabdar*, the estimate

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1. The procedure of jagir assignment under Aurangzeb was not different from what it was under Shah Jahan and Jahangir. The above procedure has been reconstructed on the basis of a number of actual *farmans* of the grant of *mansab* and assignment of *jagir* to some nobles by Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. Copies of such *farmans* are found in *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, pp.241-49, 430-32. In the first *farman* Jahangir assigned a *jagir* of over five karor *dam* to Kunwar Karan Singh of Mewar (dated the 21st February, 1619). The second *farman* belongs to Aurangzeb's reign (dated the 16th August, 1658), wherein the Emperor assigned a *mansab* and *jagir* to Rana Raj Singh of the same place. Similar documents are found in *Selected Documents* (Shah Jahan), pp. 1-4. Also cf. *Nigar-nama*, p.58, where a casual reference to the procedure has been made in a letter to Prince Muazzam by his agent at the Court.

of his stipulated salary for two ranks, names of the *parganahs* with their assessed *dams* there were to be assigned in *jagir*. The vital contents of the *fard-i haqiqat* were also put in brief on the margin of this *siaha*.

The next stage was the preparation of the *daul-i talab-i tankhwah-i jagir-i mansabdaran* (the particulars of the salary claims and assignment of jagir of the *mansabdars*). It was exactly a copy of the previous document (*siaha-i daul-i jagir*) minus the abridged contents of the *fard-i haqiqat*. The difference between the two documents seems to be that while the *siaha-i daul* was a preliminary specification of the *mahals* to be assigned in *jagir*, the daul contained the approved *mahals* for assignment (*tankhwah*) of jagir. The *daul* was now sent to the *waqia-navis* (the news-writer) of the Court for the preparation of *yaddasht* (memorandum) and Emperor's final approval. The *yaddasht* contained, on the authority (*risalah*) of the *Diwan-i Ala*, the audience of the *mansabdar* with the Emperor (along with the date of the audience and name of the news-writer) and the grant of *jagir* to him by the Emperor. It also contained the endorsement of the assignment of jagir (*zimn*), as specified in the *daul*.

The *Diwan-i Ala* now put a note on this *yaddasht* to the effect that 'it (i.e. the appearance of *mansabdar* at court and Emperor's grant of a *jagir* to him) should first be verified from the court diary and should then be presented before the Emperor for his final approval (*arz-i mukarrar*).

Accordingly, the news-writer compared it and endorsed on it that this was according to the court-diary. Now the Darogha (the Superintendent) of arz-i mukarrar put the matter before the Emperor for his final approval of the grant of the jagir. He then put his endorsement on the yaddasht that the grant got the final approval of the Emperor.[1] After the matter was finally approved by the Emperor, the office prepared the farman to be given to the jagirdar which contained on its reverse the text of the yaddasht and the mansab, the salary, the jagir of the mansabdar and the parganahs with jama assigned to him. This endorsement known as the zimn was signed by the Diwan-i Ala.[2] The farman entitled the assignee for the collection-rights (huquq-i diwani) in the assigned mahals, and to depute his agent (gumashta) for the collection. The Diwan-i Ala at the same time issued a parwanah informing the concerned provincial diwan, and the parganah revenue officials, the civil authorities and the tax-payers concerned about the assignment and asking them to recognise the rights of the assignee on the revenue of the mahal, pay him the same and help him in realising the same from the assigned mahals. They were also asked to keep

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1. The documents mentioned in the procedure with their content and the endorsements of the officials cited above have been reproduced as specimen in Dastur-al Amal, ff.156a-157b.

2. Ibid., f.157b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.33b. As already mentioned, such farmans are found in Vir Vinod, Vol. II, pp.241-49, 426-31; Selected Documents (Shah Jahan), pp.1-4. See also Farman-i Salatin, pp.106-107, 120, for similar farmans.

a check on the *jagirdar* that he treated the *raiya* of his *mahal* properly, collected only the authorised taxes and did not realise the illegal cesses (*abwab-i mamnua*).[1]

Inam-i altamgha Jagir :

A little diversion is necessary here to mention that the *inam-i altamgha jagir*[2] granted by the Emperor to the nobles themselves or their families as *watan*, rent free and on hereditary basis, also come under the jurisdiction of the *Diwan-i Ala*. *Farman* for such grants was issued according to the same procedure as in the case of ordinary *jagir*, with the *risalah* of the *Diwan-i Ala*.

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1. *Akhbarat*, 2nd Rabi I, 49th R.Y., 4th Jumada I, 49th R.Y.; *Bikaner Archives*, 90/95; *Nigarnamah*, p.91. Many such *parwanahs* are found in the *Selected Documents* (Shah Jahan), pp.4-20, 150-58. These *parwanahs* also contain '*zimn*' wherein the grants of *mansabs* to the assignees, their stipulated salaries, and the assigned *parganahs* with their assigned *dams* are mentioned. These *parwanahs* help us in understanding the functions of the concerned officials as also some connected terms like the *zimn* itself, *yaddasht*, *risalah*, *muchalka* (surety) and *arz-i mukarrar* etc.

2. For the origin and nature of *inam-i altamgha*, or perhaps more correctly *inam-altamgha* (vide *farman* cited below) see Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, p.312.

3. Two such *farmans* are found in *Farmain-i Salatin* (pp.70-78, 95-98). The first one (dated 20th Zilhijja, 5th R.Y. and issued through the then in-charge of the *Diwani*, Raja Raghunath) was issued to Diler Khan granting him the *altamgha jagir* of six lac *dams* and thirty-seven villages in lieu thereof as '*watan*' in the *parganah* of Shahabad in the *sarkar* of Khairabad in the *subah* of Awadh. The second *farman* (dated the 22nd Shawwal, 29th R.Y.) and issued with the *risalah* of the then *Diwan-i Ala* Asad Khan) was granted to Kamaluddin Khan the son of above mentioned Diler Khan on latter's death, confirming on him the above *jagir*. Both the *farmans* contain in their *zimn* the endorsements of the officials referring to the procedure. There is still a third *farman* (*Ibid.*, pp.99-101) issued to the same man (dated the 7th Rabi II, 31st R.Y.), with same procedural details, granting to him a *jagir* of six lac *dams* in the same *parganah* as *mahal-i watan*, without, however, reference to *altamgha*.

Sanad of Zamindari Rights :

Similarly, the *Diwani Ala* also issued the *sanads* to the *chaudhris* and *deshmukhs* conferring on them the *zamindari* rights. The position of the *chaudhris* and the *deshmukhs* was usually hereditary, and there was therefore little scope for the *Diwan-i Ala* to play any significant role in its confirmation or otherwise. Theoretically, however, the Emperor could confirm or remove a successor.[1] Hence each successor wanted to secure a *sanad*, and if possible, an imperial *farman* to strengthen his claims against possible contenders. It was here that the government used the issue of a *sanad* and *farman* as an effective means to recover the arrears of *peshkash* (tribute), if any, against the deceased *chaudhri* or *deshmukh*, or to enhance it.[2] In some cases in the Deccan, the confirmation was also made conditional on maintaining the troopers (*piadahas*) and assisting the imperial forces against the enemy.[3]

The procedure for the issue of *sanad* for the *deshmukhi*, and evidently also for *chaudhrai*, was almost the same that was followed for the assignment of jagir, with the difference, however, that the procedure here was initiated after the candidate moved an application (*arzdasht*)

1. Cf. Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, pp.291-92.
2. Vide documents in *Inayat Collection*, I 8/161, 1177; I 5/11, 1178.
3. *Ibid.*, I 5/6, 1173; I 5/8, 1175.

for such confirmation and submitted a surety (muchlaka) to the effect that he would regularly pay the peshkash; and ended with the issue of a sanad, instead of a farman, to the candidate and a parwanah to the local officials by the Diwan-i Ala.[1] The farman was also granted if the candidate insisted for one[2] and in some cases when promised to pay an ad hoc peshkash for it.[3]

Madad-i Maash Grants :

Likewise, the madad-i maash grants (aid for subsistance) too were subject to the confirmation by the Diwan-i Ala. After the Emperor granted land in madad-i maash to certain deserving people, the sanad for such grants was x issued according to set procedure by the Sadr-us Sudur.[4] But the local revenue officials recognised the rights of the grantee only after

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1. The present writer has reconstructed the procedure followed in the assignment of deshmukhi on the basis of a series of related documents found in the State Archives, Hyderabad, and in the Inayat Jung Collection, National Archives, New Delhi, in an article, 'Appointment and Confirmation of Deshmukhs in the Mughal Empire', Proceedings of IHC, 1972, pp.223-26.

2. Two such farmans are available in Faramin-i Salatin. One (pp.57-58) dated the 4th Ramazan, 1st R.Y., was issued to a Maratha Chief Pedia Naik, confirming on him the sardeshmukhi of his ancestral zamindari; and the other (p.132) dated the 14th Rajab, 49th R.Y., granting the chaudhurai of parganah [illegible] in sarkar Lucknow of Awadh to one Muhammad Turab.

3. Vide Aurangzeb's farman to Tolaji, dated the 10th Ramazan, 5th R.Y., SAH; Inayat Collection, I 8/161, 1877.

4. For detail see Chapter VI.

they received a parwanah of the Diwan-i Ala,[1] confirming the fact. It was on the basis of this parwanah that the local revenue officials carved out the patch of land (chak) according to the specifications given in the parwanah and gave him a chaknamah and possession of the land.[2] Evidently the Diwani officials would have also furnished at the Court the details about the 'available' villages for assignment in madad-i maash. And it was, perhaps, because of this role the Diwan-i Ala and his colleagues in the grant of madad-i maash land that Aurangzeb once described the department of the Sadr-us Sudur as a part of the department of the Diwani.[3]

Salaries of Naqdi Mansabdars :

As the Diwan-i Ala assigned jagir to the mansabdar, so also he was responsible for the fixation and the payment of cash salaries of the 'naqdi' mansabdars. The matter was processed by the Daftar-i Tan, but it was not as complicated as was the assignment of jagir. After the grant of mansab, an estimate of the cash-salary of the mansabdar was prepared. He was then given the entitlement to draw the salary (dastak-i tankhwah-i naqdi), signed by the Diwan-i Ala.[4] At the same time a parwanah was issued

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1. Farhang-i-Kardani, f.30a. See also Infra, p.431.
2. For the terms chak, chaknamah see Irfan Habib, op. cit., p.301. For some madad-i maash chaknamah see Farhang-i Kardani, f.36a; Inayat Collection, I 5/17, 118b.
3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.393.
4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.36a.

by him to concerned treasury officials authorising them to pay the amount.[1] Cash was sometimes sent from the court-treasury for payment to the *naqdi-mansabdars* posted in the provinces.[2]

Musaidat (*Loan*) :

The *Diwan-i Ala* also advanced loans to the *mansabdars*. The *mansabdars* were sometimes appointed the governor of a disturbed province or were sent on some expedition. It often occurred that they did not possess enough money or equipments for the job,[3] and needed some financial or material assistance.[4] Even the princes were sometimes confronted with such situations.[5] In such emergencies the revenue ministry used to come to their rescue. According to the orders of Emperor, the *mansabdar* (or the prince) was granted some loan (known as '*musaidat*') to be realised

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.36a; *Nigarnamah*, p.73; *Selected Documents* (*Aurangzeb*), pp.45, 157.

2. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.638.

3. Thus for instance, when Allah Virdi Khan was sent on Kumayun expedition, he sought a *musaidat* of one lac rupees through Jafar Khan the *Wazir* with the request that if he succeeded in expedition, the *musaidat* be converted into inam (*Akhbarat*, 2nd Zilhijja, 9th R.Y.).

4. '*Musaidat*' was advanced to a state servant not only at the time of expedition or posting, but also in case of robbery or theft in their houses. *Akhbarat*, 8th Shawwal, 40th R.Y.

5. A prince, as also a *mansabdar*, for example, needed not only the money, but also the horses and camels which were provided to them by the state as *musaidat*. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.510; *Nigarnamah*, pp.39-40, 69.

later.[1] The Diwan-i Ala issued the 'sanad' to the mansabdar and a dastak to the treasury officials for the payment.[2] Because of the continuous military activity in the empire, the mansabdars were almost always on their toe and often needed musaidat. For the purpose, therefore, a separate sub-treasury called 'khazana-i musaidat' was maintained.[3]

Control over the Mansabdars :

The job of the Diwan-i Ala did not finish with the assignment of jagir or payment of cash to the mansabdars. He had also to ensure that the jagirdars did not transgress their rights in the areas granted to them as jagir, did not realise illegal or an unauthorised tax from the subjects and did not indulge in oppression in their respective tayuls, the points that were emphasised in the sanads of their jagirs themselves.

Bernier has written that the jagirdars neglected their jagir because of the fear of transfer and lack of interest, and drew all the money from the soil leaving the peasants to starve.[4] But perhaps Bernier could not appreciate the working of the system, and the fact that the actual

1. Cf. Ain, p.195 (Blochmann, p.275). Akbar realised the musaidat with interest. Apparently, Aurangzeb would not have been doing it because of his orthodoxy.

2. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.36a.

3. Ibid., ff.14b, 36b.

4. Bernier, p.227.

interests of the *jagirdar* lie in looking after the prosperity of his *jagir*. Because some instances of excess notwithstanding, the *jagirdars* knew fully well that in neglecting their *jagirs* or oppressing the peasants they might loose both their mansab and *jagir*. If any *jagirdar* violated the rules and instructions, serious view was taken by the Emperor and the *Diwan-i Ala* was instructed to reduce or recover the *jagir* of the offender.[1] Even the princes were not spared if they or their servants treated the subjects with cruelty.[2]

Similarly, the *Diwan-i Ala* initiated action against the *mansabdar* if he failed in fulfilling his obligations. The *jagir* or the cash salary was given to a *mansabdar* for certain obligations.[3] It were the *Bakhshis* who saw to it that the *mansabdars* were fulfilling these obligations.[4] If, however, a *mansabdar* failed in fulfilling his obligations, the *Diwan-i Ala* deducted the equal amount from his allowances or realised it from him. For the purpose, the *Diwan-i Ala* received from the *Mir Bakhshi* a number of papers.[5]

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1. *Akhbarat*, 17th Jumada II, 32nd R.Y.; *Nigarnamah*, p.93.
2. Thus on a report that a servant of Prince Azam has ill-treated the *raaya* (peasants), the Emperor admonished the Prince and wrote him that if corrective measures were not taken immediately, his (Prince's) *jagir* will be taken back and substitute *jagir* will not be granted (*Ruqaat*, p.6) see also *Ruqaat* Nos.23 and 35 to the same prince (pp.8, 11).
3. For these obligations, see A. Aziz, *The Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army*; Ali, M.A., *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, pp.53-59.
4. See Chapter III.
5. For a list of such papers, see Infra p.

Through these papers the Diwan-i Ala came to know whether or not the mansabdars were fulfilling their obligations and maintaining the required number of contingents. If the mansabdar failed in his obligations or committed any act of indiscipline,[1] the Diwan-i Ala recovered or reduced the jagir of a mansabdar, according to the instructions of the Emperor.

Recovery of State Dues :

The Diwan-i Ala had also to recover the state dues ('mutaliba' or talab-i sarkar) from the jagirdars and the mansabdars. Sometimes a mansabdar serving as the subahdar or diwan in a province illegally appropriated the state money.[2] Similarly, certain amount was recovered from the jagirdars under various rules of the jagirdari system.[3] The loan advanced to the mansabdars (musaidat) was also treated as 'mutaliba' against them. The Diwan-i Ala recovered all this mutaliba from the state servants. It seems that Diwan-i Ala had a special assistant for the purpose namely the Darogha-i tahsil-i mutaliba. This officer prepared the abstract of the arrears from the papers in the Diwan-i Ala's office and

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1. Leaving the place of the posting without the prior permission of the King, for example, was considered an act of indiscipline. For such an offence the mansab of Hasan Ali Khan was reduced and his jagir recovered. Ruqaat, p.28; Dastur-i Agahi, f.76a. Also cf. Ruqaat, p.30; Raqaim, f.5b.

2. Akhbarat, 21st Rajab, 44th R.Y.

3. For these rules, see Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.37a-43b. Also cf. Athar Ali, op. cit., pp.50-52.

deputed his men for the collection of the amount.[1] But the recovery was a difficult task. The *mansabdars* evaded the officials or bribed them to stall the payment; and sometimes stern measures had to be taken against them with the help of civil officials.[2] In later years of Aurangzeb's reign, however, it was mostly the *Diwani* that was at fault. Because of the recruitment of large number of *mansabdars*, especially the Marathas and the Deccanis on high *mansabs*, and the shortage of '*paibaqi*', the revenue ministry did not assign *jagir* to many khanazads for years together and large amount of their claims stood against the state. And even if after strenuous efforts of their *wakils* and a patron at court the *mansabdars* were able to establish their claims, the *Diwani* paid them only ¼ of their claims.[3] It was to reduce the liabilities of the state against the claims of *mansabdars* that some new rules were introduced by some *Diwan-i Tan* whom we would now discuss.

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1. *Akhbarat*, 14th Shaban, 49th R.Y.

2. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.261, 376-78.

3. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.396-97. The fact has also been partly confessed by the Emperor himself in his letter to Zulfiqar Khan Nusrat Jang (*Kalimat*, f.70a).

<u>The Diwan-i Khalisa and the Diwan-i Tan</u> :

As has already been mentioned, the *Diwan-i Ala* had two subordinate *diwans* to assist him in performing his job in the *Diwani*, namely the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan*. As is evident from their designations, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* assisted the *Diwan-i Ala* in the *Khalisa* office (*Daftar-i Khalisa*) in the collection and disbursement of revenue from the *Khalisa* land; and the *Diwan-i Tan* assisted him in the *Daftar-i Tan*, in the fixation and payment of cash salaries or the assignment of *jagir* to the *mansabdars*.

We, however, find no reference to an incumbent to either of the posts during the first three years of Aurangzeb's reign.[1] It was only in the beginning of the 4th R.Y., that appointments were made to the two posts in May, 1661. Apparently, Aurangzeb did not feel urgency for these appointments as he had already divided the functions of the *Wazir*, and he himself was looking into the important matters of the *Diwani* that were put before him by Raja Raghunath, the incharge (*mutasaddi*) of the *Diwani*. It was, perhaps, the increasing pressure of work on Raja Raghunath and on Aurangzeb himself which ultimately laid him down on bed in 1662,[2] that evidently forced Aurangzeb to reappoint separate *diwans* for the two sections

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1. The analysis given in the two paragraphs is based on the data in the two 'Tables' of the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan* of Aurangzeb's reign, appended at the end of Chapter II. For detail, see the 'Tables'.

2. *Kazim*, pp.746-50.

of the *Diwani*. Since 1661, however, neither of the two posts was left vacant, though there are instances when one individual combined the two posts for years together or held the independent charge of his section as has been mentioned somewhere else in our discussion.

Some among the incumbents, like Rashid Khan as the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and Inayat Ullah Khan as the *Diwan-i Tan* held their respective posts for a record period of over fifteen years, the longest term after that of the Wazir Asad Khan. But in all nine persons, most of them being here as elsewhere in the central government the Iranis, were appointed to either office since 1661. Their average tenure, therefore, comes to about five years which is higher than the average tenure of similar officials of other central departments. Some of them were even given a second term to serve in the same or the other section of the *Diwani*. These facts as also the undisturbed thirty-years tenure of Asad Khan the *Diwan-i Ala* indicate that in comparison to other central departments, Aurangzeb cared more for stability, continuity and experience for this premier department of his government.

Position and Status :

What is, however, striking is the fact that the *Diwan-i Khalisa* or the *Diwan-i Tan* held comparatively low position in the hierarchy of the Mughal *mansabdars*. A *mansabdar* of just 700 *zat* and 150 *sawar*, which was

certainly a very low *mansab*, could be appointed to either post.[1] Perhaps none of the two *diwans* under Aurangzeb ever held a rank higher than 2000 *zat* and 500 *sawar*.[2] Similarly, as regard to their position in the hierarchy of Mughal officials, the two *diwans* are found to be transferred to posts as low as the *faujdarship* of a *chakla*,[3] and as high as the *diwanship* and governorship of a province.[4] Likewise, a person serving as the *diwan* of a province was appointed the *Diwan-i Khalisa* or the *Diwan-i Tan*.[5] The position of a *Diwan-i Khalisa* or the *Diwan-i Tan* may, thus, be considered equal to a provincial *diwan*. But no *Diwan-i Khalisa* or the *Diwan-i Tan*, with the exception of Raja Raghunath was ever promoted to the position of the *Diwan-i Ala* under Aurangzeb. As we have already discussed, Raja Raghunath did not hold the complete and independent charge of the *Diwani*, and the

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1. Thus for instance, when Amanat Khan was appointed the *Diwan-i Khalisa* in August, 1671, his rank was 700/100 (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.110). At least one *Diwan-i Khalisa*, Lal Chand had still lower rank of 600/60 (*Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.85a). Similarly, when Inayatullah Khan was appointed the *Diwan-i Tan* in 1692, he held the *mansab* of 700/100 (*Ibid.*, f.86a; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.349).

2. Cf. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.84a-85a.

3. Inayat Khan, for example, was first transferred to the *faujdari* of Bareilly (August, 1671) and then to Khairabad in the same capacity (*Maasir*, English translation, Vol. I, p.680).

4. Thus in 1675, Amanat Khan was appointed the *Nazim* and the *Diwan* of Lahore (*Maasir*, Vol. I, p.263).

5. Itemad Khan, Burhanuddin was the '*Diwan* of Shahjahanabad' when he was appointed the *Diwan-i Tan* in the 22nd R.Y. (*Ibid.*, Vol. III, p.35). Similarly, Amanat Khan was transferred from the *diwani* of Kabul to the post of *Diwan-i Khalisa* in 14th R.Y. (*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p.261).

persons who were raised to the position of full-fledged Diwan-i Ala had held the posts other than that of the diwani of khalisa or of the tan before their promotion. But the two diwans did get the opportunity to officiate the Diwan-i Ala as we shall see.

Functions and Duties:

As the Diwan-i Ala was also the Wazir-i Azam and had many other administrative responsibilities and preoccupations, the two diwans would have had the major responsibilities in respective two sections of the Diwani. It seems that the two diwans were responsible for the routine work in their respective sections and saw to it that necessary papers were received in their offices from the provincial diwans and the pargana revenue officials.[1]

The nature of the endorsements put by the Diwan-i Ala and the Diwan-i Khalisa on various papers suggest that the Diwan-i Khalisa looked after the internal processing of the papers in the daftar-i khalisa and implemented the instructions of the Diwan-i Ala as put up on the papers. For example, on papers like tasdiq (verification of the presence of a mansabdar at Court), the Diwan-i Ala wrote 'dakhil-i waqia numayand' (it

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1. Siyaqnamah, pp.99-101; Inayat Collection, I 6/122, 1378; I 7/255, 1671; I 8/27, 1743.

should be entered into the occurrences of the court); on *yaddasht ba-arz-i mukarrar rasanand* (the matter should be put before the Emperor the second time), on the *roznamcha-i jama-o kharch* (the diary of income and expenditure) *ba-nazar darayad* (seen), and on the *sanads manzoor darand* (it should be accepted). On all these papers the *Diwan-i Khalisa* endorsed *sabt numayand* (it should be entered or recorded).[1] On the salary-bills (*afrad-i talab*) of the *naqdi mansabdars*, the musketeers (*barqandazan*), the retainers (*ahsham*) and the employees of the *karkhanas*, the *Diwan-i Ala* wrote '*sanad dihand*' (give them the certificate) and the *Diwan-i Khalisa* wrote '*mulahiza shud*' (seen).[2] It seems that the signature and the endorsements of the *Diwan-i Ala* and the *Diwan-i Khalisa* were in nature of procedural approval rather than the instructions and orders and hence there was little significance in their literal meaning. Apparently, they indicated only that the matter or the paper was put before the *Diwan-i Ala* and the *Diwan-i Khalisa* or the *Diwan-i Tan* and checked by them. The endorsement thus cleared the way for further processing by the lower staff and the clerks of the *daftars*. Apart from these procedural endorsements, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* was authorised to sign independently on the *sium* of the appointment orders of the *diwani* of a province, and *faujdari* and *amini* of a *pargana*. But on the *sium*, of *farmans* the signature of the *Diwan-i Ala* was necessary.[3]

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1. *Dastur-al Amal*, f.151b.
2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.31b. Cf. *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), p.xii.
3. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.33b.

The *Diwan-i Tan*, like the *Diwan-i Khalisa*, processed the papers of the assignment of *jagir* and cash-salary to the *mansabdars* and state officials in the *daftar-i tan* and supervised its internal working. His job in this respect, was to complete the procedure for the assignment of *jagir* or cash-salary already granted by the Emperor.[1] But as already referred to above, he appears to have had considerable say in the selection of *paibaqi* for assignment in *jagirs*[2] and, therefore, his favour would have been sought after by many a *mansabdars*.

But what is more important is the fact that the *Diwan-i Tan* had also the power to work out the details of the claims of the state servants. Thus, for example, in 32nd R.Y. (July 1688 - June 1689) Musavi Khan, the then *Diwan-i Tan*, introduced the practice of taking surety (*muchalka*) from the newly recruited *mansabdars* that they would not claim any salary for the period between the preparation of '*yaddasht*' and the final assignment of *jagirs* and from the old ones for the period between their transfer and the fresh deputation (*tainyunati*). The innovation created much resentment

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1. Thus for example, after the Emperor orally granted *jagir* to a person, the procedure for the grant of *jagir* was initiated by the *Diwan-i Tan* by preparing the first document of the procedure, namely the *fard-i hakikat*, which contained the appearance of the person at court and Emperor's grant of *jagir* to him (*Dastur-al Amal*, f.156a).

2. Cf. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.432, where it is stated that once (October, 1700) Inayatullah Khan, the *Diwan-i Tan*, was ordered by the Emperor to give *jagir* for 3,000 *sawars* to Prince Kam Bakhsh, and not to insist on a new *yaddasht*'.

among the *mansabdars*. But the rule introduced by him had so much validity that it was scrupulously followed even after Musavi Khan was transferred from the post.[1] The practice relieved the state-exchequer of some of its burden in its financial crisis; but it affected badly the *mansabdars* and their military capabilities which ultimately reduced the Mughal military might.

The above discussion amply shows that the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan* assisted the *Diwan-i Ala* in discharging his duties in the *Diwani* and held subordinate position in the revenue ministry. Some modern scholars have, however, described that all the work done in the two *daftars* of the *Diwani* (i.e. *daftar-i khalisa* and *daftar-i tan*), discussed above, was done by the two *diwans* of *khalisa* and *tan*. According to them, all appointments of *parganah* and provincial officials, including that of the governors, were made by the *Diwan-i Khalisa*; and *jagirs* were assigned by the *Diwan-i Tan*.[2] Other scholars have said that the two *diwans* were almost independent central ministers and their position vis-a-vis the *Diwan-i Ala* was the same as was that of *Mir Saman*. They have observed, "They (i.e. the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan*) held almost independent charge of their departments and were directly responsible to the monarch. The *Wazir* had precedence over them and coordinated their work, but his

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1. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.396-97; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.633-35.
2. Sarkar, J.N., *Mughal Administration*, pp.35-40.

control over them was not absolute".[1] While this is true that the two officials, like many other imperial servants, had access to the Emperor, and were ultimately responsible to him, the observation that 'they held almost independent charge of their respective departments' is not borne out by a host of sources, administrative manuals and the documents that we possess. Just a cursory glance over the endorsements put by the *Diwan-i Ala* and the two *diwans* on *diwani* papers mentioned above, clearly proves the subordination of the two *diwans* to the former. Nor is it correct that all the work in the two *daftars* of the *khalisa* and *tan* was done by the two *diwans*. It seems that these scholars have, probably, been misled by the terms '*khalisa*' and '*tan*' and assumed that all the work in the *daftar-i khalisa* was done by the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and in the *daftar-i tan* by the *Diwan-i Tan*. Hence the conclusion that they held the independent charge of their respective departments. But if that be accepted, the *Diwan-i Ala*, then would have no business to do in the '*Diwani*', because the office of the *Diwan-i Ala* existed only in the form of these two *daftars*.[2]

On some occasions, however, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan* got the independent charge of their respective '*daftars*' and were even asked

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1. Qureshi, I.H., *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, p.75. The observation of Mr Qureshi is, in fact, contradictory in itself, because it has been preceded by the statement, "At the centre the *Wazir* was 'assisted' by the three high officials" the two *diwans* and the *mustaufi*.

2. Cf. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.31b-36a; *Dastur-al Amal*, ff.151b-156a; *Farhang-i Kardani*, ff.27b-30a.

to officiate the *Diwan-i Ala*. Thus in April, 1670 when Jafar Khan the *Diwan-i Ala* was on his death bed, Amanat Khan, the *Diwan-i Khalisa* was was probably holding the full charge of the *daftar-i khalisa*. During this period, he presented the papers before the Emperor and apprised him of income from the *Khalisa-i Sharifa* and of the excessive expenses, and received from him the instructions to reduce the expenses accordingly.[1] Perhaps, the *Diwan-i Tan* also would have been enjoying the same position in his own section during this period. Again in March 1673, Asad Khan, the acting *Diwan-i Ala*, resigned from the post, and Amanat Khan the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and Kifayat Khan, the *Diwan-i Tan*, were asked to 'look after the *Diwani* affairs and sign and seal the papers (in their respective sections).[2] Similarly, in December, 1698, when Asad Khan fell ill and was unable to sign the papers, Inayatullah Khan, the then *Diwan-i Tan* was asked to perform the job and sign the papers as his deputy.[3] The same arrangement was made once again in November, 1699 when Emperor left his camp at Islampuri for Miraj and Asad Khan was left at the base-camp. Inayatullah Khan, the *Diwan-i Tan*, reported to the Emperor that the work had stopped in the *Diwani* (because of the absence of the *Diwan-i Ala*). The Emperor ordered that "*Mir Bakhshi* Bahramand Khan should sign the papers, in place of Asad Khan while he (Inayatullah Khan) should seal them".[4] Obviously it was

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.100.
2. *Ibid.*, p.126; *Maasir*, Vol. I, p.310; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.83b.
3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.390.
4. *Akhbarat*, 18th Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.

not simply the question of signing and sealing of the papers. Inayatullah Khan would have been looking after the other matters in the Diwani.

Thus, notwithstanding their status in the hierarchy of the Mughal mansabdars and officials, the Diwan-i Khalisa and the Diwan-i Tan held key positions in the administrative structure of the Mughal empire and performed important functions in the most important department of the central government. This was, perhaps, the reason that an honest and devoted Diwan-i Khalisa or the Diwan-i Tan exercised great influence over the Emperor and the latter showed them his great favour and regard. Their favour was, therefore, much sought after by the Mughal nobles, officials and the haram[1] and even the Wazir-i Azam could not treat them lightly or with contempt.[2]

Some scholars have observed that under Aurangzeb's predecessors, "the Diwan-i Khalisa enjoyed greater importance and responsibility than the Diwan-i Tan".[3] While this is true that the Diwan-i Khalisa had more important and complex job to perform under Aurangzeb too, it is rather

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1. Maasir, Vol. I, pp.262-63.

2. In 47th R.Y., during the siege of Kondana, Inayatullah Khan, the Diwan-i Khalisa and Tan was insulted by the servants of the Wazir on the question of suitable place for his encampment. When the Emperor leant the matter, he ordered the Wazir to go to the house of the former and apologise. For the detail of incident see Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.475-77 (the author was an eye-witness); Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.381; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.319-20.

3. Ibn Hasan, op. cit., p.208.

difficult to say which of the two diwans was considered more important in the official hierarchy. Under Aurangzeb, sometimes the same person held both the positions as Kifayat Khan in the 18th-20th R.Y.;[1] and again Inayatullah Khan from the 45th R.Y. to the death of Aurangzeb.[2] Moreover, in the 41st R.Y. and again in 43rd R.Y., it was the _Diwan-i Tan_ and not the _Diwan-i Khalisa_, who was asked to officiate the _Diwan-i Ala_, as we have already mentioned. Getting the chance of officiating the _Diwan-i Ala_ obviously meant that he got precedence over the other _diwan_. Notwithstanding the quality and quantity of their work, therefore, the importance of the two _diwans_ was determined not on the basis of their office, but, perhaps, depended upon the personality of the holder of the office and his closeness to the Emperor.

Peshdast-i Khalisa and Peshdast-i Tan :

There was another official attached to each of the two _daftars_ of the _khalisa_ and the _tan_ viz. the _Peshdast-i Khalisa_ and _Peshdast-i Tan_. The exact function of the two officials is not known. _Peshdast_ means 'assistant'.[3] And it seems from their designations that they were assistants to two respective _diwans_ of _khalisa_ and _tan_. One of four authorities has,

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1. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.144; _Salatin-i Chaghta_, f.252b.
2. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.441.
3. Steingass, _Persian English Dictionary_, p.267.

indeed, described one of them as the *peshdast-i diwan-i khalisa*. According to him, while the *Diwan-i Khalisa* endorsed *sabt-numayand* (it must be entered), the *Peshdast* endorsed on it *sabt shud* (entered).[1] It becomes obvious from this evidence that the *peshdasts* stood between the *diwans* and the lower staff of the two *daftars*. They presented the papers to their superiors,[2] implemented their instructions and supervised the work of the lower staff. But under Aurangzeb we have come across just one instance where an individual was separately holding the post of the *peshdast-i khalisa*.[3] Otherwise the officials who were serving as the *Diwan-i Khalisa* or the *Diwan-i Tan* have also been described as the *Peshdast-i Khalisa* and *Peshdast-i Tan* respectively.[4] As there are specific references to the fact that the *peshdast-i khalisa* and *diwan-i khalisa* were two separate positions[5] in the two *daftars* of the *Diwani*, we cannot presume that under Aurangzeb the designations of the *diwan-i khalisa* and the *peshdast-i khalisa* or the *diwan-i tan* and *peshdast-i tan* became synonymous and the two positions

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1. *Dastur-al Amal*, f.151b.

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.93b.

3. *Akhbarat*, 11th Rajab, 39th R.Y.

4. Kifayat Khan, for example, has been described as the *Diwan-i Tan* at one place (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.102) and as the *Peshdast-i daftar-i tan* at another (*Ibid.*, p.144). Similarly, Amanat Khan has been designated as the *Diwan-i Khalisa* at one place (*Ibid.*, p.126) and *Peshdast-i Khalisa* at another (*Ibid.*, p.144).

5. *Dastur-al Amal*, f.151b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.93b.

the same. It may, however, be inferred that under him the two diwans were also expected to perform the duties of the 'peshdast' in their respective branches and Aurangzeb practically abolished the posts.

Daftardar-i Khalisa and Daftardar-i Tan :

We also find the mention of the designations of 'daftardar-i khalisa' and the 'daftardar-i tan' in some of the contemporary chronicles, though we have not come across these designations in the administrative manuals or in the documents. The designees are the same persons who have been elsewhere described in the same chronicles as the Diwan-i Khalisa or the Peshdast-i Khalisa and the Diwan-i Tan or the Peshdast-i Tan.[1] It, therefore, seems that the daftardar-i khalisa was synonymous either to diwan-i khalisa or to peshdast-i khalisa. Same may be said about the daftardar-i tan in relation to the diwan-i tan and the peshdast-i tan.

The Mustaufi :

All matters in which the money was involved were checked by an official called mustaufi (auditor). There were sets of mustaufis: one for the Diwani and its officials, known as mustaufi-i arbab-i mal; and the

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1. For instance, Inayat Khan who was the Diwan-i Khalisa, has also been mentioned as the Daftardar-i Khalisa (Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.76, 110).

other as mustaufi-i arbab-al tahwil (the mustaufi for the household officials).[1] The mustaufi-i amal (mustaufi of the revenue officials), mustaufi-i jagir, mustaufi-i paibaqi, mustaufi-i inam jagir probably come under the first category;[2] while the mustaufi-i khazana-i musaidat, mustaufi-i jizyah, mustaufi-i bait-al mal, mustaufi-i khazain, and mustaufi-i karkhanajat come in the second category.[3]

Among all the mustaufis, it is only about the mustaufi attached to the revenue, the khazain (treasuries) and karkhanas that we know something about the method of their work. The former checked the collections, arrears and balance. For the purpose, he collected papers from the revenue officials on the one hand and from the zamindars on the other. He then compared the two sets of papers, and if he found any standing amount against the peasants or the officials, he submitted the report to the Diwan-i Ala. On his instructions, he prepared the tumar-i tahsil (an account of recovery) and handed it over to the Darogha for the recovery of the amount.[4] The mustaufi-i khazain audited the collections and disbursements from the treasuries. Only those payments were considered lawful for

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1. Dastur-al Amal, f.164b.

2. In the service-book (Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.33b) the term written is zar-al mal; but the term has been, perhaps, nowhere used. As the term bait-al mal in shikasta Persian script will be very similar to zar-al mal, the latter term seems to us a mistake for the former.

3. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.33b.

4. Dastur-i Alamgiri, ff.109a-110a; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.76a; Dastur-al Amal, f.164b.

which the officials produced the sanad (authorization) for payment from the Diwan-i Ala. Any other release was treated illegal and was recovered from the treasury officials.[1] Similarly, the mustaufi-i karkhanajat collected the diaries of the karkhanas from the daroghas and mustaufis (mushrifs) of karkhanas and statements of balance and payments from the tahwildars. He then carefully checked each of them, and compared the balance and expenditure. Any excess of payment over the balance was considered illegal and forged one and the official concerned was to explain it.[2] The mustaufis attached to toher sections would have been functioning on the same pattern.

There does not appear any chief mustaufi, and the mustaufis mentioned above apparently worked under the Diwan-i Ala. But if there was any head mustaufi among them, he would have supervised and coordinated the work of the mustaufis.

The nature of the job of the mustaufis was extremely technical and each mustaufi was expected to be the master of accountancy and well-conversant with state's rules and regulations about collections and disbursements and with the internal and inter-departmental working of different departments.[3] The presence of the mustaufi would have served as an

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1. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.76b; Dastur-al Amal, f.166b; Dastur-i Alamgiri, f.110b.

2. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.77a; Dastur-i Alamgiri, f.110b.

3. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.75b.

effective check on the officials who collected the revenues, kept the money and on those who spent it. But in spite of the fact that the mustaufi performed an important function, it seems that he was not considered an important official in the hierarchy of the central officials. Our authorities, who furnish us with ample information about the Diwan-i Khalisa and Diwan-i Tan and even about the Darogha-i Kachahri-i Diwan-i Ala, do not apparently mention even the names of holders of this office. Their silence about them suggests that no individual of note ever held the post of mustaufi and that it was considered an insignificant position in the administration.

Darogha-i Kachahri-i Diwan-i Ala :

There was still another official in the diwani, namely the Darogha-i Kachahri-i Diwan-i Ala. He appears to be the record keeper, the office superintendent and the establishment officer of the Kachahri (office) of the Diwan-i Ala. He collected once a week the papers from the officials of the different sections of the diwani, sent the copies of these papers to sections or departments concerned and kept the original with himself. He then sorted them out categorywise and put them together sectionwise in the registers. The Darogha maintained a complete list of these registers and and kept them in safe custody in the wooden chests (sandaqs). These wooden chests were evidently the substitutes of our modern steel almirahs.

The Darogha was also the supervisor over the lower office staff of the Kachahri of the Diwan-i Ala, like the clerks, (nawisinda) of different sections, the horsemen and peons (sawaran and piadaha), the mace-bearers (chobdaran), the announcers (naqiban), the book-binders (or the file-keepers, daftar-bandan), and the furnishers (afarrashan) etc., attached to the sundooqs of various sections of the Diwani. The Darogha maintained the list of these officials and supervised over their work. It also appears that he used to be given the charge of those officials and zamindars who were imprisoned for not paying the state's dues against them. He was given the tumar-i tahsil (an account for recovery) by the Mustaufi. The Darogha tried to realise the amount from the officials or the zamindars, as the case may be, or from their sons and relatives, by persuasion and threat. Whenever necessary, he put the papers before the Diwan-i Ala or the Emperor. The Darogha had a peshkar (assistant) to help him in his functions.[1]

There is little to say about the exact status and position of the Darogha. It, however, appears from the available references to him that in spite of being a subordinate official in the Diwani he had easy access to the Emperor, and kept him informed about the daily working of the office of the Diwan-i Ala. He promptly reported to the Emperor any irregularity

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1. Hidayat-al Qawaid, ff.42a-44a; Akhbarat, 3rd Safar, 40th R.Y.

in the functioning of the officials in the *Diwani*.[1] Thus, apart from having some functional responsibilities in the *Diwani*, the *Darogha* was an agency through which the Emperor knew about its functioning and ensured its efficiency. One *Darogha* had, indeed, acquired so much influence over the Emperor that every *sanad* passed to him before it was finally issued to the person concerned.[2]

The Other Staff of the Diwani :

As already referred to, the *Diwani* had a large staff besides the officials mentioned above. But we find no reference about the exact strength of the office of the *Diwan-i Ala*. One authority has, however, described the staff of the office of a provincial *diwan*, and on its basis we may form some idea about the office staff of the *Diwan-i Ala*. The office of a provincial *diwan* consisted of a *peshkar* and a *darogha-i kachahri w daftar khana*. These two officials were evidently the counterparts of the *peshkar* and the *Darogha-i Kachahri* respectively of the

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1. *Akhbarat*, 19th Jumada II, 31st R.Y.

2. This was Mirza Yar Ali. Much is not known about him. Khafi Khan however, says (Vol. II, pp.378-9, 410) that he had been brought up by the Emperor himself, was a very honest but rude person. Because of his honesty, he had great influence over the Emperor. He served as the *Peshkar-i Bakhshi*, *Darogha-i Dak* and *Darogha-i Kachahri-i Diwan-i Ala* combining the latter two posts at the same time. He served on the last post, at least for a decade (Cf. *Akhbarat*, 5th Safar, 40th R.Y.). But we find no information about any other *Darogha*. This might be because that the post was not a very important one; and no *Darogha* exercised so much power and influence as Mirza Yar Ali, which might have entitled him of references by our authorities.

Diwan-i Ala. Besides, there were other officials namely the *mushrif-i daftarkhana*, *tahwildar-i daftarkhana*, *munshi-i kachahri* (the writer of the office), the *huzur-nawis* (the writer to the court), the *suba-nawis* (writer of the province), *muharrir* (clerk) one each for *khalisa*, *tan*, *paibaqi*, stipend-holders (*arbab-i wazaif*), *nawazina* and *awarija*, household office (*arbab-al tahwil*), *mushrif*, *baramad-nawis*, *nirkh-nawis* (the rate writer), *akhbar-nawis* (the news writer), and the *daftar-band* (the book-binder or the file keeper).[1]

Diwan as the Central Record Office :

It is obvious that the *Diwan-i Ala* would have maintained at least the above staff in his office. Nay, the strength of the office of the *Diwan-i Ala* would have been indeed, many times more than the staff of the office of a provincial *diwan*, because, apart from dealing with a variety of business discussed above, the office of the *Diwan-i Ala* was also the central record office in the state which maintained a complete record of innumerable papers and documents related to the revenue matters itself and to other aspects of administration. An idea about the actual volume of records maintained by the centre may be gathered from a statement of Manucci while describing Emperor's journey from Delhi to Kashmir in 1662.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. II, p.173.

Manucci writes: "The royal office of record was also there (i.e. in the royal entourage), for the original record always accompany the court, and this required eighty camels, thirty elephants, and twenty carts, loaded with the registers and papers of account of the empire".[1]

The record that was maintained by the office of the Diwan-i Ala[2] may be divided into two categories: (a) the papers that originated from or were prepared by the office of the Diwan-i Ala itself; (b) the papers that were received or invited from the provincial diwans, parganah revenue officials and from other central departments. The papers belonging to the first category were as follows:

fihrist-i subajat (the list of the provinces);

,, parganat (the list of the parganahs);

,, diwaniyan-i subajat (the list of the provincial diwans);

,, karoris, umana and fotahdaran-i mahalat (the list of the karoris, amins and fotahdars of mahals);

,, darogha, mushrifan and tahwildaran-i mahalat-i sair w karkhanajat (the list of the daroghas, mushrifs and tahwildars of karkhanas and of the mahals of sair taxes);

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1. Manucci, Vol. II, p.62.

2. The list of the record has been prepared on the basis of evidence available in the following authorities: Khulasat-al Siyaq, ff.17a-b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.7a-b, 14b-15a, 34b-35a; Dastur-al Amal, ff.151b-152a. The arrangement and order of the papers has been made on their apparent precedence or importance. The list is a long one, but, perhaps, is not a complete one.

fihrist-i zaminan, khutut-i zamini-i ummal u tahwildaran (the list of the securety holders for the revenue officials and the treasury officials and the deed of sureties in favour of them);

siaha-i huzur-i ashraf (the court diary);

dastur-al amal-i mahal-i mal, sair, karkhanajat, aluf-i ummal u ajriza-i kiraya (regulations about the mahals of land revenue and other taxes, about karkhanas, about the salary of the revenue officials and about the rates of hire);

tashkhis-i jama (assessment of revenue of the empire);

tumar-i jama-i-mamalik-i mahrusa (the sum total of the land revenue of the whole empire);

haqiqat-i amal-i amilan (the report about the collection of revenue by the officials);

badar-nawis-i amilan (audit report of the accounts submitted by the revenue officials);

tahqiqat-i sabab-i kami-i mahal u khushki (enquiry report about the decrease in the area of cultivation and about the drought);

sarrishta-i baqaya u taqavi (papers about arrears and agricultural loans to the peasants);

muwarija-i mutaliba (the account of the state-dues against the officials);

jawab-i muhasibat (explanation of the officials about audit objections);

wasilbaqi-i ijaradaran etc. (collection from and balance against the ijaradars);

madakhil-o makharij (annual income and expenditure);

intikhab-i araiz-i umal (the gist of the despatches of the officials);

mazmun-i ahkam (contents of the imperial orders sent to the officials);

naql-i parwanajat (copies of the parwanahs);

sarishta-i talabkhwahan (registers of the salary-holders);

taujih-i tankhwahdaran (the salary accounts of the salary-holders);

daul-i jagirdaran (the particulars of the jagirs of jagirdars);

yaddasht-i kami-o-ziyadati-i hasil-i jagir (the memorandum about the decrease or increase in the yield of jagir);

jama-o-kharch-i-kull-i jagir (total assignments of jagir and their collections);

awarija-i talab-i tankhwah-i sipah-o-shagirdpesha (ledger of the salaries of the soldiers and household servants);

taujihat-i sipah-o-shagirdpesha (the statement of sum total spent on the salaries of soldiers and household servants);

nuskha-i aimma ba-muhr-i Sadr-as Sudur (papers relating to *madad-i maash* grants with the seal of *Sadr-as Sudur*).

The papers that the *Diwan-i Ala* received/invited from the provincial and *parganah* officials and from other central departments were as follows:

(a) *From the provincial diwans* :

nuskha-i diwani[1] *babat mal-o sair-o-khazana* (statement of accounts about land-revenue and *sair* taxes and about the *khazana*);

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1. "*Nuskha-i Diwani* was another name for *majmalai* or the consolidated statement of accounts prepared in the office of the *Diwan* (of a province) which showed the details of the income and expenditure of the *khalisa mahals*. The balance, if any, was also noted. The statement was prepared on the basis of the accounts of income and expenditure submitted to the Diwan's office by the *Fotahdars* of the *Khalisa mahals* (*Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f.35b)". Noman A. Siddiqi, *op. cit.*, p.75 n.

jama wasilbaqi-i parganat (collections and arrears of parganahs based on the collection reports submitted in the diwan's office);

sarrishta-i zamini-wa-taahhud (papers relating to sureties and agreements);

nuskha-i mutaliba (papers describing the state-dues against the officials);

mazrija-i peshkash (diary of peshkash by the zamindars);

sarrishta-i paibaqi (papers relating to the paibaqi);

sarrishta-i aimma-i inam (papers relating to the madad-i maash grants);

nuskha-i ahkam (copies of the orders sent by the provincial diwans?);

(b) *From the parganah amins* :

sarrishta-i asame ba deh-taqsim (papers describing the land-holders of villages)

mawazina-i dah-salah[1];

sarrishta-i tukhm-rezi-i jins-i kamil (the papers describing the sowing of cash-crops);

nisha-i tashkhis (diary of revenue assessment);

daul-i jama sar-o-mal (particulars of the total revenue assessed);

tumar-i jama (the sum total of the land revenue according to register);

tumar-i wasilat (the sum total of the revenue from all heads of receipts).

(c) *From the karoris of parganahs*

mazrija-i jamabandi bad-az-inqiza-i fasl (the diary of the settlement of revenue after the assessment);

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1. For *mawazina-i dah-salah*, see Infra p. 203

tumar-i jamabandi (the total of the revenue settled and assessed);

roznamcha-i tahsil-i karorian bad-az-inqiza-i fasl (the diary of the collections by the *karoris* since the ripening of the crop);

roz-afzun tahsil (daily increase in the collections to be sent after every fifteen days);

mujmal tahsil-i karorian (the paper describing sum total collection by the *karoris*);

jama-wasil baqi (the total collections from and arrears against the peasants, with the signature of the *chaudhris* and *qanungos*);

roznamcha-i khazain (the diary of the treasury of the parganah mentioning only the deposits as appears from the next paper);

jama-o-kharch-i tahvil-i fotahdaran (deposits in and disbursements from the money with the *fotahdars*);

maujudat-i khazana (the balance in the *khazana*);

arsattah tahvil-i fotahdar (the monthly account of receipts and disbursements to be sent at the end of every month);

jama-o-kharch akhir-e-sal-i khazain (the total receipts and disbursement of the *khazana* at the close of the year);

nirkhnama bad-az inqiza-i fasl (the table of prices on the basis of which the land was assessed, with the seal of the *qazi*);

The *karori* also sent to the *Diwan-i Ala* the following papers which he took from the *chaudhris* and the *qanungos*:

muwazina-i dah-salah[1] (the ten-years' comparison);

fihrist-i dehat (the list of the villages);

jamabandi-i parganat (the settled revenues of parganahs obtained from the qanungos);

qubuliat-o-mal zamini (the deed of acceptance of settled revenue and the security for the payment of money);

tamassuk-i taqavi etc. (the bond for the repayment of the agricultural loan);

sarrishta-i aimma (the papers related to madad-i maash grant with specifications of villages etc.)

(d) From the officials of the mahal-i sair :

siaha

roznamcha

nirkhnamah

arsattah

awarija

ghulah-shumar

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1. "Muwazina-i dah-salah, also known as taqsim, was maintained by the Qanungo. It was a consolidated statement of the agrarian conditions obtaining in a parganah during the preceding ten years, showing the number of villages, the area of arable land, land under cultivation, waste, forest, gardens, pools, nullah and the area of madad maash land; various crops sown in the rabi and kharif with current prices of every article; jama figures, rates of assessments and particulars of receipts and arrears (vide Dastur-ul Amal Alamgiri, f.41a; Land Revenue History of Bengal, p.165; Diwan Pasand, f.77)" Noman Ahmad Siddiqi, op. cit., p.38n. Cf. Irfan Habib, op. cit., pp.203-4n.

(e) From the treasury officials :

siaha

roznamcha

arsattah

awarija

maujudat

(f) From the department of the Mir Bakhshi :

fihrist-i sipah (the list of the soldiers);
siahajat-i haziri-o-ghair haziri (daily report about the presence and absence of the mansabdars and soldiers, at the time of chauki from the record-keeper of the chauki, chauki-navisan);
sarrishta-i dagh-o-tashiha (papers related to dagh-o-tashiha from its office);
saqtinamah (the report of the loss of horse of a soldier);
Any other paper required by the office of the Diwan-i Ala.

(g) From the depart of the Mir Saman :

siaha-i karkhanajat (the daily report of the karkhanas from respective mushrifs);
barawurd-i karkhanajat (estimated requirements or expenditures of karkhanas from mushrifs);
jama-o-kharch-i karkhanajat (receipts of money and expenditures of karkhanas from mushrifs);
maujudat-i karkhanajat (the stock position of the karkhanas from mushrifs).

The papers enumerated above, from subordinate revenue officials themselves and from other departments of the government, were required not only for maintaining the record, but also for the proper and smooth functioning of the *Diwani*, and indeed of the other departments of the government because of the pivotal position of the revenue ministry in the administration. It is true that all of the above documents would not have come before the *Diwan-i Ala* himself, although they might have been necessary for the working of different wings of the revenue ministry. But it hardly needs any emphasis that the *Diwan-i Ala* would have liked to personally look into many of the above records to equip himself for proper running of his ministry and to acquaint himself with the actual state of *jagir* and *khalisa*, of cultivation and assessment, of collection and disbursement in his own department and in other departments of the government, and of the total income and expenditures of the state. Going through these papers would have also given the *Diwan-i Ala* an idea about the functioning of the revenue officials at various levels and would have enabled him to maintain effective control over them and over the finances of the empire. These papers thus kept the *Diwan-i Ala* fully posted about the functioning of his own department and about the actual state of finances to report these matters to the Emperor whom he regularly met in connection with his various functions and duties.

While performing his manifold responsibilities, the *Diwan-i Ala* or the *Wazir-i Azam* remained in close touch with the Emperor. He informed

him about different matters of state and took regular instructions and guidelines from him almost daily. He put before the Emperor the gist or extracts (*intakhab*) from the reports and despatches of the governors, *diwans* and hosts of other officials. He had to take the approval of the Emperor for the grant of mansab or *jagir* and for the appointments, postings and transfers of the officials. The Emperor himself had scores of matters to discuss with the *Wazir*. He sought information from him about the number of *naqdi* and *jagir*-holding mansabdars, the proportion of *khalisa*, *paibaqi* and *jagir*, the position of income and expenditure (*madakhil-o-makharij*) of the State and the balance position in the State treasuries. The *Wazir-i Azam*, therefore, used to have regular meetings with the Emperor, twice or thrice a day.

First he attended, like other officials of the State, the Court at the *Khas-o-Am* in the morning and presented before the Emperor the reports coming from the *subahdars* and other officials in the provinces. He then followed the Emperor in the *Ghusalkhana*. Here again he put before the Emperor confidential and important despatches from the *subahdars* and other officials of the empire or read out them himself and took orders about them. Here he also showed to the Emperor for appraisal, correction or modification the drafts of imperial orders and instructions, letters or *farmans* that were to be issued to the nobles and officials. But, perhaps, the most important session of the *Wazir-i Azam* with the Emperor

used to be inside the _Ghusalkhana_ after the evening (_maghrib_) prayer. At this time he had apparently the exclusive and confidential sitting with the Emperor and the two discussed any matter they considered necessary as also those relating to the _Diwani (muhimmat-i kulliya-o-juziah-i Diwani)_. Here the _Diwan-i Ala_ received specific and confidential instructions from the Emperor about the _Diwani_ and all affairs of State.[1]

The _Wazirs_ of Aurangzeb, however, lacked that lustre and eminence which marked the tenure of their counterpart Sadullah Khan under Shah Jahan. Under Aurangzeb no important reforms were introduced in the revenue-ministry, although cracks in the financial structure of the empire had started appearing in the second decade of his reign. The reasons were both administrative and political. In early part of his reign Aurangzeb had no economic problems. Shah Jahan had made special efforts to enhance the income of the state. The total yield of the empire increased from 700 karor _dams_ in his early reign to 800 karor _dams_ in his 20th R.Y. (1647-48). Besides, he acquired new territories yielding 80 karor _dams_. He also tried to increase the proportion of _khalisa-i sharifa_. It rose from one-fifteenth of total _jamadami_ of 700 karor _dams_ in the beginning of his reign to one-seventh of 880 karor _dams_ in 1647-48. That is to say, without actually reducing the volume of

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1. _Kazim_, pp.1096-1106; _Bernier_, pp.265-67; _Akhbarat_, 2nd Jumada II, 8th R.Y., 2nd Zilhijja, 9th R.Y., 4th Jumada II, 12th R.Y., 12th Zilhijja, 20th R.Y.

jagir from what it was under Jahangir, Shah Jahan enhanced the khalisa and its income to 120 karor dams or 3 karor rupees.[1] He undertook many schemes of constructions and led expensive expeditions to Balkh, Badakhshan and Qandahar. These projects together cost large amount to the state exchequer.[2] Still Shah Jahan was able to build up huge reserves during his reign.

Aurangzeb, thus, inherited large reserves and sound economy. This was besides what he himself had acquired in the Deccan during his Viceroyalty from the Deccan rulers and from Mir Jumla. It was, perhaps, because of this financial strength that in spite of many wars before and after his accession, he found himself in a position to remit certain taxes, in the second year of his reign, to bring relief to the peoples who had suffered because of the wars, as also to reconcile the hostile

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1. *Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.710-13; *Bastani Aghi*, f.77b; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.815-16. The increase of 100 karor *dams* in the jamadami of old dominions was not because of 'raising the standard of the state's demand from one-third gross produce to one-half, as Moreland thought (*From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p.254; *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp.147-48). If that would have been the case, the increase in *jamadami* should have been, according to the logic of Moreland himself, 50 per cent. But it was not to that proportion. The increase in the *jamadami* was because of improved agrarian conditions in the *subahs* of Ahmadabad and the Deccan (*Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.711-12).

2. Total expenditure on the above expeditions were about 4 karor rupees; and the total expenses on various buildings at Agra, Delhi, Lahore and other parts of the empire was 22 karor rupees. This was apart from 98 karor rupees distributed as *inam* in cash and kind. These expenses are related to only the first two decades of Shah Jahan's reign (Ibid., pp.713-14).

public opinion to his rule.[1] In spite of these remissions, the total jamadami in the 10th year (1666-67) of his reign had, indeed, increased by 44 karor dams over 880 karor dams of Shah Jahan's reign. Out of this 924 karor jamadami, worth 172 karor dam was kept as khalisa and the rest (of about 752 karor dams) as the jagir and paibaqi.[2] He thus effected some increase in both khalisa and jagir from what it was under Shah Jahan, and his treasury was evidently full in 1666.[3] But in the beginning of the second decade the conditions had changed: in 1670, 'the expenditure had exceeded the income by 14 lakhs of rupees'.[4] The imbalance might have been the result of prolonged military operations in Bengal, Assam, the Deccan and Afghanistan[5] coupled with some peasants uprisings in northern India.[6]

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1. It is significant to note that these remissions were announced within a week from the execution of Dara Shikoh on 9th September, 1659 (Cf. Kazim, pp.432-35.).

2. Mirat-ul Alam, ff.214b-15a; Malumat-ul Afaq, p.194.

3. No information about the exact amount of money is available. But before after the death of Shah Jahan in 1666, this huge treasure was carried from Delhi to the fort of Agra in 1400 carts. (Kazim, p.962).

4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.100.

5. This is on record that in August, 1670, Aurangzeb sent orders to the officials of Lahore to despatch twenty (bist), or at any rate, eight (hasht, because of the similar Persian rendering of the two words) rupees to Kabul (Akhbarat, 27th Ziqada, 13th R.Y.).

6. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.53, 57. Cf. Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, pp.338-46.

The Emperor did order (1670) to reduce some expenses on the imperial household.[1] But in spite of imbalance in the economy, he appointed no full-fledged _Diwan-i Ala_ or the _Wazir_ for next six years. And while he himself proceeded to supervise operations against the Yusufzai rebels in Afghanistan, the finance-ministry was left in the hands of subordinate revenue officials. Indeed, just one official, Kefayat Khan, worked for some time during this period, as the _Diwan-i Khalisa_, _Diwan-i Tan_ and the caretaker of the whole _Diwani_ itself. We need not stress the point that the economic conditions would have further deteriorated during these years.[2] When he, at last appointed Asad Khan as the _Wazir_ about the end of 1676, the political and financial conditions had further complicated and fresh problems were brewing up..

In 1679 there broke out the Rathor rebellion.[3] This was followed by Prince Akbar's revolt in January, 1681, which ultimately led the Emperor, rather the entire court and the officials of the central government to the Deccan.[4] While entering the Deccan the Emperor might have been hoping that besides crushing three of his enemies, i.e.

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1. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.100.
2. This is abundantly clear from the measures mentioned below, p. 213.
3. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.177-78; _Ishardas_, f.74a.
4. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.197; _Ishardas_, f.86b; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, pp.265-67.

the rebel Prince, Sambhaji and the Deccan rulers, he would also unearth the hidden treasures of centuries in the Karnatak.[1] Little did he realise that circumstances would push him so deep in the Deccan problem, that only death would extricate him from it. The financial implications of the Deccan campaign were disastrous. Its pressure on the state revenues was two-fold: (a) the state had to bear the huge expenses on the warfare in the Deccan; and (b) it had to absorb large number of Deccani nobles (Marathas and those belonging to two kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda) into service for political considerations, and were assigned high *mansabs* at the cost of old nobles. The increase in the number of the new recruits was proportionately more than what Aurangzeb got as new 'dominions'.[2] The Deccan campaign, thus, affected the both wings of *Diwani*, the *Khalisa-i sharifa* and the *jagir* or *paibaqi*. To meet the expenses, money was withdrawn from the reserves left by Shah Jahan.[3] But the extent of *jagir* could not have been increased. The result was

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1. This is what Aurangzeb wrote to Zulfiqar Khan Nusrat Jang during the Deccan campaign. See *Kalimat*, f.70a.

2. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.396; *Mamuri*, f.156b; *Dilkusha*, f.31b. For detail about proportional increase of the Deccan and Maratha nobles in Aurangzeb's reign and actual increase in the *jamadami* after the annexation of the Deccan, See M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, pp.26-30.

3. The withdrawal from the reserves in Agra has started as early as 1681. 30 lakhs rupees and 2 lakh *ashrafis* were withdrawn from Agra at this time to pay the salaries to the soldiers posted in the Deccan. This was besides rupees 16 lakhs from the treasuries of Ahmadabad and Surat and 10 lakhs from Delhi (*Akhbarat*, 10th Rajab, 24th R.Y.; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.816).

that the mansabdars did not get jagir at proper time, or were unable to realise their due share from their respective jagirs, especially in the Deccan. Large amount of their claims stood against the state.[1] It would have been under these circumstances that the jagirdars would have squeezed the peasants to the maximum. The state, on the other hand, was not getting its due from the jagirdars.[2] It was a vicious circle. Besides, the hal-hasil of the khalisa-i sharifa, if not the khalisa-i sharifa itself, would have also decreased as it had decreased in the jagir.[3]

Some measures were of course taken immediately after the appointment of the new Wazir in October 1676. A little after assuming the office, he was sent to the Deccan (September, 1677) to reorganise its revenue affairs (muqaddimat-i mali') that were in very bad shape,[4] obviously because of the long warfare, the absence of a Wazir who could look into its brewing problems, and the inept handling of its affairs by the governor, Khan Jahan Bahadur Zafar Jang, who had since been transferred and removed

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1. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.396-97; Dilkusha, f.140a. For how Prince Azam was rebuffed by the Emperor for demanding his arrears with the State, see Raqaim, f.31a; Ruqaat, p.40.

2. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.396.

3. Maasir, Vol. II, p.817.

4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.161; Dilkusha, f.73a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.295-96; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.311-12.

from *mansab*.[1] After his return from the Deccan (February, 1679), the *Wazir* was also left at Ajmer (while the Emperor went to the Deccan in September 1681, in pursuit of Prince Akbar), to settle the affairs (*nazm-o-nasaq*) of Marwar that had lately been annexed to the imperial dominions.[2]

Besides these reforms in the troubled regions of the empire, some other more concrete steps, initiated evidently by the new *Wazir*, were also taken to reduce burden on the state exchequer and augment the state resources. For example, the annual pension (*salyana*) of two nobles of a total of 10,000 rupees was stopped; the pension of four other individuals, totalling to Rs.37,000 was reduced by Rs.12,000; and of six others, of a total value of Rs.114,000 was converted into the *jagir*.[3] This we have quoted to show that similar measure might have been taken in respect of other pensioners, or *mansabdars* too. Similarly, custom duties on the European traders was enhanced (April, 1680) from 2 per cent

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1. Khan Jahan Bahadur, Mir Malik Husain, was a foster brother of Aurangzeb and attached to him since his princehood. During his reign, he rose from position to position, and in 1675 gave him the title of Khan Jahan Bahadur Zafar Jang Kokaltash and the rank of 7000/7000 on his military exploits in the Deccan. But later was removed from *mansab* etc. (1677) because of his offences (*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, pp.142, 160; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.798-813).

2. *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p.213; *Inshah*, f.83b; *Maasir*, Vol. I, p.312.

3. *Akhbarat*, 1st Ziqada, 20th R.I.

to 3½ per cent which was to yield Rs.20,000 more at Surat alone.[1] It was also reimposed on the Muslims (1681) at the rate of 2½ per cent after it had been altogether abolished for them in 1667.[2] Bullion-exchange at unauthorised places was banned (1682), as it deprived the state of the taxes from this transaction.[3] Likewise, orders were issued (1688) that the custom duties should be realised at the place of their sale by the merchants (and not at the place of their purchase by the merchants) because it was expected that the levy would increase if fixed on their sale price.[4] When it was found that the merchants were cheating the state by selling the commodities at unauthorised places, the old system was re-introduced (1697).[5] Similarly, to reduce the pressure on the jagir a new rule was introduced in 1691-92 to the effect that the newly recruited mansabdars would have no claim for the period between their initial recruitment and final assignment of jagir; and the old ones for the period between their transfer and fresh posting.[6]

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1. English Factories (1678-84), pp.255-56.
2. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.265, 298-300; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.14b.
3. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.304.
4. Ibid., pp.318-19.
5. Ibid., pp.342-43.
6. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.396-97; Manucci, Vol. III, pp.334-35.

These measures were, however, superficial in comparison to the financial pressure on state-resources. The prevailing conditions demanded some radical reforms in the economic structure. But those very factors which were responsible for financial difficulties and necessitated thorough reforms in revenue ministry, made any drastic measure impossible. No reforms were possible under prevailing conditions, when the entire administration was involved in Emperor's campaign in the Deccan. The Emperor himself, as also his ministers, including the Wazir, were spending the camp life and were shuttling from one place to another. The Diwani had been left to the care of subordinate staff. Even if the staff had the leisure and capacity to bring out required reforms in the system, they lacked the inspiring guidance of the Emperor which was available to Wazirs of Shah Jahan. Nevertheless, this was no small achievement of the Wazir of Aurangzeb at that time that he provided funds to the Emperor for his unending 'qilagiri' (fort-capturing) crusade in the Deccan, without withdrawing any considerable amount from reserves left by Shah Jahan.[1] Nay, the functioning of the Diwani and administration in those difficult conditions was itself an achievement of the Wazir.

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1. According to the author of Maasir-ul-Umara (Vol. II, p.817) Aurangzeb had left a balance of 10-12 karor rupees when he died. As he was not able to save from income of his own khalisa-i sharifa, the amount, or most of it, was apparently the balance left by Shah Jahan.

Table A, Chapter II

List of the Wazirs/Diwan-i Ala of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure

R.Y.; Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.Y.; Date	Sources
1st 20 June, 1658	Raja Raghunath	Indian	2000/ 500	2500/ 500	Died	6th 12 June, 1663	AN 117,396,829; AH 39b,81a; ZA 83b; KK 11/78; MU 11/282; AT 5a
	(Looked after the Diwani not as the Wazir or Diwan-i Ala, but as its Mutasaddi (Superintendent)						
6th 17 June, 1663	Fazil Khan I	Irani	5000/2000	5000/2500	Died	6th 3 July, 1663	AN 829,831,833; ZA 83b; KK 11/175; MU 111/524-30; AT 5a.
6th 4 July, 1663	(Asad Khan the Second Bakhshi as the Naib (Deputy) of Jafar Khan till—)					6th 10 January, 1664	ZA 83b; AT 5b; AN 849.
6th 10 Jan., 1664	Jafar Khan	Irani	6000/6000	—	Died	13th 16 May, 1670	AN 162,849; MA 47,103; ZA 83b; KK 11/41,177; MU 1/531-35; AT 5b.
13th 20 May, 1670	(Asad Khan, Second Bakhshi/Mir Bakhshi again Naib Wazir till he resigned on —)				Resigned	16th 20 March 1673	Akh 29 Zilhijja, 13th R.Y.; MA 125; ZA 83b; KK 11/235; AT 5b.
	(Amanat Khan Diwan-i Khalisa, and Kifayat Khan Diwan-i Tan looked after the Diwani till —)					19th 18 October 1676	MA 125,152; ZA 83b-84a; AT 6a.
19th 18 Oct., 1676	Asad Khan	Irani	5000/5000	7000/7000	Death of the Emperor	51st 3 March, 1707	MA 152,280,392; Akh 13 Shaban, 37th R.Y.; ZA ; MU 1/310-16; AT 5b.

Table B, Chapter II

List of the Diwan-i Khalisa of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure

R.I.; Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.I.; Date	Sources
	(There appears no incumbent during the first three years of the reign)						
4th 30 May, 1661	Rai Lal Chand	Indian	800/ 60	?	?	10th Jan., 1668	AN 619; ZA 85a; KK 11/209.
10th January 1668	Inayat Khan	Irani	?	900/ 100	Faujdar of Bareilly	14th 27 Aug. 1671	MA 76,100,110; ZA 85a; KK 11/209; MU 11/813-18.
14th 27 August, 1671	Amanat Khan Mirak Muinuddin	Irani	1000/ 200	?	Resigned; Amin, Diwan and Qiladar of Lahore	18th 10 Sept. 1675	MA 110,143-44; ZA 85a; KK 11/261,376-78; MU 1/258-68.
18th 10 Sept., 1675	Kifayat Khan, M. Jafar (In addition to the post of Diwan-i Tan which he was holding since May, 1670)	?	1500/ 200	?	Continued as Diwan-i Tan	20th 15 Nov., 1676	MA 102,144,159; ZA 83b,85a.
20th 15 Nov., 1676	Inayat Khan	Irani	1000/ 100	?	Diwan-i Buyutat	24th 8 Feb., 1681	MA 159, 206; ZA 85a; MU 11/813-18
24th 8 Feb., 1681	Rashid Khan Badiuzzaman	Indian	700/ 150	1000/ 300	Died	41st 23 Apr., 1697	MA 206,385; ZA 85a; TM 7.
41st 23 April, 1697	Kifayat Khan Mir Ahmad	?	?	?	Died	42nd April, 1698	MA 385,394; MU 1/290.
42nd April, 1698	Arshad Khan Abul Ula	Turani	?	1500/ 500	Died	45th c. July 1701	MA 394,441; MU 1/290-91; TM 14
45th c. July, 1701	Inayat Ullah Khan (In addition to the post of Diwan-i Tan, holding since July, 1692 to 1707).	Indian	1500/ 150	1500/ 250, 2000/ 250	Death of the Emperor	51st 3 March, 1701	MA 349,441,475-77,505,517; KK 11/381; MU 11/828-32.

Table C, Chapter II

List of the Diwan-i Tan of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure

R.Y.; Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Inafa, if any	Next appointment	R.Y.; Date	Sources
	(There appears no incumbent during the first three years of the reign).						
4th 30 May, 1661	Askari	?	860/ 160	?	?	6th 8 Sept. 1663	AN 619; ZA 86a.
6th 8 September, 1663	Kifayat Khan	?	800/ 200	?	?	11th 20 Nov. 1668	MA 76; ZA 86a.
11th 20 November, 1668	Haji Shafi Khan	Irani	1000/ 250	?	Diwan of the Deccan	13th 8 May, 1670	AN 870; MA 76,102; ZA 86a; KK 11/378; SC 248b.
13th 8 May, 1670	Kifayat Khan, M. Jafar (In addition, also made the Diwan-i Khalisa from September 1675 till November 1676)	?	1000/ 60	1500/ 200	Retired from active service (?)	24th ? 11 Nov., 1680	MA 102,144; ZA 83b,86a.
24th 11 November, 1680	Itamad Khan, Burhan-uddin (Fazil Khan II)	Irani	1000/ 250	1500/ 300	Mir Saman	32nd c.15 Sept. 1688	MA 207,312; ZA 86a; MU 111/34-38.
32nd 15 September 1688	Musawi Khan, Mirza Muizz	Irani	1000/?	?	Diwan of the Deccan	33rd Jun-Jul 1689	MA 312,330; ZA 86a; MU 111/633-35.
33rd June - July, 1689	Haji Shafi Khan	Irani	1500/?	?	?	33rd 28 May, 1690	MA 330,335; ZA 86a.
33rd 28 May, 1690	Amanat Khan II, Mir Husain	Irani	1000/ 150	1500/ 600	Diwan-i Buyutat	36th Jul-Aug 1692	MA 335,347,349; ZA 86a; MU 1/287-90.
36th July-August, 1692	Inayat Ullah Khan (In addition was also appointed Diwan-i Khalisa in July 1701, which too he held till the death of the Emperor).	Indian	700/ 80	1000/ 100, 1500/ 250, 2000/ 250	Death of the Emperor	51st 3 March, 1707	MA 349,441,475-77,505,517; ZA 86a; KK 11/381; MU 11/828-32.

Chapter III

THE MIR BAKHSHI

His Position, Functions and Powers

The Working of the Department under him.

Another principal functionary at the centre was the *Mir Bakhshi* who headed the department that dealt with the recruitment, promotion and posting of the *mansabdars*, looked after the horses, equipment and other related matters of their contingents (*tabinan*), and performed many other functions at court and in the field. He was variously described as the *Mir Bakhshi* (the Head *Bakhshi*), the *Bakhshi-i Awwal* (the First *Bakhshi*) and the *Bakhshi-i Kul* (the *Bakhshi* of the whole empire[1]) to distinguish him from subordinate *bakhshis* like the *Bakhshi-i Duwwum* (the Second *Bakhshi*) and *Bakhshi-i Suyyum* (the Third *Bakhshi*) etc. Apart from the Second and the Third *Bakhshis*, there were a few more *bakhshis* and the *Dagh* and the *Chauki* (mounted guard) officials who assisted the *Mir Bakhshi* in performing his various duties and functions. Their counterparts in provinces and in the armies sent on expeditions performed the same job at their respective places under the over all supervision of the *Mir Bakhshi*.

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1. *Malumat-al Afaq*, p.190. Cf. also *Maasir-i Alamgiri* (pp.195, 201) where Himmat Khan *Mir Bakhshi* has also been described as the '*Bakhshi-i Awwal*'.

Position and Status :

The Mir Bakhshi held very important position among the central ministers. He headed, perhaps, the most important central department after the Diwani, and enjoyed in the hierarchy of the central officials a position commensurate with his charge. Some contemporary writers have, of course, given him the third place among the principal functionaries at the centre, giving precedence to the Mir Saman over him.[1] In actual functioning, however, the Mir Bakhshi seems to have enjoyed preference over the Mir Saman and stood next only to the Wazir. There are instances when the Mir Saman was appointed the Second Bakhshi,[2] or the Mir Bakhshi;[3] but no Mir Bakhshi was appointed the Mir Saman. The appointment of a Mir Saman to the post of Mir Bakhshi might or might not have been a promotion; but the fact that no Mir Bakhshi was ever appointed as the Mir Saman suggests that the appointment of a Mir Bakhshi to that post was, perhaps, considered a demotion. Besides, it was mostly the Mir Bakhshi or the Second Bakhshi who was called upon to officiate the Wazir whenever such an exigency arose. As already mentioned, after the death of Jafar Khan

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1. Lahori, Vol. II, p.347; Bernier, p.171; Manucci, Vol. II, p.394.

2. For instance, Ruhullah Khan II, Khanazad Khan who had held the post of the Mir Saman (1697-1704), was also appointed the Second Bakhshi (January, 1700, Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.386, 434).

3. Such as Ashraf Khan who had earlier served as the Mir Saman (1670-1676) was later made the Mir Bakhshi (January 1681, Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.102, 206; Maasir, Vol. I, p.274).

the *Wazir* (May 1670), Asad Khan, the Second *Bakhshi* was asked to work as the *Naib Wazir* (the *Mir Bakhshi*, Danishmand Khan being away at Delhi while the court at this time was at Agra). Asad Khan continued to officiate the Wazir after his appointment as the *Mir Bakhshi* (August, 1670). It was only after he resigned from the *Niabat* (March, 1673) that the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan* were asked to look after their respective *Daftars*. Similarly, when Asad Khan the *Wazir* himself was deputed against the Marathas and to the Jinji campaign (1690-93), Bahramand Khan, the then Second *Bakhshi* was asked to officiate him[1] (the *Mir Bakhshi* Ruhullah Khan being away at Raichur).[2] He was in the meanwhile promoted as the *Mir Bakhshi* on the death of Ruhullah Khan I (July 1692)[3] and continued to perform the two jobs. These examples lead us to the conclusion that the *Mir Bakhshi*, and even the Second *Bakhshi* held important position under Aurangzeb. Incidentally it also indicates that the Second *Bakhshi* had precedence over the *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan*. Otherwise, he would not have been given the chance to officiate the *Wazir* in preference to the two *Diwans*. Moreover, it were mostly the *Mir Bakhshis* who were appointed the *Wazir* under Aurangzeb. Fazil Khan was, of course, the

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.338; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.4[illegible]; *Maasir*, Vol. I, p.456. For a few documents issued by Bahramand Khan as the '*Naib* of Asad Khan the *Wazir*', see *Inayat Collection*, I 8/98-1814, I 8/49-1357, I 8/103-1819.

2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.331; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.313.

3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.349; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.407.

Mir Saman when he was appointed the *Wazir*. But the other two *Wazirs*, Jafar Khan and Asad Khan had served as the *Mir Bakhshi* under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb respectively. Muhammad Amin Khan, who was also considered for the job, but was rejected, had also been the *Mir Bakhshi* under the two Emperors. These instances indicate that the *Mir Bakhshi* was the second important functionary at the centre. In the court too he got a place next only to the *Wazir*. While the *Wazir-i Azam* got a place in the court on the left of the Emperor, the *Mir Bakhshi* took his position on his (Emperor's) right.[1]

The appointment of the *Mir Bakhshi* was within the sole discretion of the Emperor. But the Emperor did consider that the candidate possessed certain requirements of the post. The job of the *Mir Bakhshi*, like the job of the *Diwan-i Ala*, was of a very technical nature, and required in its holder the comprehensive knowledge and thorough understanding of state rules and regulations and of the departmental procedures. The *Mir Bakhshi* had to deal with Emperor on the one hand and with a variety of people on the other - the commoners and the gentry, the ordinary trooper and the high officials and the nobles - in relation to recruitment and promotion, posting and transfer, salary and equipments and hosts of other matters. Moreover, he had also to organise the armies in the battles, and to lead expeditions and fight himself in the

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1. *Hidayat-ul Qawaid*, f.70a.

wars as we shall see. The duties of the Mir Bakhshi were thus diverse and difficult. Because of his varied functions and responsibilities he was expected to combine in himself, besides maturity and experience, the accomplishment of a scholar and the acumen of an administrator and general, the sturdiness and bravery of a soldier and the softness of a friend and benefactor.[1] In short, he had to be the master of both the pen and the sword.

In view of above qualifications and requirements, therefore, the Emperor appointed the Mir Bakhshis from amongst those who had already served on various posts and had attained maturity and experience. In the beginning of his reign, however, the Emperor ignored one who had held the post twice and was, therefore, apparently, best suited for the job. On assuming authority after the battle of Samugarh (June, 1658), Aurangzeb did not confirm Khalilullah Khan who was working on the post, and appointed instead Muhammad Amin Khan[2] as his first Mir Bakhshi.[3] Khalilullah Khan was related to the Emperor, was a noble of standing, had already attained the rank of 5000/5000, 2000 2-3 horse, had served on important positions under Shah Jahan, and had twice held the post of the

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1. Hidayatul Qawaid, ff.14a-15b; Farhang-i Kardani, f.40; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.348, 461.

2. For his life and career, see Supra p. 19.

3. Kazim, p.119; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.33.

Mir Bakhshi, first in December 1649 and again in 1658.[1] Khalilullah Khan had also played decisive role in favour of Aurangzeb after the battle of Samugarh,[2] if not in the battle itself,[3] during negotiations with Shah Jahan. But in spite of above distinctions and services, Aurangzeb did not confirm him on the post of Mir Bakhshi which he was holding at that time, as he did not confirm Jafar Khan on the post of Wazir-i Azam. This he did, apart from political considerations, probably also to assert his authority and to avoid the impression that they could hold the post as a matter of right.

Aurangzeb repeated the same thing again when he also transferred Muhammad Amin Khan himself from that post in 1667,[4] apparently without any offence, and appointed Danishmand Khan instead,[5] who had the rare honour of combining the Mir Bakhshigiri with the governorship of Delhi.[6]

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1. For a brief notice on his career see Supra p.

2. For his role favourable to Aurangzeb during the negotiation between the father and son see Bami, pp.72-74; Kazim, pp.114-15; Masir, Vol. I, p.780.

3. Khalilullah Khan had reached secret understanding with Aurangzeb even before the battle and remained inactive in the battle according to Bami, pp.60-63, and Masir, Vol. I, p.781. Therefore, Dr. Baini Prasad is not correct when he writes (Maasir-ul Umara, English translation, Vol. I, p.770 note 3) that Bernier (pp.52-54) alone accuses Khalilullah Khan of betraying Dara.

4. Kazim, p.1058; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.250a.

5. Kazim, p.1067; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.64.

6. Kazim, p.937; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.92-105; Inshah, f.52b; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.253a; Masir, Vol. II, pp.30-32.

On his death in July 1670, another senior noble, Lashkar Khan, who had also served on many posts under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, was appointed the Mir Bakhshi.[1] But on his death in December 1670, after serving only for five months, it were mostly the Second Bakhshis, some of whom had also been the Third Bakhshis, who were promoted to the position of the Mir Bakhshi.[2]

It is, however, significant to note that out of ten persons who were appointed to that high post by Aurangzeb, four were closely related to the royal family. They were Asad Khan (February 1671 - October 1676) who later became the Wazir, Ruhullah Khan I[3] (September 1686 - July 1692), Bahramand Khan[4] (July 1692 - November 1702) and Zulfiqar Khan[5] (Nov. 1702 -

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1. Lashkar Khan, Yadgar Beg was a servant of princehood of Shah Jahan; and held under him, and subsequently under Aurangzeb many important assignments. For him see, Lahori, Vol. II, pp.448, 490-91; Saleh, Vol. III, pp.63, 141, 171, 208, 344; Kazim, pp.210, 217; Maasir, Vol. III, 168-71.
2. See Tables A, B, and C at the end of this Chapter.
3. Ruhullah Khan I was the son of Mir Khalil Ullah Khan Yazdi (Supra p.22) from a daughter's daughter of Asaf Khan, Yamin-al Daula. In April 1660, Ruhullah Khan himself married a daughter of Shaista Khan (Kazim, p.477), she being the first cousin of Aurangzeb. In July 1692, Ruh Ullah Khan's own daughter was married to Prince Azimuddin, second son of Shah Alam (Akhbarat, 22nd Rabi I, 36th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.347). For Ruh Ullah Khan's life and career see Kazim, pp.830, 1061; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.127, 144, 156, 176; Dilkusha, ff.83b, 105a; Maasir, Vol. III, 309-15.
4. Bahramand Khan, Azimuddin also belonged to a distinguished Irani family of administrators that was related to three generations of Mughal rulers and had served under them. He was the grandson of Sadiq Khan, brother-in-law of Asaf Khan Yamin-al Daula, and Mir Bakhshi of Jahangir and Shah Jahan (for him see Zakhirah, f.81b; Maasir, Vol. II, pp.729-31), and the nephew of Jafar Khan the Wazir. Bahramand Khan himself had married the daughter of Asad Khan the Wazir (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.461). For his career see Kazim, p.1084; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.171-72, 176, 192, 205, 281, 349; Dilkusha, ff.129b, 143b; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.452-57.
5. Zulfiqar Khan Nusrat Jang, Muhammad Ismail was the son of Asad Khan from the sister of Shaista Khan Amir-al Umara. Born in 1657, he got his first mansab of 300 zat in March 1668 (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.71). In May 1677

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till the death of the Emperor in February 1707). The last three were also very close relations of the contemporary *Wazir-i Azam* Asad Khan, and had close family ties among themselves.[1] It is possible that this multi-relationship and strong family connections with the King and his *Wazirs* might have influenced the Emperor, and played some role in their appointment, promotion, power and influence. It should, however, be noted that their appointment to the post of the *Mir Bakhshi* was gradual. We have already referred to the pressing circumstances in which Asad Khan was promoted from the post of the Second *Bakhshi* to that of the *Mir Bakhshi*.

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he was married to a daughter of Shaista Khan and was entitled Itiqad Khan (*Ibid.*, 158). He served on a few administrative posts like that of *Bakhshi* of *Ahadis* (*Ibid.*, 176), *Qur Begi* (*Ibid.*, 251) and the *Darogha* of *Ghusalkhana* (*Ibid.*, 297). But his main achievements were in military campaigns against the Rathors and subsequently against the Marathas. In November 1689, he captured the fort of Raheri with the mother and daughter of Shambha; and was entitled Zulfiqar Khan Bahadur and promoted to 3000/2000 (*Ibid.*, 331-32). Later in 1698 he captured the fort of Jinji along with many other forts and was promoted to 5000/5000 (*Ibid.*, 392). In November 1702 he was appointed the *Mir Bakhshi* vice Bahramand Khan deceased, but continued his military career (*Ibid.*, 461; *Dilkusha*, ff.97b, 123b, 143b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.404, 419; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.93-97; *Muhammadi*, p.31).

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1. The notices given above on these three *Mir Bakhshis* would reveal their relationship to the Emperor, to Asad Khan and among themselves. Emperor's maternal aunt (*khala*) and Shaista Khan's sister was married to Asad Khan. Shaista Khan's own daughter was married to Ruh Ullah Khan I and another to Zulfiqar Khan, son of Asad Khan; one of Asad Khan's own daughter was married to Khudabanda Khan (for him see *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.814-16), son of Shaista Khan. As regard to Asad Khan and Bahramand Khan, the former was son of the paternal aunt (*amma - phuphi*) of the latter. Subsequently Bahramand Khan married the daughter of Asad Khan (*Ibid.*, p.450; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.461).

Ruhullah Khan I and Bahramand Khan too were first appointed to subordinate positions and were promoted to the post of *Mir Bakhshi* after they had successfully passed through various stages of apprenticeship and probation. Before their appointment as the *Mir Bakhshi*, they were working as the Second *Bakhshi*, and had attained the rank of over 3000 *zat*.[1]

There, however, was exception for Zulfiqar Khan who was appointed the *Mir Bakhshi* without passing through these stages. Although he was holding the high rank of 5000/5000, he had held only a few administrative posts! That were of *Bakhshi* of *Ahadis*, *Qur Begi* and the *Darogha* of *Ghuslkhana*. He seems to have never worked as the Second *Bakhshi*, or even the Third *Bakhshi*. In his appointment, therefore, the Emperor seems to have been influenced by extraneous considerations. We do find his father Asad Khan, the *Wazir*, requesting the Emperor to bestow extra-ordinary favours on his son; and the Emperor reluctantly conceding that unusual favour to him in view of his extraordinary services.[2] His

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1. Cf. Tables A and B.
2. A brief letter of Aurangzeb to Asad Khan (*Dastur-i Agahi*, f.94b) reveals that the former requested the Emperor to grant *Mahi-Maratib* to his son Zulfiqar Khan. *Mahi-Maratib* (I prefer it on Irvine's *Mahi-o-maratib*), the fish standards, the highest insignia of distinction was conferred by the Emperor generally on 6-*hazari* nobles (for the origin, significance and the components of the insignia and the prestige under the Mughals see *Lahori*, Vol. I, pp.398-99; *Mirat-ul Istilah*, f.16a; Also W. Irvine, *op. cit.*, p.33; Athar Ali, *op. cit.*, p.141, and notes). The Emperor replied that, "Although *Mahi-Maratib* is conventionally granted only to 6-*hazari* nobles, we, nevertheless, bestow it on Nusrat Jang (Zulfiqar Khan) in view of his (Asad Khan's) request and his (Nusrat Jang's) own remarkable achievements; and he may take one (*Mahi-Maratib*) he has captured". The letter is undated. But as it describes Zulfiqar Khan as Nusrat Jang, which title he got in 1693, or, in any case, in 1695 (Cf. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.355, 374; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.95-96), the request and the favour would have been done thereafter; and most probably early in 1698 when Nusrat Jang captured the fort of Jinji along

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appointment to the post of the _Mir Bakhshi_ too might be attributed partly to the influence of the _Wazir_. Indeed the appointment of Zulfiqar Khan seems to have been only symbolic as he remained busy in military campaigns,[1] and routine work of his department was looked after by another noble, Muttalib Khan,[2] and the Second _Bakhshi_. However, whatever the considerations behind the appointments of Ruhullah Khan I, Bahramand Khan and Zulfiqar Khan to the post of the _Mir Bakhshi_, the fact remains that the members of a family closely knitted with each other held the post one

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with the family and property of Rajaram (February 1698) and was holding the rank of 5000/5000 (_Ibid._; _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.391-92) and not 6000/6000 as observed by Dr. Athar Ali (_op. cit._), because the Khan got that rank only in 1704 (Cf. _Maasir_, Vol. II, p.97). Similarly, the author of _Dilkusha_, who was writing on memory, seems to have confused the events when he writes (f.97b) that the said Khan got _mahi-maratib_ after the capture of the fort of Rairi and of Shahuji (in October 1689). At that time Zulfiqar Khan had not yet got the title of 'Nusrat Jang' as mentioned in Aurangzeb's letters.

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1. As mentioned above, Zulfiqar Khan had gained many victories in difficult circumstances, and had established his reputation as one of the most capable and successful generals of Aurangzeb (Cf. _Dilkusha_, ff.97a, 137b; _Khafi Khan_, Vol. II, p.313; _Maasir_, Vol. II, p.97). After his appointment as the _Mir Bakhshi_, he was sent against the Marathas to Burhanpur and Aurangabad, and captured the forts of Wagingara, Kondana and others (_Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.470, 503-504, 511; _Dilkusha_, 146a, 150a-151a, 155b etc.).

2. _Dilkusha_, f.143b; _Maasir_, Vol. II, p.651. Muttalib Khan was the grandson of Mukhtar Khan Sabzwari, an important noble of Shah Jahan (for him see _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.409-13), and a rising _mansabdar_ of last years of Aurangzeb's reign. He died after the war of succession in 1707 (_Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.240, 272, 275; _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.650-53; _Muhammadi_, p.22).

after the other, and collectively for over two decades. It is indeed significant that since 1686 to the death of the Emperor in 1707, the posts of the _Wazir_, the _Mir Bakhshi_, and to some extent that the Second _Bakhshi_ too were confined to a family that was closely related to the Emperor.

Those appointed the _Mir Bakhshis_ by Aurangzeb were holding the _mansab_ of 3,000, 4000 and 5000 _zat_ at the time of their appointment; but none had a _mansab_ below 3000.[1] We may, therefore, infer that nobles/officials holding the rank below 3000 _zat_ were not considered senior enough to be elevated to that position. Some of them, apparently got no increase in their _mansabs_ during their tenure.[2] But others got periodical promotions, and the highest rank attained by a _Mir Bakhshi_ - Zulfiqar Khan in this particular case - was 6000.[3] It means that no particular salary or periodical promotion was attached to the post, and the allowances of the incumbent were determined by his personal rank and standing in the Mughal service, and, therefore, varied from person to person.

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1. Cf. Table A.

2. _Ibid._

3. _Maasir_, Vol. II, p.97. Dr. Athar Ali (_op. cit._, p.217) mentions the rank attained by Bahramand Khan as 7000/7000. But this does not seem to be correct. Among the sources cited by him, _Tarikh-i Muhammadi_ (p.16) does not mention his rank at all, _Maasir-i Alamgiri_ (p.374) and _Maasir-al Umara_ (Vol. I, p.456) mention his rank only 5000/3000 which is supported by _Dilkusha_ (f.143b).

The rank held by different Mir Bakhshis also indicates their position among Mughal nobles and officials and determines their status vis-a-vis the Wazir. As mentioned above the lowest rank held by a Wazir was 5000 zat and the highest attained by him 7000. True that some of the Mir Bakhshis had also reached to the rank of 5000 at the time of their appointment to the post. But while 5000 was the highest rank in the case of Mir Bakhshi, with one exception of Zulfiqar Khan, it was the lowest for the Wazir. Moreover, the contemporary Wazirs of 5-hazari Mir Bakhshis were holding the higher rank of 6000 or above at that time.[1] The Mir Bakhshi, therefore, remained both in regard to status and salary below the Wazir in the hierarchy of the central ministers. Hence the observation thathe Mir Bakhshi stood at equal footing with the Wazir appears incorrect.[2]

The terms of the Mir Bakhshis like that of their personal rank and salary, also differed from person to person. While some of them served for about a decade, a few could work on the post just for a few months. Thus for example, Muhammad Amin Khan (1658-1667) and Bahramand Khan (1692-1702) held the post for about a decade each; Lashkar Khan

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1. Thus for example, when Danishmand Khan and Lashkar Khan, the 5-hazaris, were appointed the Mir Bakhshi, their contemporary Wazir Jafar Khan had already reached 6000 in June 1658 (Kazim, p.157). Similarly, when the other two 5-hazaris Ruhullah Khan and Zulfiqar Khan were made the Mir Bakhshi, their contemporary Wazir Asad Khan was holding the rank of 7000 (Akhbarat, 6th Ramazan, 37th R.Y.; Maasir, Vol. I, p.312).

2. I.H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Mughal Empire, p.77; Cf. Ibn Hasan, op. cit., p.231.

(August 1670 - December 1670) and Himmat Khan[1] (November 1680 - January 1681) died after serving only for five and three months respectively. The rest held the post for four, five or six years. It should, however, be noted that except Muhammad Amin Khan who was sent to Kabul against the Yusufzai rebels (May 1667),[2] and was subsequently appointed the Nazim of Lahore (1667),[3] and Asad Khan who was promoted as the Wazir, the rest held the post till their death. There was, therefore, no fixed tenure of office for a Mir Bakhshi too; and he, like the Wazir, held the office during the pleasure of the Emperor. There is, however, no instance of a Mir Bakhshi being demoted or transferred because of the displeasure of the Emperor, though there are the cases of Emperor admonishing a Mir Bakhshi.[4] This incidentally shows that the Mir Bakhshis were rarely transferred to other posts, even to the governorship of a province. The fact may not necessarily establish that other posts were inferior to the

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1. Himmat Khan Mir Isa, son of Islam Khan of Badakhshan (Maasir, Vol. I, pp.217-20), and attached to Aurangzeb since his princehood. For his career under Aurangzeb see Maasir, Vol. II, pp.946-49.

2. Kazim, p.1046.

3. Ibid., p.1067; Futuhat, f.62b; Halat-i-Shaghia, f.250a. Khafi Khan writes (Vol. II, p.208) that he got the governorship of Lahore in addition to Mir Bakhshiship. But this does not appear correct. Muhammad Amin Khan was on his way back to Lahore in mid-Jumada I, 1078/ beginning November 1667 was on him (Kazim, p.1060) and the appointment of Danishmand Khan as the Mir Bakhshi was announced on 13th Rajab 1078/ 29th December 1667 (Ibid., p.1067).

4. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.412.

post of the _Mir Bakhshi_. But it does suggest that this post, like that of the _Wazir_, was a rare honour, and its holders were not ordinarily removed from it, perhaps, because the selection of a replacement was not always easy. In any case, the tradition of 'life tenure' also established for the _Mir Bakhshis_ of Aurangzeb as it had established for his _Wazirs_.

It is significant that the majority of Aurangzeb's _Mir Bakhshis_ was Irani. Among the ten _Mir Bakhshis_, Lashkar Khan was probably an an Indian. Sarbaland Khan[1] and Himmat Khan were the Turanis. The three held the post for a total of about four years. The seven other _Mir Bakhshis_ were the Iranis who had either come themselves from Persia like Muhammad Amin Khan and Danishmand Khan; or were the descendants of old Irani migrants who had joined service under the Mughals. The Iranis held the post of the _Mir Bakhshi_ collectively for about 45 years; and from 1681 to the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, without interruption. Thus, besides the _Wizarat_, the second most important position in the state and administration i.e. the _Mir Bakhshiship_ was also dominated by the Iranis for the most of Aurangzeb's reign.

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1. Sarbaland Khan Khwaja Rahmatullah, was the daughter's son of Mirza Shahrukh, a scion of the ruling family of Badakhshan (for him see _Zakhirah_, ff.4a-4b; _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.389-95). In view of his old family connections with the Mughals, he was favoured by Shah Jahan and got many assignments under him and Aurangzeb. For his life see _Maasir_, Vol. II, pp.477-79.

Functions and Powers :

The Mir Bakhshi had many functions and duties to perform. A contemporary authority has thus described his functions: "Presenting to the Emperor the candidates for fresh service (nau-sarkarmai) or for increase in mansab (izafa), putting before him the conditions of each of them and endeavouring in improving their lot; keeping the list of the imperial mansabdars with detail of those in attendance at court and deputed in provinces, the regulations (dastur-ul amal) of their salaries and the salaries of the ahadis, the awarija of the salary-bills, the rules of the dagh-o-tashiha, of the difference of lost horses and the deduction of their feed (khurak-i asp), and of the difference of Persian and Indian horses (tazi-o-yabu) for the purposes of dagh; the keeping of awarija of absence of mansabdars, of assistance (musaidat) to mansabdar, and of mutaliba (state's dues) against them; the forming of the centre and the left and right flank of the army (in the battle); and issuing the letters of posting to the mansabdars with his seal".[1] But the description is by no means comprehensive. In the actual working of the government, the Mir Bakhshi performed many other functions and enjoyed considerable power and influence at the court. He was considered one of the most confidential and the closest servants of the Emperor 'rendering it

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1. Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.73b; Dastur-al Amal, f.111a.

difficult, if not impossible, for him to remain at a distance from the King's person'.[1] While the *Mir Bakhshi* himself longed for a respite from the hustle and bustle of his office and the court, the others envied his position, his closeness to the Emperor and his functions and powers.[2]

Organisation of the Chauki :

One of the most important functions of the *Mir Bakhshi* was the arrangement of the daily *chauki* (*kushk*) i.e. the mounted guard at the imperial residence, and the *Taslim-i Chauki*, i.e. the salute by the mounted guards to the royal flags. As already mentioned, the *Chauki* and the *Taslim-i Chauki* was an important institution under the Mughals having the political and military significance. Almost all *Mansabdars* present at court had to mount guard once a week.[3] This was one of the most important duty, and, perhaps, the only regular one, for those *Mansabdars* who were present at the court. Exemption from this duty was, therefore, rare and only in special circumstances.[4] The Emperor himself appeared to inspect

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1. *Bernier*, p.171.

2. Cf. *Maasir*, Vol. I, p.457.

3. *Ain*, Vol. II, p.150.

4. Under Aurangzeb, there was, perhaps, only one exemption and that again temporary. Asad Khan the *Wazir* had been exempted from the *Chauki* for only the rainy season of 1696 (*Akhbarat*, 4th Safar, 40th R.Y.). Even Danishmand Khan, a noble of standing, who was otherwise exempted from daily attendance at the court because of his scholarly pursuits, had to mount guard on assigned day (*Bernier*, p.265).

the *Chauki* almost daily. The absence of those supposed to be on *Chauki* was considered a serious omission and the *mansabdar* concerned was promptly punished by fine or otherwise.[1] The *Mir Bakhshi*, therefore, organised the daily mounted guard with care and minute details.

The *Mir Bakhshi* issued to each of the *mansabdar* who was to mount guard a certificate to that effect (*dastak-i Chauki*).[2] Similarly, if any *mansabdar* was exempted from the *Chauki* for any reason, he issued

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1. Under Akbar, the absentee from the *Chauki* was fined by one week's pay, or was reprimanded (*Ain*, Vol. II, p.150). But subsequently, perhaps, since the reign of Shah Jahan, elaborate rules were laid down for leave or exemption from *Chauki* on certain occasions, and for fine on unauthorised absence. These rules are interesting as they show the working of the institution, the importance which the Mughal Emperors attached to the *Chauki*, their administrative wisdom, and the way by which they maintained discipline among the *mansabdars* after giving due consideration to their human requirements and failures. Briefly the rules were as follows:

   (a) Absence from three *Chaukis* was excused for sick *mansabdars* on producing a sickness certificate (*bimarnama*) from a physician (*hakim*) with his seal; thereafter the salary was deducted for each absence. (b) Exemption of one *Chauki* (each?) was granted for one's own, sister's/daughter's marriage, for the marriage/circumcision of brothers, sons, grandsons, and for the birth of a son or grandson. (c) Leave of one *Chauki* on the death of father, mother, brother/sister, son, grandson or a member of the family. (d) In case of unauthorised absence, salary was deducted for three consecutive absence; on fourth absence, the mansabdar was treated as dismissed (*bartaraf*), and his arrears of salary if any were attached as fine for his absence (*Siyaqnamah*, pp.288-89; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.39a; *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.88a).

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.16a. In the dastak, the *Chauki* officials were informed about the duty of the posted *mansabdar* and the day assigned to him for the *Chauki*. They were also asked to enroll him in the *Chauki* on the assigned day, and send his attendance to his office. For the specimen of *dastak*, see *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.88a.

the exemption certificate (*dastak-i minha-i Chauki*).[1] Apparently, he would have also prepared the list of the *mansabdars* on duty for presenting before the Emperor if required. A separate staff of *Chauki* comprising the *Darogha*, the *Amin* and the *Chauki-nawis* was maintained.[2] The staff regulated the attendance and absence of the *mansabdars* on the basis of the *dastak* issued by the *Mir Bakhshi*,[3] and sent the diary of the *Chauki* (*Siyaha-i Chauki*) and the attendance of the *mansabdars* (*tasdiq-i hazir*)[4] to the office of the *Mir Bakhshi* for record and necessary action in case of unauthorised absence. When the *mansabdars* assembled about the dusk for *Chauki*, the presence of the *Mir Bakhshi* himself, or some of his colleagues in his absence, was necessary. It was the duty of the *Mir Bakhshis* to make the *mansabdars* salute the *Sura* when the Emperor appeared for inspection and gave signal for it.[5]

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.18a.

2. *Ibid.*

3. It is difficult to describe the specific function of each of the three officials. It, however, appears from their designations and some administrative manuals (*Khulasat-ul Siyaq*, f.88a) that while the *Chauki-nawis* prepared the diary of the *Chauki* and the attendance roll of the *mansabdars*, the *Darogha* and the *Amin* regulated and supervised the guard, and issued the attendance certificate with their seals.

4. For a specimen of *tasdiq-i hazri*, see *Khulasat-ul Siyaq*, f.88a.

5. *Kazim*, pp.747, 748, 1105; *Akhbarat*, 2nd Zilhijja, 9th R.Y.

Award of Mansab and Promotion :

Another important function of the Mir Bakhshi was to supervise and control the process of award of mansab to candidates for imperial service. The candidates for service and mansabs could have been presented before the Emperor by the Mir Bakhshi himself or by his junior colleagues.[1] But it was the privilege of the Mir Bakhshi to put before the Emperor the particulars of the princes and the nobles of high ranks and positions for mansab and promotion.[2] Moreover, the final mansab memorandum (yaddasht) of all mansabdars was issued only by the Mir Bakhshi with his attestation (risalah), and seal.[3] Same was the case with promotions of mansab (izafa). The procedure of the award of a mansab and promotion has already been discussed by some scholars[4] and it need not be

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1. Kazim, pp.139, 1099; Dilkusha, f.35b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.411; Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.73b; Document No. A.R. 850, State Archives (Hyderabad); Akhbarat, 18th Rabi II, 36th R.Y., 24th Shaban, 36th R.Y. 4th Rabi II, 43th R.Y.; Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), pp.25, 36, 49.

2. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.17b.

3. Ibid., ff.18b-20b; Farhang-i Kardani, f.41a; Dastur-al Amal, f.38b. For such a document mentioning the award of a mansab of 7000/7000 to Maratha chief Shahuji in 1689, issued with the risalah of the then Mir Bakhshi Ruhullah Khan I, see Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), p.216.

4. Cf. William Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls, Chapter IV; Ibn Hasan, op. cit., Chapter III; M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, pp.59-62. There are two contemporary administrative manuals Dastur-al Amal (British Museum MS. Add. 6599, Rieu 1/404), ff.159a-160a and Farhang-i Kardani (Aligarh Muslim University MS. Abdus Salam Collection 315/85), ff.40b-41a which contain the specimen documents that used to be prepared and issued in relation to the award of a mansab. These documents also contain the endorsements of some central officials and indicate the whole procedure and the role of concerned officials in the award of a mansab.

repeated here. It should, however, be pointed out that the *Mir Bakhshi*, and even his junior colleagues played important role in the initial grant of a *Mansab* and in the subsequent promotions.

While this is true that the candidates for *Mansab* were presented to the Emperor generally on the recommendation (*Tajwiz*) of princes and nobles, the *Bakhshis* presented many candidates on their own and secured for them *Mansabs* and promotions. Their influence in this respect seems to have further increased during the long years of the Deccan campaign. It has been recorded that since there was the shortage of *paibaqi* and increase in the number of *Mansabdars* andthe *jagirdars*,[1] the Emperor instructed the *Bakhshis* not to present new candidates for *Mansab*. But some powerful Bakhshis like Ruhullah Khan I the *Mir Bakhshi* (September 1686 - July 1692) continued to present candidates for *Mansab*. The same attitude was adopted by Mukhlis Khan the Second *Bakhshi*[2] (July 1692 - January 1701). As it was unseemly on the part of the Emperor to refuse service to those presented, the Bakhshis were able to secure *Mansabs* for their candidates. Ultimately the two *Bakhshis* were admonished by the Emperor and were forbidden in strong words from presenting fresh candidates

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1. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.396-97, 411. For actual increase in the number of *Mansabdars* under Aurangzeb see Athar Ali, *op. cit.*, p.9.

2. For a brief sketch of his career see Infra p. 257, and the Table B at the end of this Chapter.

in future. Dam was, however, soon withdrawn because of the fresh pressure of the Marathas; and the Bakhshis were glad to oblige the people again.[1] The Bakhshis played almost the same role in regard to promotion in the Mansab (izafa) too. Their differences with, rather simply the indifference to a Mansabdar could have affected his promotion. There is the specific case of one Muhammad Murad Khan II, who, it is said, could not get promotions for years because of his uncordial relations with the Bakhshis.[2] Conversely, they could secure imperial pardon and favour for punished and disgraced Mansabdars if they had good relations with them.[3] These incidents not only indicate the role of the Bakhshis in grant of Mansab and promotion and their influence with the Emperor, they also shew that the Bakhshis, especially the First and the Second, would have had a good following and support of those Mansabdars for whom they secured Mansabs and promotions. This in turn partly explains their excessive influence at the Court and Emperor's connivance at their overbearance as referred to above.

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1. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.411-14.

2. Muhammad Murad Khan, Mirza Muhammad, was the son of one Murshid Quli Khan (for whom we do not know much). His grand-mother was attached to Mah Banu the aunt of Aurangzeb, had been brought up in the court and was, therefore, a confident servant of Aurangzeb. Though a Mansabdar of smaller rank of 700/400, he was sometimes given important assignments. In 1684 he was sent to Golconda to collect the tributes. After its conquest in 1687, he was punished for certain lapses but was soon restored to his rank. He survived Aurangzeb, joined the service of Bahadur Shah and died in 1711 (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.242; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.273b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.294-5; Maasir, Vol. III, pp.682-85; Muhammadi, p.27).

3. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.279.

Supervision over the Dagh-o-Tashiha :

Another important function of the Mir Bakhshi in regard to the mansabdars began after the award of mansab. It was to see that the mansabdar has produced the necessary number of horses, men and other staff (tabinan) as required under the mansab approved for him by the Emperor, before he was finally granted the sanad for his salary or jagir; and that he (the mansabdar) maintains that contingent constantly thereafter. As the strength and efficiency of the Mughal fighting force largely depended upon the contingents of the mansabdars, it was one of the most important functions of the Mir Bakhshi to ensure that the mansabdars were maintaining the full complement of men, horses, auxiliary staff and other requirements as stipulated under their mansabs. For this purpose a section of the Dagh-o-Tashiha (branding and verification) was maintained under the over all charge of the Mir Bakhshi.[1] The Dagh-o-Tashiha was, therefore, one of the principal wings of Mir Bakhshi's department at the centre; and its branches were maintained in all provinces,[2] and even in the armies sent on military expeditions,[3] which worked under

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1. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.18a; Khulasat-us Siyaq, f.73b; Malumat-ul Afaq, p.1903; Manucci, Vol. II, p.353; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatima), p.177.
2. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.18a; Manucci, Vol. II, p.353; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatima), p.177.

3. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.18a. For the appointments on the posts of Bakhshi and the Dagh officials of an army see Akhbarat, 4th Rajab, 28th R.Y.

the immediate supervision of their respective bakhshis. We would discuss the working of the Dagh-o-Tashiha later. It is, however, to be pointed out here that the Bakhshis or the Dagh officials themselves used to present the branded horses and verified sawars before the Emperor for review.[1] The Emperor satisfied himself with their proper and fit conditions. If he found a horse or trooper in unsound condition, the concerned mansabdar was promptly censured or punished by the Emperor.[2]

Advising the Emperor on Appointments :

The Mir Bakhshi also advised the Empeor on innumerable appointments in his department, and issued the appointment letters. There were hosts of officials who served under the Mir Bakhshi, like the Second Bakhshi, the Third Bakhshi, the Bakhshi of Ahadis and some other bakhshis at the centre, and the bakhshis and waqia-nigars in the provinces and in the armies sent on expeditions, the Darogha, and Amin of the Chauki and the Chauki-navis, the daroghas, amins and mushrifs of the Dagh-o-Tashiha at the centre, the provinces and of the innumerable armies sent on expeditions. Unfortunately, our sources do not say much as to how these officials were appointed. As far as the appointment of his own colleagues

1. Kazim, pp.139, 1100.

2. Ibid.; Maasir, Vol. IV, p.383.

was concerned, the *Mir Bakhshi* seems to have had little or no role in it though the *Wazir-i Azam* sometimes did influence the Emperor on these appointments.[1] In appointment of other officials, however, the *Mir Bakhshi* appears to have enjoyed considerable discretion.

It was practically impossible for the Emperor to make himself all appointments on innumerable posts in the department of the *Mir Bakhshi*. The *Mir Bakhshi*, therefore, would have exercised considerable discretion in regard to above appointments. We do find the Emperor authorising the *Mir Bakhshi* to appoint *bakhshi* for an army sent on a particular expedition (1692).[2] Once he was instructed to appoint himself the *qiladars* (fort-commandants) for a number of forts captured in the Deccan.[3] Similarly, he was sometimes asked by the Emperor to propose suitable job (*khidmat*) for a particular *mansabdar* whom the Emperor wanted to favour.[4] Presumably, even where the Emperor himself wanted to nominate a person for a particular post, the *Mir Bakhshi* would have influenced his opinion as the *Wazir* used to do as regard to appointments in his own department. At any rate, the appointment letters (*dastak*/*sanad-i khidmat*) for all posts of the provincial *bakhshis* and *waqia-nigars*, the *Darogha* and *Amin* of the

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1. See Supra, p. 126.
2. *Akhbarat*, 19th Rabi I, 36th R.Y.
3. *Futuhat*, f.111a.
4. *Akhbarat*, 1st Ramazan, 40th R.Y.

Chauki and the _Chauki-navis_, and the _daroghas_, _amins_ and the _mushrifs_ of the _Dagh-o-Tashiha_ of the centre, provinces and of the armies were finally issued by the _Mir Bakhshi_ with his attestation (_risalah_) and seal.[1] Thus the _Mir Bakhshi_ played important role in innumerable appointments in his own department and even outside.

Posting and Transfer of Mansabdars :

Apart from appointments, the _Mir Bakhshi_ was also responsible for the postings and transfers (_tainati_) of the _mansabdars_ (as distinct from the posting of officials). It hardly needs mention that after the enrolment in the imperial service with the award of _mansab_, only a fraction of the _mansabdars_ were retained at the court and the rest were sent to provinces[2] or in any army to a particular expedition. Such _mansabdars_ were known as the _tainat-i_ Deccan, Bengal etc. (posted to the Deccan or Bengal etc.). It was, of course, the Emperor who verbally ordered for the posting of _mansabdars_ or of a particular _mansabdar_ to a particular place.[3]

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1. _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.18a; _Malumat-ul Afaq_, p.190; _Mirat-i Ahmadi_ (_Khatimah_), pp.174, 177. It is interesting to note that unless a person produced the _sanad-i khidmat_ at the place of his posting, he was not allowed to resume his duties (Cf. _Waqai Ajmer_, p.484).

2. Thus, for example, during the reign of Aurangzeb, about 900 big and small _mansabdars_ with a total _sawar_ rank of 26,030, but the actual troopers' strength of 9,000 _sawars_ (according to 1/3 rule for which see M. Athar Ali, _op. cit._, pp.54-55) were supposed to be posted in the Gujarat for security and military purposes (_Mirat-i Ahmadi_ (_Khatimah_), p.169. Cf. also _Ibid._, Vol. I, pp.165-66.

3. _Akhbarat_, 9th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 4th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.; _Waqai Ajmer_, f.512; _Selected Documents_ (Aurangzeb), p.19.

For the posting of a big *mansabdar* with his contingent, or for the collective posting of smaller ones on some expedition, a list known as the *tumar-i fauj* (the detailed list of the army) was prepared generally by the *Second Bakhshi*.[1] But for the posting of individual *mansabdars* of smaller rank, the *Mir Bakhshi* issued the formal letter of posting (*dastak-i tainynati*) to the concerned *mansabdar* with his seal and signature for producing before the *bakhshi* of joining province or the army.[2] The *Mir Bakhshi* at the same time informed the concerned *bakhshi* about the posting and asked him to exercise such supervision over the posted *mansabdar* as was required under the rules.[3] Similarly, at the time of transfer of a *mansabdar* from one place to another, a *dastak* of transfer was issued to the concerned *bakhshi* to relieve the *mansabdar*.[4] Any *mansabdar* who left the place of his posting without the *dastak* and prior permission of local *bakhshi* was considered absentee (farari, literally absconding) from duty.[5] The *Mir Bakhshi* prepared and maintained a complete list of all the nobles that were in attendance at court or were posted in the provinces, with the detail of their *mansabs* and

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1. For detail see Infra p. 265.

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.18b, 19b; Add. 6598, f.138b.

3. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.501. For such *dastaks* see (a) *Dastak* of Ashraf Khan *Mir Bakhshi* to Aryab Khan dated 6th Jumada II, 27th R.Y. (S.A.M.), (b) *Parwanah* A.R. 965 (dated 3rd Shaban 29th R.Y., S.A.M.)

4. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.512; *Dastak* of Ashraf Khan *Mir Bakhshi* to Muhammad Zaman, dated 12th Jumada I, 29th R.Y. (S.A.M.).

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.175; *Waqai Ajmer*, f.515.

jagirs (*maratib*) etc. for presenting the same before the Emperor whenever required for fresh postings, transfers, or promotion etc.[1]

Communicating the Imperial Orders to Mansabdars and Officials :

Another important function of the *Mir Bakhshi* was to communicate the imperial orders (*hasb-ul hukms*) to a number of officials and *Mansabdars*. The Emperor as the head of the State and the government issued daily hundreds of orders to various officials and *Mansabdars*. Many such *hasb-ul hukms* were communicated through the *Wazir* as mentioned above. But many others addressed or related to *Mansabdars* sent on expeditions or serving as the *faujdar*, *thanadar*, *qiladar* were sent through the *Mir Bakhshi* or the Second *Bakhshi*.[2] The imperial orders concerning with the subordinate officials of *Mir Bakhshi*'s department were communicated almost exclusively by the *Mir Bakhshi* himself or by his colleagues.[3]

Similarly, the *Mir Bakhshi* or the Second *Bakhshi* put before the Emperor, if necessary, the reports of the subordinate *bakhshis* and the *Dagh* officials which they regularly received from them in the form of diaries or other official documents. But of special importance in these

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1. *Zawabit-i-Alamgiri*, f.18b; *Dastur-ul Amal*, f.159.

2. *Akhbarat*, 1st Shaban, 18th Shaban, 28th Shaban, 36th R.Y.; 11th Ramazan, 37th R.Y.; 9th Rabi II, 39th R.Y.

3. *Akhbarat*, 6th Rajab, 24th R.Y.; *Waqai Ajmer*, f.639.

despatches were the news-reports (*waqai*) that came to the office of the *Mir Bakhshi* almost daily from the *bakhshis* and *waqia-nigars* of the armies sent on expeditions and from other intelligence agencies. These despatches contained reports about the *mansabdars*, troopers, various local officials, and untoward incident in the army, the progress of the expedition and the news of enemy's camps.[1] These reports sometimes had the information of vital importance. The *Mir Bakhshi* and his colleagues were expected to keep the Emperor informed about these matters, received from him the required instructions and guide-lines and passed it on to concerned officials, if necessary.[2] Apart from these reports, the *Mir Bakhshi* also presented before the Emperor the requests of the *mansabdars* present at the court, posted in provinces or sent on expeditions, about their own promotion, about the grant of *mansab* or promotion to their followers or any other matter they liked to represent before the Emperor.[3] The *Mir Bakhshi* thus served as a link between the Emperor and the *mansabdars* on the one hand, and between the court and the subordinate officials of his own department on the other.

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1. For a large number of such despatches and reports of very interesting and important nature, see *Waqai Ajmer.* A good number of similar reports (*waqai*) sent to the Court from different places in the Deccan, have also been preserved at the State Archives, Hyderabad. A selection from these reports has also been published with the title, *Selected Waqai of the Deccan* (1660-1671 A.D.).

2. *Kamin*, p.1101. For many of such orders see also *Waqai Ajmer.*

3. *Kamin*, p.1099; Ruqaat, p.43; *Akhbarat*, 29th Rabi II, 8th R.Y., 12th Rajab, 16th Rajab, 19th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 4th Rajab, 28th R.Y., 12th Shawwal, 44th R.Y.

The above facts also indicate the extent of control the Mir Bakhshi exercised over the officials of his department at the centre and in the provinces. The Mir Bakhshi had great say in the appointment, posting and transfer of his subordinates. All appointments were made through him and he issued their appointment letters. Thereafter he sent them instructions and imperial orders from time to time; and watched their performance from Court through a number of papers which he regularly received from the different sections of the department. The papers included the diaries, the attendance the reports and other necessary papers from the Chauki and the Dagh officials at the centre, and from the bakhshis and the Dagh officials of the provinces and of expeditions.[1] Then there were the reports of bakhshis/waqia-nigars which contained detailed information about the daily functioning of the bakhshi himself and of the daroghas, the amin and the mushrif of the Dagh etc.[2]

These papers and reports would have revealed to the Mir Bakhshi and his colleagues at the centre the actual working of the concerned wing of his department and would have helped him in supervising the functioning of his subordinates and maintaining control over them. Moreover, the Mir Bakhshi, and the Second Bakhshi were directly involved in the process

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1. For a detailed list of papers received and maintained by the office of the Mir Bakhshi, see Infra p. 295.

2. Perhaps the most interesting, informative and the specimen of such diary and reports is Waqai Ajmer.

of the grant of mansab and promotion, and played important role in the matter. Their presence at the Court and their closeness to the Emperor, therefore, would have contributed in strengthening their hold over subordinate officials at the centre, the provinces and at the local level. In the latter years of Aurangzeb, however, the control of the central Bakhshis over their subordinates in provinces seems to have been slackened and the efficiency of the department affected as we shall see.

Arrangement of Emperor's Expeditions :

It was also the duty of the Mir Bakhshi to make necessary arrangements for Emperor's military expeditions. The Mir Bakhshi almost always accompanied the Emperor in such expeditions and performed many functions. Unfortunately, our authorities do not provide us much information as to what influence the Mir Bakhshi exercised over the Emperor when the latter took decisions about expeditions and wars, war strategy, selection of Mansabdars for the expedition and about assigning them positions in the battles. It is, however, not improbable that as an official of considerable status and experience, and especially as the head of the military department, the Mir Bakhshi would have been a member of considerable influence of the imperial war-council. We do find the Emperor closeting with his junior colleagues the Second Bakhshi (1696) and consulting him about the strength and other details of the

armies posted in the Deccan.[1] Similarly the same official was once asked to get a map of the Deccan (Hyderabad, Berar and Bijapur to the coast of Indian Ocean) prepared, and to show it to him,[2] obviously for war purposes. The Mir Bakhshi too would have played at least the same role in military decisions. At any rate, he had other important functions to perform in expeditions in which the Emperor was present.

When the Emperor decided upon an expedition, the list of the army (tumar-i fauj) that was to accompany the Emperor was prepared generally by the Second Bakhshi as we shall see. But on way, and after reaching the destination or the site of battle, the Mir Bakhshi, along with his assistants, arranged for the security of the entire army encampment. He posted the scout-guards around the camp,[3] assessed the exact strength of the army before the battle, arranged the army into the battle array according to the positions assigned to each mansabdar and his contingents in the right, left and centre etc.[4] The Mir Bakhshi had thus the over all supervision, though not the command, of the force. Finally, during the battle itself, the Mir Bakhshi was assigned some position in

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1. Akhbarat, 4th Rajab, 39th R.Y.
2. Ibid., 24th Zilhijja, 40th R.Y.
3. Ibid., 7th Rajab, 43rd R.Y.; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.332, 408.
4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.200; Khafi Khan, pp.332, 408; Hidayatul Qawaid, f.15b; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.349.

the field. Although he would not have got a key position in the battle because of the presence of princes and many a seasoned and more experienced generals with the Emperor, still he was given the command of a division of the army, and some important position in the battle. Thus for example, during Aurangzeb's battle against Dara Shikoh at Deorai near Ajmer (March 1659), Muhammad Amin Khan, the then Mir Bakhshi was given the command of reserve of the right flank of the Emperor (tarah-i-dast-i rast).[1] After the above battle Aurangzeb did not have to fight similar battles. But his Mir Bakhshis, Ashraf Khan (February 1681 - September 1686) and Ruhullah Khan I (September 1686 - July 1692) took leading role in the siege of Golconda (1687) in which the Emperor was present.[2] Evidently the Mir Bakhshi or his junior colleagues also prepared the list of the dead and wounded in the war[3] for the consequential entries in their own records and for passing on the information to the Diwan-i Ala and the Mir Saman for striking down the names of the dead from the pay/jagir rolls and for the purpose of escheat respectively.

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1. Kazim, p.307.

2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.272, [illegible], 281, 299; [illegible]-i Alamgiri, ff.113a-125a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.319, 363.

3. This surmise is based on the function of the bakhshi of an army that had been sent against the Rana of Mewar (September-October 1681). After a skirmish with the enemy in which some Imperialists were killed and wounded, the said bakhshi prepared a list of wounded and killed and sent it to the court (Waqai-Ajmer, f.668).

Leading the Expeditions :

Sometimes the Mir Bakhshi himself was sent on expeditions. Perhaps, it would not be correct to say that leading the expeditions was the part of his duty as the Mir Bakhshi, because any Mansabdar could have been sent on an expedition. However, even if it was not the part of his function, among all the central officials the Mir Bakhshi had better claims to be assigned such duties. The Mir Bakhshis of Aurangzeb were, in fact, sent on many expeditions. It would be unnecessary to enumerate the expeditions that were undertaken by ten Mir Bakhshis of Aurangzeb. Some of them may, however, be mentioned to illustrate our point. Muhammad Amin Khan, the first Mir Bakhshi of Aurangzeb (June 1658 - December 1667) was sent against Jaswant Singh (January 1659).[1] Subsequently, he was also sent against the Yusufzai rebels of Afghanistan (May 1667).[2] In the Deccan, Ruhullah Khan I was sent on Raichur (1689)[3] and Sakhkhar (1691) expeditions;[4] Bahramand Khan (July 1692 - November 1702) took part in many campaigns in the Deccan and was sent to capture Parnala (1693)[5] and Nandgir (1701) forts.[6] And

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1. Kazim, p.288; Hatim Khan, f.63b; Rami, p.115.
2. Kazim, p.1046; Lutkhat, f.62b; Maasir, Vol. III, p.611.
3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.331; Dilkusha, f.98a.
4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.344; Maasir, Vol. II, p.313.
5. Dilkusha, f.136a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.413.
6. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.443.

the last of them Zulfiqar Khan (*Mir Bakhshi* from November 1702 till the death of the Emperor in March 1707), indeed, served more as a general than as the *Mir Bakhshi*. Throughout his five years tenure he was mostly busy in the sieges and battles at Burhanpur (1703)[1], Wagingara (1705),[2] Kondana (1706)[3] and other places.

Mir Bakhshi as the Protocol Officer :

Lastly, the *Mir Bakhshi* sometimes also served as the Protocol officer. Apart from presenting the candidates for *mansab* and promotions discussed above, the *Mir Bakhshi* or his colleagues received from the *mansabdars* the *nazar* or the *peshkash* which they offered to the King,[4] presented *khalat* (robe of honour) or other gifts on behalf of the Emperor to the higher *mansabdars* and made them to offer usual *taslim* to the Emperor according to the court etiquettes.[5] Similarly, he welcomed the princes and the *Wazir* whenever they came to the court.[6] The *Mir Bakhshi*

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.470; *Dilkusha*, f.146a.
2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.503; *Dilkusha*, f.153a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.537; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.96-97.
3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.511; *Dilkusha*, f.159b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.540.
4. *Kazim*, p.116; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.162; *Salatin-i Chaghta*, f.249a.
5. *Ruqaat*, p.43; *Salatin-i Chaghta*, f.249a.
6. *Ruqaat*, pp.30-31; *Raqaim*, f.7a; *Kazim*, p.1031; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.109, 241.

or his assistants sometimes also received the foreign envoys or dignitaries at the court, introduced them to the Emperor, helped them in offering the obeisance to the Emperor, received the presents brought by them for the King, and presented to them the gifts on behalf of the Emperor.[1]

Thus the *Mir Bakhshi* was the second most important central minister and performed many functions and duties of different nature. Some modern scholars have described him as the head of the military department[2] and have equated him with the *Ariz-i Mamalik* of the Sultanate period.[3] But the view does not seem correct. The control of the *Mir Bakhshi* over the armed forces was neither exclusive, direct, nor all-comprehensive. The artillery was in the charge of a separate central minister known as the *Mir Atish* as we shall see. The imperial horses and elephants, the two other important components of Mughal armed forces were also out of the jurisdiction of the *Mir Bakhshi* and were placed under the charge of the *Akhta-Begi* (Horse-Master) and the *Daroghah-i Filkhana* (the Superintendent of elephant-stable) respectively.[4] The state factories and stores (*karkhanas*) required by the army were also under

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1. *Kazim*, pp.607, 635, 1050, 1065; *Hatim Khan*, f.107a; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.71, 113; *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.32, 44.

2. J.N. Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, p.199.

3. I.H. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p.77. Cf. also Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, p.215.

4. *Kazim*, p.1100.

another central minister, the Mir Saman. The Mir Bakhshi was concerned with the army only in so far as he played an important role in the recruitment of the mansabdars and saw to it that they kept full and proper contingent. It would, therefore, not be correct to call the Mir Bakhshi as the head of the military department or to equate him with the Arizmi Mamalik. Nor could he be described as the Paymaster General[1] in the proper sense of the term. He had little to do with actual payments to either the mansabdars or to the troopers in general.

The Mir Bakhshi was a unique institution of the Mughals combining in himself the court and field, and civil and military duties. This is, perhaps, the reason that the contemporary authorities, chronicles and administrative manuals (Dasturul Amals), do not name the particular department of which the Mir Bakhshi was the head, as they do in the case of the Diwan-i Ala and other central ministers. They have instead mentioned various functions which the Mir Bakhshi and his colleagues used to perform.

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1. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., p.21.

The *Bakhshi-i Duwum* or The *Tan Bakhshi* :

In performing his various functions and duties, the *Mir Bakhshi* was assisted by the *Bakhshi-i Duwum* (the Second *Bakhshi*),[1] the *Bakhshi-i Suyum* (the Third *Bakhshi*), the *Bakhshi* of *Ahadis*, the *Bakhshi* of *Ahsham*, a few other *bakhshis* and by the *Darogha of Dagh-o Tashiha* etc.

The *Bakhshi-i Duwum* was, as is evident from his designation, the next senior official of the department after the *Mir Bakhshi*. He has also been called the *Tan Bakhshi* or the *Bakhshi-i Tan* (the *Bakhshi* of salaries),[2] perhaps, because of his role in finalising the procedure of the award of *mansab* and the subsequent grant of jagir or salary certificate. But the use of this designation is not so frequent, and he has been generally described as the *Bakhshi-i Duwum*. We, however, would call him the Second *Bakhshi* for the sake of convenience and familiarity.

Position and Status :

The Second *Bakhshi* held an important position among the central

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1. *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.20a; *Mahamat-al Afaq*, p.190; *Dastur-al Amal*, f.38a.

2. For instance, Aqil Khan, the Second *Bakhshi* (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.195; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.103a), has also been described as the *Bakhshi-i Tan* (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.176; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.822). Similarly, Mukhlis Khan has been mentioned as the Second *Bakhshi* in *Maasir-i Alamgiri* (p.349), in *Dilkusha* (f.135), in *Maasir* (Vol. III, p.642), and as the *Bakhshi-i Tan* by *Khafi Khan* (Vol. II, p.407).

ministers. Almost all those who were appointed as the Second *Bakhshi* had earlier held different subordinate posts including that of the Third *Bakhshi*; and had acquired experience and status. The lowest rank held by a Second *Bakhshi* was 2000 *zat*, while some of them held even the higher *mansab* of 2500, 3000 and 3500.[1] Their respective ranks indicate their standing among the *mansabdars* and their status among the central ministers. Although the Second *Bakhshi* did not head the department, his rank shows that he stood at par with the *Mir Saman* and the *Mir Atish*, if he did not enjoy precedence over them. The fact that time and again the Second *Bakhshis* were given the chance to officiate the *Wazir*, and in many cases were made the *Mir Bakhshis* - the second most important position in the administration - testifies to their position and status in the hierarchy of the central ministers.

During the long reign of about fifty years, ten persons served as the Second *Bakhshi*. Asad Khan held the post for the longest term of twelve years, from Aurangzeb's accession in June 1658 to May 1670, when he was made the *Naib Wazir* on the death of Jafar Khan.[2] Mukhlis Khan had

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1. Thus Mukhlis Khan held the rank of 2000/700; Asad Khan that of 2500/1500; Himmat Khan of 3000/?; Saif Khan 3000/1500; Ruhullah Khan II 3000/?; Aqil Khan and Sadruddin Muhammad Khan 3000/1000; Sarbaland Khan of 3500/2500; Ruhullah Khan I, 3500/500(?), and Bahramand Khan 3500/500. Cf. Table B.

2. *Kazim*, p.119; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.103; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.235; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.310-11.

also the distinction of serving on the post for over eight years (July 1692 - January 1701).[1] The others served for six, four, three or two years.[2] Two out of ten, Mukhlis Khan (January 1701), and Ruhullah Khan II (May 1704)[3] died while serving on the post; and one Mirza Sadruddin Muhammad Khan out-lived the Emperor.[4] Among the rest, only two,

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1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.349, 434; Dilkusha, f.135b. Mukhlis Khan was the son of Safshikan Khan II and the grandson of Qiwamuddin Khan, the brother of Khalifa Sultan, the Wazir of Shah Abbas I of Persia (1588-1629. For him and his family see Alam Ara-i Abbasi, pp.148, 928, 1013, 1091). Qiwamuddin Khan and his son came over to India in 1674 because of the changed attitude of the rulers of that country (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.130), and served on various posts (for them see Maasir, Vol. III, pp.109-15, and 746-47 respectively). Mukhlis Khan also served on many posts before becoming the Second Bakhshi. He was very close to the Emperor, had great influence over him, and was bold in presenting candidates for mansab and promotion (Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.394, 407, 456, 477; Maasir, Vol. III, pp.641-44).

2. See Table B.

3. For his career see Maasir, Vol. II, pp. 315-17.

4. Mirza Sadruddin Muhammad Khan was the son of Mirza Sultan Safavi, a scion of the Safavid rulers of Iran (for him see Maasir, Vol. III, pp.581-83), and the daughter's son of Islam Khan Mashhadi, the Mir Bakhshi and the Wazir of Shah Jahan (for him see Maasir, Vol. I, pp.162-67). The Mirza held many posts before becoming the Second Bakhshi. He gained further distinctions under Bahadur Shah I, and the title of Husamuddaula Mirza Shahnawaz Khan Safavi and died while fighting with Prince Azimushshan in [illegible] (Maasir, Vol. III, pp.692-94; Muhammadi, p.30).

Safi Khan[1] and Aqil Khan[2] were transferred as the governors; the remaining five got the promotion as the *Mir Bakhshis.*[3]

Functions and Powers :

The Second Bakhshi shared most of the functions of the *Mir Bakhshi.* The department of the *Mir Bakhshi* was concerned with many administrative matters that were to be performed almost daily, such as the *Chauki* and the *Taslim-i Chauki*, putting before the Emperor the

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1. Safi Khan was the second son of Islam Khan Mashhadi, and the younger brother of Ashraf Khan who subsequently became the *Mir Bakhshi* of Aurangzeb in February 1681 (for him see, *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.272-74). He too served on various subordinate posts under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb before he was made the Second *Bakhshi*, for which there seems no specific mention either in the *Maasir-i Alamgiri* or in *Maasir* (Vol. II, pp.740-42). But the fact becomes clear from subsequent references to him. From that post he was transferred to Multan as the *Naib* of Prince Akbar, the Governor in July 1678. Later he was made the governor of Agra, Aurangabad, and again of Agra. [illegible] There seems no mention of his death (*Kazim*, pp.349, 396, 1034; *Hatim Khan*, f.81a; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.167, 176, 180, 243, 246; *Dilkusha*, f.32a; *Maasir*, Vol. Vol. II, pp.740-42.

2. Aqil Khan Mir Askari of Khawaf (Persia) was a confident servant of Aurangzeb since his princehood, when he left in charge of Aurangabad on his departure to north for contesting the throne (*Kazim*, p.44). On Aurangzeb's accession, he came to Delhi, was entitled Aqil Khan, and assigned various duties. He twice resigned from service, but was re-employed by Aurangzeb and was appointed the Second *Bakhshi* in June 1679, but was transferred as the governor of Delhi in October, 1680 (*Kazim*, p.401; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.176, 195); *Ruqaat*, p.43; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.821-23.)

3. See Tables A and B.

candidates for mansab, promotion and posting, and the reports which constantly flowed from the various parts of the empire. The Mir Bakhshi alone could not have coped with all these matters, especially when he was also assigned outstation duties and went on expeditions. For the same reasons his functions could not have been altogether barred for his junior colleagues. His department and his colleagues, therefore, worked in such a way that the daily functions of the department might not suffer; while the Mir Bakhshi headed the department, and in that capacity enjoyed some exclusive privileges, almost all his functions were shared by the Second Bakhshi. Hence the Second Bakhshi was both an alter ego to and and assistant of the Mir Bakhshi; he performed almost all functions of the Mir Bakhshi at the time of exigencies besides checking and processing the papers of the department and maintaining their record.

Among the functions which the Second Bakhshi shared with the Mir Bakhshi the most important one was to put before the Emperor the communications and reports from the bakhshis/waqianigars of provinces and armies, commanders of expeditions and forts and other officials,[1] and the requests and representations of the mansabdars about their personal matters, like mansab, promotion and appointment etc.[2] When the Emperor

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1. Kazim, pp.1099, 1101; Akhbarat, 4th Ramazan and 13th Ziqad, 40th R.Y., 28th Muharram and the 13th Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.

2. Akhbarat, 29th Rabi II, 8th R.Y., 21st Rajab, 24th R.Y., 15th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y., 7th Safar, 40th R.Y., 11th Ziqad and 20th Muharram, 43rd R.Y., 23rd Rajab, 44th R.Y.

gave orders on these matters, and they were put in black and white (technically known as the *yaddasht-i ahkam* - the memorandum of the orders), the Second *Bakhshi* also endorsed them that such and such orders were issued.[1] Again when the *Yaddasht* of such orders was despatched to mansabdar/official concerned for follow up action, it was prepared with his *zimnlak*.[2] Often the Emperor asked the Second *Bakhshi* to write *hasb-ul hukms* to officials; and like the *Wazir* and the *Mir Bakhshi*, he also communicated a large number of *hasb-ul hukms* not only to the officials of his own department[3] but also to the governors,[4] *faujdars*[5] and to the leaders of military expeditions.[6]

The Second *Bakhshi* also presented before the Emperor the candidates for mansab and promotion.[7] The *dastak* of *dagh-o tashiha* and

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1. *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.19, 142. Cf. *Akhbarat*, 2nd Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; A.R. 850 (30th Rabi I, 31st R.Y., S.A.H.)

2. *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.92-93, 120-21, 169.

3. *Akhbarat*, 6th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 19th Ziqad, 40th R.Y.

4. *Akhbarat*, 9th Rabi II, 39th R.Y.; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.336.

5. *Akhbarat*, 7th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 7th Rajab, 39th R.Y.

6. *Ibid.*, 11th Ramzan, 37th R.Y.; *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), p.162.

7. *Inshai-i Alamgiri*, f.19a; Add.6598, f.139a; *Akhbarat*, 12th and 19th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 20th Shawwal and 16th Zilhijja, 32nd R.Y.; *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.25, 165-66; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.410-13; *Maasir*, Vol. III, p.642. It is interesting to mention that the Second *Bakhshi* also performed the unpleasant duty of putting before the Emperor the particulars of a mansabdar with whom the Emperor was angry and wanted to reduce his rank. *Akhbarat*, 22nd Ziqad and 4th Rabi I, 43rd R.Y.

the *yaddasht* of *mansab* or promotion of such candidates was also prepared with the *risalah* (attestation) of the Second *Bakhshi*.[1] It has been observed that, to maintain the distinction between the *Mir Bakhshi* and the Second *Bakhshi*, the former presented the cases of only the princes and the nobles of high rank and positions; while the latter dealt with only the inferior *mansabdars* and officials.[2] But the distinction does not seem to have been scrupulously maintained; it was rather impracticable to do so because of frequent absence from the court of either of the two *Bakhshis*, and especially that of the *Mir Bakhshis*. There are, in fact, instances of the *Mir Bakhshi* presenting the candidates for initial *mansabs*,[3] or putting the particulars of smaller *mansabdars* for promotion,[4] and the Second *Bakhshi* that of the princes or the high ranking nobles for the same purpose.[5] What seems to have been the correct procedure is that while either of the two *Bakhshis* could have presented to the Emperor the

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.19b; Add. 6598, f.139a; *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.13, 53-54, 182-84.

2. Cf. Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, p.228; W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p.39; I.H. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p.78. Their observation is based apparently on *Zawabit-i Alamgiri* (ff.17b, 19a).

3. *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.411-12.

4. Cf. *Akhbarat*, 16th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 12th Shawwal, 44th R.Y. The *Mir Bakhshi* presented the particulars of as smaller a *Mansabdar* as that of 500/100 - 700/300 (*Akhbarat*, 9th Rajab, 24th R.Y.).

5. *Akhbarat*, 22nd Ziqad, 43rd R.Y.; *Dilkusha*, f.125a.

candidates or mansabdars of any rank or status or his particulars for service/mansab or promotion, the yaddasht of mansab or promotion of princes and high ranking nobles was prepared by/with only the risalah (attestation) of the Mir Bakhshi. This becomes clear from the documentary evidence of a specific case. When Shahuji was seized (29th October 1689) and brought to Court,[1] Ruhullah Khan I, the Mir Bakhshi was away on Raichur expedition since July 1689.[2] On 29th Safar, 1101/3rd December 1689 Shahuji was granted the mansab of 7000/7000.[3] The yaddasht of the mansab was prepared four days later with the risalah of Ruhullah Khan,[4] although he had not yet returned from Raichur,[5] and Shahuji would have been introduced to the Emperor by the Second Bakhshi Bahramand Khan.

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1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.331; Dilkusha, f.97b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.386-89.

2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.331; Dilkusha, f.98a.

3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.332; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.389; Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), p.215. The date of '2nd Safar, 33rd R.Y.' given in the work is evidently wrong and a misreading of 20th Safar in the original document, because it was on this date that Shahuji was brought to court, introduced to the Emperor and was granted the mansab by him (Cf. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.331).

4. For the yaddasht see Document A.R. 150 (S.A.M.); Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), p.216. The Hijri date of the document seems to have been converted in the Selected Documents according to old rules.

5. The Raichur fort was captured by Ruhullah Khan on 26th Safar, 1101/ 9th December, 1689 (Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.332-33; Dilkusha, f.98b); and the Khan would have returned to the Court only thereafter.

However, apart from presenting the candidates or their particulars for mansab and promotion, the Second *Bakhshi* completed two important pre-requisites before the person concerned was finally assigned the *mansab* and subsequently the *jagir* or the salary certificate (in case of *naqdi mansabdar*) by the *Diwani*.[1] Firstly, he supervised the preparation of the descriptive roll (*chihra*) of the *mansabdar* concerned. Secondly he acquired the surety (*tamassuk-i zamini*) from the *mansabdar* unless exempted by the Emperor himself in rare cases.[2] The second *Bakhshi* then endorsed them and kept the two documents in his custody and the candidate then got the *mansab*.[3] Thus, even in the case of those persons whom he did not present for *mansab* or promotion, the Second *Bakhshi* played important role in completing the procedure of the grant of *mansab* which entitled the *mansabdar* for *jagir* or salary certificate. And it was perhaps because of this vital role in the final grant of *mansab* and subsequently of *jagir* or salary-certificate that the Second *Bakhshi* was also called the *Bakhshi-i Tan* or the *Tan Bakhshi* (the *Bakhshi* for allowances).

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.20a; Add. 6598. f.139b.

2. Thus for instance the Emperor exempted Shahuji who had been granted the *mansab* of 7000/7000 (December, 1689) from producing a surety (*Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.215-16).

3. Add. 6598, f.139a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.19a; Cf. *Akhbarat*, 24th Muharram, 39th R.Y.; *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), p.126.

The Second *Bakhshi* also advised the Emperor on appointments and postings. It is difficult to say as to what role the Second *Bakhshi* used to play in the appointment of the subordinate staff in his own department. Apparently he had little say in the matter except checking and processing the letters of their appointment and putting his seal and signature over them.[1] There are, however, instances of Emperor asking him to recommend the names for the posts of *bakhshi* of a prince,[2] the *diwani* of a province[3] and the *faujdari*, qiladari and *thanadari* of a *pargana*h.[4] The Second *Bakhshi* had, however, much greater role in the posting (*ta'ayyun*) of the *Mansabdars*. A large number of them were presented and posted through him, individually and collectively,[5] to serve in different parts of the empire. He also issued with his own *risalah* the *dastak-i ta'ayyunati* (letter of posting) of *Mansabdars* posted through him.[6] However, this *dastak*, as also the *yaddasht* of *mansab* and promotion issued with the *risalah* of the Second *Bakhshi*, were subsequently endorsed by the *Mir Bakhshi* and were finally issued with his seal and signature.[7]

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.19b; Add. 6598, f.139a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), pp.174-75, 177.
2. *Akhbarat*, 21st Rajab, 24th R.Y.
3. *Ibid.*, 20th Shawwal, 32nd R.Y., 13th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.
4. *Ibid.*, 10th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 29th Muharram, 39th R.Y., 4th Ramzan, 40th R.Y.
5. In collective postings the names and contingents of the *Mansabdars* were included in the '*Tumar-i fauj*' (the list of the army) that was generally prepared by the Second *Bakhshi*. For it see Infra p. 265.
6. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.19b; Add.6598, f.139a. For the documents signed by the two *Bakhshis* see *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.128, 145-46;
7. A.R. 965 (3rd Shaban, 29th R.Y., S.A.M.).

The Second Bakhshi was also sent on expeditions[1] and performed some other military duties like the dividing the army into divisions, assigning it the positions before and at the eve of the battles, and organising it in the battle arrary.[2] But his more important function with which the Mir Bakhshi does not seem to have any concern, was to prepare the tumar-i fauj, i.e. the list of the mansabdars and their contingent that were to be sent on some military expeditions.[3] The commander of such an expedition was, of course, chosen and nominated by the Emperor himself.[4] But it is not clear whether the smaller mansabdars for such an expedition were selected by the Emperor, the commander of the expedition or by the Second Bakhshi. It is true that the entire matter would not have been left by the Emperor either to the leader of the expedition or to the Second Bakhshi. But it was practically impossible

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1. Thus for example Ruhullah Khan I, while serving as the Second Bakhshi was sent to attack Bijapur (December, 1681, Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.216), to Konkan (1683, Ibid., 227), to Bijapur (1684, Ibid., 242); and Bahramand Khan to Jinji (May 1691, Ibid., p.340; Dilkusha, f.102b).

2. Kazim, p.139; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.200; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.332, 408. While describing the above functions, these sources have used the plural of the bakhshi, i.e. the 'bakhshian', which, obviously includes the Second Bakhshi.

3. Akhbarat, 9th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 8th Ziqad, and 3rd and 10th Safar, 39th R.Y., 11th Safar, 40th R.Y. For such a list of an army to be sent to Poona in 1689, prepared with the risalah of Bahramand Khan, the then Second Bakhshi, see Selected Documents (Aurangzeb, pp.200-211.

4. Cf. sources cited in note 3 above.

for the Emperor to nominate all individuals for a particular expedition. We do find the Emperor ordering the Second Bakhshi to prepare a tumar-i fauj without naming the Mansabdars to be included in it.[1] While preparing the tumar, therefore, the Second Bakhshi would have had some discretion, or at least some role, in finalising the list of the participant in the expedition. And, hence, his favour would have been much sought after on such occasions by both willing and reluctant Mansabdars.

The Second Bakhshi also sometimes received the dignitaries at the Court, and gave on behalf of the Emperor, the robes of honour and other gifts to them[2] and to the imperial Mansabdars on different occasions.[3]

Apart from the above functions, the Second Bakhshi used to check and supervise the processing of the papers originated from or received in the department, and maintained a record of these papers. Notable among such processing was one related to the grant of Mansab and promotion

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1. Thus the Emperor asked Ruhullah Khan to prepare a tumar of 2000 cavalry without mentioning the Mansabdars to be included (Akhbarat, 5th Rajab, 24th R.Y.). Similarly, Mukhlis Khan was once asked to prepare two tumars of 6000 and 3000 sawars to be sent respectively with Prince Muizuddin to Thatta and Prince Azam to Kabul, without naming the Mansabdars to be included (Akhbarat, 11th Safar, 40th R.Y.).

2. Kazim, pp.116, 607, 635-36, 1050, 1065-66; Hatim Khan, f.107a; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.113.

3. Kazim p.116; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.162; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.249a.

mentioned above. Similarly, the Second *Bakhshi* received other papers from the office of the *Mir Bakhshi* like the *dastak* of *dagh-o tashiha*, the *daghnama* (the branding and verification report), the *nisha-i Chauki* etc. He checked them, signed and sealed over them before they were issued, and kept a copy of each of them in his own office (*daftar*).[1] He also maintained a complete list of the mansabdars at court or on outstation assignments with the detail of their *mansab*, *jagir* etc.[2] for record and for presenting before the Emperor whenever asked. The Emperor often asked the Second *Bakhshi* to apprise him of the number of *mansabdars* and the soldiers in a particular province.[3] Sometimes the Second *Bakhshi* himself informed him about the matter if he felt the strength is below the requirements of the province or the army.[4] Such a list would have also been of special interest for him as he could have prepared the *tumar-i fauj* only on the basis of that list.

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.19a-20a; Add. 6598, f.139a. For a *dastak-i dagh-o tashiha* with the signatures of the two *Bakhshis* (Ashraf Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi*, and Ruhullah Khan I, the Second *Bakhshi*), see *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.154-56.

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.18b-20a; Add. 6598, f.139a.

3. The Emperor once asked Mukhlis Khan to put before him the actual strength of the army in the provinces of Ahmadabad, Ajmer, Agra, Delhi, Lahore and Allahabad (*Akhbarat*, 11th Rajab, 39th R.Y.).

4. The same *Bakhshi* once himself reported to the Emperor that the province of Haiderabad did not have the proper strength of the army (*Akhbarat*, 8th Zilhijja, 43rd R.Y.).

It is now clear from the above discussion that the Second _Bakhshi_ exercised discretionary powers and also looked after the procedural matters of the department. He used to be a _Mansabdar_ of standing, higher rank, and of the confidence of the Emperor and enjoyed considerable influence over him. The political developments in the later years of Aurangzeb's reign, and the Deccan wars with their military implications, only contributed to enhance the power and influence of the _Bakhshis_ in general, and that of the Second _Bakhshi_ in particular. The number of the _Mansabdars_ was constantly on the increase because of the new entrants. The Emperor himself was growing older and weaker, and at the same time, involved deeper into the warfares. Under the circumstance, he ought to have depended upon heavily on the _Bakhshis_ and allowed them greater discretion in the departmental matters. The _Mir Bakhshi_, on the other hand, was more often in the field than at the court or in his _daftar_. The result was that the Emperor relied increasingly on the Second _Bakhshi_ for important state matters like the appointments, postings, inclusion of _mansabdars_ in a particular expedition, and on war strategy etc., and the Second _Bakhshi_ shouldered the heavier responsibilities of the department and enjoyed greater power and influence.

The Third Bakhshi, Position, Functions and Duties :

Apart from the _Mir Bakhshi_ and the Second _Bakhshi_, there used

to be another bakhshi in the department, known as the Bakhshi-i Suyyum[1] (Third Bakhshi) or the Bakhshi-i Wala Shahiyan.[2] He was mainly responsible for the recruitment, promotion and the dagh etc. of the yaumiyah-daran i.e. the daily wage-earners.

Nature of the Post :

Some scholars have written, without citing their source, that the post of the Third Bakhshi was created by Shah Jahan.[3] There, however, seems no mention of the fact in Shah Jahani sources; nor could we find a reference in them to the appointment of a Third Bakhshi by that Emperor. The observation of above scholars is apparently based on some administrative manuals (Dastur-al Amals) where the Third Bakhshi is mentioned along with the Mir Bakhshi and the Second Bakhshi.[4] Even here we do not find the name of any one who held the post under Shah Jahan. It, therefore, appears that the post or the incumbents did not exist under Shah Jahan. It was Aurangzeb who introduced it; and even under him the post functioned intermittently, for a total of about half of his reign.

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1. Kazim, p.396; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.105, 196, 216; Dilkusha, f.143a; Malumat-al Afaq, p.190.
2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.127; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.308b; Maasir, Vol. II, p.741.
3. Ibn Hasan, op. cit., pp.228-30; Qureshi, I.H., op. cit., p.78.
4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.17b-20b, 103a-103b; Add.6598, ff.138b-139b; Cf. also Arkan-i Timuriyah, ff.10b-12b, 144a-155a.

Aurangzeb created the post of the Third Bakhshi immediately after his accession (1658), perhaps, to accommodate some of his princehood's supporters,[1] as also to look after many of the mercenary troopers who would have been kept in service after his assumption of kingship for obvious political and military reasons, and for whom a separate section daftar-i Wala Shahiyan was maintained.[2] After the transfer of the then Third Bakhshi (Ruhullah Khan I) in April 1673, however, no appointment was made on the post; the peshdastan (literally the assistants, i.e. the clerks etc.) of the section were removed; the daftar was turned into a sub-section (paimal) of Second Bakhshi's office, and he was asked to look after it.[3] The move seems an economy measure as it came a little after Diwan-i Khalisa's report that the expenses have exceeded the Khalisa income by Rs.14 lakhs annually, and Emperor's orders for economy (April, 1670).[4] It is also probable that along with the post and its establishment, many of these wage-earners too might have been retrenched; some others absorbed as regular mansabdars; and the remaining ones would not have been

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1. The first incumbent of the office under Aurangzeb, Mukhlis Khan, Qazi Nizama was, in fact, a close and confident servant of Prince Aurangzeb who accompanied the Prince when he set out from Aurangabad for contesting the throne (Kazim, pp.48, 53, 294, 396. For him see Maasir, Vol. III, pp.566-68).

2. Kazim, p.398; Hatim Khan, f.81a; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.127; Maasir, Vol. II, p.741.

3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.127; Ahkam-i Timuriyah, f.154a.

4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.100.

considered a burden on the Second Bakhshi to deal with. In any case, since April 1673 the post of the Third Bakhshi remained in abeyance for almost three decades, till 1701. In between, it was revived for a brief period of three years since December 1680,[1] perhaps, because of some political and administrative problems that were as follows.

Sarbaland Khan, the Mir Bakhshi, died in January, 1680. Aqil Khan, the Second Bakhshi, was perhaps not considered suitable enough to be given a chance to officiate; Ruhullah Khan I, the Mir Atish was asked to perform the job.[2] Thus he had to look after two departments. In November 1680 he replaced Aqil Khan as the Second Bakhshi; about the same time Himmat Khan was appointed the Mir Bakhshi. But, he fell ill shortly afterwards, and could not properly attend to his work. He died on 25th January 1681, and was succeeded by Ashraf Khan on 5th February, 1681.[3] There were thus successive changes in Mir Bakhshi's department since the death of Sarbaland Khan in January, 1680. About the same time

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1. The post was revived with the appointment of Abdur Rahim Khan on 28th December, 1680. Cf. Table C. Abdur Rahim Khan was the 5th son of famous Islam Khan Mashhadi, once the Mir Bakhshi and Wazir of Shah Jahan, and the brother of Ashraf Khan the Mir Bakhshi and Safi Khan the Second Bakhshi of Aurangzeb. For his life and career see Maasir, Vol. II, pp.812-13.

2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.187.

3. Ibid., p.206; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.252a; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.272-74.

the imperialists were grossly busy in the Deccan and a little earlier (1678) about twenty thousand troopers had been recruited on daily wages.[1] The Emperor himself was engaged against the Rajput rebels;[2] and the Second Bakhshi (Ruhullah Khan I) had to be repeatedly sent against them.[3] It, therefore, appears that Aurangzeb revived the post of the Third Bakhshi in December 1680 to relieve the burden from the two Bakhshis and to look after the newly recruited twenty thousand mercenary. When the position stabilised, he allowed the post to lapse again in December, 1683, when the incumbent, Kamgar Khan was transferred as the Akhta-Begi.[4]

However, the post was revived once again, under almost similar compulsions, in 1701 with the appointment of Sadruddin Muhammad Khan as the Third Bakhshi.[5] This was the time when Aurangzeb had launched his final campaign for the capture of scattered forts in the Deccan, and had written to the governors in mid 1700 to enlist fresh soldiers on daily wages and send them to the court.[6] A little later, Mukhlis Khan, the

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1. Dilkusha, ff.79b-80a.

2. For detail see Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.177-196; Waqai Ajmer; Dilkusha, f.82b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.261.

3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.195; Maasir, Vol. II, p.310.

4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.240; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.103b; Add. 6598, f.177b; Arkan-i Timuriyah, ff.12b, 155a.

5. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.472; Dilkusha, f.143b; Maasir, Vol. III, p.692.

6. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.429; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.475, 478-81.

Second Bakhshi died in January 1701, and was succeeded by Ruhullah Khan II, who had also been serving as the Mir Saman. The Mir Bakhshi, Bahramand Khan, on the other hand, was repeatedly sent on expeditions.[1] Thus while the burden on the department had increased, the Mir Bakhshi and the Second Bakhshi had other duties to perform. In these circumstances the work in Mir Bakhshi's department was bound to suffer. This is clear from the following comments of a contemporary writer on the appointment of Sadruddin Muhammad Khan. He writes, "Though three Bakhshis have been appointed at Court, the business of no man is carried on. When the army commanders wrote to the officials (mutasaddian) at Court for the management of their expeditions' requirements, it produces no effect".[2] It was, therefore, to share the burden and improve the functioning of the department that the post of the Third Bakhshi was revived a second time in 1701. Thus the post of the Third Bakhshi was not a regular and permanent one even under Aurangzeb. It was filled up only in pressing circumstances, and in all functioned for about half of his reign.

Position and Rank :

Notwithstanding his position in the hierarchy of his department itself, the Third Bakhshi was an official of considerable rank and status.

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1. For references, see Supra p. 251.
2. Dilkusha, ff.143b-144a.

Among the eight individuals who held the post for a total period of about 26 years only two held the rank of 1500 *zat* at the time of their appointment; others had the *mansab* of 2000 and 2500 *zat*.[1] The last of them Mirza Safavi Khan, a fresh migrant from Iran (1704), had even a higher rank of 3000 *zat*.[2] Thus while the distinction of rank between the Second and the Third *Bakhshi* was generally maintained, the latter too used to be an official of standing and status. In some cases he held a rank higher than the *Mir Saman* and the *Mir Atish*,[3] though his functions and duties do not appear as heavy as that of either the *Mir Saman* and/or *Mir Atish* as we shall see. Incidentally, this post too remained a monopoly of the Persians. Among eight incumbents, only Himmat Khan was a Turani who served on the post for about ten months only; for the rest of 26 years, it was occupied by seven Persians.

Functions and Duties :

The Third *Bakhshi* was mainly responsible for the recruitment,

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1. See Table C for detail.
2. Mirza Safavi Khan, Ali Naqi (and not Ali Taqi as mentioned in the English translation of *Dilkusha*, J.N. Sarkar Commemoration Volume, p.243), was the daughter's son of Shah Abbas of Persia, came over to the Mughal court sometimes in 1703, was entitled Mirza Safi Khan, given the rank of 3000/300, and subsequently made the Third *Bakhshi* in October 1704 (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.482, 497; *Dilkusha*, f.148a; *Salatin-i Chaghtia*, f.299a; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.653-54; *Muhammadi*,
3. Cf. Tables A appended to Chapters IV and V.

promotion and the posting of the *yaumiyah-daran* (i.e. the daily wage-earners) among the soldiers who were in direct imperial service.

A large number of soldiers were employed on daily wages on particular occasions to increase the strength of the imperial army if so required by military considerations. Aurangzeb enlisted many such soldiers before he left the Deccan in 1658 for wresting the throne from his father,[1] and it were mainly these troopers for looking after whom the post of the Third *Bakhshi* had been created after his accession. In 1678, as referred to above, about twenty thousand soldiers were recruited in the Deccan on daily wages of six annas per day, and many of them were subsequently recommended to the Emperor for *mansab* and other favours.[2] In enlisting such a large number of soldiers in the Deccan, the purpose was both to strengthen the imperial forces and to wean away the soldiers of the enemy. Similarly, when many *mansabdars* and their contingents were killed in innumerable Deccan wars, Aurangzeb sent orders to the governors in 1700, asking each of them to enlist one thousand soldiers, pay them six months' advance salary from local treasury, and send them to the Court, for despatch on expeditions.[3] Thus many soldiers were recruited on daily wages on particular occasions.

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1. *Kazim*, p.42.

2. *Dilkusha*, ff.79b-80a.

3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.429; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.475, 478-81.

If the recruitment of such troopers happened to be at the Court, the Third *Bakhshi* presented the candidates before the Emperor, secured the *tamassuk-i zamini* (surety) from them, and issued the *dastak-i dagh* for the completion of the *dagh* formalities before the final employment. The *tasdiq-i haziri* of such candidates or/and the *yaddasht* of *mansab* or promotion, if and when granted, was also prepared with the *risalah* of the Third *Bakhshi*, though it also passed to, and received the seal of the Second *Bakhshi* and the *Mir Bakhshi*.[1] The Third *Bakhshi* also issued the *dastak-i Chauki* if the recruit was posted on the *Chauki*.[2]

The recruitment of the same category of troopers in the provinces would have been apparently done by the local *bakhshis*; and the Third Bakhshi would have represented their papers before the Emperor for final approval. There is, however, at least one case on record where a Third *Bakhshi*, Safi Khan (1659 - 1669), was sent to the Deccan (April, 1667) to scrutinise the papers of such troopers there and set right their affairs. Safi Khan did not only look into the affairs of the daily wagers, but also of the higher *mansabdars*, and exercised considerable discretion in reducing their *mansab* or dismissing them from service with the approval of Prince Muazzam, the governor of the province.[3] This instance clearly

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.20b; Add. 6598, f.139b.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Kazim*, p.1037; *Dilkusha*, ff.32a, 35b; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.741.

indicates that apart from the troopers on daily wages, the imperial *Mansabdars* were not altogether outside the jurisdiction of the Third *Bakhshi*. And it is quite probable that at the Court too he would have dealt with them whenever such an exigency arose because of the absence or preoccupation of either of his two senior colleagues. In any case, he assisted them in other matters. For example, he also prepared and maintained a list of the army in attendance at the Court or posted in the provinces.[1] Similarly many imperial orders (*hasb-ul hukm*) were issued through him; and after his endorsement, these orders were passed over to the Second *Bakhshi* and the *Mir Bakhshi*,[2] evidently for counter-sign, and despatch to the officials concerned.

The Bakhshis for the Ahadis:

Apart from the three *Bakhshis* mentioned above, two other *bakhshis* were maintained exclusively for the recruitment, maintenance and the posting etc. of the *ahadis*.

The *ahadis* were a special kind of troopers who were under the direct command of the Emperor and were employed for important jobs like fighting, guarding the person or the residence of the Emperor, carrying

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1. Add. 6598, f.139b; *Inshai Alamgiri*, f.20b.
2. *Ibid.*; *Selected Waqai*, p.68.

urgent imperial orders and escorting the *mansabdars*/officials from one place to another on Emperor's orders.[1] Introduced by Akbar, the *ahadis* were maintained by his successors. However, as against 'one *Amin*, one *bakhshi* and one great *Amir*', appointed by Akbar for the look after of the ahadis,[2] only two *bakhshis* are found to have been maintained by Aurangzeb for them. One was known as the *Mir Bakhshi* of *Ahadis*, or simply the *Bakhshi* of *ahadis*, and the other as the *Tan- Bakhshi* of *Ahadis*. They served under the over all supervision of the *Mir Bakhshi*.[3]

Mir Bakhshi of Ahadis :

Our sources do not help us in preparing a complete list of all those who served as the *Mir Bakhshi* of *Ahadis* under Aurangzeb.[4] We are not sure whether it is an omission on the part of our sources, or this post too like that of the Third *Bakhshi*, kept vacant for certain periods. In any case, seventeen persons are known to have served on the post

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1. For ahadis see *Ain*, Vol. II, p.145; W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, pp.43-44.
2. *Ain*, Vol. II, p.145.
3. *Kazim*, pp.237, 336, 487; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.172, 216, 221; *Malumat-ul Afaq*, p.190; *Akhbarat*, 7th Safar, 33rd R.Y., 3rd Ziqad and 24th Safar, 39th R.Y., 3rd Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.27b-28a; Add. 6598, ff.142b-143a.
4. See Table D.

during the reign of Aurangzeb. It means that transfers from this post were more frequent than from the other posts of the same department. The shorter terms and the smaller ranks of the most of the incumbents, ranging from 700 to 1500 zat,[1] indicate that the post was generally assigned to the beginners; and whatever the importance of the ahadis themselves, their Bakhshi was a lowly placed official. This explains why our sources contain little about him. Our information is even more scarce about the Tan Bakhshi of Ahadis. The discussion on the functions and duties of the two officials, therefore, is mainly based on a few administrative manuals.

The Mir Bakhshi of Ahadis introduced the candidates to the Emperor for service. After their recruitment, he also put their requests before the Emperor for horse or any other requirement or problem.[2] Subsequently, he also presented them before the Emperor for his periodical review.[3] His another function was to supervise the posting and despatch of ahadis and their recall to the Court. The ahadis were sent on different jobs whenever so ordered by the Emperor or required by the Diwan-i Ala, the Mir Saman or other central ministers. These ministers issued a dastak

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1. Cf. Table D.
2. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.27b; Add. 6598, f.142b.
3. Kazim, p.1100; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.28a; Add. 6598, f.142b.

or *parwana* for the purpose; and the *Bakhshi*, on the basis of that document, entrusted the job to a particular *ahadi* and sent him on to the mission.[1] As a large number of such orders were sent through the *ahadis* to all corners of the empire, and they were also employed on other jobs, the daily despatch and recall of the *ahadis* would have kept the *Bakhshi* fully busy in the job. Hence a separate *bakhshi*, known as the *Tan Bakhshi* of *Ahadis* was appointed for assisting the *Mir Bakhshi* of *Ahadis* in his duties,[2] and for looking after the other affairs of the *ahadis*.

Tan Bakhshi of Ahadis :

The *Tan Bakhshi* of *Ahadis* was mainly responsible for the payment of salary and allowances to the *ahadis* for which they became entitled only after the completion of *chihra* (descriptive roll) and *dagh* (branding of horse) formalities. The horse was an important prerequisite for an *ahadi*; and initially he brought his own horse for the *dagh*. Only in exceptional cases, the state provided him a horse or a subsidy to procure one.[3] Subsequently, however, if the horse was lost while on official work, the *Tan Bakhshi* (of *ahadis*) provided him with one, after Emperor's approval

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1. *Akhbarat*, 24th Safar, 39th R.Y., 12th Rajab, 43rd R.Y.; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.28a; Add. 6598, f.142b.

2. Cf. *Akhbarat*, 12th Rajab, 43rd R.Y.

3. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.28b; Add. 6598, f.142b.

and on producing the branded hide and the tail of the dead horse and the death certificate (maqtainamah) from the official concerned (maqtainamah-navis).[1] The Tan Bakhshi also provided assistance (musaidat) to the ahadis for expenses on the marriage of a son or a daughter at the rate of four and six months' salary respectively.[2] A separate sub-treasury known as the khazana-i ahadian (the treasury for the ahadis) under a darogha was maintained for the distribution of salary and other assistance to the ahadis.[3] Needless to say that the Tan Bakhshi maintained a record of the attendance of the ahadis and the relevant rules for the proper disbursement of, and deduction from, their salaries.[4]

The Other Bakhshis:

Besides the two Bakhshis maintained for the ahadis, there were separate bakhshis for the household servants (shagirdpesha) and for the archers (tir-andazan), known as the Bakhshi-i Shagirdpesha[5] and the

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1. Manucci, Vol. II, p.383; Add. 6598, f.143a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.29b-30a.

2. Ibid., ff.29b-30a; Add. 6598, ff.143a-143b.

3. Akhbarat, 3rd Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; Add. 6598, f.136b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.14b.

4. Ibid., ff.29a-31a; Add. 6598, ff.143a-143b.

5. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.158; Dastur-ul Amal, f.164a.

Bakhshi-i Tir-andazan[1] respectively. We know little about their exact position among the officials and specific functions. Apparently, they held very low ranks and performed the same functions in respect of their respective charges which the *Bakhshis* of *Ahadis* performed for the *Ahadis*. But unlike the *Bakhshi* of *Ahadis* these two *bakhshis* evidently served under two different central ministers, the *Bakhshi-i Shagirdpesha* under the *Mir Saman*, and the *Bakhshi-i Tir-andazan* under the *Mir Atish* as we shall see.

Thus apart from the *Mir Bakhshi*, there were six other *bakhshis* at the centre during the reign of Aurangzeb. While two among them were attached to other central ministers, the rest four served under the *Mir Bakhshi*. Besides them, there was at least one *peshdast* (the assistant) attached to each of the three senior *bakhshis* viz. the *Mir Bakhshi*, the Second *Bakhshi* and the Third *Bakhshi*.[2] The peshdasts were not the colleagues of the three *bakhshis* as is evident from their designation itself. But they were not the simple clerks either, as a *peshdast* of Mukhlis Khan, the Second *Bakhshi*, held the rank of 200/60.[3] The clerks were known as the *munshi* (the writer).[4] It seems that the *peshdasts* stood

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.247.

2. *Ibid.*, pp.192, 196, 205, 283; *Akhbarat*, 8th Rajab, 39th R.Y.; *Dilkusha*, f.140b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.411.

3. *Akhbarat*, 14th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.

4. *Maasir-i Alamgiri* (205) refers to Ruhullah Khan I, the Second Bakhshi, having the *munshi* besides the *peshdast*.

between the bakhshis and the clerks and held the charge of their respective *daftars* (office). Apparently they helped their *bakhshis* in disposing of papers, and maintained the files and records in their respective *daftars*.

Dagh-o Tashiha Staff :

Lastly, there was the staff of the *Dagh-o Tashiha* (the branding and verification), which run a vital wing of *Mir Bakhshi*'s department, and performed one of the most important function in Mughal military set up. It was the duty of the *Dagh* officials to ensure through the *tashiha* (the verification) of the troopers and the *dagh* (branding) of the horses that the *mansabdars* had been maintaining their contingents in stipulated number and in proper condition.[1] They performed their functions under the over all supervision of the *Mir Bakhshi* and sent him regularly the diary of their office (*siyaha-i dagh*), the verification and branding certificate (*daghnama* and/or *tashiha-namah*), and the certificates of the death of a trooper (*fauti-namah*) and the loss of a horse (*saqat-i-namah*).[2]

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1. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, ff.45b-47a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), pp. 177-78.

2. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.47a; *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.74a; *Dastur-al Amal*, f.179a; *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.40b.

The process of the *dagh-o tashiha* started immediately after the award of Mansab. When a Mansab was finally approved by the Emperor after the second reading (*arz-i mukarrar*), the *Mir Bakhshi* or his colleagues issued a *dastak* to the *Dagh* officials, or to the provincial *bakhshi* if the *mansabdar* happened to be in a province, asking them to verify and brand the troopers and the horses of the *mansabdar*.[1] The candidate then had to produce before the *Dagh* officials the stipulated number of horses, troopers and the equipments. If the officials found full compliment with the *mansabdar*, they issued him a certificate (*dastak*) with their seal. It was only after the completion of this formality that the claims of the *mansabdar* for his salary and allowances were established.[2] The same procedure was adopted in case of promotion in the rank (*izafa*) of a *mansabdar*.[3]

Besides this initial *dagh-o tashiha*, the *mansabdars* had also to undergo periodical verifications to ensure that they were regularly maintaining the full contingent. Under Akbar the *naqdi mansabdars* had to

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1. For such a *dastak* see *Dastak* of Ruhullah Khan (the Second *Bakhshi*) in the name of Kamyab Khan (the *Bakhshi* of the Deccan), dated the 30th Rabi II, 27th R.Y. (S.A.H.).

2. *Hadayat-ul Qawaid*, ff.45b-47a.

3. Thus for instance, the *Mir Bakhshi* asked the *Bakhshi* of Ajmer through a *dastak* to verify the increased contingent ([illegible]) of Abu Talib, a *mansabdar* posted in Jodhpur; and the *Bakhshi* concerned sent his officials of the *Dagh* to verify the matter (June, 1679, *Waqai Ajmer*, p.247).

produce their troopers for dagh every one and a half year, and the jagir-holders every three years.[1] The difference between the 'dagh period' of the two types of the mansabdars which was constantly maintained by the successors of Akbar also, was, perhaps, because of the difference in their mode of payment and its procedural implications in case of deductions from defaulting mansabdars.

However, it seems that the long spacing of eighteen months and three years between the two dagh reviews encouraged malpractices among the mansabdars as the period was subsequently reduced, most probably by Shah Jahan, to six months and one year for the two categories of the mansabdars respectively.[2] But the short space coupled with gradual increase in the number of the mansabdars under Shah Jahan and in the early years of Aurangzeb's reign, made it difficult for the Dagh officials to cope with the increased burden. The mansabdars, on the other hand, would have faced inconvenience on being detained for long to complete the

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1. Ain, Vol. II, p.149. Blochmann has given 'every year' (Vol. II, p.266). But the Persian text clearly has 'har sih sal'. The fact that the naqdi mansabdars were to produce their troopers every eighteen months, supports the reading of 'every three years' for jagir-holders, because the dagh period of the jagir-holders was always the double of the naqdi mansabdars. Abdul Aziz (The Mansabdari System, p.190) has accepted three years. However, his criticism of Irvine (Ibid., note 1) for accepting 'every year' is irrelevant as Irvine has described the rules (The Army of the Indian Moghul, p.247) as they existed under the successors of Akbar and not under Akbar himself.

2. Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.85a. Cf. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.39b; Akhbarat,

verification formalities. Aurangzeb, therefore, took some measures to improve the matters.

Firstly, he created a new section of the *Dagh-o-Tashiha* in October 1659, and divided the work between them. While the old section was to verify the contingents of *mansabdars* holding the rank of above 1000, the new section was entrusted with the verification of those who held *mansab* upto 1000.[1] Secondly, the Emperor allowed a grace-period (*mohlat*) of two months to the *naqdi mansabdars*, and of six months to the *jagir*-holders over their usual period of six months and one year respectively, for completing the verification of their contingents. Those who returned from out station duties were allowed an extra respite of two weeks from the date of their arrival at the Court.[2] The date of this measure of Aurangzeb could not be ascertained. Apparently it would have followed the first one because we find Aurangzeb altering again the duration of verification in 1680 as we shall see. The two reforms would have brought relief to both the *mansabdars* and the *Dagh* officials and would have improved the efficiency of the department. If, in spite of the grace period, a *mansabdar* failed in producing his troopers for *dagh*, his salary was stopped.[3]

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1. *Kazim*, pp.441-42; *Hatim Khan*, f.89a.
2. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.85a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.39b.
3. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.39b; *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.85a.

Aurangzeb, however, once again changed the *dagh* procedure sometime about the end of 23 R.Y. (6th October 1679 - 24th September 1680). He now ordered that from the beginning of the coming year (25th September 1680), the *jagir*-holding *mansabdars* should present their troopers for *dagh* every six months with a grace period of three months; and the *naqdi mansabdars* every three months. There is no mention of grace period in their case.[1] The order thus reduced the *dagh* interval by half for both categories of *mansabdars*, and would have been intended to minimise the chances of malpractice by them. The officials could now know the actual state of their contingent every three and nine months. In other words the new *dagh* rule aimed at improving the strength of the army, and had been introduced, it seems, because of the Rathor rebellion that broke out in 1679.[2] Moreover, the coincidence of the new order with the death of Shivaji in April 1680,[3] the presence of the Emperor in Rajputana, and the completion of operations against the Rajputs lead us to believe that taking advantage of the death of Shivaji, Aurangzeb was contemplating an offensive in the Deccan even before the revolt of Prince Akbar; and that the revolt of Akbar in 1681 and his flight to the

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1. *Waqai Ajmer*, p.639; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.353; *Akhbarat*, 5th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.

2. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.182-87; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.261-63. Cf. *Waqai Ajmer*; *Dilkusha*, f.83b.

3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.194; *Dilkusha*, f.83a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.271.

Deccan[1] only provided him an excuse for an action which he seems to have already decided upon.

In any case, the new *Dagh* procedure was introduced to ensure that the *mansabdars* maintained their contingent fully and properly. The *mansabdar* tried to delay the verification of their contingent as long as possible.[2] This reluctance of the *mansabdars* to face the *Dagh* official shows firstly that some instances of corruption notwithstanding, the *Dagh* staff was generally effective; and secondly that the *mansabdars* did not maintain their contingents properly, otherwise they should have not been afraid of the *Dagh* officials. There are, indeed, specific instances of *mansabdars* maintaining the soldiers much below the requirements of their *mansab*.[3] Thus in view of political problems, military requirements of the state and the failure of *mansabdars* to fulfil their military

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.197; *Dilkusha*, f.85b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.264.

2. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.639.

3. Cf. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.424. Perhaps the most glaring [example] of this malpractice is one reported to the Emperor by Mahabat Khan, the *Nazim of* Ahmadabad, in 10th R.Y. (February 1667 - February 1668). He complained to the Emperor that while the strength of the contingent of the *mansabdars* deputed in the province should have been about twenty thousand, in actual fact it was much below that number (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.265-66). For similar instances see *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.510, 513. It is interesting to read (in the evidence cited above from *Waqai Ajmer*) the excuses of *mansabdars* for not producing the full number of their troopers. Thus for example, a *mansabdar* said that he had sent 20 of his troopers to bring money from his *jagir*; the other said that he was in financial crisis, and, therefore, could not maintain the full quota of troopers.

obligations, it had become necessary to subject them to more frequent checking and verification to minimise the chances of malpractices. Moreover, because of innumerable military expeditions that were being despatched in different directions from 1679 onward, the chances of heavier and more frequent casualties in the contingents of Mansabdars had increased. The checking by the Dagh officials at shorter intervals could have helped the state administration in knowing whether the Mansabdars made good of the losses. In case of their failure to do so, their allowances could have been cut proportionately. That could have lightened the burden on state exchequer in those days of economic strain. These were the circumstances in which the Dagh-o-Tashiha officials were asked to check the contingents of Mansabdars every three and nine months for the naqdi and the jagir-holding Mansabdars respectively.

The staff of the Dagh-o-Tashiha at the centre, as also at the provinces and in the armies sent on expeditions, consisted of three officials, namely the Daroghа, the Amin and the Mushrif.[1] The Darogha was the over all in-charge of the section and had precedence over the Amin and the Mushrif.[2] The two came to the office of the Darogha and performed

1. Kazim, pp.441-42; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.18a; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatima), pp.177-78. Roznamcha-i Dagh (dated 28th Jumada I, 1st R.Y., S.A.H.).

2. Our authorities do not say much about the position and spechific functions of the three officials of the Dagh. The [illegible] provides us valuable information about the functioning of the Dagh officials of an army and helps us in understanding the specific duties of each of them. This information is supported by some Akhbarat as also by some Documents preserved at State Archives, Hyderabad. It is presumed that the same functions would have been performed by their counterparts at the centre.

their functions under his supervision and in conjunction with him.[1]

The *Darogha* was responsible mainly for *tashiha* i.e. the verification of the troopers of the *mansabdars*. He compared the features of the troopers with their respective descriptive rolls (*chihra*). The original *chihra* used to be with the *Mir Bakhshi* and a copy of it with the seal of the *Mir Bakhshi* with the *Darogha*.[2] Thus in case of transfer of a person, his *chihra* and other necessary papers were also sent to the place of his posting.[3] The *Darogha* also saw to it that the *mansabdar* had maintained the horses, horsemen, footmen (*piadah*), archers and musketeers in number stipulated under his *zat* and *sawar* rank; and that the different kind of troopers such as musketeers and archers had the required quality and quantity of weapons (*yaraq*).[4] After verification, he signed and sealed on the back of the *chihra* and enclosed the document in a register (*jild*). He at the same time issued a verification certificate (*yaddasht-i*

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1. *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.639-40, 642-43, 665-66; Document A.R. 928 (S.A.H.)

2. *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.665. Cf. also ff.639-40, 642-43; *Akhbarat*, 22nd Shawwal, 32nd R.Y.; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, ff.45b-47b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), pp.177-78.

3. This becomes clear from a *dastak* of Ashraf Khan *Mir Bakhshi*, to Kewyab Khan, the *Bakhshi* of the Deccan (dated the 16th Rabi II, 27th R.Y., S.A.H.) to send to the Court the copies of the *chihra of* horses and of troopers of a *Mansabdar* who had been detained at the Court.

4. For detailed information on the subject, see W. Irvine, *op. cit.*, pp.51-53.

tashiha) with the seals of three officials. One copy of the certificate was given to the *mansabdar* and the other sent to the *Mir Bakhshi* for the preparation of salary-bills (*barat*, in case of *naqdi mansabdars*,[1] or for proper accounting in case of *jagir-holders*).[2] Another important function of the *Daragha* at the centre was to present the verified troopers and horses before the Emperor. The Emperor inspected and satisfied himself with their conditions.[3] Such reviews of the troopers and the horses by the Emperor would have served as a check on both the *Dagh* officials and on the *mansabdars*.

While the *Daragha* was mainly responsible for *tashiha* (verification) of the troopers, the *Amin* looked after the *dagh* (branding) of the horses. He compared and checked the horses, examined their size and strength, determined their quality and breed and rejected defective ones from the *dagh*.[4] He would have also endured that the number of horses

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1. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.665, Cf. also ff.639-40, 642-43; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, ff.45b-47b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatima*), pp.177-78. For a few such Documents see *Yaddasht-i tashiha* dated (i) 29th Muharram, (ii) 9th Safar, (iii) 1st and 16th Jumada II, (iv) 2nd Shawwal, 1069 (S.A.M.)

2. Cf. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.177-78.

3. *Kazim*, p.1100.

4. *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.639-40, 642-43, 665-66; *Bernier*, p.243. One of our sources says that the *Daragha* also checked the horses (*Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.45b). But the evidence cited above (*Waqai Ajmer*) is specific that the job was done by the *Amin*. However, there seems no contradiction between the two sources as the *Daragha* could have checked any item as the head of the Section of the *Dagh*.

was according to rules. 'When a trooper's horse dies, he is obliged on the same day to produce the piece of the hide bearing the brand before the officials who are told off for that duty. These men grant the trooper seven days' time for buying another horse. If he fails to buy one within the time, his pay is reduced'.[1] The *Mushrif* was mainly responsible for preparing the diary (*roznamcha*) and the *Yaddasht* (memorandum) of the *dagh-o-tashiha* and the *dagh* (verification) certificate for record and for despatch to the *Mir Bakhshi*.[2]

It is difficult to say whether the *Amin* and the *Mushrif* had equal status or one had the precedence over the other. In any case the three officials of the *Dagh* put their seals on documents issued from the section[3] and were expected to work in unison. We have not come across an evidence referring to the differences among the *Dagh* officials at the Centre. At local level too they worked with understanding and cooperation, and some *Daroghas* relied heavily on their colleagues.[4] At some places,

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1. *Manucci*, Vol. IV, p.383.
2. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.538; Document A.R. 988 (S.A.M.). For the documents see *Yaddasht-i Tashiha*, dated 1st Jumada I, and the *Roznamcha-i Dagh* dated 28th Jumada I, 1069 (S.A.M.).
3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.177-78. Cf. Document A.R. 988 (S.A.M.). For such documents issued with the seals of three officials see the *Yaddasht-* and *Roznamcha* cited in note 2 above.
4. Thus for example, Bhim Sen Nagar, the author of famous *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, who served intermittently as the *Mushrif* of the *Dagh* of the successive armies sent to the Deccan (from 14th to 19th R.Ys, 1671-76), enjoyed the confidence of successive *Daroghas* (Cf. *Dilkusha*, ff.51a-52b, 61a-62b, 69a).

however, the three officials did not work together because of mutual jealousy, and the Darogha was often defied by his two colleagues. The Darogha of an army, who was also its Bakhshi and Waqia-nigar, complained to the Court (1679-80) that the Amin and the Mushrif did not come to his (Darogha's) office for months together, and performed their functions at their respective residences, causing thereby repetition of the dagh process and inconvenience to the Mansabdars and their troopers.[1]

The fact that the Dagh officials sometimes indulged in malpractices could not be denied. The differences of the Dagh officials with a Mansabdar could create difficulties for him. Thus a Mansabdar appealed to the Emperor that as the Darogha had enmity with him, somebody else be deputed for the verification of his troopers. As a result the Amin was asked to do the job.[2] But such facilities would not have been available to all Mansabdars, especially to those sent on expeditions. There was, therefore, scope of bribery and corruption in the Dagh department. There are, indeed, instances where the Amin detained the Mansabdars for long to exact gratification from the harassed Mansabdars.[3] Then there is the more glaring case of the Mansabdars of Gujarat where the defaulting Mansabdars were hand in glove with the Dagh official. The former did not

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1. Waqai Ajmer, ff.639-41, 642-43.
2. Akhbarat, 22nd Shawwal, 32nd R.Y.
3. Waqai Ajmer, f.640.

maintain the stipulated number of troopers and the latter did not properly enforce the *dagh* rules over the former. The result was that the strength of the troopers of the *Mansabdars* posted in the province dwindled considerably, and the governor had to report the matter to the Court for action (1667). On report the provincial *Bakhshi* was held responsible for the matter and was immediately punished by transfer.[1] However, the conditions would have been better at the centre because of the presence of and the checking by the *Mir Bakhshi* and his colleagues, and because of the periodical reviews by the Emperor himself. That is, perhaps, the reason that we do not come across the complaints of malpractices in the *Dagh* department at the centre. It is, therefore, quite probable that this fact might have also been a consideration in summoning some *Mansabdars* to Court from a particular province or expedition and sending others to the same. The Emperor used to have a review of the deputed *Mansabdar's* troops before he left for his assignment.[2] The papers received and maintained by the *Mir Bakhshi* might have also helped him in ensuring the efficiency in the *Dagh-o-Tashiha* and other sections of his department.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.265-66.

2. *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.353.

Papers Maintained by the Mir Bakhshi :

The Mir Bakhshi was responsible for maintaining many types of papers in his office. These papers may be divided into two categories: (a) the papers that were prepared at and/or issued from the office of the Mir Bakhshi himself; (b) the papers that were sent to his office from the Chauki officials from the provincial and army bakhshis and the Dagh staff and from elsewhere. The papers maintained by the Mir Bakhshi in the first category were as follows:[1]

1. Dastur-ul Amal-i tankhwah-i mansabdaran-i naqdi wa jagirdar (the regulations concerning the payment of allowances to the naqdi mansabdars and the jagir-holders).
2. Zawabit-i tashiha wa dagh-i asp (the rules of verification (of mansabdars) and the branding of horses).
3. Zabita-i tafawut-i asp-i tazi wa yabu[2] (the rule of deduction (from the allowances of the mansabdars) on the difference of the (breed of) horse as tazi and yabu.[3]
4. Siyaha-i huzur (the diary of the Court about the grant of mansab/service to the candidates).

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1. The list of the papers is based on Khulasat-ul Siyaq, ff.73b-74a; Farhang-i Kardani, f.40b; Dastur-ul Amal, f.159a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.396-97.
2. For the explanation of the term see W. Irvine, Op. cit., pp.22, 52.
3. For difference between the two breed of horses see Ibid., p.51.

5. Sar-rishta az tarikh-i mulazimat ta arz-i mukarrar (the record prepared since the audience of the candidate and the final approval of the Emperor).

6. awarija-i chihra-i mulaziman (the ledger containing the descriptive rolls of the imperial servants).

7. Sar-rishta-i zamini-i mansabdaran (the sureties of the mansabdars).

8. awarija-i zamini (the ledger of sureties) stating that such and such person has taken the surety of such and such person).

9. taujihat-i sipah wa shagirdpesha (the account of the salaries of the soldiers and the household servants).

10. awarija-i talab-i tankhwah (the ledger of salary/allowances demands).

11. naql-i dastakha-i taayyunat-i mansabdaran (the copies of the posting letters of the mansabdars).

12. Sar-rishta-i maratib-i izafa-o-kami-i mansabdaran (the records of promotion and reduction in the mansab of mansabdars).

13. Sar-rishta-i rukhsati wa bartarafi wa fauti wa farari (the record of leave, dismissal, death and absconding (of mansabdars and soldiers).

14. Sar-rishta tafawut-i aspan-i mauti (the record of deduction (from the salaries/allowances) regarding the lost Iraqi, Turkish and Tazi horse).

15. awarija-i ghairhaziri (the ledger of the absence) according to which deductions would have been made.

16. _awarija-i musaidat-o-mutaliba_ etc. (the ledger showing the assistance advanced to, and the state-dues to be recovered from the _mansabdars_).

17. _fihrist-i mansabdaran_ (the list of the _mansabdars_) with the details of their _mansab_ and place of posting - at the Court or in the provinces.

18. _tarh-i qismat-i afwaj_ (the details of army-position) on the day of the battle against enemy showing the positions of the vanguard, flanks, centre, the rear and the reserve etc.

The papers that were sent to the office of the _Mir Bakhshi_ from different wings/sections of his department and were maintained in his office were as follows:

1. _Siyaha-i Chauki wa Chauki-nawisan_ (the diary of _Chauki_ from the _Chauki_ officials) showing the presence and absence of _mansabdars_/soldiers).

2. _Siyaha-i dagh-o tashiha_ (the diary of the branding and verification from the _Dagh_ officials).

3. _naql-i tashiha wa daghnamah wa fauti wa asqat-inamah_ (the copies of the verification, branding, death and/or loss (of horse) certificates from the _Daroghs_ and the _Mushrif_ of the _Dagh_ with their seals.

4. _fihrist-i sal-akhir-i tayyunatian-i subajat_ (the list of the _mansabdars_ posted in the provinces at the close of the year (from the provincial _bakhshis_).

Apart from their archival value, these records were indispensable for the day to day working of *Mir Bakhshi's* department. As the grant of *mansab* and promotion was a continuous process, covering the whole career of *mansabdars*, many of the above documents were required for subsequent increase or decrease in the rank of *mansabdar* and its proper processing. The Emperor himself looked into the concerned documents before ordering a promotion or demotion.[1] Moreover, these papers, especially those received from his subordinates, would have helped the *Mir Bakhshi* to know the day-to-day functioning of the different sections under his charge and their respective staff, and in ensuring the smooth working of the department. But it seems that in spite of these reports and papers coming to *Mir Bakhshi's* office, bribery and corruption had considerably affected the efficiency of the Department in the later years of Aurangzeb's reign.

A contemporary writer laments that the clerks of the Department indulge in corruption and bribery and have accumulated large sums out of it.[2] The same writer who was in the *Dagh* staff of an army, was once offered gratification by a *mansabdar* for recommending his men for *mansab*.[3]

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1. Cf. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.83; *Dilkusha*, f.125a; *Akhbarat*, 19th Rajab, 24th R.Y.; 16th Zilhijja, 32nd R.Y., 24th Shaban, 39th R.Y., 29th Muharram, 40th R.Y., 5th Safar, 40th R.Y.

2. *Dilkusha*, f.140b. Cf. also *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.375-76.

3. *Dilkusha*, f.43b.

He further writes that the requests of the *mansabdars* are not attended to by the officials of the Department and their requirements are not fulfilled.[1] The reasons for this deterioration were many.

The work-load in the Department of the *Mir Bakhshi* had enormously increased because of the constant warfare in the Deccan and its consequitant effects on the *mansabdars*, such as innumerable casualties among them and their troopers, the recruitment of new ones and the like. This increase of work is evident from the revival of the post of the Third *Bakhshi* itself in 1701.[2] But the central *Bakhshis*, and especially the *Mir Bakhshi* and the Second *Bakhshi*, were becoming increasingly more busy in the warfare. Both their time and energy had been diverted from their offices to the fields of battles, and they could not fully concentrate on the functioning of the Department. But apart from it, there were some deeper economic reasons for the corruption and inefficiency.

The *mansabdars*, especially those having their *jagirs* in the Deccan, were facing great difficulties in realising the revenue allotted to them from their respective *jagirs*;[3] nor were they able to recover

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1. *Dilkusha*, f.143b.
2. See Supra p. 272.
3. *Dilkusha*, ff.139a, 140a-140b.

their dues from the state,[1] although the warfare and their military assignments would have put only heavier financial burden on them. It should not be surprising if under such conditions the mansabdars did not keep the stipulated number of their troopers. One of our authorities, indeed, attributes the Mughal failure in the Deccan to the fact that during the Deccan campaign the mansabdars maintained only a fraction of required number of their contingent because of their financial problems.[2] Only a few mansabdars who can afford from their own resources, employed the required number of soldiers simply to save their honour and dignity.[3] Moreover, even if the mansabdars could afford to maintain the full contingent, it is doubtful if in the face of known heavy casualties of the imperialists in the Deccan,[4] and in a hostile country, they could procure men for recruitment.[5] The fact that the Emperor himself wrote to most of his governors to employ one thousand soldiers each from their respective provinces and send them to the Deccan,[6] clearly shows that the Emperor himself was finding it difficult to enlist fresh soldiers in the Deccan.

1. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp. 396-97. 2. Dilkusha, f. 139a.
3. Dilkusha, f. 102a.
4. Cf. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p. 475.
5. Cf. Dilkusha, f. 139b where the author gives very valuable information in this respect. He writes, "The Emperor learnt that the Marathas were in concert with the cultivators of the imperial dominions (in the Deccan). He ordered that whatever arms and horses were found in any village, they should be confiscated. When this happened to many villages, the cultivators procured horses and arms and joined the Marathas" (translation in Sarkar Commemoration Volume, p. 231).
6. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p. 429; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp. 475, 478-80.

However, whatever the reasons, when the mansabdars could not maintain the full complement of their contingent, they had no alternative but to bribe the Dagh and other officials of Mir Bakhshi's Department to complete the procedural formalities and secure the required certificates for drawing their usual salaries and allowances. The payment of such bribes would have been economically much more convenient for them than to enlist new troopers and to provide them money and material.

It is, however, difficult to say as to how much the Bakhshis themselves were involved in this corruption of the Department. The integrity of Ruhullah Khan I has, of course, been questioned by some sources.[1] But there seems no evidence on record shewing the dishonesty of other Bakhshis. Some of them have, in fact, been praised for their honesty, benevolence and concern for people.[2] The fact is that in spite of their honesty and good intentions, it had become impossible for the Bakhshis to pay full attention to the Department and maintain its efficiency. Problem before them was whether to obey Emperor's orders for leading the expeditions and capturing the forts, or to look after the grievances of the mansabdar and worry about the working of their daftars. The dilemma seems to have become a common puzzle of most of the officials during the last years of Aurangzeb's reign.

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1. Maasir, Vol. II, pp.314-15.
2. Cf. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.381 where he records his admiration for Ashraf Khan, Abdur Rahim Khan and Mukhlis Khan, some of the Mir Bakhshis and Second Bakhshis of Aurangzeb.

Table A, Chapter III

List of the Mir Bakhshis of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure.

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Muhammad Amin Khan	Irani	4000/3000	5000/5000	Subahdar of Lahore	10th. Mid. Nov. 1667	AN 111,119,426,762,1058,1060; AH 36b,126a; MU 111/613-20.
10th. 29 Dec. 1667	Danishmand Khan	Irani	5000/2000	5000/2500	Death	13th. 28 July 1670	AN 855,1067; MA 64,105; ZA 103a; MU 11/30-32; SC 248a,253b; AT 8a.
13th. 28 July 1670	Lashkar Khan	Indian?	4000/4000	5000/5000	Death	14th. Feb. 1671	MA 105,108; ZA 103a; MU 111/168-71; SC 253b,254a; AT 8b.
14th. Feb. 1671	Asad Khan	Irani	4000/3000	5000/5000	Wazir	19th. 18 Oct. 1676	AN 880; MA 108,125; ZA 103a; SC 253a,254a; MU 1/310-16; AT 8b.
19th. 18 Oct. 1676	Sarbaland Khan	Turani	4000/2500	?	Death	23rd. 6 Jan. 1680	MA 139,153,157,187; ZA 103a; MU 11/477-79; AT 8b.
	Ruhullah Khan I, Mir Atish, officiated from Jan. 1680 to Nov. 1680 (MA 187)						
24th. 3 Nov. 1680	Himmat Khan	Turani	3000/1500	?	Death	24th. 25 Jan. 1681	MA 195,201; ZA 103a; MU 11/946-49; AT 8b.
24th. Feb. 1681	Ashraf Khan	Irani	3000/2000	?	Death	30th. 27 Sept. 1686	MA 206,281; ZA 103a; MU 1/272-74; AT 9a.
30th. 27 Sept. 1686	Ruhullah Khan I	Irani	4000/2000	5000/4000	Death	36th. Mid. July 1692	MA 281,348; ZA 103a; KK 11/337, 407; Dilkusha 105a; MU 11/309-15; AT 9a.
36th. Mid. July 1692	Bahramand Khan	Irani	3500/2500	5000/3000	Death	46th. 16 Nov. 1702	MA 349,369,461; Dilkusha, 129b, 143b; KK 11/407; ZA 103a; AT 9a; TN 16.
46th. Nov. 1702	Zulfiqar Khan	Irani	5000/5000	6000/6000	Death of the Emperor	51st. 3 March 1707	MA 392,461; Dilkusha 143b; KK 11/527; MU 11/93-97; AT 9a; TN 31.

(Because of his absence on expeditions, Muttalib Khan officiated almost permanently) Dilkusha, 143b; MU 111/650-53.

Table B, Chapter III

List of the Second Bakhshis of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure.

R.I. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.I. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Asad Khan	Irani	2500/1500	4000/3000	Naib Wazir	13th. 16 May 1670	AN 119,395,880; MA 103; ZA 83b,103a; MU i/310-16; AT 5b,10b.
13th. Beg. Aug. 1670	Himmat Khan	Turani	3000/1500	?	Nazim of Agra	15th. Oct. 1672	MA 105,120; ZA 103a; MU iii/946-49; AT 10b.
15th. Oct. 1672	Sarbaland Khan	Turani	3500/2000	4000/2500	Mir Bakhshi	19th. Oct. 1676	MA 121,139,162; ZA 103a; MU ii/477-79; AT 11a.
19th. Oct. 1676	Safi Khan	Irani	3500/1500	?	Naib Nazim of Multan	21st. July 1678	AN 1034; MA 162,167,176; ZA 103a; MU ii/740-42; AT 11a.
	(Abdur Rahim Khan officiated till June 1679)						
22nd. June 1679	Aqil Khan	Irani	3000/1000	?	Subahdar of Delhi	24th. Beg. Oct. 1680	AN 981; MA 176,195; ZA 103a; MU ii/821-23; AT 11a; Akh. 19th Zilhijja 20th R.I.
24th. Mid. Nov. 1680	Ruhullah Khan I	Irani	3000/2000	4000/3000	Mir Bakhshi	30th. 27 Sept. 1686	MA 195,281,282; ZA 103a; MA ii/309-15; AT 11a.
30th. 27 Sept. 1686	Bahramand Khan	Irani	3500/1500	3500/2000	Mir Bakhshi	36th. Mid. July 1692	MA 281,349; ZA 103a; MU i/454-57; AT 11b.
36th. Mid. July 1692	Mukhlis Khan II	Irani	2000/ 700	2500/ 700	Death	44th. 13 Jan. 1701	MA 349,368,434; ZA 103a; KK ii/407,456; MU iii/641-44; AT 11b.
44th. 13 Jan. 1701	Ruhullah Khan II	Irani	3000/?	3500/1000	Death	48th. 19 May 1704	MA 370,434,489; Dilkusha 135b,148b; KK /456,530; MU ii/315-17; TM 16.
48th. 19 May 1704	Mirza Sadruddin Muhammad Khan	Irani	3000/1000	?	Death of the Emperor	51st. 3 March 1707	MA 472,489; AT 11b; MU ii/692-99; TM 30.

Table C, Chapter III

List of the Third Bakhshis of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure.

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Mukhlis Khan	Irani?	1500/ 200	?	Naib Subahdar of Agra	2nd. 15 May 1659	AN 48,249; MU 111/566-68; ZA 103b; AT 12b.
2nd. 15 May 1659	Safi Khan	Irani	2000/1000	3000/1500	Subahdar of Orissa	12th. Oct. 1669	AN 292,396,447,1034; MA 90; ZA 103b; MU 11/740-42; AT 12b.
12th. ?	Himmat Khan	Turani	2500/1200	?	Second Bakhshi	13th. Aug. 1670	AN 981; MA 71,105; ZA 103b; MU 111/946-49; AT 12b.
13th. Aug. 1670	Ruhullah Khan I	Irani	2000/ 600	?	Faujdar of Dhamuni	16th. April 1673	AN 1061; MA 105,108,127; ZA 103b; MU 111/309-15; AT 12b.
16th. April 1673	The Section was made a Sub-section of Second Bakhshi's Daftar, then under Sarbaland Khan; and separated again in 24th R.Y. (December, 1680)						MA 127, 196; AT 12b.
24th. 28 Dec. 1680	Abdur Rahim Khan	Irani	1500/ 300	?	Death	25th. 15 Feb. 1682	AN 960; MA 196,216; ZA 103b; MU 11/812-13; AT 12b.
25th. 15 Feb. 1682	Kamgar Khan	Irani	2000/ 500	?	Akhta Begi	27th. Dec. 1683	MA 140,196,240; ZA 103b; MU 111/159-60; AT 12b.
27th. Dec. 1683	The post remained vacant.					45th. ?	AT 12b, 155a.
45th. ?	Mirza Sadruddin Muhammad Khan	Irani	2000/ 800	3000/1000	Second Bakhshi	48th. 20 May 1704	MA 433,472,489; Dilkusha, 143b; MU 111/692-94; TM 30.
49th. C. Oct. 1704	Mirza Safavi Khan	Irani	3000/1000	?	Death of the Emperor	51st. 3 March 1707	MA 482,497; Dilkusha 148a; MU 111/653-54; AT 155a; TM 23.

Table D, Chapter III

List of the Mir Bakhshi of Ahadis of Aurangzeb with Mansab, Promotion and Tenure.

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Rad Andaz Khan (later, Shujaat Khan)	Irani?	1000/ 400	?	Qiladar of Agra	1st. 13 Dec. 1658	AN 234,237; AH 54b; MU ii/679-81.
1st. 13 Dec. 1658	Sanawar Khan (Shafqatullah)	Irani	1000/ 250	1000/ 350	?	?	AN 237,240; MU ii/438-41.
1st. 28 Mar. 1659	Rad Andaz Khan	Irani	1500/ 500	1500/ 600	To Srinagar expedition	2nd. c. Aug. 1659	AN 236,336,441;486; MU ii/679-81.
3rd. 3 June 1660	Ismail Beg Kirmani	Irani	1000/ 100	?	?	?	AN 487; AH 101a.
? ?	Multafit Khan	Irani	?	?	Akhta Begi	6th. 17 June 1663	AN 830; AH 125b; MU iii/611-13.
6th 17 June 1663	Ruhullah Khan I	Irani	1000/ 500	?	Akhta Begi	10th. 12 Nov. 1667	AN 830,1061; MU ii/309-15.
10th. 12 Nov. 1667	Kangar Khan	Irani	1000/ 200	1500/ 300	Darogha of Jawahir Bazar	12th. May 1669	AN 856,1061; MA 82; MU iii/159-60; SC 250a.
12th. May 1669	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
? ?	Lutfullah Khan	Indian	1500/ 500	?	Darogha of Arz-i Mukarrar	21st. July 1678	MA 71,165,172; SC 248a; MU iii/171-77.
22nd.. 23 Jan. 1678	Bahramand Khan	Irani	?	?	Akhta Begi	22nd. 4 July 1678	MA 172,176; MU i/454-57.

continued.....

Table D continued........

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
22nd. 4 July 1678	Itaqad Khan (later Zulfiqar Khan)	Irani	2000/?	?	Sent against Rathors	25th. 19 Sept. 1681	MA 176,213,331; MU ii/93-97.
25th. Aug. Dec. 1681	Shihabuddin Khan (later Ghaziuddin Khan)	Turani	700/?	?	Sent to Junnair	26th. Sept. 1682?	MA 187,216; MU ii/872-79.
26th. 12 Sept. 1682	Saleh Khan (later Fedai Khan III)	Irani	?	?	?	26th? Dec. 1683?	MA 221; MU iii/33-34.
27th. Dec. 1683	Muttalib Khan	Irani	1000/ 400?	?	?	?	MA 386; MU iii/650-53.
? ?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
? ?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
? ?	Murad Khan II, Muhammad Murad	Irani	700/ 400	?	Faujdar of Dohad and Godhra	39th. c. March 1696	MA 242, 382; Dilkusha 81a,87b; MU iii/ 688-92
40th. Aug. 1696	Khudabanda Khan (In addition, was also made the Beyutat c. May 1697)	Irani	1000/ 400	?	Nazim of Bihar	44th. Oct. 1700	MA 351,382,386,432; SC 288a, 292a; MU i/814-16.
44th. ?	Ruhullah Khan II	Irani	3000/1600	?	Second Bakhshi	44th. 13 Jan. 1701	MA 370,434; MU ii/315-17.
44th. 13 Jan. 1701	Safshikan Khan II (Mir Sadruddin)	Irani	?	?	?	?	MA 434; MU /746-47.
? ?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?

Chapter IV

THE MIR SAMAN

His Position, Powers and Functions

The Working of the Department under him.

Another central minister was the *Mir Saman* (the chief of provisions and stores). As is evident from his designation itself, the *Mir Saman* held the over all charge of state's sub-treasuries (*khazain*), *karkhanas* (stores and workshops) and the stables, and performed some other functions. He was assisted in performing his duties and functions by the *Diwan-i Buyutat*, the *Darogha-i Kachahri*, the *Mustaufi*, and many *daroghas*, *mushrifs*, *amins* and *tahwildars* attached to each of the treasuries, stores, workshops and the stables.

Mir Saman or the Khan Saman

The *Mir Saman* has sometimes been also described as the *Khan Saman*. Under Akbar, as also under Jahangir and Shah Jahan, he was generally called the *Mir Saman*.[1] But under Aurangzeb he has been described both as the

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1. *Ain.*, Vol. I, p.6; *Tuzuk*, p.314; *Lahori*, Vol. I, pp.177, 258. Cf. Ibn Hasan, *Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, p.237.

Mir Saman and the *Khan Saman* in chronicles, *Akhbarat* and in administrative manuals (*dastur-al amals*).[1] It is, therefore, not correct to say that under Aurangzeb the *Mir Saman* becomes *Khan Saman* in the official regulations.[2] Among the European travellers too, while Bernier and Thevenot mention him as the *Khan Saman*, Manucci calls him the *Mir Saman*.[3] However, as both the terms of *Mir Saman* and *Khan Saman* were in vogue under Aurangzeb, we would prefer to call him the *Mir Saman* for the sake of continuity and uniformity with other heads of central departments like the *Mir Bakhshi* and the *Mir Atish*.

Position and Status :

The *Mir Saman* held an important position among the central ministers. Under Shah Jahan his position was considered next only to the

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1. The term *Mir Saman* is used in *Kazim*, pp.395, 832; *Hatim Khan*, ff.54b, 114a; *Dilkusha*, f.148b; *Akhbarat*, 19th Ramazan, 14th Shawwal, 40th R.Y., 4th Jumada I, 15th Safar, 43rd R.Y.; Add. 6599 (*Dastur-al Amal*), f.36b. And the *Khan Saman* in *Maasir-i Alamgiri* (which seems to have scrupulously used only this term), pp.101, 156, 172, 514; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.31, 78; *Salatin-i Chaghta*, f.252b; *Akhbarat*, 7th Safar, 33rd R.Y., 8th Safar, 39th R.Y. As for specific instances, Fazil Khan I has been mentioned as *Mir Saman* in *Kazim* (pp.346, 395), *Khafi Khan* (Vol. II, p.130), and as *Khan Saman* by *Khafi Khan* (Vol. II, p.62), and *Maasir* (Vol. III, 524-25). Same was the case with Ruhullah Khan II (Cf. *Akhbarat*, 26th Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.489; and *Ahkam*, f.7a).

2. Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, p.238.

3. *Bernier*, p.186; *Thevenot*, p.240; *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.394.

Wazir.[1] Both Afzal Khan and Sadallah Khan were the *Mir Samans* before Shah Jahan promoted them as the *Wazir*.[2] The position of Fazil Khan, the last *Mir Saman* of Shah Jahan, is also evident from the fact that after the battle of Samugarh (1658), Shah Jahan sent him to negotiate with Aurangzeb.[3] Under Aurangzeb too Fazil Khan who was confirmed as the *Mir Saman*, held important position. As already mentioned, Aurangzeb did not appoint a *Wazir* in the beginning, and divided his functions among three persons. In this arrangement, Fazil Khan was entrusted with the important job of drafting of imperial *farmans* and orders.[4] While serving as the *Mir Saman*, Fazil Khan had also reached to the mansab of 5000 *zat*,[5] a rank attained only by the *Wazirs* and a few *Mir Bakhshis* of Aurangzeb. On the death of Raja Raghunath who was looking after the *Diwani*, Fazil Khan was elevated to the position of *Wazir* itself (1663) in preference to Muhammad Amin Khan, the then *Mir Bakhshi*. Thus in the early years of Aurangzeb's reign, the *Mir Saman* was rather the first minister in the state because of the absence of a full-fledged *Wazir*; or, at any rate, he was not below the *Mir Bakhshi* in rank.

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1. *Lahori*, Vol. II, p.347; *Maasir*, Vol. II, p.442.
2. *Lahori*, Vol. I, pp.177, 258, Vol. II, pp.347, 433; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.442-43. Cf. Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, pp.189-90, 194-96, 252.
3. *Sadiq*, ff.201a-201b; *Salih*, Vol. III, pp.229-306; *Kami*, pp.72-75; *Kazim*, pp.114-15; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.31.
4. *Kazim*, p.395; *Hatim Khan*, f.81a; *Maasir*, Vol. III, p.525.
5. *Kazim*, p.762; *Hatim Khan*, f.120a; *Maasir*, Vol. III, p.525.

After Fazil Khan, however, the post of the Mir Saman under Aurangzeb gradually relegated into insignificance in comparison to the Second Bakhshi. The post which was till now considered to be almost the end of the successful career of an official, was now assigned to many a young mansabdars who were later transferred to posts of smaller significance. Thus for example, Ruhullah Khan I, after having already served as the Mir Saman (1676-79), was made the Akhta-Begi (horse-master, 1679), Mir Atish (head of the artillery, 1679) and the Second Bakhshi (1680). Similarly, another Mir Saman, Fazil-Khan II (1688-1697) was transferred as the governor of Kashmir.[1]

The rank of Mir Saman too had come down to a lower scale. Out of nine Mir Samans who served under Aurangzeb, three held the rank of only 2000 zat, three that of 2500, and the remaining three including Fazil Khan, that of 3000. But none except Fazil Khan I seems to have attained a rank above 3500.[2]

This erosion in the rank and the status of the Mir Saman under Aurangzeb might have been because of the fact that his reign did not witness that large scale construction, luxury and grandeur which marked the reign of Shah Jahan, and which had brought a qualitative and quantitative

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1. See Table A at the end of the Chapter.
2. For detail see Table A.

change in the working of the state Karkhanas and had contributed to the enhancement of the position and powers of the Mir Saman. Aurangzeb, on the other hand, forced by political and economic factors, introduced some economy measures[1] which reduced the utility and importance of many a karkhanas which they had acquired during the reign of Shah Jahan.

The change in the position of the Mir Saman is also evident from the fact that Aurangzeb did follow the same standard for the appointment to the post of Mir Saman as he had adopted in regard to the posts of the Wazir and the Mir Bakhshi. Only two among the nine Mir Samans of Aurangzeb had served as the Buyutat, and, therefore, had the experience of the functioning of the Department. They were Kamgar Khan[2] (1687-1688) and Khudabanda Khan (1704 till the death of Aurangzeb in 1707).[3] The

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1. For these measures see Infra p. [illegible]

2. Kamgar Khan was the second son of Jafar Khan the Wazir. Although he belonged to the family of most powerful nobles under Aurangzeb, and also held various posts, he could not achieve any distinction above Mir Saman. For his life see Maasir, Vol. III, pp.159-60.

3. Khudabanda was the son of Shaista Khan Amir-al Umara, and hence the cousin of Aurangzeb. Later he also married a daughter of Asad Khan the Wazir (1690). He had thus started his career late in Aurangzeb's reign, but had reached to the mansab of 3000/1200 before the death of that Emperor. His death in the subsequent war of succession cut short his rising career (Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.462, 514; Dilkusha, ff.137a, 149a; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.814-16; Muhammadi, p.22).

others were amateurs in the Department. All of them, however, belonged to the dominant Irani group of the nobility. Four of them, Ruhullah Khan I (1676-1679), Kamgar Khan (1687-1688), Ruhullah Khan II (1697-1704) and Khudabanda Khan (1704-1707) were related to the royal family and the then Wazir-i Azam Asad Khan. They together held the post for about fourteen years without interruption since 1697. The distinction of holding the post for the longest term of nine years (1688-1697) goes to Fazil Khan II,[1] followed by Muhammad Ali Khan[2] who served on the post for about eight years (1679-1687) so eminently that his designation (Khan Saman) became almost an inseparable part of his name.[3] The tenure of others ranges between seven years and one year.[4] However, as only nine Mir Samans served under Aurangzeb, their average term of office comes to five-and-a-half years, which is higher than the average term of other central ministers except the Wazirs.

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1. Fazil Khan II, Burhanuddin was the nephew of Fazil Khan I, the Mir Saman of Aurangzeb. He came from Iran a little before the death of his uncle in the year 1663, and received the favours of Aurangzeb. He served on various posts like the Diwan-i Tan, Diwan of Delhi, Nazim of Kashmir and Lahore besides that of the Mir Saman, and died in 1700-1701 (Maasir, Vol. III, pp.34-36).

2. He was the son of famous Taqarrub Khan Hakim Daud, the physician who was looking after the deposed Shah Jahan (for him see Saleh, Vol. III, p.388; Maasir, Vol. I, pp.490-93). He served on different posts under Aurangzeb and died of a wound during the siege of Golconda in 1687 (Kazim, p.757; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.131, 165, 172, 297; Maasir, Vol. III, pp.625-27).

3. Cf. Maasir, Vol. III, p.625.

4. See Table A.

Functions and Powers :

The Mir Saman had many functions and duties to perform. He has been described as the 'minister of State's expenditures, and the custodian of all nuqud (plural of naqd, meaning cash) and the ajnas (plural of jins, meaning goods).[1] Thus the Mir Saman was the minister incharge of almost all state's khazain (plural of khazana, or as Abul Fazl has used it, khazina,[2] meaning the treasury) except the main state treasury i.e. the khazana-i amira, and of almost all stores, workshops and stables collectively described as the karkhanas. In some sources an Arabic word has also been used along with the karkhanas, namely the buyutat.[3] This is the plural of buyut which itself is the plural of bait, meaning a house, a palace, family and dependents and carpet store.[4] It is because of this reason that the word buyutat was adopted in Persian for state's buildings and establishments.[5] In fact the term buyutat is more comprehensive than the karkhanas. The 'karkhana' included in its official use the stores, workshops and the stables; but, perhaps, it could not be applied to the baghat (gardens and groves), havelis (residential buildings) and the khazain (the treasuries), all of

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1. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.12a; Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.50a.
2. Ain, Vol. I, p.9.
3. Kazim, pp.124, 1101; Rasi, pp.86, 140.
4. Farhang-i Anandraj Nafisi, Vol. I, pp.676, 697.
5. Ibid.

which come under the jurisdiction of the Mir Saman as we shall see. But the word buyutat does cover all of them, and hence the official next to the Mir Saman in the Department was called the Diwan-i Buyutat.[1]

The Mir Saman and his colleagues have also been collectively described as the arbab-al tahawil (the masters of deposts/stores), as against the Diwani officials who were called the arbab-al mal (the masters of revenue).[2] The terms are self-explanatory, and were used because the Diwani officials were concerned mainly with the collection of revenue, while the Mir Saman and his staff looked after the khazain (treasuries) and karkhanajat (stores and workshops).

As the minister-in-charge of State's khazain and karkhanajat, the Mir Saman performed many functions in regard to these two important wings of the administration and his other functions were mainly derived from this position.

1. The Sub-treasuries (khazain) :

There were about two dozen treasuries, or more appropriately, the sub-treasuries, under the over all charge of the Mir Saman. As these

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1. Siyaqnama, p.109; Mahmud-al Afaq, p.191; Add. 6599, ff.37b, 58a.
2. Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.51a; Siyaqnama, pp.99, 108; Add. 6599, f.37b.

sub-treasuries functioned under the immediate supervision of the _Buyutat_, we would discuss them in a subsequent section[1] to avoid repetition and confusion. It should, however, be mentioned here that each sub-treasury had on its staff a _darogha_, an _amin_, a _mushrif_ and a _tahwildar_, who were appointed by the _Mir Saman_.[2]

2. _The Karkhanas_ (_The Stores, Workshops and Stables_) :

The _Karkhanas_ as enumerated by some contemporary _dastur-al amals_, included the stables of animals, stores of various kinds of goods and the workshops where various items were manufactured. The imperial wardrobe, kitchen and stores of bedding, prayer-carpet and bettle-leaf have also been described as the _karkhanas_. Hence the number of the _karkhanas_ varies in our sources between thirty-six and fifty-six.[3]

Sarkar has, however, described seventy _karkhanas_,[4] taking every establishment with the term '_khana_' as a _karkhana_, such as the _qur khana_ or pesh _khana_, although they were neither _karkhanas_, nor were they under

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1. See Infra p. 365
2. _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.21a; Add. 6598, f.139b; _Mirat-i Alamgiri_ (_Khatimah_), p.185.
3. _Siyaqnama_, p.110; Add. 6599, ff.58b-60a; _Khulasat-al Siyaq_, ff.71b-72a; _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.15a.
4. J.N. Sarkar, _op. cit._, pp.170-75.

the jurisdiction of the Mir Saman. His explanation of some of the karkhanas also appears incorrect. It is, indeed, difficult to prepare a comprehensive and exact list of the karkhanas because the lists in our sources are widely different. We have, however, attempted to introduce an improved list which is as follows:[1]

1. toshak khana (the imperial wardrobe)[2];
2. karkiraq khana (workshop for simple embroidery and needle-work on clothes of royal use);
3. sukhasaj khana (store of royal beddings etc);
4. aftabchi khana (store of ewer and bucket etc.);
5. janamaz khana (store of prayer-carpet etc.);
6. shama-chiragh khana (store of candlesticks and lamps etc.);
7. mashal khana (torches store, evidently used in big halls and on roads)[3];
8. farrash khana or/and qali khana (store of carpets, sheets and other furnishings, tents, canvas, screens and the like);

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1. The list and the explanation of the karkhanas is mainly based on Add. 6598, ff.136b-137a; Add. 6599, ff.58b-60a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.15a; Khulasat-al Siyaq, ff.71b-72a; Siyaqnamah, p.110. Many of them have also been described in detail in the Ain (Vol. I).

2. Blochmann (Vol. I, p.93) has wrongly translated it as 'stores for mattresses' (Cf. also Sarkar, op. cit., p.171). The items of toshak khana described in the Ain (Vol. I, pp.71-73) are only various kinds of dresses and not mattresses.

3. Cf. Ain, Vol. I, pp.32 (the plan of imperial tents and) 34-35.

9. zin khana (saddles store);

10. rakhut khana (store of harnesses of horses, elephants and camels etc.)[1];

11. bawarchi khana (the kitchen);

12. modi khana (store of flour, pulses, gram etc., spices, salt and edible oils etc.);

13. abdar khana (store of Ganges water, rose water, saltpetre and ice etc.);

14. sharbat khana (store of sugar, and sweet drinks);

15. rikab khana (store of milk, coagulated milk and other sweetmeats);

16. sachi khana (store of medicinal liquids etc.);

17. tanbul khana (store of bettle-leaf etc.);

18. mewa khana (store of fresh and dry fruits);

19. khushbu khana or itr khana (perfumery);

20. chini khana (crockery store);

21. tabaqchi khana (apparently the store/workshop for copper ware especially big trays and cauldrons);

22. bhanda khana or sifali khana (store/workshop of earthen ware which would have been needed in large number for storing water and other items of kitchen);

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1. The description by Sarkar (op. cit., p.172) as the 'apparel of children and of the khanams is evidently wrong. Rakhut is the plural of rakht (Steingass, p.572), and Abul Fazl has described in detail the rakht (harness) of the elephants, horses and of the camels (Ain, Vol.I, pp.98-110). Cf. Blochmann, Vol. I, pp.134, 143, 152.

23. Chandol khana (the store of sedan chairs which included other modes of conveyance used by the Emperor like the palki, rath and the takht-i rawan (portable throne);

24. ahangar khana (blacksmith's workshop-cum-store);

25. zargar khana (goldsmith and silversmith workshop-cum-store where gold and silver-wares and ornaments were manufactured and stored);

26. kuftgir khana (gilder's workshop-cum-store);

27. khatambandi khana (workshop for gold inlaying work, or more probably, seal engraving, or both);[1]

28. jawahir khana (store of precious stones);

29. hakkak khana (workshop for boring and polishing of the precious stones);

30. zardoz khana or chirabaf khana (workshop-cum-store for gold and silver embroidery or/and gold and silver thread (described as badla) work on silk and velvet etc.);

31. ilaqaband khana (workshop for gold and silver laces and tapes known as jhalar);

32. pashminabaf khana (workshop for woollen clothes weaving);

33. khalat khana (workshop-cum-store for robes of honour);

34. top khana (workshop-cum-store for manufacturing and storing artillery pieces and other kind of fire-arm and ammunitions);

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1. Steingass, op. cit., p.436. It is surprising that Sarkar (op. cit., p.172) has explained it as 'setting shell'.

35. _ibtia khana_ (the department for purchasing various items from the market and merchants);
36. _stabal-o-ushtur khana_ (horse and mule stables);
37. _filkhana_ (elephant stables);
38. _shutr khana_ (camel stables);
39. _gau khana_ (cow pens);
40. _ahu khana_ (deer park);
41. _chitah khana_ (stables of leopard, tigers and other beasts);
42. _qush khana_ (falconry);
43. _tayur khana_ (birds' house).

The above list of the _karkhanas_ is mainly based on some _dastur-al amals_ contemporary to Aurangzeb. But this is obvious that many of these _karkhanas_ even if not closed, were seriously affected by the political conditions of Aurangzeb's reign, the increasing economic strain on the state-exchequer, the curtailment in the household expenses referred to above, and the growing simpler life of the Emperor. These factors led the Emperor to ban the use and production of a number of goods. Thus, for example, in the beginning of his 23rd R.Y. (starting from 28th October, 1677), Aurangzeb stopped the celebration of coronation anniversary and its associated festivities. He also orderd that gold and silver railing (_katahra_) round his throne should be replaced by one of lapis lazuli set in gold; that in the _khalat khana_ only embroidered cloth

should be used instead of one stuffed with gold and silver flowers on it; that the workshop of *Aamdamni* (super-fine cloth) of Chanderi should be closed; that gold and silver censers used for aloe-wood in the royal residence should be removed; that the *inam* amount should be brought in shields instead of silver trays; and that the clerks should use inkpots of China-ware and gilt stone instead of that of silver.[1] However, notwithstanding these orders and their effect on some of the *karkhanas*, the *Mir Saman* of Aurangzeb had still to perform hosts of duties for state's stores and workshops.

Administration of the Karkhanas :

A glance over the list of the *karkhanas* will show that while some of them were simply the stores of some finished and unfinished goods, others were to improve upon them or to manufacture themselves a large number of goods required by the imperial house-hold or by the state administration, from the guns and muskets to food and clothes. It was the duty of the *Mir Saman*, and a very exacting duty indeed, to keep the *karkhanas* properly equipped with men and material i.e. with the officials, artisans, regular and casual labour, finished and unfinished goods and other provisions.[2] This was a pre-requisite for smooth functioning of the

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1. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.162.

2. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.51a; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, ff.12a-14a.

karkhanas and for ensuring the uninterrupted supply of innumerable provisions required by the king or the administration. The Mir Saman, therefore, performed many functions in regard to the karkhanas.

(a) Appointment, Posting and Transfer of Officials :

First among these functions was the appointment of the administrative staff for the karkhanas. Each karkhana, whether at the centre or in the provinces, used to have one darogha, one amin, one mushrif, and one tahwildar[1], who were appointed by the Mir Saman.[2] Unfortunately, we do not find much detail about the appointment of these officials. We can, however, presume that the Mir Saman exercised the same power and discretion in the appointment of his subordinates which the Diwan-i Ala and the Mir Bakhshi enjoyed in their respective departments. At any rate, the appointment letters (sanads) of these officials were issued with the risalah and the seal of the Mir Saman.[3] At the time of their appointment, the Mir Saman also secured the sureties (mal-zamini) from them.[4] Subsequently, he also looked to it that they regularly attend to their respective

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1. Malumat-al Afaq, p.192; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.184-88. Cf. Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.72b.

2. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21a; Add. 6598, f.139b; Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.50a; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.184-86.

3. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.184-88.

4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21b; Add. 6598, f.140a.

duties, maintained a record of their presence and absence, and verified their attendance-rolls (tasdiq-i haziri) for the purpose of drawing the salary.[1]

The Mir Saman, like the other central ministers, does not appear to have any say in the appointment of his colleague, the Diwan-i Buyutat at the centre. But the provincial buyutats, as also the other staff, were appointed through him. The provincial buyutat in turn had some say in the appointment of karkhana officials in his province.[2] To quote one specific case, the Buyutat of the Deccan sent a name for the post of mushrif of the store of a fort (zakhira) in his province (1688), and the name was approved by Aurangzeb.[3] However, the formal appointment letter was issued by the then Mir Saman, Kamgar Khan with his seal and signature.[4]

These officials of the karkhanas, at the centre or in provinces, had specific function to perform. The darogha was the superintending incharge of his karkhana and was responsible for its smooth functioning.[5]

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1. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21b; Add. 6598, f.140a.
2. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.184-88.
3. Dastak of Kamgar Khan, Khan Saman, in the name of Kishna, dated 11th Rabi I, 31st R.Y. (S.A.H.).
4. Ibid. Cf. also Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.184-88.
5. Bernier, p.258.

He was expected to keep his *karkhana* in good shape and fully furnished with concerned goods.[1] He also received orders from the *Mir Saman*, or directly from the King, for the procurement/manufacture of an item connected with his *karkhana*, and was responsible for order's execution.[2] The function of the *amin* is, however, not clear. It seems he was to assist the *daragha* in his functions.[3] The *mushrif* was the auditor-cum-accounts clerk, and one of the important functions of the *mushrif* was to prepare the *barawurd* (i.e. the bill and requisition slip) for his *karkhana* to be submitted to the *Bayutat* and the *Mir Saman* for the provision of cash or goods.[4] The *tahwildar* was the custodian of the cash, the stores and provisions in his *karkhana*. They were expected to work with honesty and in unison, and jointly signed and sealed the diary of the *karkhana* that was sent to the *Mir Saman* to whom they all were ultimately responsible for their work and performance.[5] Some *daroghas* and *mushrifs* had also access to the Emperor.[6]

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1. This is what Aurangzeb himself expected of the *daragha* of a *karkhana*. Cf. *Ruqaat*, p.39; *Raqaim*, f.10a; *Dastur-i Agahi*, f.108a.

2. *Kazim*, pp.429-55; *Ruqaat*, pp.27, 29; *Raqaim*, ff.4a-b; *Akhbarat*, 11th Jumada II, 21st Shaban, 43rd R.Y.; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.98.

3. Cf. *Akhbarat*, 23rd Ziqad, 40th R.Y.

4. *Waqai Ajmer*, pp.76-77.

5. *Siyaqnama*, pp.109-110; *Dastur-al Siyaq*, f.50a; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.12a.

6. *Kazim*, pp.429, 1101; *Akhbarat*, 15th Zilhijja, 37[illegible] R.Y.

Almost all *daroghas* at the centre, as also in the provinces, used to be the *mansabdars*.[1] The *darogha* of the store of silver wares at the centre was a *mansabdar* of 300/15,[2] while that of the *baghat* (gardens) in Kashmir held the rank of 150/5.[3] Among the *mushrifs*, one attached to *farrash-khana* (carpet-store) at the centre was the *mansabdar* of 300/80.[4] But in provinces the *mushrifs* appear to have been employed on monthly wages. Thus the *mushrif* of the treasury (*khazana*) of the fort of Zafarabad was paid rupees forty per month.[5] Similarly, the *mushrif* of *karkiraq khana* (the embroidery house) in Ahmadabad got rupees sixty per month,[6] while one attached to *bait-al mal* there, only rupees twenty-five per month.[7] The position of the *tahwildar* at the centre is not clear. But it may be guessed from the fact that in Ahmadabad the *tahwildar* of the *karkiraq khana* got rupees thirty-five per month, and that of horse-purchasing department only

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1. Cf. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), pp.184-88.

2. *Akhbarat*, 21st Shaban, 43rd R.Y.

3. *Akhbarat*, 4th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.

4. *Ibid.*, 27th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.

5. *Tasdiq-i mahiyana* of Kirpa Ram, dated 1st Rabi I, 27th R.Y. (S.A.H.). Cf. also *Dastak* (with the seal of Abdul Qadir) in the name of Udairaj, dated 22nd Shawwal, 31st R.Y. (S.A.H.).

6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.184.

7. *Ibid.*, p.185.

rupees eight.[1] The above data incidentally show that there were fixed pay-scales for certain karkhana officials. It also indicates that the mansab or salary of a darogha, amin, mushrif and tahwildar was not fixed on their designations, but depended upon their own standing and on the importance of the karkhanas they were attached to.

Apart from the appointment, the Mir Saman was also responsible for the postings and the transfers of his subordinates.[2] He issued the dastaks for such transfers or postings[3] in the same manner as the Diwan-i Ala or the Mir Bakhshi used to do in respect of their subordinates. After their appointment and posting, the Mir Saman served as a link between them and the Court. Although the Buyutat and the daroghas of the karkhanas had access to the Emperor, a large number of imperial orders to the subordinate officials were generally communicated through the Mir Saman.[4] When the orders were related to the provincial officials of his Department, he sent them the hasb-al hukm.[5] Similarly, if some imperial orders were meant to

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1. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), p.184.

2. Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.50a; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.12a; Add. 6598, f.139b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21a.

3. For such dastaks see Nigarnamah, p.151; Naql-i dastak with the seal of Kamgar Khan, Mir Saman to Kishan Ram, dated 11th Rabi I, 31st R.Y. (S.A.H.)

4. Dastur-i Agahi, f.97b; Raqaim, f.4b; Akhbarat, 18th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.

5. For a few hasb-al hukms see Akhbarat, 7th and 13th Rajab, 24th R.Y.; Waqai Ajmer, f.76; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.276.

be sent to all the provinces in the form of a general farman, it was the privilege of the Mir Saman that the yaddasht of such orders was prepared with his risalah, like those related to the departments of the Diwan-i Ala and the Mir Bakhshi were written with their risalah.[1] As the Mir Saman transmitted the king's orders to his subordinates, so was he their spokesman at the Court. He put their grievances before the Emperor[2] and pleaded their case for promotion and increase.[3] If, however, any of his subordinates misappropriated any amount, the Mir Saman was held responsible for its recovery.[4]

(b) Employment of Artisans and Workers :

The Mir Saman was also responsible for the employment of the artisans and workers in the karkhanas on monthly or daily wages.[5] But it

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1. For a yaddasht of such an order issued in 1666 with the risalah of the then Mir Saman Iftekhar Khan, see Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.266.

2. For instance, Fazil Khan II requested the Emperor for the payment of the salary arrears of a mason who had been transferred from the Court (Akhbarat, 12th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y.).

3. Thus Fazil Khan II praised the services of the Amanat of Bengal and advocated for an increase in his mansab which was granted (Akhbarat, 7th Rabi II, 39th R.Y.)

4. Khulasat-al Siyaq, 50a; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.12a. For a specific case of an embezzlement by the darogha of a store and the recovery by the Mir Saman (Ruhullah Khan II) see Akhbarat, 28th Shawwal, 43rd R.Y.

5. Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.14a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21a; Add. 6598, f.140a.

seems practically impossible that all the candidates for employment in *karkhanas* would have come to, or were interviewed by the *Mir Saman*. Therefore, his assistants, and especially the *daroghas* of the *karkhanas* would have had great discretion in their employment and in the fixation of their wages, though the fixation was not altogether arbitrary and solely depending upon the discretion of the officials; it was fixed according to the rates prevalent for their class in the locality.[1] Moreover, the papers related to their wages (*nuskha-i ajirah*) ultimately came to the *Mir Saman* for his checking and sanction.[2] It was the main concern of the *Mir Saman* to keep the artisans and the workers of the *karkhanas* happy and contented for better work and for ensuring their availability.[3] The Emperor too greatly valued the craftsmanship and bestowed lavish rewards on artisans on manufacturing rare pieces of art. Thus for example, Aurangzeb rewarded a goldsmith with a robe, an elephant and with cash for manufacturing a golden portable throne (*takht-i rawan*).[4] Similarly, a mason was given cash award for his good work.[5] These instances show artisans' achievements in their arts and Emperor's patronage to them.

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1. Cf. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.276.
2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.21a; Add. 6598, f.140a.
3. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.14a.
4. *Kazim*, pp.429, 455; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.98.
5. *Akhbarat*, 8th Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.

Bernier testifies to the artistic eminence of these artisans and their better conditions in state karkhanas.[1] During the later years of Aurangzeb's reign, however, many workers in the state karkhanas would have become jobless as the Emperor banned the use and manufacture of a number of goods mentioned above.

(c) <u>Provisions for the Karkhanas</u> (<u>Saranjam-i Karkhanajat</u>):

Now comes the function of the <u>Mir Saman</u> in relation to providing to the karkhanas various items and goods (<u>ajnas</u>) required by them for storing or processing.[2] Provision of such requirements was made according to a set procedure under the immediate supervision and control of the <u>Bayutat</u>, and would be discussed later.[3] Similarly, the local <u>Bayutat</u> was responsible for the supply of provisions in the provinces, the fund for which was arranged by the provincial <u>Diwan</u> from the local treasury on receiving the <u>hasb-al hukm</u> from the <u>Mir Saman</u>.[4] However, once the requirements of the <u>karkhanas</u> were arranged, it was again the final responsibility of the <u>Mir Saman</u> to ensure that the proper stock of various

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1. <u>Bernier</u>, p.256.
2. <u>Farhang-i Kardani</u>, f.40a; <u>Siyaqnama</u>, p.110; <u>Khulasat-al Siyaq</u>, f.50a.
3. See Infra p. 358
4. Cf. <u>Selected Waqai</u>, pp.137-38; <u>Inayat Collection</u>, I 6/132, 1388 (the text of the <u>hasb-al hukm</u>).

goods and items is maintained inall *karkhanas* by getting it manufactured by the concerned *karkhana*.[1] Apart from the routine production in the *karkhanas*, the *Mir Saman* and his colleagues were sometimes called upon to get prepared a particular item desired by the King (*farmaish-i huzur*).[2] Finally, the provisions and products from a particular *karkhana* were taken out only after the *Mir Saman* issued a *dastak* to the officials of the *karkhana* to release that specified item.[3]

(d) *Transport* :

The *Mir Saman* was also responsible for providing the porters or the transport animals for different karkhanas for the transportation of goods to and from the *karkhanas* such as the beddings, tents, and poles for tents etc.[4] He had also to provide the means of transportation for various *karkhanas* and provisions during the expeditons and Emperor's travel from one place to another.[5]

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1. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.50a; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.12b.

2. Add. 6598, f.140a. For instance, Aurangzeb once ordered to the *Mir Saman* for the preparation of a golden litter (*hauda*). *Kazim*, p.455; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.98. For other instance see *Ruqaat*, pp.27-29; *Raqaim*, ff.4a-b; *Akhbarat*, 3rd Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; Add. 6599, ff.184a-185a.

3. Add. 6598, f.140a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22a.

4. *Akhbarat*, 13th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.; *Bernier*, p.359; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22a; Add. 6598, f.140a.

5. *Akhbarat*, 16th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22a. See also Infra p. 344.

(e) Inspection of the Karkhanas (Arz-i Karkhanajat) :

The Mir Saman also performed the important job of checking the stock of the karkhanas (arz-i karkhanajat).[1] For this purpose he received the diaries (roznamcha) and ledgers (awarija) of all the karkhanas at the centre and the provinces.[2] They were looked into bythe Mir Saman who put the seal of 'non-changeable' (adam-i tabdil)[3] on them to end the possibility of their replacement by manipulated diaries and awarijas for the purpose of auditing. These documents would have kept the Mir Saman fully informed about the purchase and consumption of various goods in the karkhanas, the quantum of manufactured items, the stock position of different karkhanas; and would have minimised the chances of misappropriation and embezzlement. In this job the Mir Saman was further assisted by the Mustaufi as we shall see..

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1. Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.50 ; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.13b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.22b; Add. 6598, f.140a. J.N. Sarkar seems to have misunderstood the term arz-i karkhanajat (Mughal Administration, p.43). Perhaps confused by the word 'arz' (request in its common use), he has explained it as 'considering application from the workshops and stores'. But 'arz' has been used here in the meaning of inspecting and reviewing and hence the pre-Mughal terms 'arz-i lashkar' (review of the army), and the 'ariz-i lashkar', the official responsible for the maintenance of the army. (Cf. Muhammad Padshah Shad, Farhang-i Anand Raj, Vol. IV, pp.2871-2910). One source has indeed used the phrase 'arz-i karkhanajat wa-mujudat-i har karkhana' (Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.50b) which makes the meaning abundantly clear.

2. Khulasat-al Siyaq, ff.50a-b.

3. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f. [illegible] ; Add. 6598, f.140a.

(f) Supervision of the Royal Kitchen :

Apart from the above functions which were common to all karkhanas, the Mir Saman performed some specific duties about some particular karkhanas. One such duty was related to the royal kitchen (bawarchi-khana). It is irrelevant for us to reproduce here the details of its functioning described by Abul Fazl.[1] It should, however, be mentioned that the imperial kitchen required the unfailing attention of the Mir Saman, and he had to issue daily the dastaks to the kitchen officials for the increase or decrease in the quantity of the meal that was to be prepared.[2]

(g) Fixation and Distribution of Animal Feed :

Another such duty was to look after the proper upkeep of a large number of animals maintained by the state, such as the cows, camels, mules and, of course, horses and elephants.[3] The Mir Saman was supposed to fix the quantity of the daily feed of the beasts (dawabb).[4] It is, however, obvious that the feed and its quality for different categories of animals

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1. Ain, Vol. I, pp.40-42.
2. Add. 6598, f.140b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.22a; Siyaqnama, p.161.
3. Vide Karkhanas Nos.36-41, supra p.319.
4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.22a; Add.6598, f.140a.

maintained by the state had already become a well established routine.[1] However, under Aurangzeb as also under his predecessors, the Mir Saman had to see that the feed is regularly supplied to the animal keepers, that the feed supplied to them was actually being served to the animals, and that they were kept in proper health and shape. For checking it the ledger (siyaha) of the feed distributed among the cattles was daily sent first to the Boyutat and thence to the Mir Saman for his reappraisal and verification.[2] Moreover, the Mir Saman periodically inspected the animals themselves according to a rule invenyed by Akbar.

(h) The Paegasht Regulation :

Akbar had introduced a unique method for assessing whether the animals were getting the proper quantity of their feed. The method was known as paegasht,[3] which in later sources is described as nimgasht-o-paegasht.[4] Under the system the animal was periodically measured to know

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1. For rules and regulations about the maintenance of different species of animals and their feed etc. see Ain, Vol. I. Siyaqnama (pp.177-83) also gives the weight of various kinds of feed supplied to different kinds of beasts and expenses on it.

2. Add. 6598, f.140b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.23a.

3. For this rule see Ain (ain No.83), Vol. I, pp.126-27, and Blochmann, Vol. I, pp.226-28 and note.

4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21b; Add. 6598, f.140a; Akhbarat, 1st Rajab, 39th R.Y.

whether it had put up flesh or had shed it since the last measurement, which would in turn indicate whether the animal was being properly fed. It was, therefore, an important duty of the _Mir Saman_ to supervise this periodical _nimgosht-u-paogosht_ measurement.[1] Sometimes the Emperor himself inspected the nimgosht measurement and asked the _Mir Saman_ to bring the animals before him.[2] This shows the Emperor's concern for his animals as also the importance of the system.

Two exclusive sub-treasuries were run for the maintenance of state animals alone. One was known as the _khazana-i khurak-i dawabb_ (the treasury for the feed of animals), and the other as the _khazana-i nimgosht-u-paogosht_ (treasury of _nimgosht_ and _paogosht_).[3] While the first sub-treasury seems to have been run for purchasing the feed, the meaning and nature of the other is not clear. Its name suggests that the fine realised from the animal-keepers on finding their animals below the standard on _nimgosht_ measurement was deposited in it.

Besides the treasuries and the _karkhanas_, the _Mir Saman_ and the _Bayutat_ also appear to look after the state's mines. Thus we find Khudabanda Khan the _Bayutat_ showing to the Emperor three pieces of diamond

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1. _Ibid._; _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.21b; _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.88.
2. _Akhbarat_, 1st Rajab, 39th R.Y., 16th Rajab, 43rd R.Y. Cf. _Kazim_, p.1100.
3. _Zawabit-i Alamgiri_, f.14b; Add. 6598, f.136b.

(almas) found in the mine of Karnool.[1] Similarly the baghat (gardens and groves), shops (dakakin, plural of dukan) and residential buildings (hawalis) owned by the state were also under the jurisdiction of the Mir Saman.

3. Administration of Baghat (Gardens and Groves) :

The Mughal Emperors were specially interested in laying gardens and planting orchards described in our sources as baghat.[2] Aurangzeb inherited a large number of such baghat in the provinces of Lahore,[3] Kashmir[4] and Burhanpur[5] and the Deccan.[6] In Ahmadabad city alone there were one dozen baghat.[7] These state baghat, spread over the entire country, were an important source of income for the state. This is clear from the fact that in 1700 A.D., the darogha-i baghat of Ahmadnagar had affected

1. Akhbarat, 11th Safar, 43rd R.Y.
2. For many gardens laid by the Mughal Emperors, see C.M.V. Stuart, Gardens of the Great Mughals.
3. Akhbarat, 15th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y.
4. Ibid., 4th Ramazan, 40th R.Y.
5. Ibid., 25th Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.; Dilkusha, f.4a.
6. Akhbarat, 20th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y., 14th Shaban, 40th R.Y.
7. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), p.184; Cf. also Ibid., Vol. I, pp.267, 337-38.

an increase of Rs.4,800 over the revenue of previous year which unfortunately is not mentioned;[1] but the daroghe-i baghat of Sholapur had collected Rs.134,979 from baghat during his five years tenure (May 1691 - March 1696).[2] The total income from all the baghat of the state can easily be gauged from these figures. It was, therefore, an important duty of the Mir Saman to appoint the staff for the proper upkeep and realisation of their revenue. The baghat staff at Ahmadabad was the same that was appointed for the karkhanas, besides 95 baghbanan (gardeners),[3] and would have performed the similar duties. As the baghat yielded huge income, Aurangzeb was very been for their proper maintenance and security and sanctioned irrigation schemes for the baghat.[4]

4\. The Hawalis (the Houses) :

The hawalis (the houses) that were looked after by the Mir Saman were called the hawali-i muauli.[5] Muauli has been explained as the 'places

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1. Akhbarat, 14th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.
2. Ibid., 11th Shawwal, 40th R.Y. The money thus collected was deposited in the khazana-i andarun-i mahal (the treasury inside the palace)..
3. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.184-85.
4. Cf. Akhbarat, 10th Rabi II, 19th Rajab, 39th R.Y., 11th Shawwal, 40th R.Y., 12th Rajab, 27th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.337-38. Ruqaat (p.32) and Raqaim (f.9b) contain a letter of Aurangzeb to the Wazir Asad Khan, showing his concern for the proper upkeep of the baghat.
5. Kalimat, f.125b; Add. 6598, f.140a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21b.

that were earmarked for the occupation of incoming army and/or the officials';[1] and as the 'buildings that fall to the state from default of heirs or by escheat'.[2] There is, however, no contradiction between the two explanations, and it seems that the Mughal Emperors were alive to the accommodation problem of their officials at administrative headquarters and had solved it by earmarking official accommodation for them either by constructing the buildings of by taking possession of heirless buildings which were called the *hawaliha-i nuzuli*.[3] While allotting such *hawalis* on rent or free of charge,[4] the *Mir Saman* issued the *dastak* of allotment/rent for local officials to give the possession to the allottee and collect the rent if rented out.[5] Similarly, when a *hawali* was vacated, the *Mir Saman* wrote his subordinates to take it over.[6]

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1. Muhammad Padshah Shad, *Farhang-i Anand Raj*, Vol. VII, p.4224.
2. *Wilson*, p.381.
3. Cf. *Selected Waqai*, p.87.
4. The passage is not quite clear in our sources. In Add. 6598 (f.140a), it could be read either as '*mablaghi shudan-i havaliha*', from *mablagh* i.e. money and meaning giving on rent; or preferably as '*mutaayyani-shudan-i hawaliha*', from *tayyun*, which would then mean, I suppose, 'allotting the *hawali*'. In *Zawabit-i Alamgiri* (f.21a), which is almost a copy of the same (Add. 6598), the passage becomes even more obscure. However, the second reading and our interpretation of the passage is supported by a news-report (*waqai*) where a local official has been ordered by the Court to allot one of the *hawaliha-i nuzuli* to the widow of a noble on reaching there (*Selected Waqai*, p.87).
5. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.21b; Add. 6598, f.140a.
6. *Kalimat*, f.125b.

5. The Shops (Dukakin) :

The Mir Saman would have adopted the same procedure for allotting or renting out the shops (dukans) owned by the State. According to Mirat-i Ahmadi, in Ahmadabad alone the state owned many shops with an estimated annual jamadami rent of 191,000.[1] The staff appointed by the Mir Saman at Ahmadabad for looking after the shops and collection of their rent was almost the same that was employed for the haghat and would have performed the similar job. It is, however, not clear whether the hamalis were also looked after by the same or separate officials or by the officials maintained for the repair and construction of government buildings.

6. Construction and Repair :

Where the state owned a large number of hamalis, shops, mosques and other public buildings, the construction and repair work was naturally almost a continuous process. A separate 'construction and repair' department was maintained for this purpose under the over all supervision of the Mir Saman who appointed some regular and permanent staff for this department like the darogha, amin, a mushrif, tahwildar and a number of

1. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.183-84.

masons (memar), carpenter (najjar), digger (haldar) etc.[1] But before finally assigning the work to these officials and workers, the Mir Saman himself performed some important preliminary work. On Emperor's orders for construction or repair of a building, he got the plan (tarh) of the construction or repair prepared and showed it to the Emperor for approval.[2] After his approval, the darogha of construction and repair prepared with the help of the mushrif, a cost-estimate-cum-bill (harmaurd) and submitted it to the court for the sanction. The Mir Saman then sent a mason (memar) of his own confidence, to verify the cost.[3] On approval, the money was released and the officials were instructed to start the work. In provinces the local Diwan (evidently the Diwan-i Boyutat) was authorised to get the minor repairs done on his own without waiting for Court's sanction. But for major works he sent the cost-estimate-cum-bill (harmaurd) to the court for approval and sanction.[4] As regard to minor and major works in the

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1. Cf. Ain, Vol. I, p.132; Dastur-i Agahi, f.67b; Nagai Ajmer, f.77; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.267, 276, (Khatimah), pp.185-86.

2. Akhbarat, 7th Safar, 33rd R.Y., 12th Rabi II, 39th R.Y.; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.22b. In its other recension (Add. 6598, f.140b), however, it is transcribed as kharch-i imarat, which would not be altogether irrelevant.

3. Akhbarat, 12th Zilhijja, 20th R.Y., 7th Safar, 40th R.Y. Cf. also Ibid., 8th Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; Nagai Ajmer, f.77.

4. Akhbarat, 7th Rajab, 21st Rajab, 24th R.Y.; Dastur-i Agahi, f.67b; Nagai Ajmer, ff.76-77; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), p.185. Cf. also Ibid., Vol. I, p.330.

context of above authorisation, the repairs costing Rs.1,430 are mentioned to have been referred to the Court for sanction. And after sanction, the *Diwan* met the expenses from local treasury.[1]

7. *The Shagirdpesha Servants* :

Apart from the establishments discussed above, the *Mir Saman* looked after a variety of State's employees. First among them was the staff known as the *shagirdpesha* which included the attendants (*khidmatgaran*), macebearer (*chobdaran*), clerks (*muharriran*), cooks (*bawarchian*), torch-bearers (*mashalchian*), those who spread carpets (*farrashan*), eunuchs (*khwajasarayan*), huntsmen (*mir shikaran*), gardeners (*maliyan*), footmen (*piadaha*), book-binders (*daftar-bandan*), water-carriers (*saqqai*), stone-cutters (*sang-tarash*), sawyer (*arahkash*), diggers (*beldaran*) and the porters (*kaharan*).[2] Keeping the list in mind, it would be incorrect to describe the 'shagirdpesha' as simply the 'menials or domestic' servants.[3] In fact many of them were indispensable for military expeditions and were therefore, employed in large number, such as the water-carriers, porters,

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1. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.330, 331.
2. *Akhbarat*, 19th Rajab, 39th R.Y.; *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.200, 240; Add. 6599, f.162a.
3. J.N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p.43.

diggers, stone-cutters and sawyers, etc.,[1] and had their separate daroghas.[2] Apart from separate daroghas, there used to be a bakhshi for all of them known as the Bakhshi-i Shagirdpesha.[3] Evidently, the respective daroghas and the Bakhshi-i Shagirdpesha assisted the Mir Saman in the recruitment of various categories of shagirdpesha employees, in supervising their work and in registering their attendance etc. However, the Mir Saman looked into their sureties (mal-i zamini), verified their appearance at the Court and their recruitment, and the mode of the payment according to which their salaries were to be paid, annually, monthly or daily.[4] The Bakhshi-i Shagirdpesha was responsible for the payment of their salaries from a sub-treasury maintained for the shagirdpesha, namely, the khazana-i shagirdpesha.[5]

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1. Cf. Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), p.200, where it is mentioned that in the army of Ghaziuddin Khan alone in January 1689 (when the Khan was deputed to capture the fort of Adeni, Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.308) there were seventy water-carriers and one hundred stone-cutters.
2. Akhbarat, 8th Jumada II, 19th Rajab, 43rd R.Y.
3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.158; Add. 6599, f.164a.
4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21a; Add. 6598, f.139b. For a yaddasht containing some rules about the annual, monthly and daily wages of the shagirdpesha see Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), pp.240-42.
5. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.14b; Add. 6598, f.136b.

8. *Other Categories of Servants* :

The *Mir Saman* also exercised jurisdiction over a variety of other staff which may not possibly be included either in the employees of the *karkhanas* or among the *shagirdpesha*. The *naqqarkhana* staff in Ahmadabad was appointed by the *Mir Saman*.[1] It means that the same staff at the Centre too was under the jurisdiction of the *Mir Saman*. Similarly, a *mushrif*, and a *tahwildar*, appointed by the *Mir Saman* in consultation with the provincial *Diwan*, were maintained at Ahmadabad for the distribution of cloth and blankets to the poor and needy during the winter season.[2] A *mutawalli* (administrator) and a *mushrif-cum-tahwildar*, appointed by the *Mir Saman* and the provincial *Diwan* were kept at Ahmadabad for organising religious functions on the two nights of eleventh and twelfth of every month.[3] Almost the same staff was appointed by the *Mir Saman* for running a *langarkhana* (charity food kitchen) at Ahmadabad.[4] This is also to be noted that the above staff employed for charitable purposes did not come under the jurisdiction of the *Sadr-us Sudur*.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.185.
2. *Ibid.*, p.187.
3. *Ibid.*, pp.187-88.
4. *Ibid.*, p.186.

Public Health Staff :

But more interesting case is that of Francois Bernier, the famous French traveller who visited India during 1656-1668 and was for some years associated with the court of Aurangzeb. According to his own statement, his salary as a court-physician too depended upon the decision of the Mir Saman.[1] It means that the physicians, the auxiliary staff and the entire establishment of the hospitals (dar-al shifa)[2] that were run by the state at many places in the empire were under the jurisdiction of the Mir Saman. Such a hospital run for the poors and the destitutes at Ahmadabad had on its staff a hakim (tabib-i Unani), who also used to be the darogha of the hospital,[3] 'a vaid (tabib-i Hindi) for the Hindus who preferred this method of treatment', a surgeon (jarrah), a mushrif, a tahwildar and two other men. An annual grant of Rs.2,000 had been earmarked for this hospital 'for spending over the medicines and the food of the poor patients and for contingencies'.[4] Another hospital was working at Aurangabad,[5]

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1. Bernier, p.200.
2. We prefer to call this dar-al shifa as hospital because it had 'an annual grant for spending on the medicines and the food of the patients' which suggests that it admitted indoor patients (Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.186-87).
3. Cf. Document No. A.R. 91/11 (S.A.H.).
4. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), pp.186-87.
5. Document No. A.R. 91/11 (S.A.H.).

besides one that was run at the Court itself.[1] Similar hospitals might have been functioning at other places. Most probably it were these state physicians who were authorised to issue the medical certificates (*bimar-namah*) to the *mansabdars* and the officials for the purpose of 'earned medical leave' referred to in an earlier chapter.

9. *Emperor's Journeys* :

Another important function of the *Mir Saman* which he performed in his capacity as the minister-in-charge of State's *karkhanas* and the *shagirdpesha* staff, was to make arrangements for the journeys ofthe Emperor. A journey by a Mughal Emperor required very elaborate and careful arrangements because the entire camp looked, as an Italian traveller has put it, 'like a great city travelling from place to place'.[2] Bernier and Manucci who witnessed Aurangzeb's entourage in his journey from Delhi to Kashmir in December, 1662, have given a long list of items that were taken in the journey.[3] The list includes hundreds of articles, from water and food to birds and beasts. As the incharge of state's stores and provisions, workshops, stables and the *shagirdpesha* servants, it was

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1. *Akhbarat*, 23rd Jumada II, 39th R.Y.
2. *Manucci*, Vol. II, p.69.
3. *Bernier*, p.364; *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.62-63.

the duty of the Mir Saman to arrange all sorts of provisions and stores and other items which might accompany the Emperor, and to provide hundreds of porters and transport animals for the transportation of above store and karkhanas,[1] and various kinds of conveyance for the Emperor and the royal ladies.[2]

When the Emperor decided upon a journey, he informed the Mir Saman in advance to make the necessary arrangements;[3] and the Mir Saman besides arranging the requirements of the journey, also passed on the information to the officials on way, and especially to the officials at final destination to keep the royal buildings there repaired and furnished for Emperor's stay.[4]

Finally, the Mir Saman had to move ahead of the Emperor, for selecting a suitable and pleasant site with plenty of water and pasture,

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1. Cf. Ain, Vol. I, p.33; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.22 ; Bernier, p.359; Manucci, Vol. II, pp.62-64.

2. These modes of conveyance included besides the horses, elephants and camels with trappings and litters, rath, palki, chandol and, of course, takht-i rawan (Akhbarat, 4th Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.; Bernier, p.370; Manucci, Vol. II, p.63).

3. Kazim, p.764; Hatim Khan, f.126b; Inshah, f.84b; Masir-i Alamgiri, p.212; Akhbarat, 28th Rajab, 24th R.Y., 18th Ramazan, 40th R.Y., 23rd Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.

4. Waqai Ajmer, ff.76-77; Akhbarat, 13th Rajab, 24th R.Y.

for Emperor's halt on way and getting his tents pitched before his arrival.[1] He had a special official namely the khush-manzil, or more appropriately the Mir Manzil,[2] for assisting him in the job. Once the site was selected, the Mir Saman did not only get the royal tents pitched at a neat and clean place, he had also to fix the grounds for the tents of entire entourage - the eunuchs and attendants, the guests, the light artillery, the nobles, the army, and for the bazar etc. - to ensure peace and security around the royal tent as also to avoid confusion and chaos at the site.[3] Thus the Mir Saman had to perform a very meticulous job before and during the journey of the Emperor.

10. The Royal Marriages :

Another function of the Mir Saman similar to one described above, was to make arrangements for the weddings of the princes and princesses.[4] Thus for instance, Aurangzeb instructed Muhammad Ali Khan Mir Saman to make

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1. Intikhab, f.84a; Akhbarat, 23rd Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.; Bernier, pp.359-60; Manucci, Vol. II, p.67.

2. Akhbarat, 18th Ramazan, 40th R.Y. While Akhbarat (Ibid.) mentions him as the Khush Manzil, Kamtu (p.208), Khafi Khan (Vol. II, p.155) as well as the Ain (Vol. I, p.33) describe him as the Mir Manzil, is one 'who is deputed by the kings and nobles to select a pleasant site for their halt' (Muhammad Padshah Shah, op. cit., Vol. II, p.1737).

3. Bernier, p.365; Manucci, Vol. II, p.67.

4. Ruqaat-i Alamgiri, f.22a; Add. 6598, f.140a.

preparations for the marriage of Prince Azam with the daughter of Sikandar Adil Shah of Bijapur (1681).[1] Similar orders had been given earlier on the occasion of the marriage of Prince Muazzam with the daughter of Raja Rup Singh Rathor in 1661.[2] On such occasions the Mir Saman had not only to arrange for the clothes, ornaments, jewellery and other items required for a royal wedding, but also for the feasts and festivities etc. associated with such a marriage.[3]

11. Acquisition of Property :

(a) Of Deceased Nobles

Another function of the Mir Saman was the confiscation of the property of the nobles who died in service.[4] The escheat system was an important institution under the Mughals and its legal and administrative aspects have already been discussed by some modern scholars.[5] Aurangzeb is

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1. Akhbarat, 7th Rajab, 24th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.210.
2. Kazim, p.640.
3. Ibid., pp.640-44.
4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21a; Add. 6598, f.139b. There is perhaps no instance of escheating to the state the property of a noble who died as a 'pensioner'.
5. J.N. Sarkar, Mughal Administration, pp.146-60; R.P. Khosla, Mughal Kingship and Nobility, pp.238-50; M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, pp.63-68.

said to have stopped the practice of escheat in 1666, and had ordered that the property of only those nobles should be attached who had state-dues against them, and then again only to that proportion.[1] But there are innumerable instances where almost the entire property of a deceased noble was taken over by the state.[2] However, the charge of Bernier that the escheat reduced the sons and grandsons of a deceased noble 'generally to beggary'[3] is imaginary than real. It would indeed be difficult to cite a few cases where the sons of deceased nobles were left in distress, let alone the beggary. Mughal Emperors were unusually considerate and generous to their nobles and their sons who got *mansabs* during the life time of their fathers or immediately thereafter and were known as *Khanazad*.[4] Notwithstanding its legality or otherwise, the escheat system was, in fact, in the interests of both the state and the sons of the deceased nobles.

Apart from bringing some wealth to the state-exchequer, the system prevented the vices of senior nobles in which they indulged because of excessive wealth, from devolving upon their heirs at an early age. It,

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1. *Mirat-ul Alam*, f.211b; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.531; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, pp.266-67 (text of the *farman* issued on the matter).

2. For the detail of the property of a few nobles attached by the state, see Add. 6598, f.164b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.72a. For some more instances see Athar Ali, *op. cit.*, pp.66-67 and notes.

3. *Bernier*, p.212.

4. For *Khanazad*, see Athar Ali, *op. cit.*, pp.11-12.

on the other hand, compelled them to serve the state according to the best of their ability for a better and prosperous life. It was, perhaps, because of these economic and administrative considerations that Aurangzeb continued to confiscate the property of the deceased nobles ignoring the Shariah laws and his own farman issued earlier for discontinuing the practice.

The procedure followed in escheat was that on the news of the death of a noble, and Emperor's orders for the confiscation of his property, the Mir Saman sent his men to get possession of the property of the deceased noble and prepare a list. The servants of the deceased were also required to submit a complete list of properties (nuskha-i matrukat) that would have been left by the deceased anywhere.[1] The state-officials also tried to gather the information from independent sources if possible.[2] The Mir Saman presented the list before the Emperor for attaching the whole or part of the property.[3] The Mir Saman would have also been in touch with the Diwani officials for the adjustment of state-dues against the deceased. The attached items were then put in appropriate local karkhanas or were sent to

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1. Cf. Akhbarat, 2nd Ramazan, 40th R.Y., 20th Rajab, 43rd R.Y.; Waqai Ajmer, ff.81-82.

2. This is what was written by Aurangzeb himself to the diwan of Lahore in relation to the confiscation of the property of Amir Khan, the governor of Kabul, who died in 1698 (Ruqaat, p.28). Cf. also Waqai Ajmer, ff.81-82; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.302.

3. Akhbarat, 2nd Ramazan, 40th R.Y., 20th Rajab, 43rd R.Y.

the court according to the orders of the Emperor.[1] For the property outside his reach, the Mir Saman wrote to the nazim, the qiladar or the zamindar, as the case might have been, to help the local officials in its acquisition.[2]

If the death of a noble occurred in a province, a hasb-ul-hukm was sent generally by the Mir Saman, to the local buyutat to confiscate the property of the deceased noble.[3] He performed the job in collaboration with the provincial diwan[4] who would have to ascertain, verify and adjust the actual amount of state-dues against the deceased, and sent the confiscated property to the court.[5]

(b) Of the Enemy :

The Mir Saman also took over for the state the property of the enemy or/and the booty abandoned by him. Thus for example, after the battle of Samugarh (1658), Fazil Khan Mir Saman was deputed to take over on behalf

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1. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.226.
2. Akhbarat, 2nd Ramazan, 40th R.Y.
3. Ruqaat, p.35; Dastur-i Agahi, ff.107a, 112b.
4. Ibid.; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.302-11.
5. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.226; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.345.

of Aurangzeb all the karkhanas inside the Agra fort,[1] of Dara Shikoh,[2] and later that of Murad Bakhsh after his arrest at Mathura.[3] After the rebellion and flight of Prince Akbar in 1681, the same job was performed by Muhammad Ali Khan the then Mir Saman.[4] During the subsequent Deccan campaigns, the Mir Saman and his colleague the Bayutat had busy job in taking over the buildings,[5] and enlisting the booty left by the enemy in battle-fields and in abandoned or surrendered forts.[6]

(c) Of Peshkash and Presents :

Similarly the Mir Saman also took in his custody the peshkash[7] (offerings) of the nobles and state servants to the Emperor and the presents brought for him by the foreign envoys and visitors. He was also to assess

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1. Kazim, pp.124, 346; Waqiat, pp.85, 86; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.130.
2. Hatim Khan, f.64b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.62.
3. Futuhat, f.34a.
4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.203.
5. On receiving the report of capture or surrender of a fort, the communication was passed over on Emperor's orders to the Mir Saman for taking the follow up action for its possession (Cf. Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), pp.181-83).
6. For instance, after the capture of the fort of Basantgarh in 1699, Khudabanda Khan Bayutat was ordered to go and take possession of booty left there by the enemy. Later a list of acquisitions was presented before the Emperor (Akhbarat, 14th and 15th Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.367).
7. For peshkash, its various names and occasions on which it was presented to the King, see Athar Ali, op. cit., pp.143-44.

the value and price of each of such articles and to prepare and maintain their list to be presented before the Emperor whenever required.[1] Generally the bakhshis used to receive these peshkash or presents in the court on behalf of the Emperor,[2] and then handed them over to the Mir Saman or his colleagues.[3] If, however, a noble/official on outstation duties sent some peshkash to the King, generally the Mir Saman received it, informed the Emperor about it and himself presented it before him if so instructed.[4] The presents after being put into black and white along with their value and price, were deposited into appropriate karkhana (or in the stable in case of animals).[5]

Thus the Mir Saman performed various duties and functions of very important nature. He was the custodian of state's treasuries, stores, workshops, buildings, shops, gardens and orchards, and the incharge of many categories of servants. He provided innumerable goods and provisions to the imperial household and to different wings of administration; made

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1. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.21b; Ad. 6598, f.140a.
2. Kazim, pp.116, 607; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.162; Tazkira-i Chaghta, f.249 ; Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), pp.181-83.
3. Ibid.
4. Akhbarat, 14th, 15th and 18th Safar, 43rd R.Y.
5. Akhbarat, 29th Ziqad, 39th R.Y., 25th Muharram, 40th R.Y., 19th Rabi II, 43rd R.Y.

necessary arrangements for the marriages of the princes and for the journeys of the Emperor; took over the properties of the deceased nobles and of the enemy, and controlled the expenditure of the state. It is surprising that Ibn Hasan's account of *Mir Saman*'s powers and duties is confined only to the *karkhanas* and their treasuries,[1] and his other functions have been ignored.

The *Mir Saman* regularly appeared at the Court (i.e. the *Am-Khas*)[2] for performing his various jobs and functions - for presenting candidates before the Emperor for employment on various posts under him, for their promotion and postings and other matters. He and his colleagues also waited upon the Emperor almost daily in the *Ghusalkhana* to apprise him of the matters of the Department and for taking orders from him.[3] The Emperor himself sometimes discussed with the *Mir Saman* the important matters of the Department. Thus for instance Aurangzeb once asked Fazil Khan II (the *Mir Saman*, 1688-97) to inform him about the actual strength of the *shagirdpesha* servants and of the *karkhanas* at the close of Shah Jahan's reign, its increase and decrease in his own reign and the total expenditure over them.[4]

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1. Cf. Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII..
2. *Ahkam*, f.7a; Add. 6598, f.140b.
3. *Kazim*, p.1101; *Akhbarat*, 9th Ramazan, 13th R.Y.
4. *Akhbarat*, 25th Shaban, 36th R.Y.

Because of the nature of their job and the structure of the Department, the _Mir Samans_ of Aurangzeb mostly remained at the Court, and are rarely found to have been deputed on military expeditions or elsewhere. Nay, most of the _Buyutat_ or the _Mir Saman_ of Aurangzeb did neither have the reputation of a 'general' before their appointment, nor attained it thereafter. There seems two possible exceptions of Ruhullah Khan II and Khudabanda Khan. And whenever they were sent on a military expedition or given any other additional assignment, the _Buyutat_ was asked to officiate as the _Mir Saman_. Thus for example as Ruhullah Khan II (_Mir Saman_, 1697-1704) was sent on Satara and Khelna expeditions (in 1699 and 1702 respectively)[1] and had also been appointed the Second _Bakhshi_ (in 1701), first Khudabanda Khan (_Buyutat_, 1697-1700), and after his transfer, Fazil Khan Mir Hadi[3] (_Buyutat_, 1700-1703) were asked to officiate him.

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1. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, pp.409, 457.

2. _Akhbarat_, 24th Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.

3. _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.471.

The Diwan-i Buyutat: His Position, Powers and Functions

Position and Status :

In performing his functions and duties the *Mir Saman* was assisted by the *Diwan-i Buyutat* or simply the *Buyutat*.[1] The *Diwan-i Buyutat* stood next to the *Mir Saman* in the hierarchy of the Department. But notwithstanding his place in the Department itself, the *Buyutat* held a subordinate position as regard to his rank and status. Among fifteen persons who served on the post, only three, Rahmat Khan[2] (1660-1665), Dianat Khan[3] (1665-1666) and Kamgar Khan[4] (1678-1681) and attained the rank of 2000 *zat*; the others held the lower *mansabs* of 1500, 1000, and even of 700 only.[5] Nor were they

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1. Cf. *Malumat-al Afaq*, p.191; Add. 6598, f.140b; Add. 6599, ff.37b, 58a; *Akhbarat*, 14th Jumada I , 43rd R.Y.

2. Rahmat Khan Hakim Ziauddin, a nephew of famous Hakim Rukna of Shiraz who came over to India in Akbar's reign (*Akbarnama*, Vol. III, p.816), and the son-in-law of Jahangir's poet laureate, Talib Amuli (for him see *Khazana-i Amira*, pp.300-303). He was a favourite of Shah Jahan who entitled him as Rahmat Khan and appointed to various posts (*Lahori*, Vol. II, pp.223, 386). Later he was with Prince Murad and joined Aurangzeb after former's arrest at Mathura. Aurangzeb made him *Buyutat* in 1660. He died while serving on that post in 1665 (*Kazim*, pp.139-40, 915; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.283-84).

3. Dianat Khan Hakim Jamala of Kashan, a great physician and astrologer, who served on many subordinate posts under Shah Jahan, and was entitled Dianat Khan by him because of his honesty. On his accession, Aurangzeb first appointed him the *Darogha-i Dagh*, and in 1665 the *Buyutat* from which post he was removed in 1666, and died in 1672 (*Kazim*, pp.915, 960; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.184; *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp.37-38).

4. For a brief note on his life and career, see Supra p.311.

5. See Table B.

subsequently assigned important positions. As mentioned above, only two *Buyutats*, Kamgar Khan (1678-81) and Khudabanda Khan (1697-1700) ultimately became the *Mir Samana* in 1687 and 1704 respectively. Fazil Khan Mir Hadi[1] (1700-1708) had also the satisfaction of officiating his *Mir Saman* Ruhullah Khan II (1697-1704) as the latter was also working as the Second *Bakhshi*. But the other *Buyutats* did not rise to any important position.[2]

The frequent changes of the incumbents too refelect the comparative insignificance of the office. Except Rahmat Khan Mir Imaduddin[3] who held the post for a record period of over twelve years (1666-1678), the term of others ranges between five years to eight months.[4] But as in all fifteen persons served on the post, their average tenure comes to three and a half years which is lower than that of the Second *Bakhshi*.

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1. He was a confident servant of Prince Azam. For some reason Aurangzeb became displeased with him and imprisoned (1683, *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.237). Later he was released and sent to Agra to teach students. Subsequently, called to the Court and in 1700 appointed the *Buyutat*. He died while serving on the post in 1703. (*Ibid.*, pp.386, 433, 471; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.38-40).

2. Cf. Table B.

3. A migrant from Persia to the court of Aurangzeb in June 1660 and given the rank of 1000/200 (*Kazim*, p.486). The same year he was made *Buyutat*, promoted to 1500/250 (1666) and entitled Rahmat Khan. (*Ibid.*, pp.960, 1034; *Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.111-12). Later, we again find a Rahmat Khan serving as the *Buyutat* (1682-1687), but we are not sure whether he was the same person.

4. See Table B.

Like the *Wazirs*, the *Bakhshis* and the *Mir Samans*, most of the *Buyutats* too were the Iranis. Muqim Khan[1] (1658-1660) and Khwaja Abdur Rahim[2] (1688-92), who served for about two and four years respectively, were the Turanis. Two Indians, Inayat Khan[3] and Saiyid Sharif Khan[4] had also the distinction of holding the post, though just for over a year. The remaining eleven *Buyutats* were the Persians who together held the post for about forty-two years, and without interruption from 1692 to the death of the Emperor in 1707. Thus here too the Persians dominated the scene as elsewhere.

Powers and Functions :

Like his position, the functions and the powers of the *Diwan-i Buyutat* too appear limited, and he may not possibly be described as the alter-ego of the *Mir Saman*, a position which the Second *Bakhshi* enjoyed in his Department vis-a-vis the *Mir Bakhshi*. The main concern of the *Buyutat*

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1. Except that mentioned in Table B, much is not known about his career.

2. The ancestors of Khwaja Abdur Rahim belonged to Farghana. It was his father Abul Hasan who came over to the court of Shah Jahan. Later, Abdur Rahim himself became a favourite of Aurangzeb because of his piety and was also sent to Bijapur as envoy (1683, *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.228). In October, 1688, he was appointed the *Diwan-i Buyutat*. He died while on the same post, in July, 1692 (*Ibid.*, p.312; *Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.792-93).

3. For him see *Maasir*, Vol. II, pp. 811-13.

4. Unfortunately much is not known about him.

appears with the financial transactions of the Department, and hence, his designation the '*Diwan-i Buyutat*'. However, as the second senior most official, he also enjoyed some privileges like that of the *Mir Saman*. Thus for example, his name and seal too was put after that of the *Mir Saman* on the *yaddasht* of the imperial *farmans* related to his Department,[1] and on the *dastaks* sent to the subordinate officials of the Department.[2]

The functions and powers of the *Diwan-i Buyutat* may be considered under four heads, i.e. the escheat (*zabt-i amwal*), *karkhanas* and the cattles (*dawwab*), the treasuries and the sub-treasuries (*khazain*), and the payment of wages to the *karkhana* employees and other categories of the staff of the Department. We have tried to discuss these function in a way that may clarify the procedure followed in the procurement of provisions for the *karkhanas*, in the transfer of cash from the general treasury to treasuries of *karkhanas* and other sub-treasuries, and in the payment of wages to the staff.

1. *Escheat*

As discussed above, it was an important function of the *Mir Saman* to take possession of the properties of the deceased nobles, and of the

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1. Cf. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.266.
2. Cf. *Naql-i dastak* with the seal of Kamgar Khan to Kishna Ram, dated 11th Rabi II, 31st R.Y. (S.A.H.).

enemy.[1] As the assistant of the *Mir Saman*, therefore, the *Buyutat* helped the *Mir Saman* in the matter.[2] For instance, Aurangzeb instructed Khudabanda Khan *Buyutat*[3] to confiscate the property of the enemy after the capture of the fort of Basantgarh (1699).[4]

2. *The Karkhanas* :

(a) *Provisions for the Karkhanas*

The *Buyutat* performed many functions in regard to the *karkhanas*. The first among them was to arrange for their requirements (*saranjam-i karkhanajat*).[5] This phrase suggests that the *Buyutat* would have provided not only various goods and items needed by the *karkhanas* for the storing and processing, but also the tools, implements, furnishings and other similar requirements necessary forthe functioning of the *karkhanas* themselves. The procedure followed for such procurement seems to have been that the

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1. See Supra p. 346
2. Add. 6598, p.140b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22b.
3. *Akhbarat*, 14th Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.
4. Basantgarh or Vasantgarh, 6 miles n.w. of Mysore, was captured in December, 1699, and was renamed as the *Kilid-i Fath* (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.411; *Dilkusha*, f.128b).
5. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22b; Add. 6598, f.140b; Add. 6599, f.37b; *Malumat-al Afaq*, p.191.

karkhana officials submitted to the *Boyutat* a requisition slip for the grant of a particular item or items (*chitthi-i tankhwah-i-jins-o-ajnas*). After the *Boyutat* had seen it and put his note on it, the 'slip' was sent to the *Mir Saman* for his reappraisal and approval,[1] and would have, therefore, served as a check on the *karkhana* officials and on the *Boyutat*. However, after his approval, the *Boyutat* arranged for these requirements.

(b) *The Purchases* :

The requirements were provided either from a general huge store known as the *zakhira* (big store) which contained the commodities of bulk consumption like the grains, the animal feed and the gun-powder etc.,[2] or by purchasing them from the market. In either case the Department purchased innumerable goods (*ajnas*), many of them in large quantity, and hence there was a separate section for purchases known as the *ibtia-khana* (the purchase

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.23b; Add. 6598, f.140b; Add. 6599, f.37b; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.12a.

2. There is no direct evidence with us that the *zakhiras* were maintained at the centre. But we find the *zakhiras* of grain, and gun-powder etc. in the forts (Cf. *Selected Waqai*, pp.140, 155, 170), and there is no reason why such *zakhiras* would not have been kept at the Court. Our surmise is supported by the fact that in *Zawabit-i Alamgiri* (f.23a) and Add. 6598 (f.140b) the *Boyutat* has been described as responsible for the wages of the employees of the '*zakhira*'. Apparently this *zakhira* would have been one maintained at the Court, and not that of the forts.

department).[1] It seems that the entire process of purchase was completed under the immediate supervision of the *Buyutat*.

First of all the *Buyutat* ascertained the market prices of the required goods,[2] rather maintained in the Department an upto date list of the prices. Because, apart from supervising the purchases which was a regular affair, he had also to inform the Emperor about the prices of various commodities from time to time.[3] Even the *Mir Saman* was expected to know the current prices of necessary items.[4] However, after the quality of the commodity and its price was approved by the *Mir Saman* and the *Buyutat*, the seller submitted the bill-cum-receipt (*qabz-al wasul*) to the officials of the *ibtia-khana* who then prepared the *barat* (the payment slip).[5] This *barat* was apparently countersigned by the *Buyutat* before the *tahwildar* of *ibtia-khana* paid the cash to the seller.[6] The money for such payments was transferred from the treasury of general expenditure (*khazana-i kharch-i kul*) to the sub-treasury of *ibtia-khana* on submitting

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1. Add. 6598, f.136b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.14b; *Siyaqnamah*, p.185.
2. *Ibid.*, f.22b; Add. 6598, f.140b.
3. Cf. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.98.
4. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.13a; *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.50a.
5. *Siyaqnamah*, pp.185, 110. Cf. also Add. 6599, ff.182b-184b.
6. *Siyaqnamah*, p.185.

by its officials a requisition slip (*harawurd*) to the *Boyutat*.[1] This slip and other papers related to the purchase trnasaction at the centre as also the requirements of provincial *karkhanas* (*farmaish-i subajat*) were ultimately sent to the *Mir Saman* for checking and verification.[2] The *Boyutat* had also to prepare an estimate of the total cash-purchases (*tashkhis-i jins ibtia*) by the *ibtia-khana*[3] for assessing the approximate expenses on this head,

(e) *Custody of the Karkhanas* :

After the requirements were made available, it was obviously the responsibility of *karkhana* officials to utilise them, process them or store them, as the case might have been, in their respective *karkhanas*. But it was again the duty of the *Boyutat* to keep the strong rooms of the *karkhanas* (*Kotha-i karkhanajat*) closed under his seal.[4] As we have already mentioned, it was the *Mir Saman* who issued *dastak* for the release of a

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22b; Add. 6598, f.141a.
2. *Ibid.*, f.140a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.21a.
3. *Ibid.*, f.23a; Add. 6598, f.140b.
4. Add. 6598, f.140b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22b. There is slight variation in the two sources in the rendering of a word of almost similar form. While the former put it as '*ba-muhr-i boyutat*' (with the seal of the *Boyutat*), the latter has it as, '*hama boyutat*' (all *Boyutat*). I have accepted the former rendering because of its obvious meanings which is also supported by *Ain* (Vol. I, p.41) where Abul Fazl describes the same system of 'sealing' of the store-room of the royal kitchen.

particular item from the *karkhanas*,[1] and the *Bayutat* does not appear to have such authority. But it is possible that he exercised such discretion in the absence of the *Mir Saman*. However, the *Bayutat* was authorised to write off the worn out or obsolete items (*ajnas-i mundaris*) of the *karkhanas* according to the suggestion of respective *karkhanas*.[2] Such items were subsequently auctioned with the approval and under the general supervision of the *Mir Saman*, with the help of an assessor (*muqayyim*, lit. one who fixes the value and the price).[3]

Lastly, the *Bayutat* also looked into the diaries (*roznamcha*) of the *karkhanas* of the Court[4] which he received from the *karkhana* officials, checked it in the light of that day's supplies/purchases of the goods and their consumption; and after his endorsement sent it to office of the *Mir Saman* for further checking and record.

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1. See Supra p. 329.

2. Add. 6598, f.140b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22b. For the meaning of *mundaris* see Khulasat-al Siyaq, f.54a.

3. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.13b.

4. The actual wording is '*roznamcha-i-karkhanajat-i-rikab-i-saadat*' (Add. 6598, f.140b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.23a), which Sarkar (*op. cit.*, p.45) has interpreted as 'the *karkhanas* accompanying the Emperor during his marches'. But I think it actually means the *karkhanas* at the Court (which would include those accompanying the Emperor) as against those in the provinces on which the *Bayutat* seems to have no jurisdiction.

(d) <u>The Animals</u> (<u>Dawwab</u>) :

The <u>Bayutat</u> also performed some specific duties about the cattles (<u>dawwab</u>). Firstly, he issued the instructions for the branding of the cattles that were acquired by the state.[1] His another duty has been described as to fix their places (<u>taayyun-i-maqamat-i dawwab</u>),[2] the actual meanings of which are not clear.[3] It seems that as some species of cattles were maintained in very large number,[4] and separate stables were maintained for them according to their breed, strength and the use.[5] The <u>Bayutat</u> would have, therefore, specified the stables for the new acquisitions.

It seems that the <u>Bayutat</u> had also some role in distribution of feed for animals because the ledger (<u>siyaha</u>) of the estimated grant of feed came to the <u>Bayutat</u> before going to the <u>Mir Saman</u>.[6] Probably the <u>Bayutat</u> calculated the total consumption of feed on the basis of above <u>siyaha</u>, and the total expenditure on it, a matter with which he was more concerned as the <u>Diwan-i Bayutat</u>. The <u>Bayutat</u> sometimes also presented the cattles before the Emperor when so instructed by him.[7]

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1. Add. 6598, 140b; <u>Zawabit-i Alamgiri</u>, f.23a.
2. <u>Zawabit-i Alamgiri</u>, f.22b; Add. 6598, f.140b.
3. Sarkar (<u>op. cit.</u>, p.45) has explained it as 'fixing the halting days for the cattles'. But it is difficult to comprehend this explanation.
4. See Supra p. 331.
5. Cf. <u>Ain</u>, Vol. I, pp.102-04.
6. Add. 6598, f.140b. Cf. also <u>Zawabit-i Alamgiri</u>, f.23a.
7. <u>Akhbarat</u>, 11th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.

(e) Payment of the Wages :

Finally, the *Bayutat* was responsible for the payment of wages to the stables' staff, the *shagirdpesha* servants and those artillerymen (*barqandazan*) who were employed on wages (as against those who held *mansab*).[1] The wages were paid from their respective sub-treasuries, namely, the *khazana-i shagirdpesha* and the *khazana-i barqandazan*,[2] on receiving a general sanction of the *Diwan-i Ala* through a parwana.[3] After the payment, the *Bayutat* countersigned the receipts (qubuz)[4] of the salaries given by the staff after receiving the salary, thus giving it finality. The *karkhana* staff get its salary in the same manner. It appears that each *karkhana* had its own mini treasury (*khazana*) under the charge of respective *tahwildars*[5] for the payment of the wages of its staff and for meeting the contingencies. Same might have been the case with the stables of different animals and their staff.

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.22b, 26b; Add. 6598, f.140b.
2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.14b; Add. 6598, f.136b.
3. For such two *parwanas* issued in regard to the wages of the *barqandazan* dated the 16th Jumada I, and 16th Jumada II, 34th R.Y., see *Inayat Collection*, I 6/128, 1384; I 6/129, 1385.
4. *Qubuz* is the plural of qabz, literally taking, but in official use is the abbreviation of a compound word *qabz-ul wusul* which means a document acknowledging the receipt of money (*Wilson*, p.244).
5. This is clear from the fact that our sources refer to '*khazain-i karkhanajat*' (Add. 6598, f.140b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.22b), which means 'the treasuries of the *karkhanas*'. While describing the various treasuries under Akbar, Abul Fazl also writes (*Ain*, Vol. I, p.9), "Separate treasurers were also appointed for each of the Imperial workshops (*karkhana*)."

(f) Transfer of Cash to the Sub-Treasuries :

The necessary cash required by the above sub-treasuries for wages or contingencies, was first transferred from the main treasury of the state (khazana-i amirah)[1] to the treasury of the general expenditures (khazana-i kharch-i kul) and thence to the sub-treasuries mentioned above. These transfers of cash were subject to the final approval and orders of the Diwan-i Ala. The procedure followed in such transfers appears like this: A monthly requisition slip (barawurd) for the expected disbursements of a karkhana/sub-treasury, prepared by their officials, was submitted to the Buyutat. After the slip was checked and countersigned by the Buyutat and the Mir Saman, it was sent every month to the Diwan-i Ala.[2] The Diwan-i Ala looked into it, and after satisfying himself about its genuineness, issued dastaks to the officials of the main treasury (khazana-i amirah) or/and to the treasury of general expenditure to transfer the money to the sub-treasury concerned.[3] The disbursements from the sub-treasuries were controlled by the Buyutat and the Mir Saman themselves as mentioned.

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1. For khazana-i amirah, see Supra p. 157.

2. Add. 6598, f.146b; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.22b.

3. Ibid., f.32b; Add. 6598, f.144b. Cf. Ain (Vol. I, p.10), where Abul Fazl writes that 'The (cash for the) annual expenses are handed over by the treasurer of the collection (khazinadar-i jama) to the treasurer of the expenditure (ganjwar-i kharj). This clearly refers to the similar system of transferring the cash from the main treasury to the treasury for the general expenditure. While the transfer was annual under Akbar, it became monthly under Aurangzeb, which indeed, appears more practical.

The Sub-Treasuries :

Besides the treasuries of general expenditure, of the *shagirdpesha*, of the artillerymen and of the sub-treasuries of the *karkhanas*, there were a number of other sub-treasuries. They were:[1]

1. *Khazana-i ibtia* (the treasury for purchases);
2. *Khazana-i kiraya* (the treasury for the payment of hire/rent charges);
3. *Khazana-i mablaghi* (the treasury for the deposit of sale proceeds of state properties);[2]
4. *Khazana-i jurmana* (the treasury for the deposits of fines from state servants);[3]
5. *Khazana-i khurak-i dawwab* (the treasury for the feed of the animals);
6. *Khazana-i nimgosht-o-paogosht* (the treasury of *nimgosht*);
7. *Khazana-i ahukhana* (the treasury for the deer-park);
8. *Khazana-i bahla* (the privy purse);
9. *Khazana-i naqdi-i andarun-i mahal* (the cash treasury inside the palace);
10. *Khazana-i beguman* (the treasury for the ladies of the palace);

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1. The list of the sub-treasuries is mainly based on Add. 6598, f.136b, and the *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.140b. But references to many of these treasuries are also found elsewhere and will be cited below. Some of the above treasuries are similar to ones mentioned in the *Ain* (Vol. I, pp.10-11), such as one for *peshkash*, *nazr*, charitable donations, one inside the palace and the *kharj-i bahla*. Many others have not been specified by Abul Fazl.

2. The properties that were sold by the state were perhaps those of the deceased nobles and obsolete ones of the *karkhanas* (Cf. *Khulasat-al Siyaq*, f.53a).

3. *Ibid.*

11. *Khazana-i khadiman-i mahal* (the treasury for the servants of the palace);

12. *Khazana-i inam* (the treasury for reward by the Emperor);

13. *Khazana-i khairat* (the treasury for charity);[1]

14. *Khazana-i nazr* (the treasury for the deposit of offerings to the Emperor);

15. *Khazana-i iwaz-i jagir* (the treasury for payments in lieu of *jagir*);

16. *Khazana-i musaidat* (the treasury for advancing loan/assistance to the nobles and the officials);[2]

17. *Khazana-i bazyaft-i musaidat* (the treasury for the deposit of recovered loan/assistance);[3]

18. *Khazana-i paimali-i zarat* (the treasury for payments to the peasants on damage to their crop by the movement of the imperial camp or the army);

19. *Khazana-i shadiyan*[4] (the treasury for the payment to the *shadis*); and the

20. *Khazana-i bait-al mal* (for explanation see below).

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1. Sarkar (*op. cit.*, p.30) has read it as '*zarahat*', and has, therefore, explained it as of 'minting'. But such a treasury is unlikely, while its reading as '*khairat*' (charity) is also supported by the *Ain* (Vol. I, p.10) because a treasury for charitable donations existed under Akbar with the same name (i.e. *khairat*).

2. Cf. also *Ain*, Vol. II, p.155.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Akhbarat*, 3rd Jumada II, 43rd R.Y.; also *Ain*, Vol. II, p.145.

If we also include the khazana-i shagirdpesha and the khazana-i hamrandasan, there were about twenty two sub-treasuries[1] besides the khazana-i kharch-i kul. Among them Nos.3, 4, 13, 17 and 18 appear only for the deposit of some particular collections; and we are not quite sure as to where these deposits ultimately went. Probably they would have been transferred to the main state treasury (khazana-i amirah) or to the treasury for the general expenditure. Khazana-i bait-al mal (no.20) was a self contained treasury. It consisted of the properties of the heirless persons and the deceased nobles taken over by the state; and was spent mainly on the salaries of the ulama and the divines, on the temporary maintenance of the converts to Islam, and on the burial of the poors, travellers and the heirless persons with the approval andthe verification (tasdiq) of the Qazi.[2] The nature and the purpose of other sub-treasuries is obvious from their names themselves.

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1. Compare this figure with the Ain (Vol. I, pp.10-11) where Abul Fazl mentions 'nine treasurers (which, of course, implies separate treasuries) for storing the money for the different kinds of cash-payments', besides the treasury for general expenditure, inam, nazr, bahla (for explanation see Ibid.), and one maintained inside the palace. The difference in the number of sub-treasuries run under Akbar and Aurangzeb is, therefore, marginal; and would have been the result of dividing some of them into two.

2. Mirat-i Ahmadi Vol. I, pp.298, 330; Ibid. (Khatimah), p.185. See also Supra p. 156.

On the basis of evidence cited above, we may reasonably presume that for the transfer of cash to and disbursement from these sub-treasuries too the same procedure would have been followed which was observed in the sub-treasuries of the *shagirdpesha* and the *harqandazan*, ~~and the treasury for general expenditure would have been transferred according to the same procedure that was followed in regard to the sub-treasuries of the shagirdpesha, harqandazan and of the karkhanas discussed above.~~ However, the ledgers (*siyaha*) and the account of receipts and disbursements (*awarija*) of all sub-treasuries was sent to the *Diwan-i Ala* for his appraisal.[1] And it would have been on the basis of these papers that an account of state's receipts and expenditures was prepared by the *Diwani*.

The above details show that the Mughal Emperors had evolved a very elaborate and almost fool-proof system of financial disbursement and accounts keeping. We have mentioned above that during Aurangzeb's reign four separate treasuries were maintained for the deposit of various kinds of state revenues and each of them was earmarked for spending on particular heads.[2] Now for expenditure too first a treasury for general expenditures (*khazana-i kharch-i kul*) was maintained, money to which came from the main state treasury, i.e. the *khazana-i amirah*. This general treasury of

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1. Add. 6598, f.136b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.14b. See also Supra p. 158.
2. See Supra p. 152.

expenditure would have had ready figures of net daily expenses of the state. Then there were separate sub-treasuries for spending on only specified state's establishments, money for which was provided from the treasury of general expenditure on proper requisition and with the checking of three ministers, viz., the _Buyutat_, the _Mir Saman_ and the _Diwan-i Ala_. The maintenance of separate sub-treasuries for different kind of expenses would have simplified the procedure for cash transfers and disbursements and eliminated the confusion - the points emphasised by Abul Fazl in the _Ain_.[1] It would have also ensured the quick disposal of work, made it easy to know the exact expenditure on a particular state establishment and its budgetary implications, and would have facilitated the task of checking and auditing.

There was a separate official for the checking and auditing of the stores and accounts of the karkhanas and the treasuries, namely the _Mustaufi_. The _Mustaufi_ looked into the _roznamcha_ (the diary) and the _awarija_ (the account of receipts and disbursements) of the _karkhanas_ and the treasuries; checked and compared the supplies or transfers of cash to them and its disbursement. If he found any misappropriation or embezzlement (_tagallub-o-tasarruf_) by the officials, he prepared a _Awarj-i tahsil_ which may be described as the 'statement for recovery' and submitted it to the

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1. _Ain_, Vol. I, p.10.

Buyutat. After going through it and signing it, the Buyutat sent it to the Mir Saman who was ultimately responsible for the recovery of such amounts and which he used to do through the darogha-i tahsil (the darogha for the recovery).[1]

Peshdast-i Mir Saman :

There was another official in the Department who was called the Peshdast-i Mir Saman[2] (the Assistant of the Mir Saman). But references to him are few in our sources and it is difficult to describe his exact position and function. Rai Girdhar Das,[3] the Peshdast to Iftekhar Khan (Mir Saman, 1663-1670), held the rank of 2000/1000,[4] while Ikhlas Kesh,[5] the Peshdast of Ruhullah Khan II (1697-1704) was a mansabdar of just 400/350.[6] This fall in the mansab of the Peshdast was, perhaps, a corollary of the decrease in the rank and status of other officials of the Department discussed above. As regard to his functions, his designation suggests that

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1. Add. 6599, ff.38a, 58a.
2. Kazim, p.857; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.386.
3. Rai Girdhar Das was the younger brother of Raja Bithal Das Gaur, an important noble of Shah Jahan. For both of them see Maasir, Vol. II, pp.250-56; Kazim, p.857.
4. Kazim, p.857; Maasir, Vol. II, p.255.
5. For his career see Maasir, Vol. I, pp.350-52.
6. Ibid.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.380-86.

the *Peshdast* stood between the *Mir Saman* and the clerks of the Department and served as a link between them. As such, he would have put papers before the *Mir Saman* and would have looked after the proper distribution and routine processing of the papers that came to or were despatched from the Department to its own wings or to other central Departments.

Darogha-i Kachahri-i Mir Saman :

There used to be a separate official for the collection of papers from different departments and their proper record, viz. the *Darogha-i Kachahri-i Mir Saman* (Superintendent of the office of the *Mir Saman*). Unfortunately still less is known about the *Darogha-i Kachahri-i Mir Saman*. Apparently he seems to have enjoyed an intermediary position between the *Mir Saman* and the *Buyutat* on the one hand, and the office staff on the other. He may be described as the incharge of the office staff and the office establishments of the *Mir Saman*. According to one *dastur-al amal*, he supervised over the working of the office staff, maintained discipline among them, and saw to it that nothing should happen that might affect the work and the efficiency of the staff.[1] But his more exacting duty was to ensure that the necessary papers are regularly collected from innumerable treasuries and the *karkhanas* for processing and record. He was also the

1. Add. 6599, f.38a.

custodian of all these records, and it was his responsibility to keep the records and papers (daftar) of the Department in the strong-room (kotha) of the office of the Mir Saman under his seal.[1]

Before we enumerate the papers which were maintained in the office of the Mir Saman, it is necessary to say a few words about the strength of the Department. As discussed above, the Department of the Mir Saman had on its staff apart from the Mir Saman himself, the Diwan-i Buyutat, the Peshdast of the Mir Saman, the Darogha-i Kachahri and the Mustaufi. Besides them, Ibn Hasan has also mentioned a Mushrif-i Kul-o Juz (the Head accountant of the Department) and a Nazir (Overseer) among the staff of the Department.[2] But the two officials do not appear to have existed under Aurangzeb. We have not come across to either of them in the Alamgiri sources. Ibn Hasan himself has written that the Nazir is no where mentioned under Jahangir and Shah Jahan.[3] The same may be said about the Mushrif-i Kul-o Juz. However, if the two officials ever functioned under the immediate predecessors of Aurangzeb, he appears to have abolished the posts, perhaps, because their functions overlapped with that of the Mustaufi and the Darogha-i Kachahri.

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1. Add. 6599, f.38a.
2. Ibn Hasan, op. cit., pp.238-39.
3. Ibid., p.239.

Records of Mir Saman's Office :

The records that were maintained in Mir Saman's offices were many and may be divided into two broad categories: (a) those that were originated or prepared in the office itself; (b) and those that were collected from other sections of the Department. The first kind of the papers included:[1]

1. siyaha-i waqai-i huzur (the Court-diary, apparently because it also contained Emperor's orders and observations about the department and the staff of the Mir Saman);
2. yaddasht-i izafa maratib[2] (the memorandum of the promotion or increase in the rank of the staff);
3. tamassuk-i zamini (the surety bonds taken from the staff);
4. taujih (salary statements) of the shagirdpesha and other employees on monthly wages like eunuchs, chelas and the scribes (navisindaha);
5. tasdiq-i haziri (verification of the attendance of work) of the daroghas, amins, mushrifs and the tahwildars;
6. fihrist (i.e. the list) of the karkhanajat;
7. ,, ,, of the daroghas, mushrifs and the tahwildars;

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1. The list of the two kinds of papers is mainly based on Farhang-i Kardani, ff.40a-40 , and on Khulasat-al Siyaq, ff.50a-50b. Cf. also Add. 6598, f.140a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.21a-21b.

2. The passage is not quite clear. But as the Mir Saman issued sanads for the employment of his subordinates and their promotion, we have understood the passage in the presented form.

8. *fihrist* (i.e. the list) of the *shagirdpesha* servants;
9. ,, ,, of the officials and the servants of the *mahal*;
10. *dastur-al amal-i karkhanajat-o-khazain* (the rules and regulations about the working of the treasuries andthe *karkhanas*).

We may presume that apart from above papers, this category would have also included the copies (*naql*) of orders, replies and the *dastaks* given to various officials of the Department.

(b) The papers that were collected or received from the treasuries and the *karkhanas* included the following documents:

1. *barawurd* (the bills and vouchers) of the *karkhanas*;
2. *roznamcha* (the diary) of the *karkhanas* and the treasuries;
3. *awarija* (the ledger of receipts and disbursements) of the *karkhanas* and the treasuries;
4. *nuskha-i kiraya-o-ajurah* (the statement of wages and of hire and work charges);
5. *maujudat* (the stock position of the *karkhanajat* at the end of every month;
6. *siyaha-i arz-i karkhanajat* (the statement about the stock position of the *karkhanas* at the time of review);
7. *jama-o-kharch-i-akhir-i-saal-i-karkhanajat* (the consolidated account of receipts and disbursements of the *karkhanas* at the end of the year);
8. *badar-nawisi* (the audit report);
9. *jawab-i muhasibat* (the replies of the officials concerned to the recovery demands).

The above papers which came from different wings of the Department, would have kept the Bayutat and the Mir Saman fully posted with the daily purchases, production, consumption, receipts and disbursements and the actual position of stocks of goods (ajnas) and the balances of the cash (nuqud) in various karkhanas and the treasuries; and the two officials would have been in a position to provide details to the Emperor whenever required. It would have also helped them to maintain effective control over the treasuries and on the karkhanas, and proper check over their officials. There seems, indeed, little complaint about the inefficiency and corruption of this Department; and it appears that on the whole Aurangzeb was satisfied with most of his Mir Samans and the functioning of the Department under them. There can be no doubt about the successful tenure of Fazil Khan I as the Mir Saman because of his promotion as the Wazir. Besides, Aurangzeb was all praise for his services even much after his death.[1] His successor Iftekhar Khan was, of course, removed from the post in 1670. But Aurangzeb's annoyance with him was not because of his failure in the Department, but for other reasons.[2] Subsequently Aurangzeb himself praised Iftekhar Khan for his successful tenure as the Mir Saman in

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1. Cf. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.471.

2. The reason was his failure to send correct reports to the Emperor when the Khan was sent to the Deccan to conduct an enquiry against Prince Muazzam, who had been reported acting 'in a self-willed and independent manner' (Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.100-101; Dilkusha, f.37a; Salatin-i Chaghta, f.252b).

a letter to Prince Azam.[1] In the same letter apparently written in 1703, Aurangzeb also praises Muhammad Ali Khan, Fazil Khan II and Fazail Khan for their good nature and efficient administration.[2] In still another letter written after the death of Fazail Khan (1703), Aurangzeb expresses his deep sorrow on his death, describes him as his confident servant, and writes that 'he illuminated his household with his effective control over the officials, and efficient and honest administration of the Department'.[3] These comments of the Emperor himself a little before his death, lead us to the conclusion that on the whole the Department maintained its efficiency till the end of the reign. The reasons for this were perhaps that because of the nature of its work and functioning, this Department, as against the departments of the _Diwan-i Ala_ and the _Mir Bakhshi_, was least concerned with and affected by the political and economic developments of the period.

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1. _Ruqaat_, pp.18-19.
2. _Ibid._; Cf. also _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.471.
3. _Raqaim_, f.11a; _Ruqaat_, pp.17-18; Cf. also _Maasir-i Alamgiri_, p.471.

Table A. Chapter IV

List of the Mir Samana of Aurangzeb, with their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure.

R.I. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any	Next appointment	R.I. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Fazil Khan	Irani	3000/1500	5000/2000	The Wazir	6th. 17 June 1663	AN 339-40,395,762,829-30; AH 81a 126a; KK 11/175; ZA 106b; AT 13a; MU 111/524-30.
6th. 17 June 1663	Iftekhar Khan	Irani	2000/1200	2500/1200	Removed from post & mansab	13th. April 1670	AN 158,830,832; MA 101; ZA 106b; AT 13a; MU 1/252-54.
13th. April 1670	Ashraf Khan	Irani	3000/1000	?	? (Later the Naqia Khana, April 1678)	20th. 7 Dec. 1676	MA 101,156,165; ZA 106b; AT 13a; MU 1/272-74; SC 252a.
20th. 7 Dec. 1676	Ruhullah Khan I	Irani	2500/ 800	?	Akhta Begi	22nd; c Feb. 1679	MA 156,172; ZA 106b; AT 13b; MU 11/309-15.
22nd. c Feb. 1679	Muhammad Ali Khan	Irani	2000/ 500	?	Death	30th. 30 May 1687	MA 172,203,297; ZA 106b; AT 13a; MU 111/652-57.
30th. 30 May 1687	Kamgar Khan	Irani	2500/ 800	?	?	32nd. c Sept. 1688	MA 297,312; ZA 106b; AT 13a; MU 111/159-60.
32nd. c Sept. 1688	Itemad Khan (Burhan-uddin - later Fazil Khan II)	Irani	2000/ 400	2500/ 500	Nazim of Kashmir	41st. c May 1697	MA 312,317,369,386; ZA 106b; AT 13a; MU 111/34-36.
41st. c May 1697	Ruhullah Khan II	Irani	3000/1000	3500/1000	Death	48th. 20 May 1704	MA 386,434,471,489; AT 13a-13b; MU 11/315-17; Akham 7a; Akh. 24 Jumada I, 43rd R.I.
	(He also held the post of the Second Bakhshi (MA 434), and, therefore, first Khudabanda Khan Buyutat officiated him as the Mir Saman, and after his transfer, Fazil Khan Buyutat, till his own death on 17 Nov. 1699)						
48th. 20 May 1704	Khudabanda Khan	Irani	2500/1000	3000/1200	Death of the Emperor	51st. 3 March 1707	MA 489,514; Dilkusha 149a; AT 13b; MU 1/814-16.

<u>Table B, Chapter IV</u>

List of the <u>Diwan-i Buyutat</u> of Aurangzeb with Their <u>Mansab</u>, Promotion and Tenure.

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	<u>Mansab</u>, when appointed	<u>Izafa</u>, if any.	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Muqim Khan	Turani	1000/ 500	?	Diwan of Kashmir	3rd. 3 June 1660	AN 78,248,310,487; AH 66a.
3rd. 3 June 1660	Rahmat Khan Hakim Ziauddin	Irani	2000/ 600	?	Death	8th. 24 Oct. 1665	AN 140,487,915; ZA 107a; MU 11/283-84.
8th. 24 Oct. 1665	Diyanat Khan	Irani	2000/ 700	?	Removed	9th. 6 April 1666	AN 915,960; ZA 107a; MU 11/37-38.
9th. 6 April 1666	Mir Imaduddin(later Rahmat Khan	Irani	1500/ 250		?	21st. 9 May 1678	AN 960,1034; MA 166; ZA 107a; MU 111/111.
21st. 9 May 1678	Kamgar Khan	Irani	2000/ 500	?	Waqia Khwan	24th. c 6 Feb. 1681	MA 140,166,206; ZA 107a; MU 111/154-60.
24th. c 6 Feb. 1681	Inayat Khan	Indian?	1000/ 100	?	Faujdar of Ajmer	24th. c April 1681	MA 206; ZA 107a; MU 11/813-18.
25th. 14 Sept. 1681	Saiyid Sharif Khan	Indian	700/ 100	?	?	25th. 7 March 1682	ZA 107a; Add. 6598, 179a.
25th. 7 March 1682	Rahmat Khan (Mir Imaduddin ?)	Irani	1500/ 250	?	?	31st. 8 Sept. 1687	ZA 107a; Add. 6598,179a; Nemat Khan 141. (There seems no other references about these two Boyutats.
31st. 8 Sept. 1687	Muhsin Khan	?	1000/ 100	?	?	32nd. c Oct. 1688	MA 312; ZA 107a; Add. 6598, 170a.

(continued.....)

Table B, Chapter IV (continued......)

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any.	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
32nd. c Oct. 1688	Khwaja Abdur Rahim Khan	Turani	?	?	Death	36th. July 1692	MA 312,349; ZA 107a; Add. 6598, 179a; MU i/792-93.
36th. July 1692	Amanat Khan III, Mir Husain	Irani	1000/ 900	-	Mutasaddi of Surat	41st. April 1697	MA 349,386; ZA 107a; Add. 6599, 179a; KK ii/444; MU i/287-90.
41st. April 1697	Khudabanda Khan	Irani	1500/ 500	-	Subahdar of Zafarabad Bidar	44th. c Oct. 1700	MA 386,433; MU i/814-16; SC 288a.
	(Also officiated Ruhullah Khan II, the Mir Saman, Akhbarat, 24th Jumada I, 43rd R.Y.).						
44th. c Oct. 1700	Fazail Khan Mir Hadi	?	?	-	Death	47th. 24 March 1703	MA 433,471; MU iii/38-40; TM 15-16.
	(Also officiated Ruhullah Khan II Mir Saman, till his own death in 1703)						
47th. 24 March 1703	Abdur Rahim	Irani	?	?	Death	47th; April 1703?	MA 471; MU iii/36.
47th. April 1703?	Ziauddin Khan	Irani	?	?	Death of the Emperor	51st. 3 March 1707	MA 471-72; MU iii/36.

Chapter V

THE MIR ATISH

His Position, Powers and Duties.

The Working of the Department of the Topkhana (Artillery) under him:

Another functionary at the Centre was the *Mir Atish* who headed the *Topkhana* (artillery wing) of the Mughal armed forces, and was as such responsible for the appointment and posting of the personnel attached with the *Topkhana*, namely the *barqandazan* (the matchlockmen) and the *ahsham* (the musketeers and the auxiliary staff). In performing his functions the *Mir Atish* was assisted by a senior *Mushrif* and two subordinate *mushrifs*, one each for the *barqandazan* and the *ahsham*, known as the *Mushrif-i-barqandazan* and the *Mushrif-i-ahsham* respectively. While the senior *Mushrif* assisted the *Mir Atish* in going through the routine office work, the other two *Mushrifs* completed the formalities about the recruitment, postings and the payment of wages to the two categories of the *Topkhana* employees.

The term *Topkhana* was used under the Mughals in two sense : firstly for the fire-arms wing of the Mughal armed forces.[1] This wing

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1. *Kazim*, pp.62, 92, 97, 460; *Dilkusha*, f.24a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.6, 67-8; *Akhbarat*, 14th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y.

we may better call the artillery;[1] and secondly for the workshops and the stores of the fire-arms including the Tup (i.e. the cannon and the gun).[2] It could thus be described as the arsenal. The inclusion of Tup in both sections was apparently the reason for their nomenclature as the Topkhana (the Section of the Tup). To distinguish between the two, however, the second section was sometimes mentioned as the Topkhana-i jinsi (i.e. the arsenal).[3] While the arsenal with its staff for manufacturing and store was under the Mir Saman as mentioned in the previous chapter, the artillery with its staff of barqandazan (the match-lockmen) and the shahan (the musketeer etc.) came under the jurisdiction of the Mir Atish.

Mir Atish or Daragha-i Topkhana :

Because of his charge of the Topkhana (the artillery), the Mir Atish has often been mentioned as the Daragha-i Topkhana.[4] This

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1. For various kinds of muskets and guns introduced during Akbar's reign and their manufacture, see the Ain, Vol. I, pp.88-91. Cf. W. Irvine, op. cit., Chapter X.

2. Guldasta, f.21b; Nigarnamah, p.121; Akhbarat, 20th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.; Add. 6598, f.136b.

3. Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), p.186. Cf. Wilson, p.240. William Irvine (Army of the Indian Moghuls, p.133) has obviously misunderstood the Topkhana-i jinsi as the 'light artillery'. At any rate, the term does not seem to have been denoting that meaning during the reign of Aurangzeb.

4. Thus for instance Darab Khan has been mentioned as the Mir Atish at one place (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.176; Maasir, Vol. II, p.39), and as the Daragha-i Topkhana at other (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.150). Similarly, Ruhullah Khan II has sometimes been mentioned as the Mir Atish (Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.370; Maasir, Vol. I, p.315), and sometimes as the Daragha-i Topkhana (Akhbarat, 8th Safar, 39th R.Y.), Cf. Malumat-ul Afaq, p.191.

designation was, however, more common and less distinctive than that of the *Mir Atish*. The term *darogha-i topkhana*, like that of the *diwan*, was also used for the superintendent of an artillery unit kept in a fort,[1] or of one sent with an army on expedition.[2] But the designation of the *Mir Atish*, like that of the *Mir Bakhshi* and the *Mir Saman*, was used exclusively for the head of the artillery at the Centre as none of the subordinates *daroghas* of artillery seems to have ever been mentioned as such. We would, therefore, prefer the *Mir Atish* in our discussion.

Position and Status :

Although the *Mir Atish* did not have to run a large department as the *Mir Bakhshi* and the *Mir Saman* used to do, and held the charge of just one wing of the Mughal armed forces, he nevertheless enjoyed comparatively high position among the central ministers, as far as his *mansab* was concerned. Among the sixteen persons who served as the *Mir Atish* under Aurangzeb, just one held the rank of 1000 *zat*, three of 2000 *zat* each, four of 2500, seven of 3000, and one that of 4000 *zat*.[3] Subsequently, one

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1. Cf. *Akhbarat*, 19th Ziqada, 40th R.Y.
2. Cf. *Akhbarat*, 11th Rabi I, 43rd R.Y.; *Hakim Khan*, f.82a; *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.530, 578, 652.
3. For detail see Table at the end of the Chapter.

were Mir Atish (Tarbiyat Khan)[1] reached to the mansab of 3500 zat, and two (Fedai Khan, Muzaffar Husain[2] and Shujaaat Khan Ramdandas Beg)[3] to that of 4000. Thus taking as a whole, the rank of the Mir Atish under Aurangzeb compares favourably with the position of the Mir Saman under him, and is not much inferior to that of the Mir Bakhshi. Some of the Mir Atish were also assigned other high positions. Ruhullah Khan I, Bahramand Khan, Mukhlis Khan and Ruhullah Khan II also served as the Second Bakhshi[4] and

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1. Tarbiyat Khan Mir Muhammad Khalil, the eldest son of Darab Khan Bani Mukhtar (for him see, Maasir, Vol. II, pp.39-42), was an important noble of later years of Aurangzeb's reign. He had married the daughter of Asad Khan the Wazir in January 1696 (Akhbarat, 22nd Jumada II, 39th R.Y.) and was made the Mir Atish a little later. He performed many remarkable military deeds in subsequent campaigns and got rapid promotions. He fought with Prince Azam in the war of succession after Aurangzeb's death and was killed. For his life and career see Maasir, Vol. I, pp.498-503. See also Infra p. 391.

2. Fedai Khan Koka, later Azam Khan Koka, was the foster brother of Aurangzeb. He held many subordinate posts under Shah Jahan who entitled him Fedai Khan in 1657. On his coming to power, Aurangzeb put special reliance on him and deputed him against Sulaiman Shikoh, Dara Shikoh and Shuja and subsequently made the Mir Atish. Later he held the governorship of Awadh, Lahore, Kabul and Bengal etc. and got the title of Azam Khan (1675). He died in 1678 (Maasir, Vol. I, pp.247-52). His younger brother Khan Bahadur Kokaltash also was an important noble of Aurangzeb (for him see Ibid., pp.798-813).

3. He was attached to Aurangzeb since his princehood. After serving on subordinate posts, he became the Mir Atish in 1667. Later he was sent against the Satnamis, and subsequently, to Kabul where he was ambushed by the Afghans and was killed in 1674 (Maasir, Vol. II, pp.679-81).

4. See Table B, Chapter III.

the *Mir Saman*[1] or both; the first two, indeed, attained to the position of the *Mir Bakhshi*.[2]

In the rank and the status of the *Mir Atish*, therefore, we do not find that gradual decline which we noticed in the case of the *Mir Saman* and the *Diwan-i Buyutat*. The reason for this almost scrupulous 'regard' for the position of the *Mir Atish* might have been the fact that unlike the *Mir Saman*, the *Mir Atish* held the charge of a department the importance and utility of which grew under Aurangzeb as the time passed on as we shall see. It was also, perhaps, because of his charge of the imperial *Topkhana* that the *Mir Atish* enjoyed the unique privilege of living inside the palace enclosure.[3] When during the Deccan campaigns, Khanazad Khan *Mir Atish* was sent on an expedition (1695), and the *Mushrif* was asked to officiate him as the *Mir Atish*, he too was instructed by Aurangzeb to remain within the *Gulalbar* (the outer enclosure of the royal residence) till the return of Khanazad Khan.[4]

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1. Vide Table A, Chapter IV.
2. Cf. Table A, Chapter III.
3. *Ma'asir-al Umara*, p.191.
4. *Akhbarat*, 8th Safar, 39th R.Y.

Functions and Powers :

As the incharge of the imperial artillery, the mainfunction of the Mir Atish was to lead the artillery attack on enemy's formations in a battle or in a siege.[1] In the siege of a fort, he had also to fill up the ditches around the fort and to construct trenches, mines, platforms and batteries for an assault.[2] It was not just the simple job of looking after the routine office work. It was much more difficult and challenging job. It required apart from the military acumen and generalship, imagination and daring, and posed great risk to the life and career of a Mir Atish. It was perhaps because of this reason that those who were appointed to the post had the reputation of a fighter and a general rather than that of a man of art and learning. It is interesting to mention that some of the Mir Atishes had had the fiery titles like that of Barq Andaz Khan[3] (thrower of lightning), Safshikan Khan[4] (breaker of the army formations) and

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1. Kazim, pp.62,92,314; Akhbarat, 8th Safar, 39th R.Y.; Futuhat, f.27b; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.19,474,478; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.14,23.

2. Akhbarat, 1st Rajab, 43rd R.Y.; 9th and 22nd Shawwal, 44th R.Y.; Dilkusha, f.144a; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.290,410; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.336.

3. Barq Andaz Khan was the Mir Atish of Shah Jahan's forces under Dara Shikoh that were pitted against Aurangzeb in the battle of Samugarh (Kazim, p.95).

4. There were two individuals of this title under Aurangzeb. One was Safshikan Khan Muhammad Tahir. He was the Darogha-i Topkhana (artillery) of the Deccan during the last days of Shah Jahan. He accompanied Aurangzeb in his march to Agra and was entitled Safshikan Khan. Besides fighting in the battles of Ujjain, Samugarh and Khajwa, he was sent in pursuit of Dara, and made Mir Atish before the battle of Deorai. He held the post of the Mir Atish twice (Maasir, Vol. II, pp.738-40). The other was Safshikan Khan Mir Sadruddin, who came from Iran and joined the Court of Aurangzeb in December, 1673, who also twice held the post of the Mir Atish. For his life and career see Maasir, Vol. II, pp.746-47.

Rad-Andaz Khan[1] (dropper of lightning). It was because of this challenging nature of the job that sometimes Aurangzeb did not find a suitable person for the post of the Mir Atish and reappointed a person who had once served on the post. There are at least three cases of such 'reappointments'[2] (of Safshikan Khan Muhammad Tahir, Salabat Khan[3] and Safshikan Khan Mir Sadruddin). Besides, during the siege of Golconda (1687), four persons were appointed to the post and were removed within a span of just two months.[4]

However, even if we ignore these removals and appointments of despair and hope, sixteen appointments (including the repetitions) were made to the post of the Mir Atish. As such, each incumbent held the post for an average term of a little over three years, which is lower than the average tenure of all other heads of central departments. The reason for so many appointments on the post was, perhaps, the difficult nature rather than the insignificance of the job; there are three cases of resignation from the post because of the inability of the incumbents to push through the

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1. For a brief note on him see Supra p. 251.

2. Cf. Table.

3. Salabat Khan Khwaja Mir of Khwaf (Iran) was a favourite noble of Aurangzeb because of his nobleness of mind and character and served on various posts under him, and twice held the post of the Mir Atish. Later during the siege of Golconda (1687) again he was twice made the Mir Atish. For his life and career see Maasir, Vol. II, pp.742-46.

4. For detail see Infra P. 390, and the Table.

siege; two removal from the post because of their capture by the enemy during operation against them; and three instances of 'dismissal for offence' where the exact nature of the 'offence' could not be ascertained.[1] It is, however, significant that in spite of comparatively higher number of the incumbents, no non-Irani was appointed the Mir Atish; and although Aurangzeb is said to have decided never to assign that post to an Irani because of Safshikan Khan Mir Atish's suspected sympathies with the enemy during the siege of Golconda (1687),[2] this particular office remained almost exclusive monopoly of the Persian group of Aurangzeb's nobility. And it should be pointed out here again that this central post too, like the three others discussed above, was occupied since 1695 till the death of the Emperor in 1707, by those who were related to the Emperor and his Wazir Asad Khan. It was held by Ruhullah Khan II from March 1695 to February 1696; and then it went to Tarbiyat Khan, the son-in-law of the Wazir, who held it till the death of Aurangzeb.[3]

Leading the Artillery Attack :

However, the most important function of the Mir Atish was to lead the artillery attack on the enemy in battles and sieges. A large camp of

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1. Cf. the Table.
2. Ni'mat Khan, p.104; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.359.
3. Cf. the Table.

the imperial Topkhana used to go with the Emperor wherever he went, even if on some excursion visits.[1] But if the Emperor went on some war or expedition, the Mir Atish almost invariably accompanied him on such expeditions because of his charge of the imperial artillery and his duty to lead the artillery attack on the enemy. In the battle of Samugarh (June 1658) while Barq Andaz Khan, the Mir Atish of Shah Jahan, held the charge of Dara's Topkhana in the battle-field,[2] Zulfiqar Khan, the Mir Atish of Aurangzeb, took position along with his artillery in front of his forces.[3] Similarly, in the battle of Khajwa against Shuja, Zulfiqar Khan was asked by Aurangzeb to array his guns against the enemy.[4] Later in the battle of Deorai against Dara Shikoh, Aurangzeb instructed the then Mir Atish Safshikan Khan to place his Topkhana against Dara's formations.[5] But perhaps more illustrative of the function and the role of a Mir Atish is the siege of Golconda (1687) where four persons were appointed to and were removed from the post within a short span of a few months.

During the protracted siege of the impregnable fort of Golconda (February-September 1687), the Mughal forces faced the stiff resistance

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1. Bernier, pp.217, 352; Manucci, Vol. II, p.61.
2. Kazim, p.95; Masi, p.60.
3. Kazim, p.92; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.23; Masi, p.59.
4. Kazim, p.245; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.48.
5. Kazim, p.314; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.67-68.

from the besieged. Aurangzeb ordered the then *Mir Atish* Safshikan Khan to construct high platforms for guns and shelling inside the fort. But after successfully constructing the batteries close to the turrets of the fort, Safshikan Khan resigned from the post (13 May 1679)[1], either because of his differences with Firoz Jung who was to lead the assault, or because of his unwillingness to fire upon his co-religionists in the fort.[2] His successor in the office, Salabat Khan could produce little and resigned after a week (21 May 1687).[3] Aurangzeb then appointed Izzat Khan as the *Mir Atish* (22 May 1687). Izzat Khan was able to blow up some portion of the wall of the fort through two wines. But later he himself was surprised by a detachment of the besieged and was carried away as captive (26 June 1687). Aurangzeb, in his frustration and anger, imprisoned Safshikan Khan, and reappointed Salabat Khan as the *Mir Atish* as others were not prepared to accept the post and face the disgrace by the hands of the enemy or of the Emperor. Within a few days, however, Aurangzeb released Safshikan Khan on the intercession of Firoz Jung, and appointed him the *Mir Atish* again on the promise that he would reconstruct the batteries for a successful

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.118b-119a; Add. 6598, f.183a (These two sources give the day to day account of the siege); *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.290.

2. Cf. *Nemat Khan*, pp.103-104; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.290; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.359.

3. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.120b; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.291.

attack. The fort was ultimately surrendered by the Qutb Shahis on 2nd October, 1687.[1]

The role of a *Mir Atish* thus becomes clear from the events at Golconda. But the importance of the *Mir Atish* increased further in the later years of Aurangzeb's reign when he embarked upon his *qilagiri* (fort-capturing) campaign in the rocky region of the Deccan. Such an enterprise could have been accomplished only with the help of the artillery and its staff. In these campaigns the *Mir Atish* had to perform very difficult job and some of them even faced the humiliation as Izzat Khan had faced it earlier. Thus Khanazad Khan, later Ruhullah Khan II (*Mir Atish* 1695-96) and some other *mansabdars* were arrested by the Marathas during their operation against Santa[2] (February, 1696), and were released after paying very heavy ransom. On their return to the Court, Aurangzeb sent them in disgust to distant assignments.[3] The last decade of Aurangzeb, however, witnessed some remarkable feats by Tarbiyat Khan *Mir Atish*, who

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.120b-127a; Add. 6598, ff.183b-185b; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.291, 289; *Dilkusha*, f.104a-b; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.360-62.

2. Properly known as Santaji Ghorpare was a Maratha chief of Kolhapur who joined service under Shivaji, and served under his successors. Later he became a prominent Maratha general and caused serious troubles to the Mughals. For his career and exploits see J.N. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp.235-56.

3. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.374-79; *Dilkusha*, ff.117b-118a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, pp.428-33.

like his brother-in-law Zulfiqar Khan, performed some magnificent deeds during the siege of Vasantgarh,[1] Satara[2] and elsewhere and got rapid promotions. At the time of his appointment as the Mir Atish about the end of 39th R.Y. (March, 1696), his mansab was 2000/1200.[3] But by March 1704, he had reached to the rank of 3500/1800.[4] His rank was thus almost doubled in eight years, in which the influence of his father-in-law Asad Khan the Wazir could not be altogether ruled out. But it cannot be denied that he was one of the most successful Mir Atish of Aurangzeb during the most diffic-ult days of his reign as far as his military duties were concerned.

Arrangement of Artillery Requirements :

The duties of the Mir Atish were, however, notconfined just to lead the artillery attack. It was also his responsibility as the head of the imperial Topkhana to see that the arms and ammunitions (ajnas-i topkhana) and the means of transportation (barbardar) required by the artillery were

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1. For its siege and capture see Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.410; Dilkusha, ff.128b-129a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.462.

2. For Satara expedition see Akhbarat, 7th Jumada II, 1st Rajab, 43rd R.Y., 9th, 23rd Shawwal, 44th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.413-422; Dilkusha, f.133a; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.463-70.

3. Akhbarat, 24th Shaban, 39th R.Y.; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.381; Maasir, Vol. I, p.498.

4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.485; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.514.

arranged. For the provision of such requirements of the artillery unit of an army (at the Court, provinces or elsewhere) or of a fort, the request was first made to the *Mir Atish*.[1] Sometimes the Emperor himself instructed the *Mir Atish* to arrange particular items for the artillery of a particular army.[2] The *Mir Atish* then issued the *dastaks*[3] apparently to the *Mir Saman* the incharge of the *shagirdpesha* servants and states' stores and workshops including the arsenal, for the supply of required men and materials. When the *Mir Atish* himself happened to be on some military assignment and needed men and material, he wrote to the Emperor for favour of instructions for the supply of requirements; and Aurangzeb is found ordering his Deputy (the *Mushrif*) for arranging the despatch of men and/or material.[4]

Fireworks Show :

Mention may be made here that interestingly enough, it also formed part of the duties of the *Topkhana* officials to arrange the fire-works show (*atishbazi*) in front of imperial quarters on a particular festive occasion.[5]

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1. Add. 6598, f.141a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24b.
2. *Ruqaat*, pp.36-37; *Raqaim*, f.8a; *Akhbarat*, 4th Ramazan, 37th R.Y., 11th Safar, 11th Rabi I, 43rd R.Y. Cf. also *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.200, 214-15; *Akhbarat*, 3rd Safar, 33rd R.Y.
3. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24a; Add. 6598, f.141a.
4. *Akhbarat*, 23rd Ziqada, 40th R.Y., 22nd Jumada II, 1st Rajab, 43rd R.Y., 23rd Shawwal, 44th R.Y.
5. *Kazim*, p.405; *Hatim Khan*, f.83a.

Appointment and Posting of Artillery Personnel :

As the head of the topkhana, the Mir Atish also exercised jurisdiction over a variety of staff that served in the topkhana, and like the other central ministers, he too was responsible for its appointment, posting, transfer and the payment of wages to it. The employees who served in the topkhana have been described as the barq-andazan and the ahsham.[1] While the barq-andazan were the mounted matchlockmen (tufangchian-i suwar),[2] the ahsham comprised different kind of personnel attached with the artillery. The ahsham literally means the domestic servants, retainers, the militia,[3] the attendants and the servants of the army (chakaran-o-ghulaman-i sipah).[4] But under the Mughals the ahsham included the banduqchi (musketeer), the golandaz (gunner), the deg-andaz (cannoneer), the bandar (rocket-thrower), the atishbaz (maker of fire-works which means here the cannon-balls and the rockets), the naqab-kan (miner), the sang-tarash (stone-cutter), the ahangar (blacksmith), the arah-kash (sawyer), najjar (carpenter), kharati (turner), mochi (cobbler), kharwa (sailor) and the tabardar (hatchet-man).[5] The

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1. Add. 6598, f.141a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.23b.
2. Kazim, p.1099.
3. Steingass, p.21; Farhang-i Nafisi, Vol. I, p.115.
4. Farhang-i Anandraj, Vol. I, p.169.
5. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.58b-62a; Add. 6598, ff.158a-160a. Cf. Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), pp.200, 214.

ahsham thus comprised all military and the para-military forces of the Mughal army other than the main cavalry (the *tabinan* of the *mansabdars*), the *shadis*, the archers and the *barq-andazan* themselves.

Besides the *barq-andazan* and the *ahsham*, there were, of course, the subordinate officials (*mutasaddiyan*, plural of *mutasaddi*, meaning an officer)[1] of the *topkhana*, viz. the officials of an artillery unit kept in a province, in a fort or sent with an army on some expedition, the officials of the *dagh-o-tashiha* (branding and verification of the artillery personnel only), and the officials of the *Chauki* (Mounted Guard for taking the attendance of only the artillery staff posted at the *Chauki*).[2] Unfortunately we do not have details about all these officials. As regard to the staff of an artillery unit, however, we find references to a *darogha* and a *mushrif* attached with an artillery unit posted in a province[3] or sent on an expedition;[4] but we have not come across to separate *mushrifs* for the *barq-andazan* and the *ahsham* with such a unit. It, therefore, seems that the two *mushrifs* of *barq-andazan* and the *ahsham* worked at the Court alone because of the large number of the *barq-andazan* and the *ahsham* there;

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1. *Steingass*, p.1160.
2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.23b; Add. 6598, 141a.
3. Cf. *Hatim Khan*, f.82a; *Dilkusha*, f.24a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.349.
4. Cf. *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.530, 578, 652, 668; *Dilkusha*, f.114b; *Akhbarat*, 12th Muharram, 20th R.Y., 20th Shaban, 36th R.Y.

in the provinces or in an army these forces would have been looked after by the respective darogha-i topkhana and the mushrif. The artillery units stationed in forts were apparently under the charge of the commandants of the forts.[1] The officials of the dagh-o-tashiha and of the Chauki would have been similar to what the Mir Bakhshi appointed for the mansabdars, i.e. a darogha, an amin and a mushrif; and would have performed the same function.[2] The dagh-o tashiha of the artillery personnel in a province, fort and in an army was performed apparently by the dagh officials kept at these places for the mansabdars.[3]

For the appointment of the officials of the topkhana or the recruitment of the barq-andazan and the ahsham, the Mir Atish introduced the candidates before the Emperor.[4] In the appointment of the barq-andazan and especially the ahsham, their respective mushrifs completed many official formalities as we shall see. It is possible that they might have also had considerable say in their recruitment because of the other preoccupations

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1. Cf. Nigarnamah, p.121, where in an appointment letter the qiladar has been instructed to keep the artillery unit (topkhana) there properly equipped and in good shape; Waqai Ajmer, f.423.

2. Vide Supra p. 290.

3. Waqai Ajmer, f.559.

4. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.23b; Add. 6598, f.141a. Cf. Tasdiq-i-barq-andazan (Kohi Beg s/o Khwaja Beg) issued with the misalah of Rad Andaz Khan Mir Atish, dated the 21st Zilhijja, 13th R.Y. (S.A.M.).

and duties of the *Mir Atish* and the large number of the *barq-andazan* and the *shahan*. In the siege of Golconda alone (1687) there were about three thousand *barq-andazan* and fifteen thousand *shahan*;[1] the number of *shahan* in the siege of Bijapur earlier (1686-87) was even higher, about 23000.[2] We do not find the *mushrif* of the *topkhana* of a province exercising such discretion in the recruitment of artillery personnel there.[3] However, as the head of the department, the *Mir Atish* examined the capabilities of the *shahan* and the *barq-andazan*, and tested their marksmanship before their selection. After the selection, he also issued orders (*dastaks*) for the *dagh-o tashiha* (verification of men and the branding of the horses of those who kept it, such as almost all of the *barq-andazan*), and verified their descriptive rolls (*chihra*) by his endorsement (of '*manzur darand*', i.e. it be accepted[4]). It was also the privilege of the *Mir Atish* that the *yaddasht* (memorandum) of all such appointments was prepared with his attestation (*risalah*) as was the case with other central ministers; and he signed and sealed it.[5] If, however, the *barq-andazan* were employed on

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1. Add. 6598, f.190a. In *Zawabit-i Alamgiri* (f.138b), however, the number of barq-andazan is given below two thousand.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Dilkusha*, f.24a.

4. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.23b-24a; Add. 6598, f.141a.

5. *Ibid.*, ff.141b, 142a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.26a. There is such a *yaddasht* issued by Rad Andaz Khan *Mir Atish* on 21st Zilhijja, 13th R.Y., on the employment of one Lchi Beg son of Khwaja Beg (S.A.H.)

wages (as against *mansab*), which was generally the case,[1] the *yaddasht* was prepared with the *risalah* of the *Mir Saman*, but was also sealed by the *Mir Atish* and the *Mushrif*.[2]

After the initial recruitment, the *Mir Atish* also issued the *dastaks* for the postings of his staff to a province, fort, on an expedition or on the *Chauki*.[3] Subsequently, in case of loss of a horse (*asqati*), the natural death of an employee (*fauti*), or death in the battle or operation (*kar-amadan*), the *Mir Atish* signed on the loss certificate (*asqati-namah* in case of horses), death certificate (*fauti-namah*) and on the casualty certificate (*kar-amad-namah*) for the purpose of the replacement of the horse or for the adjustment of accounts of the dead staff.[4]

Finally the *Mir Atish* also passed the salary-bills of the employees of his department, and all questions of their attendance and payment were looked into by him. For this purpose he endorsed on their

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1. It appears from *Bernier* (p.217), *Waqai Ajmer* (ff.412-13) and the *yaddasht* cited in note above that most of the *barq-andazan* and the *bandooqchis* (musketeers), were employed on wages and some of them received two hundred rupees a month. A European group-commander (*Sardar-i Farangiyan*) of some artillery-personnel, however, was holding the rank of 150/50 (*Akhbarat*, 14th Zil-hijja, 39th R.Y.).

2. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.25b, 26a, 27a; Add. 6598, ff.141b, 142a, 142b.

3. *Waqai Ajmer*, f.205; Add. 6598, f.141a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.23a.

4. *Ibid.*, ff.24b-25a; Add. 6598, f.141b.

attendance roll 'it be accepted' (*manzur darand*); and in case of the illness of an employee, verified his sickness-certificate[1] which the employee should have secured from authorised physician (*tabib*).[2] After his sanction and verification, the respective Mushrifs of the *harq-andazan* and the *ahsham* prepared the salary-bills (*barawurd*) and sent it to the *Mir Atish* for checking and signing. When after his approval of the salary-bills, the *barat* (the payment slip, or the salary-cheque as Blochmann has translated it[3]) were prepared, the *Mir Atish* signed and sealed these *barats* too,[4] giving it the finality for the payment by the treasury-officials.

As mentioned earlier, the *harq-andazan* employed on wages were paid under the supervision of the *Diwan-i Buyutat* from a sub-treasury known after them viz. the *khazana-i harq-andazan*.[5] We are not quite sure whether a similar sub-treasury was run for the *ahsham*. At least we have not found a reference to such a treasury. Rather it appears from a reference in the *Zawabit* that the *ahsham* also were paid from the sub-treasury

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1. Add. 6598, 141b; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.25a.
2. See Supra p. 342.
3. *Ain* (Blochmann), Vol. I, p.272.
4. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24b; Add. 6598, f.141a.
5. Vide Supra p. 364.

of the *barq-andazan*.[1] It was then a treasury for both the categories of the employees of the *topkhana*. As the papers related with the payment of salary were processed and checked by various officials, an employee with the designation of *karora* was appointed by the *Mir Atish* whose duty it was to ensure the quick movement of the relevant files (*sarrishta*) for prompt disposal of work and the timely payment.[2]

In spite of these elaborate arrangement, however, there are instances of rather inordinate delay in the payment of wages to the *barq-andazan* and *ahsham*. Thus for instance the personnel of a unit of the artillery sent to Ajmer (1678-79) was not paid for months together. There was clamouring and protest by the staff, and repeated requests of the officials to the Court for cash before the staff was finally paid by the *diwan* accompanying the army.[3] The same often happened subsequently in Aurangzeb's Deccan campaign, and the then *Mir Atish* wrote to the Emperor for fund.[4] But what is more glaring is the fact that once Tarbiyat Khan *Mir Atish* himself misappropriated the fund sent to him for distribution among the *barq-andazan* and the *ahsham*. Aurangzeb was deeply sore on the matter and wrote in great anguish to the *Wazir* Asad Khan about the dishonesty of his son-in-law (Tarbiyat Khan).[5]

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24b; Add. 6598, f.141b.
2. *Ibid.*; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24b.
3. *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.199, 269, 412-13.
4. *Akhbarat*, 25th Rabi II, 15th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.
5. *Ruqaat*, p.38; *Raqaim*, f.9a.

In relation to his various functions and duties as the head of the imperial *Topkhana* and for reporting its matters to the Emperor, the *Mir Atish* enjoyed the privilege of having regular meetings with him in the Court (*Aam-o-Khas*). Here he presented the candidates or the employees of his Department before him for interview, apprised him of the affairs of the Department and took orders.[1] Sometimes the Emperor himself enquired matters from the *Mir Atish*, and he was expected to be well posted about the actual number of the employees of the Department and the quality and quantity of guns and arms and ammunition etc.[2] Thus for instance, Aurangzeb once asked Khanazad Khan to inform him about the strength of the artillery (*maujudat-i topkhana*) in various fortresses (*qilajat*).[3] The orders related to this Department were also issued generally through him, and the *Mir Atish* communicated these orders to the officials. If, however, the orders were concerned with officials on outstation duties, he sent these orders to them through *hasb-al hukm*.[4]

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1. *Kazim*, pp. 1099-1100; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24a; Add. 6598, f.141a.
2. *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.23a.
3. *Akhbarat*, 7th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y.
4. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.24b; Add. 6598, f.141a. For a such *hasb-al hukm* see *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.239-40.

The Mushrif :

The Mir Atish was assisted in performing his functions and duties by a (general or senior) Mushrif, and two two subordinate mushrifs, one each for the barq-andazan and the shahan, known as the Mushrif-i barq-andazan and the Mushrif-i shahan respectively.[1] There seems no mention of a (general) Mushrif in the dasturu-l amals which describe the Mir Atish and other officials of the Department.[2] Nor do the chronicles help us in the matter. But some Akhbarat of later years of Aurangzeb's reign do contain references to such a Mushrif.[3] It is possible that the post would not have existed earlier, and was created by Aurangzeb later in his reign when the strength and the activities of the topkhana had increased and the Mir Atish was more frequently sent to the field assignments. An official was then required to assist the Mir Atish in clearing the heavier/ office work and to look after it in his absence. This surmise is strengthened by the fact that the Akhbarat referred to above as also some other Akhbarat mention the Mushrif as officiating (naib of) the Mir Atish.[4] It appears that

1. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.25b, 26b, 119b, 164a; Add. 6598, ff.141b, 142a, 201b.

2. Cf. the two dasturu-l amals cited in the note 1 above.

3. Cf. Akhbarat, 8th Safar, 39th R.Y., 23rd Ziqada, 40th R.Y., 1st Rajab, 43rd R.Y.

4. Akhbarat, 20th Shaban, 36th R.Y., 4th Ramzan, 37th R.Y., 8th Safar, 39th R.Y.

apart from officiating the *Mir Atish* in his absence, the responsibility of looking after the stock and the financial aspect of the *Topkhana* had also devolved upon the *Mushrif*. Aurangzeb once asked the *Mushrif* to assess the cost of the guns etc. abandoned by Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan in Jinji (1693),[1] and recover the amount from the two grandees.[2] Incidentally, the fact that the *Mushrif* officiated the *Mir Atish* shows that he enjoyed a position next to the *Mir Atish* in Department's hierarchy, and stood between the *Mir Atish* and the two subordinate *mushrifs* of the *barq-andazan* and the *ahsham*.

Mushrif-i Ahsham :

Our information about the *Mushrif-i barq-andazan* and the *Mushrif-i ahsham* is also based mainly on some *dastur-al amals* and there is hardly any reference to them in the chronicles or even in the *Akhbarat*. The reason for this might have been the insignificant position of the two *mushrifs* in the official hierarchy. Thus for instance, a *Mushrif-i barq-andazan* in

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1. Zulfiqar Khan had been sent by Aurangzeb to capture the fort of Jinji in 1691. Later Prince Kam Bakhsh and Asad Khan were also sent with reinforcement (1693). But the Prince showed the signs of rebellion, entered into secret negotiations with the besieged, and the father and the son had to abandon the siege and the guns etc. and to return to the Court. For detail see *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.354-59; *Dilkusha*, ff.107a-111b.

2. *Akhbarat*, 4th Ramazan, 37th R.Y.

1687 held the rank of 400/60.[1] The rank of the *Mushrif-i ahsham* about the same period was still lower, only 200/20,[2] which was later raised to 300/30.[3] His rank was in fact a little higher than the rank of a European (*Farangi*) commander of a group of Europeans in the artillery who held the *mansab* of 100/50 which was subsequently promoted to 150/50.[4]

As regard to their functions, the *Mushrif-i ahsham* was mainly concerned with the recruitment and posting of the *ahsham* and the payment of wages to them. He completed the preliminary routine procedure in these matters for the final seal and signature of the *Mir Atish*. We have already mentioned that the *Mushrifs* appear to have had considerable say in the recruitment of the employees under their charge. However, once the candidates were approved for service, the *Mushrif-i ahsham* took the sureties (*tamassuk-i zamini*) from them, supervised the preparation of their descriptive rolls, and that of their horses; and signed and sealed them to ensure their authenticity.[5] Later the *yaddasht* of the employment of the candidate also appear to have been prepared by the *Mushrif* and his name too was mentioned on the *yaddasht* (in the form of: *marifat falan Mushrif*,

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.164a; Add. 6598, f.207b.
2. *Ibid.*; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.164a.
3. *Ibid.*, f.166a; Add. 6598, f.208b.
4. *Akhbarat*, 14th Zilhijja, 39th R.Y.
5. Add. 6598, f.142a; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff.26b-27a.

i.e. through such and such *Mushrif*[1]) whether the *yaddasht* was written with the *risalah* of the *Mir Atish* or of the *Mir Saman*.[2] After thus joining the service, when any group of *ahsham* was posted on the *Chauki*, sent to provinces, fortresses or on expedition, or was deputed in the *karkhanas*,[3] or elsewhere,[3a] the *dastaks* of such postings were prepared in *Mushrif's* office and were then signed and sealed by the *Mir Atish*.[4]

Finally, the *Mushrif-i ahsham* completed the necessary formalities for the payment of wages to the *ahsham*. He prepared the salary-bills (*barawurd*) of the employees under his charge that was to be sent after the checking and signing of the *Mir Atish* to the *Diwan-i Ala*[5] (through the *Diwan-i Buyutat* and the *Mir Saman*) for the grant of cash to the sub-treasury of the *barqandazan*. When the payments were made, the *Mushrif* also secured the payment-receipts (*qabz*) from the employees.[6]

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1. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.27a; Add. 6598, f.142b.
2. See Supra p. 317.
3. Thus for instance, small groups of musketeers (*banduqchiyan*) were sometimes posted at the *karkhanas* or *bagh* for security purpose (Cf. *Akhbarat*, 12th Rajab, 27th Shaban, 43rd R.Y.; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.27a).

3 a. Similarly, a posse of nine musketeers (*banduqchiyan*) was deputed at the court (of justice), *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb, p.101.

4. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.26b; Add. 6598, f.142a.
5. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.27b; Add. 6598, f.142b.
6. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f.27a; Add. 6598, f.142a.

Mushrif-i Barq-andazan :

We do not possess the same details about the barq-andazan and their Mushrif. On the basis of above information, however, we may safely presume that the Mushrif-i barq-andazan too performed the similar functions about the barq-andazan under his charge.[1]

Besides the above functions, the two mushrifs were sometimes also assigned the military duties. Thus for example, when Safshikan Khan Mir Atish resigned from the post during the siege of Golconda (1687), Aurangzeb instructed the two Mushrifs to protect the batteries for an assault on the fort.[2]

The Department of the Mir Atish at the Centre thus consisted of, apart from the Mir Atish himself, a senior Mushrif and two subordinate mushrifs of the barq-andazan and the shahan. We found no reference to a Daroghah-i Kachahri of the Mir Atish. Nor could we find a full list of the records maintained in the office of the Mir Atish. This might have been because of comparatively small number of papers received or kept by the Mir Atish; and those that were maintained, would have been looked after by the Mushrifs. Like the offices of other heads of central departments, apparently the following papers would have been kept in the office of the

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1. Cf. Add. 6598, ff.141b-142a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.25b-26b.
2. Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.119a; Add. 6598, f.183b.

Mir Atish :[1]

1. naql-i siyaha-i huzur (the copy of the Court-diary);
2. the list of the barq-andazan and the ahsham;
3. the descriptive rolls of the barq-andazan and the ahsham;
4. maratib-i barq-andazan-o-ahsham (the mansab or salary details of the barq-andazan and the ahsham);
5. roznamcha-i dagh-o-tashiha (the diary of the branding and verification) of the barq-andazan and the ahsham;
6. siyaha-i Chauki (the diary of the Mounted Guard) of the barq-andazan and the ahsham;
7. sarrishta-i mutayyanah afwaj-o-hazirat (list of the artillery personnel sent on expedition and present at the Court).

The Mir Atish thus held the charge of an important central department and performed many functions related to it in the office and in the battle-field. His department was important not only because it comprised a very important and strong wing of the Mughal army, but also because it was avery large department having thousands of matchlockmen, gunners, grenadiers (bandara), musketeers, and many times more of para-military forces attached to it, the total strength of whom would have been well over twenty-five thousand. It is, however, surprising that in spite

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1. Mention to some of these records is found in Add. 6598, ff.141a-142a; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, ff.24a-27a.

of important position of the Mir Atish and his department in the central government under the Mughals, neither the Mir Atish nor his department could find a mention in Ibn Hasan's Central Structure of the Mughal Empire.

<u>Table</u>, <u>Chapter V</u>

List of the <u>Mir Atish</u> of Aurangzeb with their <u>Mansab</u>, Promotion and Tenure.

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	<u>Mansab</u> when appointed	<u>Izafa</u>, if any.	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
1st. June 1658	Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad Beg	Irani	4000/2000	?	To Bengal against Shuja	1st. 25 Jan. 1659	AN 51,62,92,245,269; KK ii/14,23; Mu ii/81-93.
1st. c March 1659	Safshikan Khan Muhammad Tahir	,,	3000/1500	3000/2000 3000/2500	Removed	4th. 23 Dec. 1661	AN 307,314,334,380,634; KK ii/65; MU ii/738-40.
4th. 23 Dec. 1661	Fidai Khan, Muzaffar Husain	,,	3000/2000	3500/200 4000/2500	Faujdar of Gorakhpur	10th. 12 Nov. 1667	AN 634,741,870,1061; AH 126a; ZA 108a; MU i/247-53.
10th. 12 Nov. 1667	Rad Andaz Khan, later Shujaat Khan	,,	2000/1500	3500/2000 4000/2500	Died	17th. 24 Feb. 1674	AN 1061; MA 50,116,131; SC 253a; ZA 108a; MU ii/679-81.
17th. April 1674	Safshikan Khan, Muhammad Tahir	,,	3000/2500	?	Died	18th. 3 June 1675	AN 880; MA 132,141; ZA 108a; MU ii/738-40.
18th. 3 June 1675	Multafit Khan, Ibrahim Husain	,,	3000/1000	?	Removed	19th. c April 1676	MA 142,150,193; MU iii/611-13.
19th. c April 1676	Darab Khan s/o Mukhtar Khan Sabzwari	,,	3000/?	?	Died	22nd. 4 July 1679	MA 150,176; SC 252a; ZA 108a; TU 65b; MU ii/39-42.
	(In addition, held the post of <u>Mir Tuzuk</u> since May 1677, MA 157)						
22nd. 4 July 1679	Ruhullah Khan I	Irani	3000/2000	?	Second <u>Bakhshi</u>	23rd. 30 Jan. 1680	MA 176,187,195; ZA 108a; MU ii/309-15.
23rd. 30 Jan. 1680	Salabat Khan, Khwaja Mir Khwafi	,,	2500/1200	?	Removed	23rd. 17 April 1680	MA 187-88,192; ZA 108a; MU ii/742-46.

(continued.......)

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any.	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
23rd. 17 April 1680	Bahramand Khan	Irani	2000/ 500	2500/ 500	Darogha of Ghuslkhana	24th. 17 July 1681	MA 192,209; ZA 108b,161b; MU 1/454-57.
	(In addition, was also made the Mir Tuzuk in Feb. 1681, MA 205).						
25th. December 1681	Salabat Khan, Khwaja Mir Khwafi	Irani	2500/1200	?	To Awadh	27th. December 1683	MA 216,240,242; ZA 108a,109b, 110a; MU 11/742-46.
27th. December 1683	Shujaat Khan, Mir Sadruddin (later Safshikan Khan II)	,,	2500/1500	3000/2000	Resigned	30th. 13 May 1687	MA 240,290-91; Dilkusha, 91b; ZA 119a,160b; KK 11/359; MU 11/746-47.
30th. 14 May 1687	Salabat Khan	,,	2500/1200	?	,,	30th. 21 May 1687	MA 290-92; ZA 109b-110a,119a-120b; MU 11/742-46.
30th. 22 May 1687	Saiyid Izzat Khan	,,?	1000/ 200	?	Captured by enemy; removed	30th. 26 June 1687	MA 291-92; ZA 110a,120b,123b-124b; KK 11/348.
30th. 26 June 1687	Salabat Khan	Irani	2500/1200	?	Relieved	30th. 27 June 1687	MA 291-92; ZA 110a,125a.
	(ZA 125a has Mukhlis Khan, the son of Safshikan Khan)						
30th. 27 June 1687	Safshikan Khan, Mir Sadruddin	Irani	3000/2000	?	Died (?)	31st. October 1687	MA 291-92,303; ZA 109b,125a; KK 11/359; MU 11/746-47.
31st. October 1687	Mukhlis Khan s/o Safshikan Khan Sadruddin	,,	1000/ 300	?	Darogha Arz-i-Mukarrar	33rd. 19 July 1689	MA 303,313,330; ZA 110a,165b; KK 11/394,399; MU 111/641-43.
33rd. 19 July 1689	Mukhtar Khan Qamaruddin	,,	2500	?	?	36th. ?	MA 330; ZA 110a; MU 111/655-660.
36th. ?	Safshikan Khan Amanullah	?	?	–	Removed	37th. March 1694	MA 365,370; ZA 110b; TU 102a.

(continued.....)

Table, Chapter V (continued......)

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any.	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
37th. March 1694	Mukhtar Khan Qamruddin	Irani	2500	-	Governor of Agra	38th. March 1695	MA 365-70,269-70; MU iii/655-660.
38th. March 1695	Khanazad Khan, later Ruhullah Khan II	,,	3000/1000	-	Subahdar of Bidar	39th. 14 Feb. 1696	MA 370,374-380; Akh. 10th Rajab, 24th Shaban, 39th R.Y.; KK ii/428-33; MU ii/315-17.
(In addition, was also the Darogha of Khas Chauki, MA 380)							
39th. March 1696	Tarbiyat Khan, Muhammad Khalil	Irani	2000/1200	2500/1200 3000/1200 3500/1800	Death of Aurangzeb	51st	Akh. 24th Shaban, 39th R.Y.; MA 381, 395-96,460,485; Dilkusha, 133a; MU i/498-503.

(In addition, appointed the Qiladar of Nabishah Durg and Nahiabad, as also the Darogha of the Topkhana of the Deccan where his son Muhammad Ishaq served as his Deputy, MA 497)

Chapter VI

THE SADR AS SUDUR

His Position, Powers and Functions

The Working of the Department under him.

The *Sadr-as Sudur* was another functionary at the centre who headed the department that was responsible for the distribution of charity (*khairat*), *madad-i maash* (aids for subsistence) grants, and for the appointment of *sadrs*, qazis, *muhtasibs* (censors of public morals), and variety of other staff for mosques, tombs and *madrasas* (schools) maintained by the state.

The department of *Sadr-as Sudur*, or of *Sadr* as he was earlier called, has always been an important wing of the government under the Muslim rulers because of its twin functions of organising the administration of justice and looking after the religious affairs. The department acquired special significance during the reign of Aurangzeb because it was mainly through this department that Aurangzeb could project himself as the 'reviver of the faith', a title which he had actually adopted on his accession, and could win over the influential religious sections of the society by extending to them the posts and patronage. It was, perhaps, with this end in view that after his accession Aurangzeb liberalised the rules for

madad-i maash grants and created two important posts of pure religious nature at the Court and many smaller ones throughout the empire. These measures brought some structural and functional changes in the department of the *Sadr-as Sudur* and enhanced its responsibilities and functions.

The changes that Aurangzeb introduced in *madad-i maash* grants we would discuss later. As regard to creation of posts, one was that of the *Qazi-al quzat* or the Chief *Qazi* as he is commonly called. This was not actually a new post, but in fact the existing post of *Qazi-i Urdu* or the *Qazi-i Askar* (i.e. the *Qazi* attached with the Court) had been redesignated as the *Qazi-al quzat*.[1] Aurangzeb gave this old and high sounding designation to the same *Qazi-i Urdu*, perhaps, to impress upon the people his regard for the *Shariat* and its representative, as also to reward the then incumbent Qazi Abd-al Wahhab for establishing the legality of his accession during the lifetime of his father.[2] It was, however, not the simple change of

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1. Cf. *Mirat-al Alam*, f.226b; *Futuhat*, ff.71b, 86a; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, pp.148, 239.

2. Qazi Abd-al Wahhab was the grandson of Muhammad Tahir, a famous scholar of Patan, Gujrat (for him see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Khatimah*, pp.116-17), and was himself the qazi of Patan during the reign of Shah Jahan. Later, he joined Aurangzeb during his viceroyalty of the Deccan as the qazi of his army, and accompanied him to the north. When, on his final coronation Aurangzeb asked the then *Qazi-i Urdu* to recite the *khutba* in his name, he refused to do so on the ground that it was not legal during the lifetime of his father. Abd-al Wahhab then came forward to the rescue of Aurangzeb, argued with the *Qazi-i Urdu*, recited the *khutba*, replaced him as the *Qazi-i Urdu* and got the title of *Qazi-al quzat* (*Futuhat*, ff.36b-37a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.248).

designation. Apart from the usual functions of hearing and deciding the cases, and reciting the khutba and the nikah of princes and princesses which a Qazi-i Urdu used to perform earlier,[1] most of religious matters were now referred to and were represented by the Qazi-al quzat.[2] And although he did not have any administrative responsibility, he nevertheless exercised great influence over the Emperor which was envied by high ranking nobles of the realm.[3]

Before we discuss the other post created by Aurangzeb at the Court, it is necessary to remove here a wide spread confusion about the post and functions of the Qazi-al quzat. Some modern scholars, rather majority of those who have written on the subject, hold the view that the Qazi-al quzat and the Sadr-us Sudur were two distinct posts since the time of Akbar, though sometimes combined in one person. And hence the conclusion that the Qazi-al quzat was the head of the justice department at the centre and appointed the qazis.[4] But the view is not supported by the

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1. Salih, Vol. II, p.185; Kaatm, pp.457, 643; Hidayat-al Qawaid, f.25a; Zawabit, f.36a; Majmuat-al Afkar, p.191.
2. Cf. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.297-98, 309, 319, 330, 340.
3. Mirat-ul Alam, f.226b; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, pp.215-16.
4. J.N. Sarkar, The Mughal Administration, p.96; M.B. Ahmad, The Administration of Justice in Medieval India, p.143; P. Saran, Provincial Administration of the Mughals, pp.324-25; I.H. Qureshi, Administration of the Mughal Empire, pp.183, 187.

facts. As mentioned above, the post of the Qazi-al quzat was revived by Aurangzeb. Under his predecessors there used to be a Sadr or the Sadr-as sudur, but not a Qazi-al quzat. There was, of course, a qazi attached with the Court as there were the qazis at the provincial headquarters and at other places. This qazi was called the Qazi-i Urdu or Qazi-i Askar (i.e. the Qazi of the Court);[1] and as such also enjoyed eminent position among the qazis, commensurate with the place of his posting. But he was neither called the Qazi-al quzat, nor did he hold any administrative responsibility. While describing the chief functionaries of the state, Abul Fazl has mentioned only the Wakil, the Wazir, the Bakhshi and the Sadr;[2] but we find no reference to a Qazi-al quzat in the Ain. The observation of N.B. Ahmad[3] and Z.U. Siddiqi[4] that the Qazi-al quzat was an important official under Akbar, is therefore based on unwarranted assumption that the Sadr-as sudur and the Qazi-al quzat were identical posts and designations. Nor do the Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, Padshahnamah and other contemporary sources mention the post of the Qazi-al quzat or the incumbents. And even when Aurangzeb created the post, the Qazi-al quzat was not the Chief Qazi in the sense that he headed the justice department, and appointed, posted or transferred the

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1. Lahori, Vol. I, part II, p.343; Saleh, Vol. III, p.113.
2. Ain, Vol. II, p.187.
3. N.B. Ahmad, op. cit., p.143.
4. Z.U. Siddiqi, 'The Institution of Qazi under the Mughals', MIM, Vol. I, p.240.

qazis. These matters continued to be under the jurisdiction of the *Sadr-as sudur* as we shall see. He was the Chief *Qazi* because he was associated with the Court, and was justly the most eminent of all qazis as regard to his qualifications, rank, status and function.

Position and Status :

The other post which Aurangzeb created (June, 1659) besides the *Qazi-al quzat*, was that of the *Muhtasib-i Mulk* (i.e. the censor of the public moral at the Court). His main function was to ensure that the people properly observe the religious obligations.[1] The *muhtasibs* were also to be appointed, like that of the qazis, throughout the empire.[2] Although the *Muhtasib-i Mulk* did not enjoy the same influence which the *Qazi-al quzat* did, he too used to be a scholar of repute and standing.[3] The *Qazi-al quzat* or the *Muhtasib-i Mulk* were not included in the hierarchy of the department of the *Sadr-as sudur*; nor did they hold a rank higher than that of the *Sadr-as sudur* - while the highest rank held by a

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1. *Kazim*, pp.391-92; *Hatim Khan*, f.84a; *Khafi Khan*, Vol. II, p.80; *Manucci*, Vol. II, pp.4-5; *Kalimat-al Afzal*, p.191.

2. *Kazim*, pp.392, 1076; *Futuhat*, f.84a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. I, p.249.

3. The first incumbent Mulla Iwaz Wajih was a great and reputed scholar of Turan who came over to India in 1647 and became the *Mufti* of Shah Jahan. For him see *Salih*, Vol. III, p.384; *Mirat-al Alam*, f.226b; *Kazim*, p.392; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.156.

Qazi-ul quzat or the *Muhtasib-i Mulk* was 1500, it was lowest for *Sadr-us sudur*.[1] But the presence of two high religious dignitaries at the Court considerably affected the position of the *Sadr-us sudur* as the sole exponent of the religion and the representative of religious sections at the Court. And in spite of his functions of distributing the charity and *madad-i maash* grants, and of appointing hosts of religious functionaries, the *Sadr-us sudur* under Aurangzeb emerges like other central ministers, as a civil official rather than a religious authority. Some of them like Qulij Khan Khwaja Abid, who twice held the post for a total of about seven years, held the civil and military posts before and after becoming the *Sadr-us sudur*.[2] And his nephew Muhammad Amin Khan Chin Bahadur, who too served on the job for an identical period, was indeed sent on military expeditions even while holding the post itself, and subsequently rose to the exalted office of the *Wazir* under Muhammad Shah (1719-1748).[3]

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1. Cf. *Kazim*, pp.392; *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.506; *Muhammadi*, p.9. See also Table at the end of this Chapter.

2. Qulij Khan was the son of Alam Shaikh, a famous scholar of Samarqand, and was himself a scholar. He came to India in 1655, went on Haj, and on return joined Aurangzeb and given the rank of 3000/500 which was later raised to 4000/700. He became *Sadr-us sudur* in 1661, made the governor of Ajmer (1667) of Multan (1671), sent against Akbar (1681), again appointed the Sadr-us sudur (1681), sent to the Deccan (1681) and made the governor of Bedar and was killed during the siege of Golcunda (*Maasir*, Vol. III, pp.120-23).

3. He was the nephew of Qulij Khan, and a scholar of religious sciences. He too came over to India in 1686, joined service under Aurangzeb, given the rank of 2000/1000, and deputed on the Deccan campaign. He became the *Sadr-us sudur* in 1698, and while holding the post, actively participated in the siege of Khelna (1702), Wagingara (1705) etc. He took active part in group-politics under the successors of Aurangzeb against the Saiyid brothers (vide Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Chapters V, VI and VII) and became *Wazir* of Muhammad Shah in 1720, but died four months later, in February, 1621 (*Maasir*, Vol. I, pp.346-50).

However, notwithstanding these changes in his position, the main consideration in the appointment of a _Sadr-us-sudur_ continued to be his scholarship and learning. He was also expected to be just (_adil_), truthful (_sadiq_), courteous (_khaliq_), considerate (_ba-murawwat_) and benevolent (_shafiq_).[1] Almost all _Sadr-us-sudur_ of Aurangzeb, with possible exception of Shaikh Makhdoom,[2] were scholars of repute and masters of religious sciences. And it was perhaps because of these considerations that except Shaikh Mirak Hirawi,[3] who held the post for about a year and a half, the other incumbents were non-Iranis: two were Indians who together served on the job for eight years; the rest were the Turanis who who occupied the post for the rest of thereign.[4] As most of the posts in central departments were dominated by the Iranis, their exclusion from the _sadarat_ in favour of the Turanis would not have been but deliberate. Though all Iranis may not be presumed as the Shiites, it was perhaps because of the nature of the post that Aurangzeb preferred to appoint to this particular post the persons who belonged to Turan, the traditional seat of Sunite scholarship and learning.

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1. _Hidayat-al Qawaid_, f.24a.
2. He was a native of Thatta in Sindh, and was in the beginning attached to Prince Azam. Later he became the _Munshi_ of the Emperor himself (1680) and then the _Sadr-us-sudur_ in 1682, on which post he died in 1688 (_Maasir_, Vol. III, p.32; _Tazkirat-al Umara_, f.118b).
3. The second _Sadr-us-sudur_ of Aurangzeb. He was a native of Herat (Khurasan) and a great scholar. He came over to India during the reign of Jahangir, but entered into service under Shah Jahan and attained the rank of 2500/200. Aurangzeb raised him to 3000 and appointed the _Sadr-us-sudur_ in March 1660, and died soon after his retirement in November 1661 (_Lahori_, Vol. II, pp.344, 755; _Mirat-al Alam_, f.223b; _Maasir_, Vol. III, pp.418-19).
4. Cf. the Table.

It was also perhaps because of the same reason that among the nine incumbents who permanently held the post, only Qulij Khan Khwaja Abid was twice transferred from the post to civil and military assignments. But the rest held the post either till their retirement, as was the case with first two incumbents, or till their death, as happened with last four of them.[1] It was thus the third post, besides the _Wizarat_ and the _Mir Bakhshigiri_, where the incumbents were allowed to serve the life term.

The _mansabs_ held by the _Sadr-as sudur_ also compare favourably with other central ministers. Among the nine permanent _Sadr-as sudurs_, only one held the rank of 1500; two of 2000; one 2500; two 3000; one 3500; and two that of 4000. Later, one more among them attained the rank of 4000.[2] Thus taken as a whole, the _Sadr-as sudur_ held a rank higher than the rank of some other central ministers like the _Mir Saman_ and the _Mir Atish_ which is quite in consonance with the functions and responsibilities of the _Sadr-as sudur_.

Functions and Powers :

Appointment of Qazis, Sadrs and the Muhtasib etc.

The most important function of the _Sadr-as sudur_ was to appoint

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1. Cf. the Table.

2. For detail see the Table.

the *qazis*[1] and the *muhtasibs*[2] for almost all provincial, *sarkar* and *parganah* headquarters, cities, towns (*qasbah*) and *bazars* etc. He also appointed the subordinate *sadrs* (*sadr-i-juzw*) for the provinces[3] and the *parganahs*[4] whose main function was to look after the *madad-i-maash* holders of the area and perform their annual physical verification (*tashiha*) to ascertain whether they were alive and in possession of the grants.[5] These *sadrs* also supervised the work and function of the subordinate employees which the *Sadr-us-sudur* appointed in their jurisdictions like the *imams* (who lead the prayer), the *muazzins* (who give the call for prayer) and the attendants for the mosques, and the *mutawallis* (administrators) and the maintenance staff for the shrines and tombs maintained by the state.[6] According to *Waqai Ajmer*, Aurangzeb had also ordered for the appointment of *waiz* (religious preachers) at different places.[7] Similarly, he also issued instruction in 1664 that teachers be appointed in all provinces and students be given the stipends. Evidently, this order was meant to extend

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1. *Siyaqnamah*, pp.86-87; *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.30-31; *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.35-36; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.174.

2. *Kazim*, pp.392, 1076; *Hidayat-al Qawaid*, f.26a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.174.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.173.

4. *Nigarnamah*, p.83; *Siyaqnamah*, pp.82-83.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.173; Cf. also *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.30a; *Waqai Ajmer*, f.373.

6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Khatimah*), p.173; *Kalimat*, f.37a; *Malumat-al Afaq*, 191.

7. *Waqai Ajmer*, ff.280-81.

the existing facilities. Unfortunately much detail is not available as to how the appointments of these small but innumerable functionaries were made. This much is, however, clear that the provincial sadrs had considerable say in these appointments and their recommendations were generally approved.[1] There is also the specific instance where the Sadr-as sudur authorised the provincial sadr to appoint the qazis in his jurisdiction.[2] It is possible that he might have been authorised for other similar appointments. At any rate, the sanads of these appointments were issued by the Sadr-as sudur himself.[3]

We can, however, say something more with greater confidence about the appointment of the qazis, the muhtasibs and the sadrs. Needless to say that the Sadr-as sudur does not appear to have any say in the appointment of either the Qazi-al quzat or the Muhtasib-i Mikab, though the recommendation of Qazi-al quzat Shaikh-al Islam (1676-1683) himself was accepted for his own brother-in-law Qazi Abu Said (1683-1685) to succeed him.[4] And the next incumbent Qazi Abdullah (1685-1698) was

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1. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.258. Cf. Ibid., p.358; Kalimat-al Afaq, p.191.
2. Waqai Ajmer, ff.280-81.
3. Ibid.; Kalimat, f.37a; Mirat-i Ahmadi (Khatimah), p.173.
4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.237.

appointed on the recommendation of Prince Azam.[1]

In the appointment of subordinate qazis too the Sadr-as sudur seems to have lost much of his role because a reference in Maasir-al Umara alludes to the fact that the post had become almost hereditary (irsi).[2] Though there are instances when the fresh candidates were appointed as the qazis, ignoring the sons of the deceased qazis,[3] the statement of Maasir-al Umara is supported by some actual appointments. Thus the appointment of first three Qazi-al quzat was made on hereditary basis. On the death of first Qazi-al quzat Abd-al Wahhab (January 1676), his son Shaikh-al Islam succeeded him.[4] The son-in-law of Abd-al Wahhab, Qazi Abu Said first succeeded his brother-in-law Shaikh-al Islam as the qazi of Delhi, and then as the Qazi-al quzat itself on his resignation in 1683.[5] The post thus remained confined in the same family for half of Aurangzeb's reign, from

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1. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.310. Qazi Abdullah was the son of one Muhammad Sharif who was the qazi of Aurangzeb's army before his accession, about whom much is not known. Qazi Abdullah himself was first the qazi of Ahmadabad. On complaint against him, was summoned to the Court, but found innocent and made the qazi of Prince Azam's army, whence he transferred as the Qazi-al quzat. Later he was also made the Sadr-us sudur (1698), but died within two months (Maasir-i Alamgiri, pp.258-59; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, pp.309-10).

2. Maasir, Vol. I, p.239.

3. Cf. Siyaqnamah, pp.86-87; Nigarnamah, p.122; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.327.

4. Futuhat, f.70b; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.148; Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.247.

5. Futuhat, f.93b; Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.239; Maasir, Vol. I, p.238.

June 1659 to May 1685. Still another son of Abd-al Wahhab, Muhy-al Din was the sadr, and probably also the qazi of Ahmadabad, and on his death in 1689 was succeeded by his son.[1] When Qazi Abdullah became the Qazi-al quzat (May 1685), his son succeeded him as the qazi of Prince Azam's army;[2] and on the death of his father was also considered for the post of Qazi-al quzat. But perhaps he could not muster the support of Azam.[3] Such appointments were not confined to the centre and provinces alone. When the qazi of Daryabad in the subah of Awadh died, his son was appointed to the post at the same place.[4]

The qazis of many places combined in themselves other similar posts. The posts of provincial sadrs and qazis had been amalgamated almost throughout the empire;[5] the sadr of Ajmer was also the administrator (mutawalli) of the tomb of Shaikh Muin-al-Din Chishti;[6] the qazi of Ahmadabad was also the muhtasib of the place;[7] and the qazi of Merta in

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1. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.319.
2. Ibid., p.310.
3. Cf. Ruqaat, p.12; Raqaim, f.14b.
4. Cf. Nigarnamah, p.83.
5. Cf. P. Saran, op. cit., p.200.
6. Waqai Ajmer, f.83.
7. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.291.

Rajputana also collected the jizyah there.[1] Later a general order was issued (1696-97) that the provincial qazis would also work as the amin of the bait-al mal in their respective provinces.[2] It thus means that wherever the qaziship had become hereditary, and the qazi combined some other post, that post too devolved upon the succeeding qazi.

The hereditary appointments on above posts, as also on many others in our period, might have been because of some social compulsion in a society where education was not very common and diversified; and its pattern, as also that of the profession, was largely decided by inheritance and social environment. The non-availability of suitable persons for innumerable posts under discussion, perhaps, for the same educational reasons, might have made the hereditary appointments inevitable. Because we know that Aurangzeb's order to appoint waezis (religious preachers) could not be complied with at some places as suitable persons were not available.[3] Similarly, the qazis and muhtasibs were not appointed at Nagor for years together in spite of repeated local demands.[4] The combining of more than one post in the qazis itself might have been partly because of the same reason of non-availability of suitable persons for various posts of religious nature.

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1. Waqai Ajmer, ff.508-509.
2. Mirat-i Ahmadi, Vol. I, p.338.
3. Waqai Ajmer, ff.280-81.
4. Ibid., f.45.

Whatever the reasons, once the inheritance became an important factor in the appointment of the qazis, and other similar posts which a qazi could combine, it would have considerably reduced the role of the *Sadr-us sudur* in the selection of candidates to these posts. However, whether the post was given to the son of a deceased qazi or to some other person, the appointment was subject to the approval of the Court and the issue of the *sanad*. And like the heads of other central departments, it was the privilege of the *Sadr-us sudur* to issue the *sanad* of appointment of all employees of his department with his *risalah*.[1] These *sanads* contained the name of the incumbent, the post, the place of his posting, the duties and functions as also the salary or allowance fixed for him.[2] The salaries of the *qazis* varied according to the place of their posting and from person to person, and were paid in the form of *mansab*, land grants or cash. Thus while the *Qazi-ul quzat* held a rank ranging from 1000 to 1500,[3] the qazi of Daryabad in Awadh got 150 *bighas* of land as *madad-i maash*.[4] Similarly, the qazi of Aurangabad got Rs.5 per day which was raised to Rs.8 for a new incumbent;[5] and that of a village only 8 *annas* per day.[6]

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1. & 2. *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.30-31; *Siyaqnamah*, pp.86-87 (the sources contain the *sanad* of qaziship with the *risalah* of the *Sadr-us sudur*; and the one in the *Siyaqnamah* is with the *yaddasht* and the endorsement of concerned officials and, therefore, indicates procedure). For similar *sanads* of *sadarat* and *ihtisab* see *Siyaqnamah*, pp.83, 148-49.

3. Qazi Abdullah held a rank of 1500 (*Muhammadi*, p.9), and Qazi Muhammad Akram Khan that of 1000/500 (*Maasir-i Alamgiri*, p.506).

4. *Siyaqnamah*, p.83.

5. *Selected Documents* (Aurangzeb), pp.30-31.

6. *Ibid.*, p.15.

Besides the sanad given to the appointee himself, the Sadr-as sudur also issued a parwanah to the local officials to let the incumbent assume his duties.[1] On the basis of this parwanah the provincial sadr also issued the instructions to the local official to help the candidate join his service. Without these procedural facilities, it was not possible for a person to function at the place of his posting. This is clear from an incident quoted in the Waqai Ajmer. A person claimed that he had been appointed the qazi of Nagor. But the agents of local jagirdar did not allow him to function without a parwanah from the provincial sadr. When the claimant approached that official, he refused to oblige him unless he received a parwanah from the Sadr-as sudur. When he showed him a letter of recommendation from the Sadr-as sudur, the provincial sadr refused to honour it on the plea that it might be a forged one; and said he could intervene only after he would receive a parwanah about his appointment from the Sadr-as sudur himself.[2]

Like the appointment, the Sadr-as sudur would have also been responsible for the transfer of officials working under him. But the hereditary nature of many appointments plus small land grants and salaries would have left him little discretion for such transfers. But what was more harmful from social and administrative point of view was the fact that

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1. For one such parwanah issued after the appointment of a sadr of a pargana, see Siyaqnamah, pp.82-83.

2. Waqai Ajmer, ff.35-36.

the hereditary appointments and serving at their home towns badly affected the professional efficiency of these officials. Theoretically, certain qualifications were necessary for a qazi in accordance with the nature of his duties and functions. He was expected to be a scholar of religious sciences (alim), just, honest, impartial and ungreedy.[1] But when the sons were almost sure of getting the job of their fathers, they did not need to bother about these requirements. The author of Maasir-ul Umara deplores that the 'hereditary qazis of towns (qasbat) had hardly a touch of learning, most of them were illiterate (jahil), and the records of the deshpandiahs and the utterances of the zamindars were their scriptures and the law-books',[2] meaning thereby that they had little knowledge of law and jurisprudence, and functioned according to the behest of the local chiefs. The same writer remarks further that honest qazis are scarce.[3] The evil was not confined to the qazis alone. And without generalising that all of them were corrupt, the observation of the statement of Maasir-ul Umara is supported by many complaints in the Waqai Ajmer against the functioning of the qazis, the muhtasibs and the collectors of the jizyah.[4]

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1. Mirat-ul-Qawaid, ff.25a-26a.
2. Maasir, Vol. I, p.239.
3. Ibid.
4. Waqai Ajmer, ff.36, 183, 190, 206-207, 223-24. Cf. also Dilkusha, f.139b.

As the head of the department, it was the duty of the Sadr-as sudur to look into such complaints. Thus for instance, on report by the agent of a waqai nigar that the qazi of Merta, who had also been collecting the jizyah, had misappropriated huge amount, the Sadr-as sudur sent his pashdast to enquire into the matter. But it appears from the proceedings of the enquiry that the pashdast tried to shield his co-professionalist. He intimidated the agent of the waqai-nigar either to produce witness against the qazi or give a statement refuting the charge. The agent of the waqai-nigar protested to the Court how could he procure witnesses unless the qazi was first transferred.[1] On proving the charges, however, the qazis seem to have been removed from service. This is clear from an order of Aurangzeb issued in February, 1683 that the dismissed qazis should not be reappointed.[2] But the same order indicates that the dismissed qazis were sometimes reappointed, and therefore, reaffirm the doubt that they were protected by their superiors at the Court. It is thus unfortunate that this department of public importance was no less infested with corruption than were some other departments, and its personnel did not enjoy a good reputation.

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1. Waqai Ajmer, ff.508 - 509.

2. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p. 224.

Grant of Madad-i Maash :

Another function of the Sadr-us sudur was to formally grant the award of the madad-i maash (aid for subsistence) grants to certain sections of people who were consideredd entitled to these grants, like the scholars, saints, poors, the destitutes of noble descent, the retired nobles and their families.[1] In some documents the allowances or salaries of the qazis and muhtasibs have also been termed as the madad-i maash grants.[2] This indicates that not only the land grants but also the cash payments which Abul Fazl describes as wazifa[3] were called the madad-i maash. But what is more interesting is the fact that besides the land grants and the stipend, some deserving people (arbab-i istahqaq) had also got about 5000 man of salt annually from the salt-ranges of Sambhar and Didwana in Ajmer province in madad-i maash without actually using that term.[4]

The Sadr-us sudur[5] or his peshdast[6] generally presented the candidates before the Emperor for the grant of madad-i maash. As the

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1. Ain, Vol. I, p.156. Cf. Irfan Habib, op. cit., pp.306-308.
2. Selected Documents (Aurangzeb), pp.15, 30-31; Nigarnamah, pp.148-49; Siyaqnamah, pp.86-87.
3. Ain, Vol. I, p.156.
4. Waqai Ajmer, f.373.
5. Kasim, p.1101; Malumat-ul Afaq, p.191; Hidayat-ul Qawaid, ff.24a-25a.
6. Ruqaat, p.38; Raqaim, f.10a; Dastur-i Agahi, f.108a.

Bakhshis could not award any mansab by themselves, so also the *Sadr-as sudur* does not appear to have enjoyed the privilege of granting the *madad-i maash* himself. If that discretion was ever enjoyed by the *Sadr-as sudurs* under the predecessors of Aurangzeb,[1] he had ceased to enjoy it under Aurangzeb. However, where the role of the *Sadr-as sudur*, like that of the *Bakhshis*, mattered in introducing the candidate to the Emperor, explaining his circumstances and requirements and in impressing upon him his entitlement (*istehqaq*) for a small or a big grant.[2] Thus while in some cases the Emperor granted only thirty *bighas*,[3] one hundred *bighas*[4] or two hundred *bighas* of land,[5] in one case he granted 500 *bighas*.[6] This big difference was evidently the result of forceful pleading of the case by the *Sadr-as sudur* that 'the candidate spends his days and nights in fast and prayer, is visited by large number of students, and has many dependents with no means of livelihood'.[7]

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1. Cf. Ibn Hasan, *op. cit.*, pp.272-73.
2. *Kamin*, p.1101.
3. Cf. *Farman* of Aurangzeb, granting *madad-i maash* to Shaikh Nemat Ullah, dated the 17th Rajab, 28th R.Y. (S.A.M.).
4. Cf. *Parwancha* about *madad-i maash* grant to Saiyid Abd-al Wahhab and sons, dated the 4th Jumada I, 9th R.Y. (S.A.M.).
5. Cf. *Sanad-i madad-i maash*, *Nigarnamah*, p.91; *Inayat Collection*, 1/5/17, 1184.
6. *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.39b.
7. *Ibid.*, f.39a.

After the Emperor verbally granted the *madad-i maash* to a particular person, the procedure for the issue of a *sanad* for it was almost the same that was followed in the grant of *mansab* and *jagir*[1] with the difference however, that the *yaddasht* of this grant was prepared with the *risalah* of *Sadr-as sudur*[2] indicating his position as the head of the department. The *Sadr-as sudur* at the same time issued a *parwanah* to the *chaudhris*, the *qanungos* and the *muqaddams*[3] (if the land granted happened to be in area under *khalisa*), or to the agents of the concerned *jagirdar*[4] (if the grant was located in the *jagir*) instructing them to give the possession of land to the grantee. The *parwanah* contained the full particulars of the grantee and the land granted with details of the area, village, the *parganah* etc. and the crop season (*fasl*). But the above officials acted perhaps only after they received a *parwanah* from the *Diwan-i Ala*[5] and from the provincial *diwan*[6] which used to be almost a copy of the *parwanah* of the *Sadr-as sudur*, and which were evidently treated as the confirmation of the grant by the head of the revenue department (the *Diwani*), and an authorisation to the

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1. For this procedure see Supra p. 166.

2. For such *yaddashts* see *Insha-i Salatin*, p.109; *Naql-i Yaddasht* of *madad-i maash* to Sahiba Sultan, dated the 8th Ramazan, 50th R.Y. (SAH).

3. Cf. *Parwanah-i madad-i maash*, *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.39b.

4. Cf. *Naql-i parwana* of *Sadr-as sudur* Muhammad Amin Khan to the agents of *jagirdars*, dated the 24th Ramazan, 51st R.Y. (S.A.H.).

5. For such *parwanahs* of the *Diwan-i Ala* see *Farhang-i Kardani*, f.30a; *Naql-i parwanah* of Amir-al Umara Asad Khan to the agents of the *jagirdars* dated the 7th Ziqadah, 51st R.Y. (S.A.H.).

6. Cf. *Naql-i-parwanah* of Diyanat Khan, the *diwan* of the Deccan, dated the 17th Ziqadah, & 51st R.Y. (S.A.H.).

local officials to carve out the patch of land and hand it over to the grantee. And the grantee got a *chaknamah*[1] which defined the area and its boundaries.[2] It will be interesting to mention here a case of *madad-i maash* grant the relevant documents of which we were lucky to collect. These documents illustrate the procedure as well as the time consumed in completing the procedure.

Aurangzeb verbally granted sixty square *bighas*[3] land in *parganah* Okhli in Bijapur province to the family of deceased mansabdar on 28th Muharram 49th R.Y. (22nd May, 1705). The *yaddasht* of the grant was prepared on 8th Ramazan 50th R.Y. (24th December 1705), that is to say about seven months after the verbal grant of the Emperor. It was then put before the Emperor for confirmation (*arz-i mukarrar*) on 2nd Jumada I, the same R.Y. (12th August, 1706), again after eight months since the *yaddasht* was prepared. Unfortunately, we could not find the *farman* of this grant which could have shown us the time taken in issuing it after the grant was finally confirmed by the Emperor. However, the *parwanah* of the *Sadr-us sudur* to the local officials was issued on 24th Ramazan, 51st R.Y. (30th December 1706), and that of the *Diwan-i Ala* Asad Khan on 7th Ziqadah

1. For 'chak' see Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, p.301.
2. Such *chaknamahs* are found in *Inshang-i Kardani*, f.36a; *Inayat Collection*, I 5/17, 1184.
3. In the documents it is *nim-chamar*, which means 120 square *bighas* (*Wilson*, p.107).

the same (51st) R.Y. (10th February 1707).[1] Thus from the date the Emperor granted the *madad-i maash* to the final issue of the parwanah by the *Diwan-i Ala* which entitled the grantee to get the possession of land, it took about 22 months. We are not in a position to say whether the time consumed in completing the formalities in this case was a usual feature with such grants or was it because of the political and administrative conditions in the Deccan. In any case it indicates the actual functioning of two central departments at the close of Aurangzeb's reign. Supposing that the grantee had all the requirements for bringing the land under cultivation which would have taken him another year or two, it was a long way for him to get his or her subsistence from the *madad-i maash* grant.

But what is more significant to note is the fact that the grant of land in *madad-i maash* was not just one way benevolence shown by the Mughal rulers to certain sections of the people. As most of such land grants consisted of cultivable waste (*banjar*, *laiq-i zarat*) and unassessed (*kharij az jama*) land,[2] and the whole or the part of the grant was in most cases annexed to *khalisa* after the death of the grant holder, the state was no less beneficiary from the system than was the grantee. The system enabled the state to reclaim vast stretches of waste land through the

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1. The documents with names and dates mentioned above are preserved in the State Archives, Hyderabad.

2. See documents quoted above; *Farhang-i Kardani*, ff.36-39b; *Nigarnamah*, p.91; *Inayat Collection*, I 5/17, 1184. Cf. Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, pp.302-303.

grantees; and then by taking it back after their death, to increase the area under the khalisa. Akbar was the first Mughal ruler who resorted to this method of taking back the land granted in madad-i maash with the two-fold objective of weakening the Afghan power and influence entrenched in the countryside, and of increasing the area under the khalisa to transfer in jagir among the expanding number of his nobles. In a series of measures, he annexed to the khalisa a large number of madad-i maash grants and reduced almost all holdings above one hundred bighas to two-third. Later he also issued an order which implied that the grant would lapse to the state on the death of the grantee.[1]

Jahangir does not seem to have introduced any significant change.[2] But Shah Jahan gave some concessions to the madad-i maash holders. He issued an order in his 5th R.Y. (25 December 1631 - 13 December 1632) that if a holder of madad-i maash grant dies, and his grant does not exceed thirty bighas, the grant should be left to the herirs; but if it were above thirty bighas, half of the land should be annexed to the khalisa, leaving the other half to the heirs.[3] In his 18th R.Y. (5 August 1644 - 24 July 1645), however, on report that some madad-i maash holders possessed spurious sanads, Shah Jahan issued two more orders.[4] One meant for checking of

1. Ain, Vol. I, pp.156-57, 230.

2. Cf. Ibn Hasan, op. cit., p.273.

3. Allahabad Document II, 284. I am thankful to Professor Irfan Habib for lending me the copy of this valuable document.

4. Ibid.; Lahori, Vol. II, p.366 (which, however, mentions the issue of the farman in the 17th R.Y., in March, 1644).

sanads for detecting spurious cases. But the other order was rather harsh and partly a reversion to conditions prevailing under Akbar. It stipulated that the half of the *madad-i maash* holdings of a deceased grantee should be allowed to the heirs only if the *farman* of the grant contained the formula 'with sons';[1] otherwise the whole grant, irrespective of its quantum, must be annexed to the state.

It was in compliance with this rule that every *madad-i maash* holder was specifically required in this *farman* or the *sanad* of *madad-i maash* grants to appear every year before the local *sadrs* for his personal verification (*tashiha*).[2] Without annual verification or on the death of the grantee, the grant was taken back into the khalisa according to rules.[3]

Aurangzeb, however announced some concessions to both the holders of *madad-i maash* grants and their heirs a little after his accession. It is obvious that the circumstances of his accession had prompted him to announce these concessions and his objective in giving them was to show his regard for the poors and the religious classes and to win over the public opinion. It should be noted that the *parwanah*[4] of the then *Diwan*,

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1. *Lahori* (Vol. II, p.366), however, does not specify that only the half of the grant was to be left to the heirs.

2. Cf. *Farman* of Aurangzeb, granting the *madad-i maash* land grant to Shaikh Nemat Ullah, dated the 17th Rajab, 28th R.Y. (*Husain Alyafani Collection, S.A.H.*); *Farhang-i Kardani*, ff.30a, 36a, 39b; *Nigarnamah*, p.83. See also *Lahori*, Vol. II, p.366.

3. *Ibid.*; *Allahabad Document*, II, 284.

4. *Allahabad Document*, II, 284.

Raja Raghunath announcing these concessions was issued on 10th January, 1661, a few months after Dara Shikoh's execution.

Among these concessions the first was that the stopped enquiries into and action against the reported irregularities of the reign of Shah Jahan, and instructed his officials to regularise all possessions provided the grantees were alive and in actual possession of grants. Secondly, he reverted Shah Jahan's order of 1644 about the inheritance of _madad-i maash_ grants. He ordered that if a holder of _madad-i maash_ grant died, and his holding was not more than 20 _bighas_, the half of the grant should be allowed to the heirs, irrespective of the fact whether the grant was 'with son' formula or without it. The _farman_ has no reference for holdings above 20 _bighas_. For such holdings the policy of Shah Jahan was evidently maintained.

Later in his reign, however, Aurangzeb went a step further and made the _madad-i maash_ grants almost hereditary. He issued a _farman_ on 15th Rabi I, 34th R.Y. (17th December, 1690),[1] instructing the officials to allow the _madad-i maash_ holdings of the deceased grantees to their heirs generation after generation whether or not the grant was 'with son' formula, irrespective of the holding of the deceased, and even if the heirs held other land at the same place or elsewhere. Aurangzeb further incorporated elaborate rules in the _farman_ for the division of the grant if the heirs were many and there was a dispute among them for division. These concessions

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1. _Allahabad Document_, II, 53, 55.

are important from administrative point of view in so far as they made the annual checking of the sanads and the personal verification of the grantees (tashiha) unnecessary. This is perhaps the reason that the farmans and the other related documents of madad-i maash grants referred to above, which were issued after the 1690, do not ask the grantees to appear before the sadrs for annual verification. It thus considerably reduced the burden on the department of the Sadr-as sudur, as also the chances of corrupt practices of which we hear so much during the earlier reigns.[1]

Distribution of Cash in Charity (Khairat) :

Like the madad-i maash grants, the cash charities (khairat) were also distributed generally through the Sadr-as sudur. The system existed under Akbar[2] and Jahangir[3] and a separate sub-treasury known as the khazana-i-khairat[4] was maintained for the purpose. Shah Jahan regularised the system of distribution reflecting his religious views and attitude as also his methodical temperament. Instead of random distribution he fixed Rs.10,000 for distribution each month, Rs.30,000 in the month of Ramazan, and some

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1. For such complaints see the Ain, Vol. I, pp.196-97; Ahkam, Vol. II, pp.365-66; Allahabad Documents, II, 53, 55.

2. Ain, Vol. I, p.11.

3. Tuzuk, p.124.

4. Ain, Vol. I, p.10; Zawabit-i Alamgiri, f.14b; Add. 6598, f.136b.

additional amount on some selected and religiously important dates of the Islamic calendar.[1] Aurangzeb scrupulously followed his father in distributing the fixed charity on specified/months and dates; and the amount was handed over to the Sadr-us sudur,[2] for the purpose. Large sum was thus distributed through the Sadr-us sudur, and offered him an opportunity to extend his patronage to a large number of deserving people. The privilege was, however, not confined to the Sadr-us sudur. The Qazi-ul quzat too was sometimes was given the cash to distribute.[3]

Peshdast of Sadr-us sudur :

The Sadr-us sudur had a Peshdast (Assistant) who helped him in performing his functions and duties.[4] The Peshdast presented the candidates before the Emperor, apparently in the absence of the Sadr-us sudur, for the grant of madad-i maash,[5] and was sometimes deputed by the Sadr-us sudur to conduct enquiries against the corrupt qazis or muhtasibs.[6] This incidentally indicates that the Peshdast held a higher position as compared to these functionaries. Nothing more is known about him.

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1. Lahori, Vol. I, part I, pp.394, 417, 440; Vol. II, pp.8, 128, 134, 348, 362.
2. Kazim, pp.439, 574, 608, 616; Hatim Khan, ff.81b, 100a, 115a, 127a; Akhbarat, 2nd Rajab, 12th Zilhijja, 20th R.Y.; 21st Rajab, 24th R.Y.
3. Khafi Khan, Vol. II, p.549.
4. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.222.
5. Ruqaat, p.38; Raqaim, f.10a; Dastur-i Aqahi, f.108a.
6. Waqai Ajmer, ff.508-509.

Other Staff of the Department :

Nor do we find the mention of other subordinate staff of Sadr-as sudur's department which other central departments used to maintain. Abul Fazl mentions that the Sadr was assisted by a clerk who had to look after the financial business and was therefore styled as the Diwan-i Saadat.[1] But we find no reference to such an official under Aurangzeb, perhaps because the work done by this official had since been shifted to the daftar-i tan of the Diwani. According to some dastur-al amals, belonging to the reign of Aurangzeb, the yaddasht, the farman and the parwanchas etc. of the madad-i maash grants were prepared by the daftar-i tan of the Diwani.[2] It then means that these matters were now completed under the immediate supervision of the Diwan-i Tan. The surmise is supported by the fact that Aurangzeb once himself described the department of the Sadr-as sudur as the part of the Diwani and asked the Diwan-i Tan Inayat Ullah Khan to also officiate as the Sadr-as sudur till a regular appointment was made.[3]

We may, however, presume that the Sadr-as sudur had some clerks with him as the provincial sadrs used to have for office work and for maintaining the records.[4] But the record maintained by the Sadr-as sudur

1. Ain, Vol. I, p.196.
2. Inshait-i Alamgiri, f.37a; Add. 6598, f.146b.
3. Maasir-i Alamgiri, p.393.
4. Siyaqnamah, p.83.

too are not mentioned in our sources. But he would have maintained at least the record which a provincial sadr is said to have maintained. This record included :

fihrist-i arazi (the list of the land granted in madad-i maash) according to the farmans and parwanchas;
naql (copy) of the farmans, parwanchas and the chaknamahs;
awarija-i madad-i maash (the ledger showing the grants in madad-i maash);
fihrist-i dehat (set assigned for being granted in madad-i maash);
naql-i sanad-i tashiha (copies of the verification certificate);
siyaha-i tashiha-i arazi (the abstracts of the verification of land granted in madad-i maash);
tumar-i tashiha (the register of the verification).[1]

These papers would have automatically included the list of the subordinate sadrs, qazis, the muhtasibs and other staff appointed throughout the empire, because almost all of them held the madad-i maash grants.

We may now conclude from the above discussion that the department of the Sadr-us sudur was different from other central departments as regard to its structure and functioning. In theory the Sadr-us sudur was responsible for the grant of madad-i maash and the appointment of a large number of sadrs, qazis, muhtasibs and hosts of other small staff for mosques, madrasas and shrines. But the combination of more than one post

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1. Siyaqnamah, p.83.

in the qazis, muhtasibs or sadrs and the hereditary appointments at various levels deprived the Sadr-us sudur much of his powers and responsibilities about the appointments, postings and transfers. As regard to the madad-i maash too, he only presented the deserving candidates before the Emperor and explained their circumstances. The rest was done by the daftar-i tan of the Diwani. Thus, notwithstanding his rank and status of a central minister, the department of the Sadr-us sudur was a one man's department, and his actual functions were confined to introducing the candidates for the madad-i maash grants and signing the appointment letters of the employees associated with his department. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to say that the Sadr-us sudur was mainly a religious dignitary rather than the head of a full-fledged central department with real administrative powers and responsibilities.

The Table, Chapter VI

List of the Sadr-us sudur of Aurangzeb with Their Mansab, Promotion and Tenure.

R.Y. Date	Name	Race/ Group	Mansab when appointed	Izafa, if any.	Next appointment	R.Y. Date	Sources
1st. June, 1658	Saiyid Hidayat Ullah	Indian	2500/ 200	-	Retired	2nd. c.25 March 1660	AN 473; AH 66a; MU 11/456-57.
2nd. .25 March 1660	Shaikh Mirak Hirawi	Irani	3000/?	-	Retired	4th. 23 Nov. 1661	AN 473, 634; MU 111/518-19.
4th. 23 Nov. 1661	Abid Khan (later Qulij Khan)	Turani	4000/ 700	4000/1500	Subahdar of Ajmer	10th. c. 5 June 1667	AN 634,855,1049,1056; AH 111a, 126a; MA 62; MU 111/120-23.
10th. c. 5 June 1667	Rizawi Khan	Turani	3000/ 500	-	Died	24th. 3 July 1681	Salah 111/357; AN 1049; FA 71a; MA 62,139,207; MU 11/307-09.
24th. 3 July 1681	Qulij Khan (formerly Abid Khan)	Turani	4000/1500	-	To Deccan campaign	25th. 6 Nov. 1681	MA 207, 214; Dilkusha, 80b,93b; MU 111/120-23.
25th. July 1682	Sharif Khan, Khwaja Shah	Turani	2000 (?)	-	Died	26th. 14 Oct. 1682	MA 219, 222; TU 90a.
26th. 14 Oct. 1682	Shaikh Makhdum (later Fazil Khan)	Indian	500/ 300	1500/ 300	Died	32nd. c.9 Nov. 1688	MA 191,223,318; FA 86a; MU 111/32-35; TU 118b.
	(In addition to earlier charge of dar-al insha. Also made darogha-i arz.)						
32nd. c.9 Nov. 1688	Siyadat Khan, Saiyid Oghlan	Turani	?	3500/ 500	Died	41st. c. Feb. 1698	Farawin-i-Salatin, 109; MA 392; MU 11/494-96.
41st.. c. Feb. 1698	Qazi Abdullah	Turani	1500/?	-	Died	42nd. April 1698	MA 248, 392, 393.
42nd. April 1698	Inayat Ullah Khan (In addition to his post of the Diwan-i Tan; to officiate till regular appointment)	Indian	1000/ 100	-		42nd. c. Sept. 1698	MA 393; MU 11/828-32.
42nd.	Muhammad Amin Khan	Turani	2000/1000	3000/1000; 3500/1200; 4000/1500	Death of the Emperor	51st. 3 March 1707	MA 394,397,480-81,518; Dilkusha, 143b; KK 11/495-96; MU 111/346-5
	(In addition, made the governor of Bidar, to be performed by his Saif Khan as Naib).						

Conclusion

The central government under Aurangzeb remained almost the same what it was under his predecessors as regard to its main structure, character and spirit, but not in detail, actual working, vigour and efficiency.

Aurangzeb had proclaimed himself as the 'Reviver of the Faith' mainly to establish the credibility of his disputed accession and rule rather than to run the government according to the Shariat. Most of his religious measures were superficial and were meant to win over the agitated public. These measures did not alter either his own position and powers or the functioning of the government.

The creation of the post of the Qazi-al-quzat and of the Muhtasib-i-Mulkah was of course significant. The two dignitaries did not head any central department, and enjoyed no administrative powers. But they, and especially the Qazi-al-quzat considerably affected the position and the functions of the Sadr-us-sudur and exercised great influence over the Emperor. But even his solicited opinion was rejected when it did not conform to the wishes of the Emperor. Aurangzeb also remitted about eighty taxes considered to be illegal, and later also imposed the jizyah. These two steps were of considerable political, economic and administrative consequence. The remission of taxes, without actually relieving the burden from the tax-payers, deprived the state of huge income; while the imposition

of the *jizyah*, alienated the people from the government without adding a paisa to state revenues. Moreover, the two departments of the *Diwan-i Ala* and *Sadr-as sudur* that were associated with its collection and disbursement, could not maintain the effective control over the officials concerned, and the new impost proved a source of corruption in the departments and a cause of further resentment among the subjects.

The creation of the above posts and the imposition of *jizyah*, however, did not mean that the character and the spirit of the government was changed. Aurangzeb continued to have equal concern for the welfare and prosperity of all his subjects, irrespective of their religion. The *farmans* to Rasikdas and Muhammad Hashim are testimony to this. The entire government apparatus from the king and the *Wazir* to the petty *amalah-nigar* in a village or township was to see that the people were not subjected to hardship and oppression. The doors of the imperial court were always open for grieved parties and the complaints were promptly attended to and redressed. Even the most beloved princes were not spared if they neglected their duties towards the subjects. Nor were the benefits of the appointment of *muhtasibs*, the establishment of state hospitals, the remission of taxes and the liberalisation of *madad-i-maash* grants confined to one single group or community. Aurangzeb gave grants to the Hindu temples and pujaris, appointed Hindu physicians in hospitals maintained by the state and kept the doors of state-service - as *mansabdars* or wage-earners - open to all, to the Indians and foreigners, to the Iranis, Turanis and Europeans.

True that the government at the centre did not have the proper representation of various racial and religious groups, and was dominated almost completely by the Iranis many of whom were the Shias. Their dominance, however, does negative the belief that Aurangzeb had developed prejudice against the Shias. But it does not prove that Aurangzeb was anti-Hindu as the nominal representation of the Turanis in the central government does not establish that he was anti-Turanis. The appointments to the central post were made not on communal considerations, but because of the good reputation of the Iranis for office work and for ensuring the efficient working of the central government.

The functioning of each department of the central government was very elaborate and the duties of its official well defined. The procedure of work was based on checks and scrutiny at various levels and had been so intimately interwoven that no important matter - the collection and the disbursement of cash, the grant of _mansab_ and promotion, _jagir_ and _madad-i maash_ and the payment of wages - was left to one single department. The procedure was complicated and caused delay in completion of the work, but it minimised the chances of manipulation and misappropriation. Among the five central departments that of the _Diwan-i Ala_ and of the _Mir Bakhshi_ naturally occupied the pivotal position because the first dealt with the finances of the State and the other with the nobility and the army. The two departments were the mainstay of the government and the whole administrative machinery revolved round them. They affected as well as were being affected by the course of events in the

empire and were the pulse of the body of the Mughal government. The department of the Mir Bakhshi got further importance during the second half of Aurangzeb's reign because of the innumerable military expeditions and the enlistment of many mansabdars during the period for political and military considerations. The department of the Mir Atish too gained in strength and prominence for the same reasons. The Mir Saman and his department, on the other hand, lost some of its previous importance because the restless military campaigns, camp life of the Emperor and the economy measures ended the pomp and pageantry of Shah Jahan's reign, and with it the importance of the household department. Similarly, the Qazi-al-quzat took away some of the influence of the Sadr-us sudur, though not his powers.

Aurangzeb scrupulously maintained the internal as well as the inter-departmental equilibrium in the central government by carefully chosing the candidates for various posts, keeping in mind their worth and rank. It is significant to note that while some of the nobles did have a mansab equal to or higher than the Wazir, none of the central ministers held a rank equal to the Wazir at the time of his appointment. The fact that this difference was never broken in the long reign of fifty-one years, indicates that the Emperor was anxious to maintain the supremacy of the Wazir. In the later years of the reign indeed, the Wazir emerged as the most powerful official in the empire. The deep personal involvement of the Emperor in the Deccan warfare, his growing age, the suspicious attitude of princes during the siege of Golconda, Jinji and elsewhere left no alternative to the extra

cautious Emperor but to lean heavily on the Wazir, his maternal uncle, a near contemporary and a confident and dependable servant. And the Wazir, taking the full advantage of the circumstances, grew his power and influence steadily and acquired almost complete hold over the central government during the last decade of Aurangzeb's reign. He himself was Wazir, his son-in-law Tarbiyyat Khan became the Mir Atish in March 1696, and held the post till the death of the Emperor; his another son-in-law, Bahramand Khan became the Mir Bakhshi in July 1692. On his death in 1702, the post went to Zulfiqar Khan, the son of the Wazir himself. his still another son-in-law, Khudabanda Khan was the Mir Saman virtually since 1697. The group of Asad Khan at the close of Aurangzeb's reign, therefore, was not confined to Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan alone. There were four members of the group in the central government itself holding the charge of four most important departments, leaving only one - that of the Sadr-as sudur to the rival group of the Turanis. It would therefore not be incorrect to say that during the last decade of Aurangzeb's reign the Asad Khani oligarchy was ruling over India in the name of Aurangzeb.

This was not the only sad development of Aurangzeb's reign. The administration as a whole and its efficiency also suffered under him. When Aurangzeb had come to power, the central government had been dislocated because of the uncertainty and changes made by Dara Shikoh during the illness of Shah Jahan. Instead of reorganising it after his accession, Aurangzeb avoided to make key appointments. He was the first Mughal Emperor who did

not appoint a *Wakil*. The next important post of the *Wazir* was also kept in abeyance for the same reason. Not only that. Aurangzeb also did not appoint separate *Diwan-i Khalisa* and the *Diwan-i Tan* during the first three years of the reign. Raja Raghunath, a *mansabdar* of comparatively smaller rank was looking after the revenue ministry at a time when the financial burden on the state and the pressure of work on the *Diwani* had considerably increased because of the wars of succession, liberal grant of *mansab* and promotions and the abolition of taxes. This indeed happened only under Aurangzeb that during the first twenty years of the reign, the post of the *Wazir* or the *Diwan-i Ala* was filled only for about six years (January 1664 - May 1670); and for the rest of the period, even when the government was confronted with the Jat revolt, the Satnami uprising and the Afghan rebellion, this vital department was left to the care of subordinate and temporary officials. The situation seriously affected the functioning and efficiency of the revenue ministry itself and of other departments. It also hampered the growth and training of the nobles for shouldering the higher administrative responsibilities when called upon; and at times a single individual was made to serve on more than one posts. The effects of this policy were evident in the second decade of the reign of Aurangzeb itself.

Compelled by the brewing problems, Aurangzeb did at last appoint Asad Khan as the *Wazir* at the end of 1676; and the new *Wazir* immediately introduced some economy measures to end the imbalance in the income and the expenditure of the state. But his reforms were more than neutralised when

Aurangzeb launched his military campaigns in Rajputana and then in the Deccan. The prolonged warfare and continuous recruitment of *mansabdars* and the soldiers imposed heavy burden on strained state resources and on the two departments of the *Diwan-i Ala* and the *Mir Bakhshi*. It required the concentrated attention of the King and the ministers concerned to find out the solutions for new problems. But the entire government - the King, the *Wazir*, the *Bakhshis* and other officials - was plunged into the unending warfare, leaving the administration to the subordinate officials. Even the proper reorganisation of newly acquired territories in the Deccan where many *mansabdars* had been given the jagirs, was not attempted. The results were disastrous in many respects.

The restless military operations and the failure of the government to protect the peasantry from the depredations of the enemy, shattered the agriculture and the economy of the whole region. The state could not realise its revenue and the *jagirdar* his allowances. Unable to recover his due either from the state or from the *jagir*, the *mansabdar* maintained only a fraction of the stipulated number of troopers, and bribed the subordinate government officials to escape from state regulations. The result was that the resources of the state and the strength of the army dwindled, administration was neglected, state rules were flouted and the corruption and inefficiency became rampant.

The government during the last years of Aurangzeb's reign had ceased to serve its purpose of looking after the interest of the country

and the people. It had spent it out in wearisome and fruitless fort-capturing campaigns, and had lost its vigour, vitality and effectiveness. It was the strength of the structure that it could withstand the inclement weather during Aurangzeb's reign. But when Aurangzeb closed his eyes, he bequeathed it to his successors in a dilapidated condition.

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